

**SECOND EXTERNAL EVALUATION OF THE RENTAL SUPPORT CASH
GRANT APPLIED TO RETURN AND RELOCATION PROGRAMS IN
HAITI**

FINAL REPORT
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Executive Summary

This final evaluation report details the findings of the second external evaluation of the Rental Support Cash Grant (RSCG) programs, which were carried out in Haiti between 2010 and 2014. The programs were carried out by 10 implementing agencies that were part of this evaluation: CARE, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Concern Worldwide, GOAL, Helpage, Handicap International, the International Federation of Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), International Organization for Migration (IOM), J/P Haitian Relief Organization (J/P HRO) and World Vision (WVI). These organizations implemented a humanitarian response that included the distribution of a core RSCG package of US\$500 to allow beneficiaries to rent a property of their choice for one year as well as a second grant given 6 to 12 weeks after they leave the camp and a small amount of money to defray moving costs. Some organizations added livelihoods training and/or supplementary grants on top of this core package. The exception to the core package described is the CARE program, where the renters stayed for at least one year though in practice usually up to 2 years under a signed agreement with the property owner whose house is repaired in exchange for hosting a renter. Large-N Analysis Inc. was commissioned to undertake the evaluation, beginning in October and continuing to mid-December, 2014. Detailed Terms of Reference (TOR) for the evaluation can be found in Annex 1 of this final evaluation report.

The purpose of the evaluation was to understand whether program beneficiaries have been able to obtain and maintain safe and secure accommodation, and to what extent this is attributable to the Rental Support Cash Grant (RSCG) programs. Secondly, the evaluation was to consider the relevance, efficiency and management of the programs (See the Evaluation Matrix in Annex 2 for further details on the evaluation's key questions). The broader purpose of the evaluation was to inform future programming and granting activities in the post-disaster context of Haiti. To that end, the report contains a series of evaluation conclusions/lessons learned and recommendations for future initiatives.

Evaluation Context & Approach

The 12 January 2010 earthquake in Haiti destroyed hundreds of thousands of homes and displaced approximately 1.5 million people, most of who moved into approximately 1500 formal and informal camps largely concentrated in the capital of Port-au-Prince. The RSCG programs were intended to help the most vulnerable populations, those individuals who were relocated to the Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps. The cash grant programs were viewed as a potentially viable way to relocate a large number of people and to permanently close the IDP camps.

The evaluation of the programs consisted of a mixed-methods analysis of program documentation, semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders, and a survey of program beneficiaries (heads of households). The survey was conducted from October 21 to November 7, with an additional sample collected between November 14 and 17. The survey analysis consists of 2234 individuals who were surveyed (a head of household who represents a family of beneficiaries). Given the number of households (49,621) relocated during the period under evaluation – from the beginning of the program in 2010 to September 2013 – the analysis of the survey sample is at the 95% confidence level, with a 2% margin of error (MoE). In lieu of the inter-agency comparison originally specified in the TORs, the evaluation Steering Committee opted to carry out a secondary 'by-group' analysis, which is a comparative approach whereby implementing agencies could be roughly grouped according to program type (RSCG core program only, RSCG core program + livelihoods training, RSCG core program + additional

cash grant). The findings below reference the aggregate (overall) analysis and where specified, the by-program type comparison.

Findings

Overall Effectiveness

We found strong evidence that recipients of the RSCG obtained safe and secure rental accommodation, an observation that holds true across gender and age groups. Indeed, when asked about their perceptions of safety before and after the earthquake, respondents overwhelmingly reported feeling safe at both temporal points. One notable observation is that there was a positive change in perceptions of safety among 69% of respondents who had previously felt ‘somewhat unsafe’ in their pre-RSCG living environment, and a positive change in perceptions of safety among 58% of respondents who had previously felt ‘very unsafe’. In other words, the transition from pre-earthquake accommodation to the rental-subsidy program represented a positive change for approximately 10% of the surveyed population (211 of 2234 total respondents).

