**Evaluation of the Concern Worldwide Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda**

**Emergency Response and Recovery Programme**

***The track of typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda and priority areas for assistance (Source: OCHA)***

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# Executive Summary

Typhoon Haiyan, known locally as Yolanda, hit the Philippines on November 8th 2013. As the strongest typhoon ever to make landfall it left a path of destruction across the Visayas region affecting approximately 14 million people. Concern Worldwide initiated a response programme focusing on the provinces of Iloilo and Negros Occidental, providing emergency response and recovery support to approximately 24,387 households (approximately 121,935 people) through emergency distributions, livelihood support and disaster risk reduction activities.

This report details the findings of an evaluation of Concern’s Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda response, conducted 13 months after the typhoon made landfall. The purpose of the evaluation has been to establish the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the strategies deployed to respond to Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda affected populations and to look at the impact and sustainability of the response in terms of building increased community capacity to respond to and withstand future shocks. To do this, the evaluation has drawn together information from interviews with key informants (staff, government officials, local community stakeholders and members of the international humanitarian community), focus group discussions/group interviews with affected community members, observation of the programme achievements and review of relevant documentation.

The evaluation found that the response remained **highly relevant** to the needs of the affected populations throughout the duration of implementation. Very appropriate decisions were made from the start of the response, with a focus on the underserved but equally affected areas of Concepcion, Carles and Negros Occidental. Within these areas, the interventions targeted the poorest of those affected (predominantly island communities) and engaged in an extensive and effective process to validate the damage assessment reports completed by the local government. Programme components covered the highest priority needs of shelter and NFIs initially, before building on communities own significant resilience through appropriate and extensive livelihoods recovery and disaster risk reduction components. There was scope to include some additional programme components – provision of basic shelter construction materials and an increase the number of school classrooms constructed. However, a holistic suite of activities have aimed to restore people’s ability to provide for themselves, increase their capacity to cope with future disasters and reduce the impact of those disasters when they do strike. Flexibility, a combination of tested and innovative approaches, and holistic consideration of the connectedness of programme components established an environment where programme impact could be maximised.

The appropriate decisions taken, combined with the conducive environment found in the target locations – cooperative local government with good capacity, and engaged local community with a strong cultural volunteer spirit - established a firm base from which a very **effective** programme was implemented. Affected communities were informed and engaged in the decision-making and implementation process wherever possible, with an extensive complaints response mechanism in operation that successfully resolved questions and issues amongst the affected populations. Strong working relationships were formed with local government from the start, leading to mutually beneficial outcomes – the local government providing support to programme implementation and gaining increased technical and programme management capacity. The wider humanitarian community experienced ‘great collaboration’ with the Concern programme, which also engaged with many locally-based stakeholders to draw on expert guidance, support and implementation capacity. A quality approach was taken in all aspects of the programme, both in terms of materials and services, which many beneficiaries spoke highly of, and the design of programme components ensured equality across beneficiaries wherever possible.

The programme was quite **efficient** in its use of resources – people, money and materials. The first phase distributions to 11,000 households were completed within 8 weeks of the typhoon making landfall – a significant achievement given the logistics required to transport a large selection of items from multiple international locations, through several national hubs and then to numerous island sites. Some recovery components have experienced delays, requiring the programme to be extended beyond its initial 12 month timespan, and the distribution of cash to Negros Occidental took nearly a year to implement – the result of taking a remote management approach. The programme made use of Concern experienced Filipino nationals from the start of the programme, and sought to minimise expatriate staff and maximise community involvement to achieve a better programme outcome. Issues from the high turnover of Country Directors and the cultural adaptability of seconded/recruited Concern national staff from other country programmes have impacted the efficiency with which implementation occurred. However, the skilled and dedicated team has worked tirelessly to overcome such problems and implement the programme, which has played a significant part in achieving the extent of the results seen. Strong logistics in the first phase of the response gave way to difficulties during the recovery phase with some delays in procurement and issues with the type and quality of specialised items purchased – predominantly due to a disconnect between the programme and logistics teams that could have been avoided with additional logistics staff. The sufficient and flexible funding available to the response has been largely well used and, given the extent and quality of the outcomes, good value for money has been achieved. Time spent on unsuccessful consortium proposals may have been better spent on seeking additional funding for constructing/rehabilitating more school classrooms, or financing the provision of basic shelter materials.

It is not possible to fully measure the **impact** of the programme at this point in time, due to ongoing activities and the long-term nature of some programme components. However, the evaluation observed emerging impacts and was able to deduce a wide range of expected impacts. Importantly, the holistic, well thought-through programme has aimed for multiple benefits from even simple interventions, ensuring connectedness across the programme components, and striving to mitigate potential risks and negative implications. The build back safer intention is evident where feasible, and the activities have contributed to increasing people’s ability to provide for themselves, an increased capacity to cope in the face of future disasters, and a reduction in the impact experienced from those disasters. The needs addressed also represent a proportionate approach, in both the duration and scale of activities, seeking to ensure that the interventions do not undermine the evident resilience and ‘baya nihan’ spirit of those affected.

The programme has sought to build capacity and **sustainability** within all the activities, and has resisted the temptation to engage in the wider opportunities that appear so inviting. The focus on disaster risk reduction components – interventions that seek to reduce the impact of future disasters – have ensured that outcomes will last. The approach of engaging local stakeholders in all activities has built capacity that will enable interventions to be implemented more widely once the Concern programme closes. The programme has also influenced the way in which local government and international organisations operate, although this was not deliberately intentional. Opportunities existed to more deliberately speak out about the good practice approaches taken, demonstrating the outcomes, with a view to influencing how both the government and other organisations operate going forwards and following future disasters. In this way the programme had the potential to be even more sustainable.

Whilst the full impact of the programme has yet to be realised, what is evident is the strong reputation Concern has established amongst local stakeholders at all levels. Beneficiaries tearfully expressed their thanks, local government officials declared their appreciation for the ‘extra mile’ that Concern has gone to, and OCHA described the engagement as ‘realistic, humble and professional’. Many feel that Concern has shown genuine care for marginalised communities and this reputation can be used as an indicator of just how well Concern has implemented its Typhoon Haiyan response programme. It is a wonderful example of what a short-term response and recovery programme can achieve given the right approach, decision-making and operating conditions. This was an appropriately ambitious programme, with a strong focus on both meeting people’s immediate needs and building greater resilience to the multiple disasters faced by those targeted. A number of good practice lessons, as detailed in the report, can be applied to future response operations.

Many thanks go to the Concern Philippines team for their accommodating and flexible attitude, and to the municipal representatives of Concepcion and Carles, and the provincial representatives of Iloilo for the time they gave to this evaluation. It has been a privilege to witness the success of this programme.Context – Typhoon Haiyan

The strongest typhoon to ever make landfall hit the eastern Philippines on November 8th 2013. Over the course of 24 hours typhoon Haiyan, known locally as Yolanda, left a path of destruction across the Visayas region. Winds of 300km per hour, heavy rains and a 16ft tidal surge that hit coastal regions affected an estimated 14 million people (OCHA 10 Jan 2014) in 10,436 barangays[[1]](#footnote-1) (ADRA 2013) across the provinces of Leyte, Eastern and Western Samar, Cebu, Negros Occidental, Capiz, Iloilo, Aklan and Palawan. These areas are some of the poorest in the Philippines, where fishing or agriculture are often the only source of income for those in the rural areas.

4 million people were displaced by the typhoon, which caused extensive destruction of infrastructure (including power lines, communications and road networks), agriculture and fishing assets. Fisherfolk lost an average of 70% of their income (Humanitarian Country Team *MIRA II* Dec 2013) with 65% of the fishing communities in the affected areas losing their productive assets, including 28,000 mainly small-scale fishing boats (OCHA 7 Jan 2014). 33 million coconut trees, the primary source of agriculture, were also destroyed (FAO 2014). Over 1/2million homes were completely destroyed, and the same again partially damaged (IFC 2013). Multiple assessments identified urgent food, water and shelter needs, and the importance of restoring livelihoods to revitalise food security, as well as restoring essential community services such as water, education and social welfare (Humanitarian Country Team *Strategic Response Plan* Dec 2013).

The principle town of Tacloban, in Leyte, Eastern Visayas, was one of the most severely affected locations and in the weeks following the disaster this was the focus of much of the western media’s attention, as well as the humanitarian response. However, many communities in the Western Visayas were as badly hit (Humanitarian Country Team *MIRA II* Dec 2013), 42% of which were located in the Province of Iloilo (ADRA 2013). The worst affected areas were the island communities of the poorer, fishing-dependent municipalities on the north-eastern coastline, including Concepcion[[2]](#footnote-2) and Carles. In some of these locations 97% of people experienced damaged or destroyed homes (made primarily of bamboo and thatch) and loss of fishing assets (less than 10% of boats remained). Infrastructure such as schools, health centres and water systems were also severely damaged or destroyed. Assessments identified shelter, NFIs and restoration of livelihoods as the most prioritised needs.

The Visayas is one of the major fishing grounds in the Philippines, and fish-stocks have suffered from illegal fishing practices and increased population pressure for many years. The loss of fishing assets represented a major obstacle to household recovery following the typhoon, which already experienced poverty rates in the 40-60% bracket (the second highest poverty indicators in the region) (Humanitarian Country Team *MIRA I* Nov 2013) with an estimated 80% of families receiving government welfare assistance. The marine eco-system (corals, mangroves), upon which 90% of the population rely, was heavily affected, which is expected to have a significant negative impact on the already declining fish stocks over the coming years.

The Philippines is made up of 7,000 islands and has a total estimated population of 98.9 million people. The country, situated in the Pacific ‘ring of fire’ and the typhoon belt, is ranked globally as the third most at risk of disasters (Beck and Shepard 2012) with 74% vulnerable to hazards of typhoons, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, floods, droughts, landslides and mudslides (Featherstone 2014). Typhoon season occurs between June and December, with approximately 6-9 making landfall each year, and up to 900 earthquakes are experienced annually (Urgence Réhabilitation Développment 2013). Coupled with social and environmental issues, including rapid urbanization and decreasing fish stocks, the disaster risk levels posed by these hazards is extreme (Featherstone 2014).

# Concern’s Response Programme

Concern began assessing the impact of typhoon Haiyan on the 14th November 2013, having previously never been operational in the Philippines. Through coordination with OCHA and contact first with the Provincial Governor of Negros Occidental, and then the Provincial Governor of Iloilo, aerial and participatory assessments were conducted that led to Concern focusing its response operations on the municipality of Concepcion, Iloilo Province. Additional interventions in Carles and Ajuy municipalities, Ilolilo Province, and in Negros Occidental were also implemented.

On the basis of the needs assessment, Concern developed a twelve month emergency response and recovery programme which was jointly funded by DEC (with a grant of £1,483,739) with a similar level of additional funds provided by Concern through its fundraising activities in Ireland, the UK and the U.S. The overall goal of the initial response was to ensure that those affected by the typhoon received necessary materials, cash and/or services to live with dignity in a safe and healthy environment, focusing on adequate shelter, access to basic NFIs and restoration of fishing-related livelihoods to approximately 11,000 households in Iloilo, and 11,500 households in Negros Occidental (over 106,000 beneficiaries).

Following the response phase, the programme developed into early recovery activities, aiming to assist over 24,000 households around two areas - the Fisheries Livelihoods Recovery Programme (FLRP) to contribute to the rehabilitation of the primary livelihoods of Haiyan affected populations, and the Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Programme (CBDRRM) aimed at reducing the risk faced by those who are highly vulnerable to natural disasters. The components of the whole response programme are detailed in the table below (and full details can be found in Annex C).

| **Activity** | **Location** | **Direct Beneficiaries** | **Description** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Emergency (Phase 1) Activities | | | |
| NFI Distribution | Carles, Concepcion | 11,004 households  (48,831 people) | Emergency shelter materials, essential household items and basic hygiene items (15 items per kit) |
| Boat rehabilitation | Ajuy, Carles, Concepcion | 3,526 households (16,280 people) | New (small motorised and non-motorised) boats to replace those totally destroyed; repair kits for those partially damaged; cash grants for those who had fixed their own boats; fishing equipment |
| Cash Distributions | Negros Occidental | 11,569 households  (57,845 people) | For emergency shelter support, to compliment government grants. 2,000 Peso (€33) to each household |
| Fisheries Livelihoods Recovery Programme (FLRP) | | | |
| Aquaculture | Concepcion | 99 households  (495 people) | Training & seedlings supplied to individuals &/or barangay groups to replace previous farms. 18 seaweed farms, 46 oyster farms, 90 mussel farms |
| Coral Rehabilitation | Concepcion | (Indirect 15,210) | Replant 10,000 coral fragments on 600 purpose-made concrete jackstones placed on sea bed in marine protected areas (MPAs) |
| Coconuts | Concepcion | 550 households (2,750 people) | 279,177 coconut trees treated for Brontispa infestation and Rhinocerous beetle |
| Reforestation | Concepcion | (Indirect) 1,920 people | 17,500 indigenous trees replanted over 50 hectares of water catchment area |
| Mangroves | Concepcion | 30 people trained  (Indirect 15,210) | Training, development of mangrove rehabilitation plan, sourcing and planting of 50,000 mangrove seedlings and construction of bamboo & stone breakwaters. In partnership with Zoological Society London. |
| Awareness Raising | Concepcion | 6,772 people | Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) training and planning; Coastal Cleanup; Guard houses (for MPAs); Fishing Ordinance translated to local language & 1000 copies for distribution |
| LGU Support | Ajuy, Carles,  Concepcion |  | Patrol boats x 3; School boats x 2; Fish catchment monitoring |
| Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Programme (CBDRRM) | | | |
| Water Supply Systems | Concepcion | 1610 households (9,391 people) | Bladders and ‘trucking’; rehab of community building roofs for rainwater harvesting system; spring catchment systems rehabilitated and extended including underwater pipes |
| Infrastructure/ Schools | Concepcion | 1,393 pupils | Rehabilitation of 25 school classrooms and construction of 13 new classrooms; Replacement of public structure roofs |
| Disaster Risk Reduction | Concepcion | 34,392 people | Training and contingency planning to create barangay disaster management plans. Provision of disaster management equipment |
| Concourse construction | Negros Occidental | 723 HHs (3,615 people) | 1.2km of walkway and 4 footbridges |

# Evaluation Methodology

This evaluation covers the response and recovery phases of the Concern Philippines Haiyan Programme as carried out between November 2013 and December 2014. The evaluation seeks to establish, in an evidenced-based manner, the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the strategies deployed to respond to Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda affected populations and to look at the impact and sustainability of the response in terms of building increased community capacity to respond to and withstand future shocks. It also seeks to identify lessons that might be appropriate to future Concern response programmes[[3]](#footnote-3).

The evidence on which this report is based comprises a combination of data sources aimed at gathering as wide an understanding of the programme as possible, undertaken through both a desk-based review and physical visit to the programme locations[[4]](#footnote-4). The data sources, which are predominantly qualitative, are:

* Relevant programme and external documents
* Post-distribution monitoring data
* Key staff questionnaires regarding the programme
* Focus group discussions/group interviews with affected communities (11 focus groups)
* Key informant interviews with barangay level stakeholders, municipal and provincial government representatives – Water Users Committees, barangay officials (14 interviews)
* Key informant interviews with NGO and UN representatives (5 interviews)
* In depth discussions with Concern staff members (15 interviews)
* Observation of programme activities

The programme had already undertaken a substantial amount of post-distribution monitoring amongst beneficiaries, as well as conducted an internal questionnaire with key response personnel and an HQ ‘wash-up’ review. Therefore the visit to the programme locations concentrated on observations, and discussions with in-country stakeholders - focus group discussions with affected communities, key informant interviews with wider stakeholders and in-depth discussions with staff members. Some limitations were experienced in terms of data gathering:

* the amount of travel time required between programme locations and the necessity of travel curfews limited the time available at each programme location
* the wide spread of programme locations meant that it was not possible to visit either Ajuy municipality or Negros Occidental Province. It was judged that the understanding gathered from other locations would be sufficient to account for these locations also
* Typhoon Ruby began approaching the Visayas region early in the evaluation visit. This meant that some beneficiaries, government representatives and UN staff were unavailable due to undertaking essential preparations. The evaluator left Concepcion early as a result of the typhoon[[5]](#footnote-5)

A purposive sampling strategy was used, identifying those expected to be able to provide the most useful data for the evaluation. However, more extensive sampling was also undertaken to ensure that the results were verified amongst the wider stakeholders to the programme. A full list of people met/interviewed during the evaluation can be found in Annex B. The issues covered were drawn from the original evaluation questions and broadly focused around the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of the programme, as well as what people would have done differently.

Analysis took into account the bias that may exist amongst certain groups of people, as well as the need to ‘weight’ evidence according to how valid an individuals’ viewpoint might be[[6]](#footnote-6). The data was also analysed through a triangulation approach, ensuring that findings are compared and cross-checked between a variety of sources to ensure reliability and validity. Ultimately there was relatively minimal conflict between the evidence gathered. Where conflicts arose the evaluator considered the differing agendas and experience of the source in light of her own humanitarian experience, before drawing conclusions.

# Evaluation Findings

## The Relevance of the Intervention: Were appropriate choices made?

*Location*

Negros Occidental and Iloilo Provinces, and the municipalities of Concepcion and Carles in Iloilo in particular, were not the most heavily devastated by Typhoon Yolanda in terms of numbers affected (OCHA 7 Jan 2014) but a significant proportion of inhabitants experienced similar levels of impact in terms of destruction of livelihoods assets, houses and household goods (Humanitarian Country Team *MIRA II* Dec 2013) particularly those living in the islands and coastal areas. In addition, Concepcion and Carles are ranked as several of the poorest municipalities within the path of the typhoon with an estimated 80% of people being permanent recipients of social welfare. Furthermore island communities, who are almost entirely dependent on fishing for their livelihood, are recognised by the local government as the most vulnerable in the area due to their limited opportunities and limited access to many basic goods and services.

Concern staff, local government officials and OCHA representatives agree unanimously that Concern’s choice of areas in which to focus the response was extremely appropriate in terms of the needs of the people and the lack of other assistance opportunities. Furthermore, by focusing on these locations Concern has managed to align the response with its core organisational principles of working with the poorest communities, despite responding to a disaster in a country outside their normal long-term operating contexts. The early and deliberate decision to focus on an underserved location facilitated rapid identification of the area and target communities in which Concern was to work and therefore enabled response activities to get underway more quickly than they might have done in the heavily response-congested areas such as Tacloban (Crowley 2014), or, more locally, Estancia. The areas selected were also highly enabling in terms of the capacity and engagement of local government, and the cooperation and ‘baya nihan’ (volunteer spirit) of the affected communities, contributing to greater effectiveness of the programme.

*Beneficiary Selection*

The beneficiary selection process made use of the existing government damage assessment reports (done at barangay level) followed by an intensive, validation process based on well-justified programme criteria and involving house to house visits, site visits, discussions with neighbours and community meetings. The majority of programme components targeted whole communities, and this was determined by relative damage levels – island and coastal barangays being the most affected – or gaps in coverage, such as in Carles and Ajuy. For boat and cash distributions individuals who had previously owned small boats were targeted.

The criteria were communicated through the validation process, through subsequent community meetings and in response to complaints/questions to ensure understanding across affected communities. During distributions the Local Government Unit (LGU) and barangay officials provided additional verification, and were asked to identify those who were more vulnerable (e.g. elderly, disabled) so they could be targeted for assistance first, particularly when stocks (e.g. of non-food items - NFIs) were not sufficient to cover all households.

There were only very limited reports of people being missed by the validation process or people receiving assistance despite not fulfilling the criteria. Community members and LGU officials both reported that they appreciated the in-depth validation process and that assistance was given on the basis of need, and not because of political, religious or family affiliations (as is common in the Philippines).

The validation process was reported as a very challenging and time-intensive by staff (the validation period for boat recipients in Carles took 2 months). However, they agree the effort and time was well spent. The process built on culturally understood approaches to beneficiary targeting, but ensured greater equality in selection criteria, and so reduced the possibility of dissatisfaction amongst community members. The validation process was also thorough, utilising the connectedness of small communities to identify those who did not require assistance, thereby ensuring as participative and transparent a process as possible.

*Programme Components*

Affected populations met through this evaluation consistently expressed the priority of their needs in the wake of Yolanda to be livelihoods (so they could access food and water) and education for their children (who are unable to learn if they are hungry). Shelter was identified as a third, but lower priority - several community groups stated they do not mind their houses have remained unrepaired since the typhoon as they have been able to restore their livelihoods and ensure their kids can go to school. Education is overwhelmingly the priority for many – those in island communities especially see this as the only option to ensuring family success.

***School is important as this is viewed as the only way to get out of poverty – ‘the children are our only wealth’ (Mother, Manlot, Carles)***

Building on communities own resilience, programme components have addressed immediate needs of the affected populations (shelter, household and WASH NFIs, boat and cash grant distributions) enabling families to keep their children in school, and reflecting the priorities identified in the UN strategic plan (Humanitarian Country Team Dec 2013) and the primary challenges highlighted by the DEC review (Crowley 2014). Recovery components have focused on resilience to future hazards - both large-scale natural hazards such as typhoons and earthquakes, as well as the chronic ‘disaster’ of over-fished seas and ongoing poverty - through livelihood restoration and disaster risk reduction activities (water provision, school infrastructure and projects to increase communities resilience to future disasters). These aim to build assets that enable people to better cope in the event of future disasters (school classrooms strong enough to act as evacuation shelters, disaster preparedness planning, capacity to treat coconut tree infestations, access to clean water following storms) or to mitigate the impact of those disasters (mangrove planting and breakwaters, coral rehabilitation to promote increased fish-stocks, reforestation to protect the watershed and reduce floods from run-off). This reflects the priorities and approaches laid out in the Government’s Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda (National Economic and Development Authority 2013), and the Humanitarian Community’s Early Recovery and Livelihood Plan (Humanitarian Country Team Feb 2014). The emphasis placed on resilience building follows the UN recommendation that all interventions should be undertaken with a view to enhancing resilience (Humanitarian Country Team Dec 2013), and the national policy on disaster risk reduction and resilience, which calls for an integrated approach to social and human development that local government units (LGUs) do not have the financial or technical capacity to achieve [[7]](#footnote-7). The Mayor of Concepcion reported that Concern made a near accurate assessment of the needs of those affected by Typhoon Yolanda, a sentiment echoed by the Provincial Administrator and OCHA.

The programme has not been shy in exploring innovative options for dealing with the needs and problems presented. The innovative techniques, such as for dealing with the coconut infestation, have sat alongside trusted programme components, and they appear to have been carefully thought-through in terms of the possible risks and implications. It has not been possible to identify whether these innovative approaches have paid off yet, as the timeframe of the programme has been too short to see any real impact to date.

A couple of notable opportunities existed for Concern to expand the programme components undertaken. A greater number of schools requiring new/rehabilitated classrooms were identified in Concepcion municipality, but funds were not available to cover every location. Also, whilst Concern engaged very appropriately in emergency shelter through the initial NFI kit distribution, a strategic decision was made not to engage in the construction of transitional or permanent shelter – a notoriously complex activity[[8]](#footnote-8). Given Concern’s clear decision to limit the duration of the programme in the Philippines, the fact that 17 other organisations were engaged in shelter in Iloilo province as of June 2014 (Shelter Cluster 2014), and that the affected communities rank shelter as a lower priority than the issues addressed, this decision is a very appropriate one. However, it was observed that, a year on from the typhoon, many people were still using the plastic sheet distributed by Concern in the first NFI kits. Observed repairs are makeshift, using miscellaneous items, and most community members requested assistance with shelter as their remaining priority. Most households will never be in a position to receive or build a structurally resilient house – the most they can hope for is to ensure suitable protection from everyday weather, and expect to undertake repairs/rebuilding in the wake of a significant storm. The Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) has agreed with response organisations that basic material support (timber, CGI sheets) for households in potential no-build zones is acceptable (Alliance 2015 2013). Given the relationship Concern has established amongst the communities of Concepcion in particular, the fact that few other organisations are targeting Concepcion specifically for shelter, and the ease with which previous distributions have occurred, there was scope for providing basic shelter materials to enable households to strengthen their ‘temporary’ shelters.

*Approach*

Multiple factors have been considered in the approach taken to implementing the programme, all contributing to a well thought-through, effective programme. Each component has, at a minimum, worked to a ‘do no harm’ principle (such as only distributing boats to non-commercial fisherfolk so as not to further exacerbate the dwindling fish-stocks in the area), but has also carefully considered the connectedness between various components (resilient school classrooms that also act as evacuation shelters, using multiple approaches to reinforce the same message). Most components offer multiple benefits to affected populations, both now and for longer-term resilience[[9]](#footnote-9) and the programme has also demonstrated that impact can be maximised and risk and negative consequences minimised through an appropriate approach - choosing to build boats for distribution rather than providing materials and cash grants ensured boat assets were restored, whereas other agencies received complaints that there were not enough carpenters available and the money received was not sufficient for the job required. An emphasis on quality has also been evident across all programme components.

Also, where possible, each component of the programme sought to use local labour to implement the programme to provide further cash injections to affected populations. This was done on a fair selection or rotating basis where possible, to ensure equality in impact. In taking this approach the programme ensured the cash-for-work approach was meaningful, highlighted as necessary by the DEC report (Crowley 2014).

A flexible approach has also been taken, with the NFI distributions responding to emerging gaps in Carles and the beneficiary lists for the boat distributions changing constantly due to non-coordinated coverage by other small organisations. A cash grant option was also added to the boat distribution component when the validation process revealed that many people had gone into debt to proactively fix their own boats. For recovery activities decisions were made early on to focus on livelihoods and disaster risk reduction components, but the flexible approach has allowed the programme to make the most of opportunities as they arose, such as engagement with locally based resources like the Zoological Society of London, or to extend/alter a programme component based on monitoring data or new information. The coastal clean-up component added two additional events following demand from neighbouring barangays, and the 100,000 seedlings initially planned for the mangrove replanting was reduced once the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) plans to do the same became apparent.