There is also strong evidence that recipients of the RSCG either maintained their existing safe and secure rental accommodation or obtained new accommodation that was perceived as safe and secure after the end of the grant period (49% of respondents reported moving, while 51% remained in the same housing). Significantly, there was little evidence of program beneficiaries moving on account of feeling unsafe in their RSCG rental housing, nor did the physical condition of housing appear to be a motivation for moving. Evaluations of the condition of the housing were scarcely different between the respondents that moved and those who remained in RSCG housing.

An important finding related to the first two is that the RSCG played a significant role in obtaining safe and secure accommodation, both during the grant period and after its completion. This analysis is based on the fact that few respondents reported receiving supplementary cash or benefits from a non-RSCG program in addition to their RSCG benefits – thus their situation was linked to the RSCG programming rather than to other humanitarian aid given.

Regarding socio-economic well-being, beneficiary self-assessment found that this had significantly improved as a result of the RSCG; yet more objective measures indicate that beneficiaries’ situation was largely in line with their pre-earthquake levels. More specifically, over 85% of respondents reported that the Rental Support program either ‘somewhat’ or ‘very much’ improved their safety over the long term. Relatedly, while the RSCG provided adequate funding for the beneficiaries to remain in safe and secure accommodation throughout the time of their subsidy, it had limited carryover in terms of longer term saving for accommodation. That being said, it is important to note that any money saved would be viewed as a positive externality of the program, but was not a motivating goal of the RSCG.

Similar to socio-economic well-being, respondents reported a positive economic outlook after having completed the grant yet more objective measures were more muted – for example, monthly income remained stable (i.e. did not substantively decline) from pre-earthquake levels among those respondents who resumed self-employment. Approximately one-third of respondents were unable to revive their previous livelihood.

Regarding the survey process, there is no substantive difference in terms of age, gender, community or agency-support composition of the group of recipients that were surveyed and could not be found to those who were surveyed. There was however a lower level of response among younger program beneficiaries between the age of 18 and 24, as is typical of surveys in general. This could be an indicator of higher levels of mobility in this respondent group.

Overall, the RSCG programs were enabled by their adaptation to the particular context in Haiti, by relative consensus on the approach between key actors and because they were reasonably flexible. Challenges related to data – in terms of the absorptive capacity of the rental housing market, weak tracking of beneficiaries, and poor understanding of the impact of the programs on the local community and the local economy – to some degree impacted upon overall effectiveness, and more fundamentally the relative success of the RSCG programs muted pressure for full consideration of alternative approaches.

Effectiveness by Program Type

There was not a strong relationship between being the beneficiary of a particular program type and reported level of safety and security. To the extent that these relationships did suggest any difference across recipient groups, the differences were marginal. There is also no perceptible link between respondents who reported positive economic opportunities/outlook, and those who received livelihoods training or an additional cash grant in addition to the RSCG core package. However, those respondents who received the RSCG core package plus a supplemental cash grant had a higher than average likelihood of starting a small business.

Relevance

The programs were highly relevant to the local context in Haiti at the time of implementation and to the beneficiaries, since camp residents were increasingly seeking to leave the camps for reasons that included mass evictions by landlords, the generalized insecurity and violence, and the serious health issues in many of them; yet due to land access issues and low resource levels, renting was the preferred option. At the same time, there was pressure from government to close the camps down. The programs were furthermore relevant to the priorities of the implementing agencies, to funders and to the Government of Haiti.

Efficiency & Management

The RSCG programs were largely successful at identifying and reaching their intended beneficiaries through a methodology that excluded non-camp residents who sought to benefit from the RSCG programs yet that also included an appeals process to ensure that those excluded could petition for inclusion. The programs also did so in the expected numbers given the limitations of the rental housing market (which was the main brake on the pace of programmatic implementation).

The RSCG programs were quite effectively coordinated through a Cluster approach that brought together the relevant actors on a regular basis and that helped to ensure the relatively smooth functioning of the humanitarian response. It should be pointed out that there was some disagreement between implementing agencies and the Government of Haiti regarding the balance between humanitarian vs development programming, though this has not had a significant impact on coordination to this point.