In some cases the approach taken has incurred higher costs (professional design of school buildings), or greater implementation times (to source specific pipeline seabed anchors for storm protection), but has achieved greater quality as a result. The flexibility of the funding obtained for the response and the ability of staff to support other programme components made it possible to take a flexible approach and, in so doing, resulted in a more appropriate response, remaining relevant to the changing needs and pace of recovery (Crowley 2014). Overall, the holistic approach has been not only appropriate, but has set the right conditions for a very effective programme.

The remote implementation of the components undertaken in Negros Occidental, despite this constituting a significant proportion of the overall budget (approaching 10%) was somewhat surprising compared to the very community engaged approach taken in Concepcion. The programme team judged the Provincial and Local government had the necessary capacity to undertake relatively straightforward cash distributions and construction (following detailed involvement in planning and designs by Concern). Post distribution monitoring of the cash distributions shows they were carried out effectively (96% felt the process was satisfactory), and the causeway is yet to be constructed. However, these components did not achieve the same level of impact as those in the Concepcion area (see section on ‘Impact of the Intervention’) suggesting this was not the most effective implementation approach, and further reinforcing the appropriateness of the approach taken in Concepcion.

## The Effectiveness of the Intervention: Was it done well?

Overall, several factors have combined to provide a good foundation for an effective programme: the appropriate choices made around location, beneficiaries and programme components; the holistic implementation approach adopted; and the good fortune of a conducive environment. As a middle-income, relatively stable country, the Philippines exhibits many traits that are more enabling of response operations than most of the countries Concern works in. In the areas of Concerns response programme in particular, the government is relatively open and cooperative, with significant capacity, albeit bogged down in the bureaucracy of a semi-decentralised system; materials and goods of a reasonable quality are generally easily accessible, and there is a relatively high capacity of knowledge, skills and initiative amongst the population, coupled with a cultural volunteer spirit. Internal operations, external engagement and achievement of standards have been built on this base. As a result, the intended programme outcomes, as laid out in donor proposals and programme documents, have certainly been achieved (or are nearing completion), with over 114,375 people being directly reached with the programme at the time of the evaluation.

### Engagement with Stakeholders

*Beneficiaries*

Ways have been sought at every point to include affected populations in the decision-making and implementation process, empowering them to take ownership of their own recovery. Also, by building on the cultural use of barangay assemblies, and ensuring information about programme intentions is transmitted in multiple ways, the programme has sought transparency in its engagement with beneficiaries. In the early response stages input was sought from community members of the most appropriate items for the NFI kits and the validation approach engaged households, neighbours, barangay officials and whole communities in determining who was to receive new boats, equipment, materials or cash. The new prototype design for the boats distributed in Carles was shared with fisher folk to obtain input and approval, whilst head teachers and barangay officials were consulted over the design plans for classroom construction and rehabilitation. Water User Committees (WUCs) have been established for each water system, democratically electing leadership positions and registering as an independent entity, to ensure decisions and agreements about pipe routing, access, payments and maintenance are made locally. A few small coordination issues have arisen around the water systems, which often prove to be contentious components – in one location the barangay officials felt they had been excluded from the decision-making process.

Beneficiaries have also reported significant levels of engagement in the implementation process: volunteers used during NFI distributions, beneficiaries constructing the outrigger and painting their own boat, communities providing labour (paid, but on a rotating basis to ensure equality of income across the community) for the water system construction, mangrove planting and reforestation work. The impact of this approach was seen in the response to the coastal clean-up events – entire communities, some of which had previously been unresponsive to local clean-up campaigns, turned up to participate, with each community striving to make their event better than the ones that had gone before. The majority of staff, some who come from beneficiary communities themselves, also feel there was a significant level of engagement, which addresses issues identified from previous Philippines typhoon responses such as Ketsana and Bopha (ACAPS 2014). However, some staff feel more could have been done to truly engage affected populations.

*Local Government*

At the local government level a strong working relationship was established from the start, and has continued throughout the programme. Information collected by the LGU, such as damage assessments, and advice/proposals from technical specialists have been used to inform the programme design. Programme components and implementation details have been proposed by both Concern and the relevant LGU, and all have been discussed and agreed through consultations between the two parties prior to implementation, and in the case of any alterations. Wherever possible the LGU has also been engaged in the implementation, either through the advice of internal specialists, or the provision of volunteers/staff. For all programme components official agreements have been made between parties wherever possible, including beneficiaries, water user committees, fisher folk associations and LGU departments. Only the disaster preparedness activities showed less optimal engagement as the limited time meant the LGU was not as heavily involved in the barangay level contingency planning as it could have been.

The programme established its approach to consultation and coordination well from the start, unlike many NGOs engaged in the response, and, despite a variety of staff changes throughout the programme, continued in the same way. Concern has been praised by both government officials for their commitment and contribution to coordination. All government staff, both local and provincial, spoke of their appreciation of the level of coordination and ease with which they could work with Concern staff (one respondent giving a 9.9/10 approval rating, another describing it as ‘wonderful’). The right balance of formality and flexibility appears to have been found, and officials often commented on the frustration of dealing with many other organisations which didn’t seem to understand the importance of coordination. The LGU has provided some invaluable assistance to the programme as a result - the Mayor of Concepcion has resolved issues of overlap when other organisations have attempted to duplicate Concern’s efforts, assisted in water system mediation efforts in Polopina, and provincial trucking resources were directed to Concern for transport of NFIs and other items as the programme progressed.

*Humanitarian Community*

Coordination with the humanitarian community was less straightforward than with local authorities, due to the geographical barriers presented by the location of coordination hubs. In the first month of the response a dedicated liaison person engaged with the coordination system at the Manila level, although this was reported to be of limited use beyond an understanding of gaps in location and sector. Engagement with the logistics cluster in the early phase of the response resulted in minimal transport costs for the international NFI supplies. Following settlement in Concepcion, a coordination focal point was assigned to liaise with the coordination hub in Roxas (2-3hrs from Concepcion), which continued until July 2014. This engagement yielded more benefit – the ability to raise and engage in issues, understanding other agency plans, and make clear Concern’s area/sectors of operation. It also provided a forum to share the approach taken to some activities and advocate for more appropriate actions amongst the humanitarian community, such as ensuring boat registration amongst beneficiaries and coordination with the local government.

Several OCHA representatives mentioned the ‘great collaboration’ they had experienced, and felt that Concern extended its full cooperation to the humanitarian system, often being the first to contribute and giving a very real picture of what was happening in the response. Due to the lack of other agencies present in Concern’s main area of operation, Concern appears to have given more to the coordination system than it benefitted. However, the level of engagement opened up a platform to influence the way in which other organisations were operating, and so, although unquantified, likely had a lasting influence in terms of the quality of the humanitarian response as a whole (see section on ‘Sustainability of the Intervention’)

*Other Partners*

There have been questions raised by some about the lack of engagement of local partners in the response. The *Missed Again* Report (*Missed Again* 2014) highlights a limited presence of local organisations in the areas hit by the typhoon and any local organisations identified have had a very different approach or profile to the work Concern has been undertaking. Given the short time-frame of the response programme and the purpose of working with local partner organisations, it would not have added value to seek out partners from further afield. It is recognised that, as a middle-income country, the Philippines has significant capacity in government and civil-society (*Missed Again* 2014). In many ways the LGUs of Concern’s intervention areas have acted as a partner, and have received substantial capacity building as a result of the interventions, which should ensure the continuity of various aspects of the work.

However, associations with locally-based organisations have been adopted where appropriate, to provide expert guidance, support or implementation capacity. This includes the Zoological Society of London, met through a workshop, which advised and trained local community members and LGU staff on mangrove replanting; the Universities of San Carlos and Visayas which provided technical advice in the regeneration of coral reefs; the Central University of the Philippines which has undertaken a structural mapping survey of houses and possible evacuation centres as part of the disaster preparedness programme components.

### Cross Cutting Issues

*Quality*

A preference for quality of both materials and services has been displayed across the programme. High quality materials for the water systems have been sourced, using international suppliers where necessary (e.g. water pumps, anchor points for underwater pipes); the raw materials for school classroom construction, including the water for making concrete, have been sourced on the mainland and are checked for quality before being shipped to the island locations; construction quality is checked at each stage of the build process (such as testing the strength of the concrete); the construction process is supervised by qualified Concern staff at every stage. Had time and money allowed the staff would have preferred to build all classrooms from new rather than rehabilitating some, to guarantee the whole structure in the event of future hazards. In lieu of this, non-destructive testing has been carried out to determine a suitable measure of robustness before selecting structures for rehabilitation.

The majority of beneficiaries spoke highly of the good quality of the boats they received, and staff also reported that many other people visited the Concern office to request a boat from Concern specifically due to the quality. Beneficiaries also consistently commented on the high quality of the NFIs distributed, and, of those observed, the majority were still in good condition. Those involved in the disaster preparedness activities commented that items distributed by other sources are generally ‘disposable’, but the items from Concern (rain jackets, radios, first aid kits etc.) are good quality. Overall, the Provincial Administrator declared he could see the quality in Concern’s work, in both the materials and the workmanship.

*Equality*

Equality issues have been largely addressed through the type of component and the targeting approach of each element of the programme. From a gender perspective there already exists a greater level of equality between men and women in the Philippines than in the contexts in which Concern is used to working (World Economic Forum 2014), as witnessed during the evaluation. No specific equality issues came to light during the evaluation process.

Many potential issues were mitigated through the targeting of programme components: NFIs were distributed to every household in the selected barangays; boats/cash grants were distributed to those who previously owned boats (including elderly, disabled and women); water systems, classroom construction, disaster preparedness, awareness raising, MPA protection, and coral rehabilitation components were targeted at whole communities or through existing groups (such as Fisher Folk Associations). Other mitigating actions included the deliberate selection of vulnerable people/households to receive NFI items first during distributions, the process of elections to select key representatives for the Water User Committees, the process of selecting community labourers on a rotating household basis for work on programme components to ensure equal distribution of income across households[[10]](#footnote-10).

The anticipated impact of some of the programme components will also go some way towards reducing existing inequality issues. For instance, the water systems are regarded as ‘gender friendly’ by the Provincial Administrator – they will reduce the burden of work on women and children in travelling to collect water, so allowing them greater opportunity to go to school or pursue other activities.

*Accountability*

Accountability was factored into the programme from the outset. A simple complaints response mechanism (CRM) was established to inform communities of what to expect and instruct them in how to voice any questions or dissatisfaction. Communities were kept informed of programme plans and entitlements through multiple channels (such as leaflets, banners, and community meetings) as more programme components were established, and beneficiary participation in design and implementation, as discussed elsewhere, was strong. Most ‘complaints’ received simply required further explanation of programme plans or criteria, or a revalidation of beneficiary inclusion, and all issues were resolved with minimal problems. Other community-based issues that arose through the programme were dealt with by local staff members primarily, and, if necessary, then involved the LGU and the Mayor.

The majority of beneficiaries spoken to were aware of the CRM and the Mayor of Concepcion commented on his surprise at the CRM, stating he did not see other organisations implementing anything similar. Despite the extensive mechanism, there was not a significant number of complaints received. This may be partly due to the fact it is not cultural to complain much in the Philippines. However, given the evidence seen of the programme, it is believed that beneficiaries genuinely had very little to complain about.

Concerns Programme Participant Protection Policy (P4) was less well understood amongst staff. Whilst all those interviewed knew of the P4, there were varying perceptions of its purpose – several thinking it existed to protect the reputation of Concern, and one thought that it focused on ensuring donor money went to the intended beneficiaries. However, most were aware of some the key ‘rules’ around interacting with beneficiaries. The lack of detailed understanding possibly reflected the cultural interpretation of the P4 purpose. However, individual staff members, who themselves belonged to beneficiary communities, distanced themselves from activities within those communities so as not to create any perception of bias

## The Efficiency of the Intervention: Were resources used well?

*Timeliness*

The typhoon made landfall on the 9th November 2013; one locally-based staff member began work on the 12th November, and the field assessment began on the 14th November; the main programme location had been decided by the 17th November. Distributions began 2.5 weeks later and by 31st December 2013, 7.5 weeks after the typhoon, over 11,000HHs in 24 different locations had received NFI kits.

There is some conflicting opinion over whether activities in the response phase happened quickly enough. Locally government officials praised timely distributions, and several staff believe distributions occurred much quicker than they would have done in Tacloban or other congested response areas. The assessment phase occurred quickly as a result of good local links and appropriate location targeting. The ‘logistics nightmare’ of procuring and transporting goods from multiple locations internationally (to ensure the required quality of goods), as well as the geographically complex national-level transport routing reliant on pooled and in-kind transport, was responsible for the delay in distribution. There will always be a trade-off between cost and timeliness, but in this instance, with the local transport resources available, and sufficient logistics capacity placed in strategic locations by Concern, the delays were minimised without excessive cost.