Finally, while program activities seem to have been conducted within planned timelines, data gaps for particular organizations as well as lack of documentation for other organizations make it impossible to draw definitive conclusions about the usage of financial resources and the appropriateness of program monitoring.

Conclusions

The rental support cash grant programs have been a successful response to the particular circumstances extant in Haiti at the time of their implementation. The effectiveness of the programs was underlined by the fact that beneficiaries overwhelmingly obtained and maintained safe and secure rental accommodation both during and beyond the end of the grant period. This observation was true across gender and age groups. And significantly, there is good evidence linking these results with the RSCG.

The beneficiary survey data showed that beneficiaries enjoyed improvements as a result of the RSCG. It also seems clear that the RSCG programs provided adequate funding for beneficiaries to remain in safe and secure accommodation throughout the course of the grant period, though with limited impact on longer-term economic well-being. In this sense, they maintained their overarching goal as a humanitarian response. The effectiveness of the programs was enabled by their adaptation to the particular context in Haiti, though challenges related to data to some degree impacted upon overall effectiveness. Relatedly, the programs were eminently relevant to respond to the needs and priorities of beneficiaries, as well as to the contextual challenges that existed in Haiti during the time of implementation. They were well aligned with the priorities of the Haitian government, the implementing agencies and the donors, and their combined management through a cluster approach was relatively smooth given the conditions and number of actors involved. Taken together then, these conclusions underline that the RSCG programs were a success given the outcomes sought.

Lessons Learned

In order for an intervention like the rental support cash grant programs to be successful, it must be sensitive to and reflective of the needs and limitations of the particular context. Notwithstanding the challenges experienced, the lesson from the RSCG programs is that they can be a highly effective tool for responding to a humanitarian crisis of this nature when they are put in place based on a close analysis of the particular context, particularly the nature of the challenge and its scale, access to land for building vs. renting and the time pressures, as well as the resources available.

Humanitarian contexts change over time, thus relocation programs should remain flexible and should adapt to those changing circumstances. Some implementing agencies adjusted to the changing RSCG context over the multi-year implementation period, for example by changing the mix of their beneficiary package, much more than others. Such proactive adaptation is crucial to the success of a response, yet there is often a temptation to find a successful approach and then to stick with it even if there are diminishing returns. There is therefore a need to build in mechanisms for change and adaptation in a response, and to manage such change proactively.

Information is a valuable commodity in a humanitarian context, in terms of implementation but also in terms of planning. Putting resources into information gathering and analysis of that information should

be a priority, coupled with building in mechanisms to ensure that new data filters up to decision-makers so as to inform both the implementation and the planning processes. Information also needs to be shared between relevant key actors, with particular efforts made to avoid duplication.

Coordination and communication are crucial success factors in a complex response, particularly when humanitarian priorities begin to overlap with development priorities. In a context with deep developmental challenges such as in Haiti, overall response effectiveness also depends upon facilitating the gradual move toward a developmental response by coordinating between humanitarian and development actors and ensuring a smooth blend between their various activities. This process requires joined up thinking in terms of better linking the humanitarian and development funding apparatus to ensure cohesive planning and activities.

Recommendations

Recommendation 1: Implementing agencies, likely under the coordination of the Cluster, should gather more complete information on availability and inflation in the rental housing market, should update it on a regular basis, and should share it with other key actors. (Related to Finding 8)

Recommendation 2: Implementing agencies should gather more data on beneficiaries and should keep contact information up to date, in order to effectively adapt interventions and to facilitate follow up with beneficiaries. (Related to Finding 8)

Recommendation 3: To ensure effective adaptation and the ongoing effectiveness of a particular RSCG intervention, a small number of beneficiaries should be followed up with at multiple points during and immediately after their grant period. (Related to Finding 8)

Recommendation 4: The development and sharing of learning tools through the Cluster is a strong initiative that should be continued and enhanced. (Related to Finding 13)

Recommendation 5: The impact of livelihoods programming and extra funding should be comparatively evaluated in a future evaluation. (Related to findings 8, 9 and 10)