Other programme components have experienced varying degrees of timeliness. Overall the programme has been extended beyond its initial 12 month period by 4 months in order to complete planned activities. Delays in procurement, lack of some key staff at crucial points, external constraints such as weather and sea conditions, and the drive for a quality approach, particularly in construction activities, have contributed to this. There is also a trade-off in timeliness that occurs as a result of working with a smaller team and greater local involvement, but, as discussed elsewhere, this approach has brought many other benefits.

The main timeliness issue has been in the agreement and implementation of activities in Negros Occidental. Cash distributions intended for emergency shelter support did not occur until October, nearly a year after the typhoon. The post-distribution monitoring showed that 59% of recipients did spend some of the money on shelter, but many also split it for purchases related to food and education. Staff feel a quicker distribution and therefore greater impact would have been achieved by replicating the model of Concepcion and implementing a direct distribution, rather than it being done entirely remotely through the LGU.

*People - Staffing and Management*

Largely the team responsible for this programme has worked very well – dedication and a great team spirit were evident, with staff supporting each other wherever possible. By reaching out to previous Filipino Concern staff as soon as the disaster occurred a level of immediately available capacity and knowledge was available to the programme that enabled it to get up and running in a shorter time-frame than otherwise would have been possible. This approach has been highlighted both internally and externally as very valuable, as has the approach of limiting the numbers of expatriate staff and making use of secondments from across the organisation. Given the existing capacity and the enabling environment found in the Philippines, this was a very appropriate, and efficient, approach to take.

These characteristics have played a significant part in achieving the extent of the results seen, as has the very supportive nature of all management staff. However, various problems have been highlighted that may have more greatly impacted the programme had it not been for the dedication and team-spirit observed. These are issues that are therefore worth exploring to learn from.

The ‘baya nihan’ spirit of volunteerism amongst the local communities, and the widely enabling environment, meant that staffing levels did not need to be as high as they might have been. However, many staff have commented on the structure being ‘top-heavy’ and with not enough junior positions to distribute tasks to, resulting in senior staff undertaking cash counts or running around town purchasing food for a community training well into the recovery phase of the work. There also remained some key positions still unfilled at the time of this evaluation, resulting in an almost unmanageable workload for some staff still in the midst of programme implementation which will possibly impact on the quality of the work being finalised. Problems with finding suitable national staff were highlighted as the reason for the staffing gaps, and a lack of planning and/or dedicated HR capacity during the recovery phase may have contributed to this.

The high turnover of the Country Director (CD) position was also highlighted as an impediment to the efficient running of the programme, with one CD in post for 3 months and the following two CDs staying in position no more than 2 months. This meant that staff had to adjust to new ways of working, and some decisions took a long time to be made, with each CD requiring time to get up to speed with the programme, identify the issues *and* have sufficient time to see through any change required. Greater efficiency could have been achieved with a lower CD turnover - the renegotiation of the office, accommodation and transport terms and conditions remained at their initial emergency cost until after the fourth CD was in place, despite being identified as a problem much earlier.

The appropriateness of national staff seconded or recruited from other Concern programmes has been questioned, particularly in relation to their ability to adapt to the local cultural ways of operating. Whilst national staff may be very effective in their own context, and the principle of looking to utilise and build the capacity of national staff is a valid one with many benefits, it is just as important to establish their ability to adapt to other cultures and contexts as with any expatriate recruit. The approach and attitude of some staff has both reduced the effectiveness of the overall response around key functions (logistics and finance), and potentially risked the hard-earned reputation of Concern and its operations.

Other issues raised included a lack of consistent consultation amongst staff, particularly at senior level, around programme and organisational development, although many local staff felt very involved and engaged in the programme development. A safety and security management plan was not completed until August 2014 –the location experiences minimal security issues, but there are notable safety issues (road and boat transport), for which basic procedures could have been specified from early in the response. Several senior staff members also raised issues around wellbeing factors – working weeks remaining long until well into the recovery phase (7 days/week until February, and effectively 6 days/week until August) and non-local staff living in the hotel where the office is based until team houses were identified in August, despite a decision to source team houses in May. Whilst there was little long-term negative impact detected as a result of these issues, and context and work plans will always necessitate flexibility around actions to ensure staff wellbeing, a deliberate and considered approach should be taken in future responses to minimise possible issues.

*Materials - Logistics*

High praise was given to the logistics staff operating during the initial response phase of the programme, with sufficient staff located at key procurement/transit points to acquire and negotiate the passage of significant stocks of local and international supplies despite substantial geographical challenges. The main factor that slowed transport times, and thus caused delays to the initial distributions, was the inability to fly international goods directly to Iloilo airport. Instead, the logistics air-bridge through Cebu was used, before onward logs cluster flights to Roxas and local transport to Concepcion. An additional logistics staff member would have been usefully positioned in Concepcion itself, to assist with base logistics and local transport.

The recovery phase of operations has struggled more with a lack of sufficient logistics capacity, particularly in light of the types of programmes implemented. Logistics demands included specific capacity for managing boat production and building the capacity of locally employed carpenters; there was high demand for procurement of materials and goods for the boat and other programme components, with the main supplies location a 2hr drive from Concepcion; very specific types and quality of materials were required for the engineering activities in particular, which were not always readily available. Staff across the programme reported delays in procurement and a lack of proactivity in completing supplies requests. The engineering team in particular experienced unilateral decision making as to the appropriateness of specialised materials, rather than consultation with programme staff, often resulting in unsuitable materials. It is widely felt amongst staff that this problem could have been avoided with additional logistics support staff.

Once logistics issues were worked through, high quality materials and equipment has been sourced, contributing to the high quality seen in the programme results. Following staff changes, the current logistics capacity is working well with and for the wider team.

*Money – Finance*

Sufficient funding of a flexible nature has been available to the response, totalling €4,522,681**[[11]](#footnote-11)**, of which approximately half was raised through general donations with the rest from the DEC and corporate donors. This has enabled flexibility in the programme as required, and reduced the requirement for arduous reporting and constant re-budgeting.

Two funding bids, presented to ECHO by a consortium of Alliance 2015 members, failed to receive funding. The bids both proposed multiple agencies implementing multiple projects covering multiple geographic locations. As the proposals demonstrated little added value from using a consortium approach it is likely that this is the reason why the bids were rejected. The implication for the programme team was wasted man-power at a time when resources were already stretched. Corporate donor demands were also found to be disproportionately high for the amount of funding being donated to the programme. Whilst the need to account for significant private and corporate donations is recognised, there must to be a balance against the other programme requirements. Those managing corporate donors can usefully assist in this process.

Finance management was also highlighted as a barrier to efficient programme implementation on some occasions. Difficulties in recruiting a permanent Country Financial Controller (CFC) led to budget codes, essential to tracking expenditure, not being put in place until nearly 5 months after the start of the response, resulting in a near underspend on the DEC budget. Also, the need for rigorous procedures wasn’t being offset against the realities of the field, and this resulted in feelings of being distrusted amongst some programme staff. It is essential that finance staff are aware of the realities and limitations experienced by a programme so that procedures can be adapted to provide the support function that they are intended to be.

The community willingness to get involved in programme implementation was significantly high, resulting in less money spent on staffing. The relationships developed with the Provincial officials and the Logistics Cluster facilitated in-kind transport, minimising transport costs. Ultimately this meant more money was available for direct spend on beneficiaries. However, in some cases, inflated support costs were not renegotiated early enough to avoid significant overspend, particularly on office, accommodation and personnel transport costs. Whilst this is a very small proportion of the overall budget it highlights the need to be attentive to all support cost spending in order to ensure the most efficient use of funds.

Given that, on the whole, the funds available have been spent economically across the programme, that efficiencies have been sought in the way the programme has been implemented, the quality of the goods and services obtained, and the outputs achieved as a result, this programme has demonstrated very good value for money, and demonstrated what can be achieved by a well thought-through approach.

## The Impact of the Intervention: What difference will it make?

It is not possible to fully measure the impact of this response as some activities are still ongoing (e.g. schools and water systems) and others will not demonstrate success for many years (coral rehabilitation). However, it is possible to get a sense of the emerging and expected impact across the programme from the range and types of benefits, large and small, that have been observed. A combination of the choice of component and a well thought-through approach taken to implementing that component has resulted in multiple benefits being attained. The following diagram outlines these benefits as found through post-activity monitoring, observation, community discussions, LGU and other local stakeholder conversations – the table in Annex C gives greater detail.

| **Activity** | **Location** | **Direct Beneficiaries** | **Immediate Needs** | **Increased Capacity to Cope after Disasters** | **Reduced Impact from Disasters** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Emergency (Phase 1) Activities | | | | | |
| *NFI Distribution* | Carles, Concepcion | 11,004 households  (48,831 people) | **X** |  |  |
| *Boat rehabilitation* | Ajuy, Carles, Concepcion | 3,526 households (16,280 people) | **X** | **X** | **X** |
| *Cash Distributions* | Negros Occidental | 11,569 households  (57,845 people) | **X** |  |  |
| Fisheries Livelihoods Recovery Programme (FLRP) | | | | | |
| *Aquaculture* | Concepcion | 99 households  (495 people) | **X** | **X** |  |
| *Coral Rehabilitation* | Concepcion | (Indirect 15,210) | **X** | **X** |  |
| *Coconuts* | Concepcion | 550 households (2,750 people) | **X** |  | **X** |
| *Reforestation* | Concepcion | (Indirect )1,920 people | **X** | **X** | **X** |
| *Mangroves* | Concepcion | 30 people trained  (Indirect 15,210) | **X** | **X** | **X** |
| *Awareness Raising* | Concepcion | 6,772 people |  | **X** |  |
| *LGU Support* | Ajuy, Carles,  Concepcion |  | **X** | **X** |  |
| Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Programme (CBDRRM) | | | | | |
| *Water Supply Systems* | Concepcion | 1610 households (9,391 people) | **X** | **X** | **X** |
| *Infrastructure/ Schools* | Concepcion | 1,393 pupils |  | **X** | **X** |
| *Disaster Risk Reduction* | Concepcion | 34,392 people |  | **X** | **X** |
| *Concourse construction* | Negros Occidental | 723 HHs (3,615 people) | **X** | **X** | **X** |

The emerging and expected impact can perhaps be seen most clearly through the value that beneficiaries and other stakeholders have attached to the interventions. Whilst the Mayor of Concepcion noted that some of the activities would have happened without Concern’s presence, he identified that many might not have happened at all and those that did would have been achieved much more slowly.

*Immediate needs*

Staff and visitors present during the distributions reported seeing tools and tarps being used immediately, often before the distributions had even finished. Recipients rated the items very highly in terms of usefulness (average of 4.6/5) and everyone met reported the kits to be of good quality and comprehensive, with many demonstrating that items were still being used and in good condition. Plastic sheets (observed on many houses) and solar lights were reported as the most useful items, and several people reported that the tools distributed had allowed them to take part in government and other cash-for-work programmes (clean-up campaigns etc.) so enabling additional household income to be earned.

Many people also reported that paid labour work on various components of the programme (water systems, coral rehabilitation, coconut infestation eradication) had helped to provide essential short-term cash for basic needs whilst they were recovering from the typhoon. The programme strived to ensure that labour contributions rotated around households to ensure fair distribution of income, and that agreements were made with labourers that money earned would be used for household necessities rather than frivolous purchases (one Water User Committee specified payments were not to be used to buy alcohol), so potentially increasing the impact of the additional cash injections.

*Increased Capacity to Cope*

Economic resilience has been tackled through the restoration of livelihoods and the enhancement of areas that support those livelihood activities. As the population are almost totally dependent on sea-based activities the replacement of boats and fishing equipment and the restarting of aquaculture for those who previously engaged in these activities has enabled a restoration of economic income to previous levels - affected communities report they are once again able to provide for their basic income needs. By October 2014 90% of those assisted reported having returned to fishing activities. The only exception to this was found amongst boat owners in Carles whose fishing gear distributions did not include lead sinkers and floats - they reported that they are unable to use the gear without these items and do not have the financial capacity to purchase them independently.

A strategic decision was taken to not expand fishing capabilities amongst affected communities due to the significant issues of over-fishing found in the region. So whilst these interventions have not enhanced the economic resilience of individuals beyond previous levels, they have helped to ensure that the activities have not negatively contributed to a decreasing economic resource (the sea). A contribution to economic resilience has come about through the quality of the boats provided though – beneficiaries have reported that the good quality of the boats will ensure they last, reducing the amount of income that needs to be spent on repairs, and thus increasing income to be used for other purposes. Most significantly, the programme components aimed at protecting/enhancing Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) have contributed to a reduction in illegal fishing according to government representatives, who also believe the work to protect the wider ecological environment (coral rehabilitation, mangrove replanting) will contribute to enhanced fish-stocks, thus ensuring a greater degree of long-term economic resilience for sea-dependent livelihoods.

Protection of coconut trees has seen 85% of infested trees recovering, and harvesting of new coconut fruit is already occurring in Bagongon, ensuring that secondary livelihood opportunities remain available. Farmers didn’t expect the coconut trees to survive following the infestation, and other community members are able to access *copra* (dried coconut kernel) again to help with shelter/roofing. The reforestation on the mainland will also see trees bearing some fruit in the future, helping to increase secondary livelihood options for some. Whilst livelihood diversification was outside the scope of the programme (due to the time required to implement effectively), every effort has been made to ensure programme components build individual capacity wherever possible, to help increase livelihood resilience even in small ways –the training of local carpenters in the boat building programme (carpenters have reported their ability for higher quality work and increased livelihood options); the agreement made with those receiving aquaculture support to pass on supplies (seedlings) and knowledge to neighbours once the first harvest has occurred; the training received by coconut farmers in the techniques used for eradicating coconut infestations. The provision of clean water supplies will enable communities to access clean water during and following storms (when existing water sources often become polluted), reducing the need for immediate travel in continued stormy weather, and freeing up money to be spent on other essential recovery activities.

Contributions to social resilience are harder to identify, but the temporary and rebuilt schools and the Water Users Committees have contributed to this. The temporary schools allowed children to continue schooling largely regardless of weather, whilst the rehabilitated/newly built classrooms will enable more effective teaching as classes can continue for longer, accommodate more children and walls can be used for visual aids. It was also seen that the small ‘ad-hoc’ interventions that have come about through programme adaptations have been cited as particularly valuable to the affected communities, such as the school boat for Manlot Barangay in Carles which now allows even small children to go to school (who could not previously wade/swim across to the island with the school). The awareness raising work also appears to have had a social cohesion impact, with some barangays reporting it was previously hard to gather people for awareness raising events and clean-up purposes. When discussing the campaigns that had taken place it was clear that children in particular had learnt the importance of cleaning up and protecting fish.

*Reduced Impact of Disasters*

The construction of earthquake and typhoon resistant school classrooms will not only ensure they withstand future disasters, but also offer strong evacuation centres for islanders (school buildings traditionally being used for this purpose)[[12]](#footnote-12). The specification of the causeway being constructed in Negros Occidental should ensure it withstands future disasters, but in doing so will help to ensure access remains open for communities in in the wake of another typhoon. Mangrove planting and breakwater construction both aim to reduce the impact of storm surges and the reforestation will strengthen protection against flooding, mudslides and silt run-off that damages mangroves.

The primary DRR-focused component centres around disaster planning and preparedness. 74% of people have reported a good understanding of their barangay contingency plan, and the impact of the disaster preparedness work conducted with 18 barangays in Concepcion was observed first-hand in response to in-coming Typhoon Ruby. Several days before the typhoon was due to make landfall island and coastal communities were aware of the incoming storm, began moving boats to higher ground, and reported initiating text-message alerts, stocking up on contingency items, securing houses and ensured people were aware of their responsibilities under their newly created contingency plans. Community members reported that they expected no more casualties and no forced evacuations during future storms, and that they had a much quicker system for alerts and communication. Senior and disabled people were now the first priority as opposed to some previously having been forgotten, and some had already been moved to the evacuation centres as the storm was moving towards the area. Whilst some of the observable impact has to be attributed to the recent experience of Typhoon Yolanda, it seems this has provided the motivation to be better prepared and Concern’s activities have enabled such preparations to be effective.

Even the basic level of contingency planning that was undertaken with communities will serve to ensure better preparedness in the future, although the process, focused at barangay level, identified a lack of capacity at the municipal level which, if addressed, would have ensured greater impact and sustainability to the work carried out. Some elements of the component were also not the most relevant or appropriate to the context (e.g. provision of tablets) and would have benefitted from better analysis during planning.

*Programme Value*

Overall all local and provincial officials spoken to, as well as many community members, expressed how impressed they were with the work Concern had undertaken. They often cited the high standard and extra mile that Concern had gone to – working outside just their focus area of Concepcion, distributing items but also engaging in the ‘software’ (education) components, teaching people about contingency planning and then engaging in a simulated practice. The Mayor of Concepcion highlighted that the programme has extended beyond initial expectations, strengthening the communities beyond their pre-Yolanda state. He believes that multiplier effects have arisen – that people have been energised to face challenges, and that people are now more cooperative. Another official stated that Concern’s presence had boosted spirits and the Provincial Administrator expects the impact to remain for the long time, making a significant difference during future calamities. The level of emotion surrounding Concern’s work was evident from the consistent thanks that were expressed by community members and government officials, and the number of people who became teary whilst discussing the difference Concern’s work had made to their lives.

***‘Rare privilege, joy and a blessing to have CWW with us’ – BFAR Official***

***‘The rebuilder of our community’ – the Mayor of Concepcion***

By striving to get alongside the communities, and by following the same approach across all those engaged in the programme, Concern has generated a strong reputation and appreciation amongst local stakeholders. The communities feel cared for, not just because of the goods and services that have been delivered, but the approach with which it has been done.

*Unintended Impacts*

It was difficult to identify many unintended impacts resulting from Concern’s response programme. Despite trying many different ways of questioning across all levels of stakeholders issues appeared to be few, and most focused on isolated incidents. As the programme also targeted most of the populations within the target areas with at least one intervention component identifying non-beneficiaries was also difficult.

Officials and community members in Carles noted that some people who did not receive boats from Concern had taken to painting a Concern-style registration name on their boats to try and fool patrol boats into believing they were actually registered (a pre-requisite of receiving a boat from Concern) and so this practice may enable some additional illegal fishing in the area.

Several affected community members and local government officials also commented on the need to ensure people were able to rebuild and improve their own lives. Any deeper intervention may have risked damaging remarkable individual resilience (Humanitarian Country Team Nov 2013) and the very evident volunteer spirit. Observation of community members calling Concern for advice/assistance ahead of the approaching Typhoon Ruby rather than calling the LGU indicate this may have started to occur already, and the slightly surprising lack of people ‘begging’ Concern to continue working in the area perhaps indicates a sufficient level of assistance has been reached.

The strategy to focus the majority of the response activities in Concepcion, and fill gaps in other areas of Carles, Ajuy and Negros Occidental, raised the question of whether greater effectiveness and impact would have been achieved by solely focussing resources on Concepcion alone. Despite there being many other activities Concern could have usefully engaged in in Concepcion, given the scale of the needs across the different areas, and the ability of Concern to effectively engage local government and communities in the programme, the approach of gap-filling may have ultimately had a greater impact by demonstrating good practice and thus influencing the practices and approach of local stakeholders across a wider area. However, it was acknowledged by some staff that the approach taken to working in Negros Occidental in particular could have had greater impact had it been done through the same approach as the rest of the components – a dedicated team and in greater partnership with the LGU rather than through remote management. Whilst the post distribution monitoring showed the money distributed had been made good use of it arrived too late to provide a multiplier effect in combination with other assistance being received earlier.

## The Sustainability of the Intervention: Will it last?

As described earlier the programme demonstrated a well thought-through, holistic approach to responding to the emergency and recovery needs of the target population. The programme has been designed so that each element brings multiple benefits and the highly enabling environment has also contributed to the levels of sustainability anticipated. In particular the involvement of very engaged LGU and community members has allowed local capacity to be built across the target areas, and the partnership approach with the LGU has ensured significant levels of local ownership to be built.

*Emergency Activities*

The initial emergency response activities – NFI and boat/fishing equipment distribution – were naturally intended to be quick-impact, short term activities. However, they managed to incorporate recovery and sustainability elements, in particular through the use of good quality equipment, materials and workmanship. Plastic sheeting was still visible on many houses almost a year after distribution, and recipients of NFI kits demonstrated that solar lights were still working. Other items were also still in good repair, such as tools, which were reported to have been used for ongoing house-building/repair work.

The approach taken to replenishing boats and fishing gear demonstrated sustainability in a number of ways. The decision to provide boats rather than cash-grants to the majority of those with lost/damaged boats, unlike the majority of other organisations in the area, ensured beneficiaries had an asset they could continue to use long-term rather than risk the cash being spent in other less-sustainable ways. The quality of the materials chosen in many cases should ensure longevity of the boats, and reduce the need to spend income on repairs, although in Carles it was not possible to obtain the highest quality of materials desired, which some beneficiaries have noted as a problem. The use of local carpenters for the boat building has increased the carpentry skills in the area which should provide alternative livelihoods for some and also increased quality of workmanship in new boats. The decision to restrict boat distribution in order to not contribute to increasing levels of overfishing also demonstrates longer-term sustainability of interventions, although the impact of this cannot be measured by this evaluation.

*Recovery Activities*

Recovery activities have also demonstrated long-term sustainability considerations, primarily through a focus on disaster risk reduction: new school classrooms have been professionally designed to withstand earthquakes and winds of over 300km/hr, and roofing structures on communal buildings in Baliguian island are also designed to resist typhoons; the water systems have been designed to withstand similar disasters, using high quality anchors for pipes crossing over the sea-bed between islands, professionally designed tank stands, and good quality equipment and materials (shipped from the mainland where necessary to ensure required standards); water systems have been designed to provide a minimum of 15l/person/day (Sphere standard) for at least a 20 year lifespan (accounting for population growth, diminishing rainfall etc.); methods used for coconut infestation eradication are able to be replicated by local farmers, labourers and LGU officials should they be required, and lab equipment has been handed over to LGU officials; a selection of 10 community members and LGU officials have become trained divers and engaged in both coral rehabilitation and pipe laying activities. This capacity will be available to the LGU going forwards, and the diving equipment will be handed over to them once programme activities are complete

In the majority of cases the designs and techniques used for each programme element are replicable in the local area or to other municipalities, should the funding be available to support them. The only element that may lack sufficient sustainability is the disaster preparedness component. The short-time frame of the overall response programme and the relatively late start to activities (commenced in June) meant that the main engagement occurred at the barangay level. However, the simulation test undertaken identified that LGU and municipal stakeholders required greater capacity to more effectively engage in disaster preparedness and response activities. Also, despite contingency planning occurring in all 18 targeted barangays, only one was able to run a simulation. OCHA representatives highlighted this element as the one thing Concern could have done more of, and the Iloilo Provincial Administrator has previously requested Concern expand it to other municipalities. Despite this, LGU officials engaged in the process believe they can continue supporting the work done so far and are proposing to replicate it with other organisations.

*Wider Influence*

Advocacy approaches were taken at various levels within the programme:

* Awareness raising around the importance of protecting marine environments is a key component of the programme
* In Carles the translation of the fishing ordinance into the local Ilongo language will enable fisher folk to reference fishing regulations directly and assist officials in their awareness raising activities
* Several presentations on aspects of the programme were given to the NGO community through coordination mechanisms
* The Mayor of Carles was successfully petitioned to halve the cost of boat registration to better facilitate those receiving new boats to comply with local regulations

Through discussions with local and provincial government officials, as well as OCHA and other NGO staff, there is some evidence that Concern’s programme has influenced some future activities at the municipal level. The partnership approach has ensured capacity building of LGU officials wherever possible and one official felt that Concern had shown them ‘how to plan and implement, adapting local systems to be effective and efficient’. LGU officials are looking to replicate disaster planning/preparedness activities with other organisations, and have also asked the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) to continue the coastal resource management elements of the work, and in particular the coral rehabilitation. An innovative geotextile breakwater project (to protect a Carles island school site subject to erosion) that was initially proposed and researched by Concern (but not implemented due to lack of funding) has since been funded by the provincial level government. Any future replication of Concern’s programme components will require LGUs to source sufficient funding and/or partners, but the knowledge and interest required is present.

However, there appears to be significant opportunity to influence more widely at the Provincial level than has been engaged in so far. The Provincial Administrator is keen to write to the Provincial Governor to influence future development approaches – in particular he would like to see the communal rainwater harvesting system in Baliguian become policy in the province, and wants to replicate the disaster preparedness work in other municipalities, integrating new insights into policy as they arise. He has recognised there are ‘lessons we can sustain’ and expressed a desire to influence the work of other NGOs and donors. The professional designs created for the school classroom structures present a significant opportunity to improve the impact and sustainability of future construction, given they raise the standard of resilience beyond the current national level.

However, there were also opportunities for further advocacy activities that were not engaged in. Carles municipality proposed a local radio station be established to engage in dialogue on coastal resource management but there were insufficient funds to implement this. Oxfam published a paper advocating for an appropriate approach towards preserving and enhancing the depleting fisheries industry in the wake of the typhoon, and made many of the points that Concern had already implemented into their programme. The disaster preparedness component was originally designed with an advocacy approach in order to establish a strong example of good practice before spreading this more widely within Iloilo Province; other organisations were invited to the simulation event (only IOM participated), but sufficient staffing capacity was not in place to ensure the component was more widely promoted. Furthermore, the current understanding of ‘Disaster Risk Reduction’ across the Philippines focusses on preparedness and response, rather than the wider preventative elements of improved design of infrastructure, better management and enhancement of environmental resources etc. Given Concern has incorporated preventative DRR approaches into its programme wherever possible this wider approach could have been more widely promoted.

These brief examples of missed advocacy opportunities indicate that a more strategic approach to advocacy may have enabled Concern to have greater lasting influence on response and development activities over the short duration of its response, at least at the provincial level, and particularly in light of the highly enabling environment encountered, and the strong stakeholder relationships built.

Influencing national-level policy and approach would always have been difficult for Concerns response in the Philippines given the decentralised nature of the political system, the lack of Concern presence at the central government (Manila) level, and the short time-frame of the response. However, given the strong relationships established with the provincial and municipal levels, opportunities should be sought to extend the influence of Concern’s programme over the remaining period of the programme. The first step in this process is to invite the Provincial Administrator and Governor to visit Concern’s programme.

# Conclusions & Recommendations

Concern’s Typhoon Haiyan response programme has been a wonderful example of what a short-term response and recovery programme can achieve given the right approach, decision-making and operating conditions. This was an appropriately ambitious programme, with a strong focus on both meeting people’s immediate needs and building greater resilience to the multiple disasters faced by those targeted. It was built on a foundation of appropriate decisions, in particular the focus on underserved yet highly affected communities, and aided by the very enabling operating environment of strong local capacity and engagement.

Participatory involvement of affected communities, particularly in terms of implementation, has been extensive, and the implications of any given component appear to have been considered within the bigger picture, thus enabling the programme to be adapted to the realities of the local context. Strong coordination and collaboration was established with first the Provincial and then the Municipal authorities from the start of the intervention, and has been successfully continued by almost all staff throughout the duration of the programme. A dedicated national staff team, a commitment to achieving quality results and the ability to adapt to changing circumstances and make the most of the resources and opportunities available has kept Concern’s response relevant, and so ensured the best possible conditions for achieving meaningful impact.

The holistic, well thought-through programme has aimed for multiple benefits from even simple interventions, ensuring connectedness across the programme components, and striving to mitigate potential risks and negative implications. The build back safer intention is evident where feasible, and the programme displays a good balance of innovation against tested approaches. The needs addressed also represent a proportionate approach, in both the duration and scale of activities, seeking to ensure that the interventions do not undermine the evident resilience and ‘baya nihan’ spirit of those affected. Instead the programme has sought to build capacity and sustainability within the activities, and has resisted the temptation to engage in the wider opportunities that appear so inviting.

Given such a strong example of good response programming, the key area Concern could have invested in more heavily is that of advocacy, particularly at the provincial and national levels. Opportunities existed to more deliberately speak out about the good practice approaches taken, demonstrating the outcomes, with a view to influencing how both the government and other organisations operate going forwards and following future disasters. In this way the programme had the potential to be even more sustainable.

Whilst the full impact of the programme has yet to be realised, what is evident is the strong reputation Concern has established amongst local stakeholders at all levels. Beneficiaries tearfully expressed their thanks, local government officials declared their appreciation for the ‘extra mile’ that Concern has gone to, and OCHA described the engagement as ‘realistic, humble and professional’. Many feel that Concern has shown genuine care for marginalised communities and this reputation can be used as an indicator of just how well Concern has implemented its Typhoon Haiyan response programme.

## Demonstrated Good Practice

It is difficult to make extensive future recommendations as the very enabling operating environment found in the Haiyan response is unlikely to be experienced in many other disaster locations. However, it is felt that many of the examples of good practice demonstrated in the Philippines also constitute good practice elsewhere, even if the impact of those actions will not be as evident. Key good practice points, to be replicated wherever possible and appropriate in future response operations, particularly in enabling environments found in South East Asia, include:

* Engage immediately and consistently with the local government systems. The capacity and reciprocated engagement in the Haiyan response ensured this approach significantly assisted Concern’s operations. In many countries this approach will not be so easy to implement, but straightforward and transparent engagement will likely minimise any longer-term problems with the stakeholders who have ultimate responsibility for ensuring the wellbeing of affected populations.
* As long as unrestricted and sufficient funding is available target the least served but equally affected areas for assistance, particularly in an environment that is likely to experience a significant number of ‘new’ NGOs interested in ‘planting flags’. By doing this in the Haiyan response Concern has had greater impact on those affected and on the wider stakeholders who are tasked with providing assistance (such as the local government).
* Design a holistic programme that is adaptable to the changing context and aims for quality across all activities. Concern’s Haiyan response remained relevant throughout, despite the changing circumstances presented by other organisations activities and in the face of gaining increasing understanding of the communities which were being assisted. The holistic approach added value beyond the sum of its parts, ensuring a multiplier effect in some cases, and assisting in building deeper engagement with the affected communities.
* Engage wherever possible with the wider humanitarian system through active coordination. Whilst the immediate benefits for Concern may not have been as evident in the Haiyan response as in previous responses, the reputation established through the strong engagement developed a platform for influence that has likely impacted on the effectiveness of the wider response.
* The first phase team for any new emergency response should include Concern-experienced nationals of the country in question wherever possible. In the case of the Haiyan response this ensured necessary processes such as registration and bank account applications were started early, and that culturally appropriate approaches to assessments, developing government relations and working with local communities were done. This clearly led to a more effective response.
* Where possible minimise expatriate staff, build a strong team of skilled national staff and make use of local government and community partnerships where feasible. In the Haiyan response Concern’s approach has increased community participation and the sustainability of the overall response activities. Humanitarian response evaluations, such as the Interaction Operational PEER review (Interaction 2014), continue to identify that the deployment of too many international staff overwhelms the national response coordination efforts.
* Ensure sufficient logistics staff in the first phase at key locations/hubs to manage transit of international goods, procurement of local goods, and local transport to affected communities.

Recommendations – Philippines Programme

As the programme draws to a close there is opportunity to further enhance the good work already achieved:

* Strengthen the sustainability of the response by ensuring that Municipal and Provincial Officials and, if possible, the UN, have seen, understood and received relevant technical information about each of the programme components. This applies in particular to the school designs, but also components such as the coral rehabilitation.
* Assist the LGU to identify further partner organisations that may be able to work with them to build on/expand current programme components, such as the Disaster Risk Reduction and Management component
* Retain registration and nominal monitoring of hazards in the Philippines, with a view to responding, as appropriate, to future disasters. If a response is mounted, it is recommended that the same approach is taken to implementing that response as in the wake of Typhoon Haiyan

## Recommendations - Future Response Programmes

There are also some very specific recommendations that can be applied across all short-term response operations, and the early stages of longer-term response programmes.

*Staffing*

* Ensure a balanced staff structure appropriate to the context, which may not be best served by a traditional Concern development programme staffing structure. In particular, for a short term response, a flatter staffing structure, with less senior staff, may continue to be appropriate. Also ensure that sufficient junior staff are planned for, even if working in a strong community-engaging context.
* Minimise the turnover of senior staffing positions (the Country Director/Emergency Response Manager) to ensure continuity in approach and efficiency in progressing the response operations. The same may be achieved by maintaining emergency response team staff for longer periods.
* Ensure sufficient staff to perform ‘programme’ logistics functions, particularly for engineering and high material input programme components. These position(s) can sit in either the logistics teams or the programme team, but should be predominantly focused on liaising between the programme and logistics staff to ensure appropriate, high-quality materials are identified, procured and transported. There will always be a tension between quality and speed of procurement, but, if Concern’s humanitarian responses are to continue with a quality approach, it is recommended that this additional capacity is always put in place to achieve this in a timely manner. This will improve the efficiency of implementation of rehabilitation/recovery activities in particular.
* Implement a stronger selection process for the identification of Concern national staff for secondment/recruitment to response programmes, particularly to identify the capacity for cultural adaptability. Alongside this, develop a coaching/mentoring approach that assigns an emergency-experienced staff member who is not part of the response to monitor and provide advice/guidance as required.
* Develop and maintain a register of current and ex-Concern staff from countries/regions at high risk of disasters to enable rapid contact at the onset of a new emergency. The Interaction Operational Peer Review (Interaction 2014) also identified this as a key recommendation for the humanitarian community, in order to adjust surge capacity accordingly and better compliment local response efforts.

*Concern’s Response Toolkit*

* Develop a ‘DRR-lite’ programme approach that can be implemented over 6-9 months in any emergency context. The period following a natural disaster in particular is a very useful time to engage in community-based disaster management planning for future disasters. Concern has an opportunity to become a leading organisation in this area through a reduced DRR process that focuses on the response planning elements and can be easily implemented in both short term response programmes (such as for Typhoon Haiyan) and those that will transition into longer-term recovery/development programmes (in which case, the DRR-lite programme can also transition into a fuller Disaster Risk Reduction component). The DRR-lite Programme should be documented in such a way that all guidance and tools are available to the response team, so that the programme can be designed and commenced in the early stages of the response whilst appropriate staff recruitment is undertaken, thus ensuring it can be implemented fully even during short response programmes.
* Investigate developing a short workshop guideline that can be used by experienced response personnel to discuss and contextualise the Programme Participant Protection Policy (P4) with newly recruited national staff. The aim should be to ensure that the P4 can be more effectively rolled out under the constraints of a high-pressure response with multiple priorities. An interactive workshop approach should enable staff to develop a stronger understanding of the P4 in relation to their own cultural context, and so helping to better embed the required understanding.
* Develop a standard written guideline on engagement with local stakeholders (government and communities in particular) including various approaches to establishing complaints response mechanisms. Whilst the approach taken and advice given in the case of the Haiyan response was very good, this was done by email rather than a standardised guideline. Case studies of good practice from the Haiyan response should be included in the guideline, and it should take account of the issues and good practice around technological developments (social media, mobile communications etc.), particularly as explored by the CDAC Network.

*Internal*

* Develop a short, generic security management plan that can be quickly adapted/edited to provide priority procedures for first phase responses. This should include basic boat travel procedures.
* If engaging in consortium proposals ensure that the consortium approach adds value that would not otherwise be achieved by each agency implementing alone, and that the added value outweighs the added coordination/administration requirements of a consortium approach. This should minimise the time lost in the creation of unsuccessful funding bids. Also consider taking the lead in the consortium bid to ensure appropriate quality is achieved.

*Advocacy*

* Concern is a respected humanitarian response organisation that is seen to deliver quality interventions in many of the locations in which it operates. This provides a strong platform for influencing the response approach taken by other stakeholders – particularly local communities, local government, other NGOs and the UN. Whilst Concern engaged in advocacy opportunities at a local level through the Haiyan response, it did so unofficially and more by default than design. Whilst Concern is not necessarily in a position to engage in high visibility advocacy that the likes of Oxfam does, it could be more strategic about the influence it can have at the local level, and more confident in its ability to make a difference. Each response operation should examine the advocacy opportunities from an early stage, as part of the response strategy, and revisit these regularly to ensure that the programme is deliberately and consistently trying to influence best practice at the local to national level wherever possible. This will help to increase the effectiveness and the sustainability of Concern’s operations and the wider response.

# Annex A1: Terms of Reference



**Terms of Reference**

**Emergency Response and Recovery Programme Evaluation December 2014**

**PROGRAMME:**

**Disaster Response: Supporting Natural Hazards affected population, Philippines in the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda.**

1. **BACKGROUND**

The Philippines is made up of 7,000 islands and has a total estimated population of 98.9 million people. Poverty is most severe and widespread in rural areas, where almost 80% of the country’s poor live. Fishing or subsistence farming is the primary and often only source of income for poor rural people. The Philippines is considered to be among the world’s most disaster-prone countries. Commonly occurring hazards include floods, droughts, typhoons, landslides and mudslides, earthquakes and volcano eruptions. The country ranks third among countries most at risk of disasters in the world and 74% of the population is vulnerable to natural hazards. Typhoons season in the Philippines occurs between June and December. Over 20 typhoons affect the country annually, with 8 or 9 making landfall.

Concern had not been operational in the Philippines prior to this emergency response.

1. **Typhoon Haiyan**

An estimated 12.2 million people were affected when Typhoon Haiyan hit the Philippines on 8th November 2013, with more than 90% of those affected living in the Western, Central and Eastern Visayas. Typhoon Haiyan, thought to be the strongest typhoon to ever make landfall, brought winds of 300km per hour accompanied by heavy rains, and a 16 foot high tidal surge which swept through coastal areas, clearing everything in its path. About 4.4 million people (930,000 families) were displaced. The Typhoon led to the extensive destruction of infrastructure, including road network, power lines, and water systems. Agriculture and fishing sectors were severely hit, impacting people’s livelihoods. Around 65 per cent of fishing communities lost their productive assets, and 28,000 mainly small-scale fishing boats were destroyed[[13]](#footnote-13).

Concern’s assessment team began operations November 14th, 2014. This team immediately began coordination with both OCHA and appropriate government authorities at national level. Guided by the information from that level, Concern conducted initial rapid assessments of i) Negros Occidental province on Negros Island and ii) Iloilo province on the island of Panay, including aerial assessments, followed by detailed participatory assessments with affected populations, barangay captains, civil society leaders, and other key stakeholders including provincial and municipality authorities.

Concern’s assessment found that the most affected communities were located on small islands off the coast with structures made primarily of bamboo and thatch, resulting in near total destruction of homes, and family fishing boats, their main livelihood. Infrastructure such as schools, health centres and water systems were also severely damaged or destroyed. In the Concepcion area specifically, in the Western Visayas, Concern discovered that 97% of people were affected by the Typhoon. Even prior to the Typhoon, Concepcion had the second highest poverty indicators in the region, with poverty rates estimated at 45%; again due to the high number of island Barangays (village level administration unit). Approximately half of the families on these islands are receiving welfare assistance and, even before the typhoon, could not meet their daily economic needs. Islands were hit very hard by the typhoon. 80-90% of all housing was damaged or totally destroyed. Small scale fishing boats were also very badly damaged or destroyed, removing the main livelihood of the most vulnerable households.

The analysis of all the data collected in these assessments, as well as input from coordination clusters and local authorities, led Concern to focus its response in Iloilo Province, Western Visayas.

The Typhoon led to the extensive destruction of infrastructure, including road network, power lines, and water systems. Agriculture and fishing sectors were severely hit, impacting people’s livelihoods. Around 65 per cent of fishing communities lost their productive assets, and 28,000 mainly small-scale fishing boats were destroyed[[14]](#footnote-14). The natural environment was also badly affected, with mass destruction of mangroves, coral reefs, trees and other natural vegetation reported.

On the basis of the needs assessment, Concern developed a twelve month emergency response and recovery programme which was jointly funded by DEC with a grant of £1,483,739 with additional funds provided by Concern through its fundraising activities in Ireland, the UK and the U.S.

The overall goal of the initial response was to ensure that those affected by typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines receive necessary materials and services, and live with dignity in a safe and healthy environment, accomplished through the provision of emergency shelter/NFI goods, the assistance in the restoration of livelihoods and other activities as needed.

The specific outcomes of the emergency response were as follows:

Targeted Outcomes:

a) Affected persons in target areas have access to adequate shelter providing protection from climate, while ensuring privacy, safety and healthy living conditions enabling essential household and livelihood activities.

b) Affected persons in target areas have access to sufficient basic NFIs to allow them to re-establish some degree of normality in their lives

c) Affected persons in target areas have their fishing related livelihoods restored to pre-typhoon levels.

Following the emergency phase the response then shifted in most areas from life-saving interventions to early recovery phase. Across affected areas, local markets had largely returned to normal. Focus had shifted to livelihood restoration activities, including sustainable and targeted agriculture and fishery activities.

The Visayas is one of the major fishing grounds in the Philippines. A combination of destruction of marine eco-systems and illegal fishing practises, as well as increase in the catch due to population pressure, has contributed to declining fish stocks in Visayan waters. Exacerbating this, Government agencies are forecasting that damage to marine eco-systems caused by the typhoon will have a long term negative impact on local fish stocks, and accordingly, the fishing industry. Given the dependency of poor coastal communities on fishing and fisheries related activities for income, and their increased vulnerability due the direct effects of Typhoon Haiyan, this was expected to have serious impact on their medium-long-term livelihoods.

Additionally the rehabilitation programme focused on the restoration of damaged drinking water supplies and the rehabilitation and reconstruction of schools in outlying islands as well as an extensive community-based Disaster Risk Reduction programme working with the local government in both mainland and coastal communities of Concepcion.

1. **OBJECTIVES OF THE EVALUATION**

As the programme nears its completion stage, an evaluation of the emergency phase and the recovery phase of programme has been planned This evaluation seeks to establish the appropriateness and relevance of the strategies deployed to respond to Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda affected populations and to look at the impact and benefit of the response in terms of building increased community capacity to respond to and withstand future shocks.

The evaluation seeks to gather useful information to improve future response and rehabilitation programmes and is intended to:

1. Assess, in an evidence-based manner, the effectiveness, efficiency and timeliness of the program’s components and implementation strategies against project results/objectives and assess impact.
2. Provide understanding of the relevance of the Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda Response and rehabilitation programme by gathering and analysing information regarding overall living conditions, social and economic situation of the program beneficiaries;
3. Assess the sustainability of the intervention’s results, focussing on the target groups quality of their current living conditions, their economic resilience and the support from local, municipality authorities to withstand future shocks
4. Provide recommendations that will inform future emergency response and rehabilitation programmes of a similar nature

The results of the evaluation will be used for Concern (and shared with the donors – DEC) to evaluate the overall achievements of the interventions and importantly will also be used by Concern to inform future programming and share lessons learnt with relevant stakeholders (local authorities, government bodies, and other interested local and international actors).

**3. METHODOLOGY**

The evaluation will be carried out through the analysis of various sources of information including survey data, site visits, in-depth interviews/case studies with programme participants, consultations with key stakeholders including Concern and Concepcion and Carles Local Government Unit technical staff, the Mayors of Carles and Concepcion, barangay captains and other local authorities, Water User Committees and other household/community members. In addition to a review of existing monitoring data, it is also anticipated that the consultant will undertake interviews with a number of beneficiaries and community members.

The evaluation will review the relevance, effectiveness, sustainability and emerging and expected impact of the Haiyan/Yolanda response and recovery programme. The majority of programme activities are expected to be completed by end of November 2014 with some Water and School Construction activities continuing until the first quarter of 2015.

The key questions below are of particular interest to Concern and therefore, while not exhaustive, should be included in the review. The evaluation is expected to answer the questions in an evidence-based manner using either qualitative or quantitative data, to note and highlight differences between the implementation strategies and program components in terms of their overall effectiveness and relevance.

Cross cutting themes e.g. equality, partnership, programme participant protection, Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), Sphere Standards, and advocacy should be taken into account throughout the evaluation.

**Key Questions**

**Identification/selection and registration of beneficiaries**

* How efficient were the selection criteria used to identify beneficiaries? Were the right people (disaster-affected and extreme poor) targeted?
* How participative and transparent was the selection criteria of the participants in the programme.
* To what extent were the assessment tools adequate for fully capturing beneficiary needs?

**Relevance**

* To what extent have objectives and strategies responded to the needs and priorities of our target groups and the various stakeholders at various stages?
* How well did the programme respond to the needs of the affected population within the local context?
* What adaptations were made to fit the realities of the local context as the programme progressed?
* How well did the programme align with the needs as outlined by the clusters and other coordinating UN agencies and NGOs ?

**Effectiveness**

* To what extent have the expected results of the Haiyan/Yolanda Response programme as identified in project log frames been achieved and what are the main factors that have enabled or impeded this achievement?
* What value do beneficiaries, stakeholders and communities attach to the outcomes achieved?
* How have programme interventions been redirected in response to results of on-going monitoring and how have the program indicators been used in this process?
* To what degree was programme learning shared within the community and neighbouring communities, local authorities and other CBOs/NGOs (local and international)?
* How have equality issues been addressed, and how were issues related to poorer families and individuals and issues between men and women addressed?
* How has the analysis of hazards and risks contributed to the design of the programme?

**Efficiency**

* How responsive has been the project’s management structure?
* How did the various components and support mechanisms of the intervention work and complement each other?
* How have programme interventions been redirected in response to results of on-going consultations as well as routine monitoring and evaluation?
* How were beneficiaries, communities, partner NGOs, Government Bodies involved in decision-making about changes in programme implementation strategies?
* How well did the programme ensure the timely and on-budget delivery of outputs?
* How well did the programme ensure the contribution of local partner NGOs and Government Bodies in the delivery of outputs?
* How well were conflicts and programme issues resolved?
* Has the programme been implemented in such a way as to give value for money for the attainment of the desired standards?

**Impact**

* Have the programme objectives been achieved?
* How have the different activities improved economic and social resilience of affected population?
* How has the programme contributed to increased capacity to respond to and to withstand future shocks of this magnitude.
* What have been the positive and/or negative effects of the programme on not directly targeted communities?

**Sustainability – The level of connectedness and coherence of the response**

* Did the short term nature of the emergency activities take longer term issues into account – recovery and sustainability
* How have donor and national policy been influenced by this intervention?
* Did the response benefit from engagement with the humanitarian architecture – clusters etc.
* To what degree did we avail of advocacy opportunities
* Has the response reduced future vulnerabilities and has the programme helped build resilience to future shocks amongst the target group and the wider community? Are the infrastructures which were developed for the programme replicable and sustainable

**Management issues**

* To what extent have the human resource levels, management and partnership structures been appropriate and effective in delivering the programme?
* To what extent was management able to respond to changing needs within the programme?

**Accountability**

* To what extent was the level of engagement and awareness of beneficiaries/stakeholders in the design and implementation of the project sufficient to ensure optimum achievement of results?
* How effectively were complaints received and dealt with?
* How well is Concern’s Programme Participant Protection policy (P4) understood by the staff of Concern and its partners?

**Future Opportunities**

* Based on findings of the evaluation, make recommendations for future responses to similar emergency situations, both in terms of needs’ evaluation and programme design.

The methodology should be proposed by the consultant but must be participatory and allow for the inclusion of viewpoints of representatives of key stakeholders, including:

* Government stakeholders
* Donors (DEC)
* CWW’s Senior Management and Haiyan/Yolanda team
* Water User Committees
* Beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries
* Particularly disadvantaged or vulnerable groups (women, people with disabilities etc.)

All data should be disaggregated by gender, age and any other relevant criteria, where possible. Data collection and analysis should adhere to research methods best practice

1. **DELIVERABLES**

The following deliverables will be required:

* An outline of key findings in writing to be discussed with then CD prior to concluding the in-country phase of the assignment;
* A first draft of the report with an Executive summary and clear recommendations (complete less appendices) for comment from CWW within one week of concluding field work;
* A full final draft of the report, integrating the feedback received within one week of receiving consolidated feedback on the draft report.
* The report, in English, should be 15-20 pages long without appendices and should be submitted in electronic format (Word or PDF), and include the following sections :
  + Executive Summary (maximum 2 pages)
  + Context of the intervention
  + Brief description of the intervention
  + Presentation of evaluation methodology and any limitations encountered
  + Presentation of main findings in relation to the points in Section 2 and 3 of these TORs, using graphs, charts and tables where appropriate
  + Recommendations
  + Annexes: including ToRs, list of people/groups consulted, interview frameworks/questionnaires or other evaluation tools

1. **ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND RESTRICTIONS**

CWW will be responsible for:

* Approval of the final evaluation plan, tools and methodology
* Providing relevant documentation to the Consultant on the Haiyan/Yolanda programme activities and an initial briefing on the intervention as well as expectations of this evaluation
* Provision of timely feedback to the Evaluator on first draft of report
* Communication of results of the evaluation to key stakeholder groups in the appropriate languages

The evaluator will be responsible for:

* Developing methodology (including sampling size & methods, if appropriate) and evaluation plan for approval by CWW as well as detailed tools to obtain relevant data.
* Developing a programme/schedule for the evaluation with support from CWW
* Data compilation and analysis
* Report writing
* Presentation of draft findings to senior Concern staff
* Conclusion of reports according to feedback provided.

The report will be the intellectual property of CWW. Its content should be shared with third parties only with Concern’s express consent. Sensitivities to confidentiality will need to be respected. Names associated with any particular quotes or experiences should be cited only with the agreement of the person concerned.

1. **CONSULTANT PROFILE**

The successful candidate will be identified on the basis of their ability to demonstrate the following criteria:

* Extensive knowledge and experience of humanitarian aid in rural (coastal)settings~~,~~
* Proven expertise in conducting evaluations in natural disaster contexts
* Experience of qualitative research techniques
* Good oral and written communication skills

1. **LINES OF COMMUNICATION**

The evaluator will report to the Concern Worldwide Country Director in the Philippines or to a person whom s/he will delegate for contractual matters including approval of deliverables.

1. **BUDGET / FEES AND TIMEFRAME**

These will be agreed with the evaluator according to submitted quotation and available budget. It is expected that the work will involve **22** days of work of which four days will be allowable for travel to and from the programme area.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| ***Task*** | ***No. of days*** |
| Background reading and preparation of tools and methodology | 2 |
| Travel to Manila & Iloilo | 2 |
| In country briefings, stakeholder meetings and preparatory field work | 2 |
| Field Work and site visits | 5 |
| Debrief in the field | 1 |
| Travel to Iloilo & Manila | 1 |
| Stakeholder meetings in Manila | 1 |
| Travel to UK | 1 |
| Analysis and compiling of draft evaluation report | 5 |
| Complete final report | 2 |
| **Total** | **22 days** |

1. **DOCUMENTS**

* Programme Proposals and Programme Reports
* Reports by other agencies – UN and NGO
* Project monitoring data

# Annex A2: ToR and Questions answered per section

Some questions have been moved between sections from the original ToR in order to improve the flow of the report.

**The Relevance of the Intervention: Were appropriate choices made?**

***Identification/selection and registration of beneficiaries***

* How efficient were the selection criteria used to identify beneficiaries? Were the right people (disaster-affected and extreme poor) targeted?
* How participative and transparent was the selection criteria of the participants in the programme.
* To what extent were the assessment tools adequate for fully capturing beneficiary needs?

***Relevance***

* To what extent have objectives and strategies responded to the needs and priorities of our target groups and the various stakeholders at various stages?
* How well did the programme respond to the needs of the affected population within the local context?
* How well did the programme align with the needs as outlined by the clusters and other coordinating UN agencies and NGOs ?
* How has the analysis of hazards and risks contributed to the design of the programme?

**The Effectiveness of the Intervention: Was it done well?**

***Effectiveness***

* To what extent have the expected results of the Haiyan/Yolanda Response programme as identified in project log frames been achieved and what are the main factors that have enabled or impeded this achievement?
* How have programme interventions been redirected in response to results of on-going monitoring and how have the program indicators been used in this process?
* How have programme interventions been redirected in response to results of on-going consultations as well as routine monitoring and evaluation?
* What adaptations were made to fit the realities of the local context as the programme progressed?
* How were beneficiaries, communities, partner NGOs, Government Bodies involved in decision-making about changes in programme implementation strategies?
* How well did the programme ensure the contribution of local partner NGOs and Government Bodies in the delivery of outputs?
* To what degree was programme learning shared within the community and neighbouring communities, local authorities and other CBOs/NGOs (local and international)?
* Did the response benefit from engagement with the humanitarian architecture – clusters etc.
* How have equality issues been addressed, and how were issues related to poorer families and individuals and issues between men and women addressed?

***Accountability***

* To what extent was the level of engagement and awareness of beneficiaries/stakeholders in the design and implementation of the project sufficient to ensure optimum achievement of results?
* How effectively were complaints received and dealt with?
* How well is Concern’s Programme Participant Protection policy (P4) understood by the staff of Concern and its partners?
* How well were conflicts and programme issues resolved?

**The Efficiency of the Intervention: Were resources used well?**

***Efficiency & Management Issues***

* To what extent have the human resource levels, management and partnership structures been appropriate and effective in delivering the programme?
* To what extent was management able to respond to changing needs within the programme?
* How responsive has been the project’s management structure?
* How did the various components and support mechanisms of the intervention work and complement each other?
* How well did the programme ensure the timely and on-budget delivery of outputs?
* Has the programme been implemented in such a way as to give value for money for the attainment of the desired standards?

**The Impact of the Intervention: What difference will it make?**

***Impact***

* Have the programme objectives been achieved?
* How have the different activities improved economic and social resilience of affected population?
* How has the programme contributed to increased capacity to respond to and to withstand future shocks of this magnitude.
* Has the response reduced future vulnerabilities and has the programme helped build resilience to future shocks amongst the target group and the wider community? Are the infrastructures which were developed for the programme replicable and sustainable
* What have been the positive and/or negative effects of the programme on not directly targeted communities?
* What value do beneficiaries, stakeholders and communities attach to the outcomes achieved?

**The Sustainability of the Intervention: Will it last?**

***Sustainability – The level of connectedness and coherence of the response***

* Did the short term nature of the emergency activities take longer term issues into account – recovery and sustainability
* How have donor and national policy been influenced by this intervention?
* To what degree did we avail of advocacy opportunities

**Future Opportunities**

* Based on findings of the evaluation, make recommendations for future responses to similar emergency situations, both in terms of needs’ evaluation and programme design

# Annex B: People Interviewed

***Local Government***

* BG Captain – Botlog
* BG Captain – Bancal (Carles)
* BG Captain – Malot (Carles)
* Aileen – Department of Education, Municipality of Concepcion
* Delvy Balasbas – MDRRMO, Concepcion
* Emelinda Abian – LGU in charge of fisheries and conservation
* Jimmy David – Engineer, Provincial Office, Iloilo
* Julieto Manggasang – Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Focal Point in Carles
* Milliard Villanueva – Municipal Mayor, Concepcion
* Raul N. Banias - Provincial Administrator, Iloilo Province
* Siegfredo A. Betita – Municipal Vice Mayor, Carles

***Others***

* Coconut Farmer - Botlog
* Focus Groups (Concepcion) - Polopina, Botlog, Tambaliza, Malangabang, Bagongon, Bacjawan, Nipa,
* Focus Groups (Carles) – Bancal, Manlot, Barusbus,
* Water User Association – Tambelisa - President
* Water User Association – Tambelisa – Secretary

***Concern Staff***

* Alex – Construction Engineering Programme Officer
* Arnold – Logistics Officer
* Ernesto – Project Officer, Fisheries and Livelihoods Rehabilitation Programme
* Ferdie – Community Mobiliser
* Jess – Construction Engineering Programme Manager
* Judy – Project Support Officer, Fisheries and Livelihoods Rehabilitation Programme
* Maan – Fisheries and Livelihoods Rehabilitation Programme Coordinator
* May – Engineer, Water
* Novo – Coconut Rehabilitation, Fisheries and Livelihoods Rehabilitation Programme
* Per – Emergency Response Engineer
* Remy – Project Officer, Carles
* Roberta – Operations Support Officer
* Rose – Country Director
* Salvadore – Storekeeper, Carles
* Sam – Water Supply Programme Officer

***Other Orgs***

* Fernando Arroyo – previously of OCHA Roxas
* Fotini Rantsiou – OCHA Manila
* Gonzalo Atxaerandio – Save the Children, Estancia
* Dr Kamal Raj – DWHH, Panay
* Kenga Shandralingam – previously of OCHA Roxas

# Annex C: Detailed table of Interventions and Benefits

| **Description** | | | | ***Impact*** | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Activity** | **Location** | **Direct Beneficiaries** | **Description** | ***Immediate Needs*** | ***Increased Capacity to Cope after Disaster*** | ***Reduced Impact from Disasters*** | ***Added Benefits*** |
| Emergency (Phase 1) Activities | | | | | | | |
| NFI Distribution | Carles – 8 barangays  Concepcion – 21 barangays | 3,529 households (16,448 people)  7,475 households  (32,383 people)  ***Total***  11,004 households  (48,831 people) | 1 tarpaulin (4x6); 2 kilos of assorted nails; 1 tie wire; 1 tool pack (saw, hammer, plier, shovel, machete); 2 blankets; 2 mosquito nets; 1 kitchen set (pots, pan, cutlery); 2 jerry cans (10 liter); 10 bars of soap (5 bath and 5 laundry); and 1 solar lamp. | Emergency shelter, basic household items, basic hygiene supplies |  |  | Materials of good quality – many still useable after 1 year |
| Boat rehabilitation | Ajuy – 15 barangays  Carles – 17 barangays  Concepcion- 13 barangays | 3,526 households (16,280 people) | New (small motorised and non-motorised) boats to replace those totally destroyed; repair kits for those partially damaged; cash grants for those who had fixed their own boats. Beneficiary contribution to register, install outrigger and paint own boat.  All receive lost fishing equipment also.  946 new boats, 419 boat repair kits, 482 cash grants | Restoration of livelihood; communications to mainland; income generation for carpenters | Trained carpenters | Conditions of receiving: sign agreement for no illegal use and register with LGU – prevention of illegal fishing | Good quality boats - will require less maintenance |
| Cash Distributions | Negros Occidental | 11,569 households  (57,845 people) | For emergency shelter support, to compliment government grants. 2,000 Peso (€33) to each household | Emergency shelter and other immediate household needs |  |  |  |
| Fisheries Livelihoods Recovery Programme (FLRP) | | | | | | | |
| Aquaculture | Concepcion – 6 barangays | 99 households (495 people) | Training & seedlings supplied to individuals &/or barangay groups to replace previous farms. 18 seaweed farms, 46 oyster farms, 90 mussel farms | Restoration of livelihood income | Training & agreement to pass on to other households |  |  |
| Coral Rehabilitation | Concepcion – 3 barangays | (Indirect 15,210) | Replant 10,000 coral fragments on 600 purpose-made concrete jackstones placed on sea bed in marine protected areas (MPAs) (Expect 95% survival of coral fragments – some regrowth already seen) | Income for divers (selected equally from affected communities | Trained divers; kit handed over to LGU; protects from illegal fishing; replenishes coral (breeding/ hiding place for fish) |  | Divers spread conservation information back to own communities |
| Coconuts | Concepcion - 11 (island) barangays | 550 households (2,750 people) | 279,177 coconut trees treated for Brontispa infestation and Rhinocerous beetle | Restoration of livelihoods – fruit and copra (pig feed); leaves for roofing; timber |  | Communities and Philippine Coconut Authority knowledge to ID and deal with future problems | Community members as labourers (non-land owners prioritised - cash) |
| Reforestation | Concepcion – 2 barangays | (Indirect 1,920) | 17,500 indigenous trees replanted over 50 hectares of water catchment area | Income for barangay members (to source and plant trees) | Increase of livelihoods through fruit generation/ management | Watershed management; replacing trees used for boat building; silt protection that kills corals/ marine life; mudslide prevention |  |
| Mangroves | Concepcion – 11 barangays | 30 people trained  (Indirect 15,210) | Training, development of mangrove rehabilitation plan, sourcing and planting of 50,000 mangrove seedlings and construction of bamboo & stone breakwaters. In partnership with Zoological Society London. | Income for barangay members (to source and plant seedlings) | Regeneration of spawning/nursery areas for marine organisms so helping to increase fish stocks;  capacity building on planting/maintaining mangrove areas | Breakwaters are buffers for waves/storm surges so prevents coastal erosion and excess coastal flooding |  |
| Awareness Raising | Concepcion – 13 barangays | 6,772 people | Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) training and planning (11 barangays); Coastal Cleanup (13 barangays); Guard houses (for MPAs) (3 barangays); Fishing Ordinance translated to local language & 1000 copies for distribution by LGU (Carles)  School poster campaigns (Carles) |  | Increased capacity for environmental enhancement, which leads to livelihood protection/ enhancement (through prevention of illegal fishing, cleaner environment etc.) |  |  |
| LGU Support | Ajuy  Carles  Concepcion |  | Patrol boats x 3 (1 per municipality)  School boats x 2 (Carles)  Fish catchment monitoring | Labour wage for fish catch monitoring | Reduction in illegal fishing; increased opportunity to maintain education |  |  |
| Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Programme (CBDRRM) | | | | | | | |
| Water Supply Systems | Concepcion – 9 barangays | 1610 households (9,391 people) | Bladders and ‘trucking’ to Baliguian and Salvacion (during rehab of old wells);  Baliguian – rehab of community building roofs for rainwater harvesting system;  Other locations - spring catchment systems rehabilitated and extended including underwater pipes to additional sitios; Community selected water user committees established for ongoing management and maintenance | Basic safe water needs in sufficient quantities for 20 years;  Income generation (labour) | Prevents from navigating rough seas to buy water during/after storms; preserves money for other essentials; | Water sources will remain unpolluted by calamities | Divers used for both coral rehabiliation and pipe laying; management and maintenance fully handed over to water users committees; professional design of structures may influence other construction |
| Infrastructure/ Schools | Concepcion – 5 barangays | 1,393 pupils | Rehabilitation of 25 school classrooms and construction of 13 new classrooms  Replacement of public structure roofs in Baliguian |  | Continuation of education in the event of disasters | Provide evacuation centres during hazards | Better classrooms facilitate better teaching methods (e.g. information on walls); professional design of structures may influence other construction |
| Disaster Risk Reduction & Management Activities | Concepcion – 18 barangays | 34,392 people  (+ 31,395 indirect beneficiaries) | Training and contingency planning to create barangay disaster management plans. Provision of disaster management equipment |  | Prepositioning of basic supplies, capacity to respond when disasters hit | Minimisation of death, injury and damage to assets |  |
| Concourse construction | Negros Occidental | 723 HHs (3,615 people) | 1.2km of walkway and 4 footbridges. | Ability to access essential services and resources (e.g. schools) | Continued access to essential services and resources | Professional design will limit damage to infrastructure |  |

# Annex D: References

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# Annex E: Acronyms

BFAR Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources

CBDRRM Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Programme

CD Country Director

CFC Country Finance Controller

CRM Complaints response mechanism

DEC Disasters Emergencies Committee

DENR Department for Environment and Natural Resources

DRR Disaster Risk Reduction

DSWD Department of Social Welfare and Development

ECHO European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department

FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation

FLRP Fisheries Livelihoods Rehabilitation Programme

IOM International Organisation for Migration

LGU Local Government Unit

MPA Marine Protected Area

NFI Non-food item

NGO Non-governmental organisation

OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

P4 Programme Participant Protection Policy

UN United Nations

WUC Water User Committee

1. The smallest administrative division in the Philippines, and the native equivalent of a village [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Concepcion municipality is 89% water, 11% land [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. The terms of reference for the evaluation can be found in Annex A, along with the list of evaluation questions ordered by section in this report [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. This took place between 28th November and 7th December 2014 [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Ultimately, and thankfully, the typhoon decreased in intensity after first making landfall, and downgraded quickly to tropical storm level [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. For example, comments on the impact of an activity carry more weight from a beneficiary than they do from a staff member [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. As highlighted in the “Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010” [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Experience from the Haiti earthquake response in 2010 and the Indonesia tsunami response in 2004 has shown that shelter programmes are often over-ambitious and slow to achieve results, requiring significant support and engagement at national government level (on issues such as appropriate design, land ownership etc. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. See section on ‘Impact of the Intervention’ [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Elderly people already receive a monthly pension (paid every 3 months) through the Department of Social Welfare and Development so are assured a cash income even if unable to provide labour to the programme. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Programme Overview Apr 2014 [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. A highly appropriate approach, as identified in the ACAPS review Jan14 [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. OCHA situation report, 07 January 2014 [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. OCHA situation report, 07 January 2014 [↑](#footnote-ref-14)