Recommendation 6: The impact of the RSCG programs on the local community and local economy should also be evaluated in a future evaluation, to better understand any negative or positive consequences of the programming beyond simply the beneficiaries. (Related to Finding 8)

A c r o n y m s

Acronym	
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CCCM	Camp Coordination and Camp Management
CCCM/SC	CCCM/Shelter Cluster
DFATD	Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development
DIFD	United Kingdom's Department for International Development
DMU	IOM Data Management Unit
DPC	Displacement Registration Card
ECHO	The European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies
IOM	The International Organization for Migration
J/P HRO	J/P Haitian Relief Organization
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MoE	Margin of Error
OCHA	The United Nations Secretariat's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ONACA	Office National des Cadastres
RSCG	Rental Support Cash Grant
SAG	Strategic Advisory Group
TOR	Terms of Reference
TWiGs	Technical Working Groups
UCLBP	Unité de Construction de Logements et de Bâtiments Publics
WVI	World Vision International

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1. Introduction

This Evaluation Report presents the findings of the second external evaluation of the Rental Support Cash Grant (RSCG) applied to return and relocation programs in Haiti. The report is organized into five sections, as follows:

- Section 1: Introduction
- Section 2: Context and Purpose of the Evaluation
- Section 3: Findings
- Section 4: Conclusions / Lessons Learned
- Section 5: Recommendations

The report also contains seven appendices that supplement the information contained in the main body of the report.

- Annex 1: Terms of Reference
- Annex 2: Evaluation Matrix
- Annex 3: List of persons interviewed
- Annex 4: List of documents consulted
- Annex 5: Survey Questionnaire for Heads of Household
- Annex 6: Interview Protocols
- Annex 7: Data by Implementing Agency

2. Context and Purpose of the Evaluation

2.1 CONTEXT

The 12 January 2010 earthquake in Haiti destroyed hundreds of thousands of homes and displaced approximately 1.5 million people, most of who moved into approximately 1500 formal and informal camps largely concentrated in the capital of Port-au-Prince.¹ The humanitarian response to the earthquake was coordinated through a cluster approach with various stakeholders that included the Government of Haiti, donors and humanitarian agencies. One of the most pressing priorities for the stakeholders was to help find shelter solutions for the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Broadly speaking, there were ultimately five different solutions adopted: Transitional Shelters (T-shelters); Yellow House Repairs; Rental vs. retrofitting; Permanent Housing Reconstruction; and Rental Support Cash Grants.

The initial emphasis after the earthquake was on providing T-Shelters as well as repairing Yellow Houses (so-called based on an engineer's assessment that the house was in need of repair) and building new housing. However by early 2011, people were increasingly seeking to leave the camps for reasons that included mass evictions by landlords, the generalized insecurity and violence, and the serious health issues in many of them.² There was also pressure from the government to close the camps down, to keep them from becoming permanent settlements but also to enable people to begin to get their lives back on track. Moving people out of the camps and closing them down thus became a higher priority for the various humanitarian actors, and Rental Support Cash Grants (RSCGs) became an increasingly important strategy used to help them carry it out. By 2012, they had become the primary displacement-related intervention being carried out.³

The shift in emphasis to Rental Support is because by 2011, the camp residents with access to land upon which to build or a home requiring repair had almost all left the camps;⁴ at the same time, those who were still in the camps had almost all been renters before the earthquake and did not have access to land.⁵ Thus the housing solutions that had been pursued up to that point could not be as effective for the

1 This section draws upon the Terms of Reference for the assignment.

2 <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/24/world/americas/24haiti.html>

3 Sherwood, Angela, Megan Bradley, Lorenza Rossi, Rosalia Gitau and Bradley Mellicker. March 2014. Supporting Durable Solutions to Urban, Post-Disaster Displacement: Challenges and Opportunities in Haiti. Brookings Institute, pg. 16.

4 Fitzgerald, Emmett. "Helping Families, Closing Camps: Using Rental Support Cash Grants and Other Housing Solutions to End Displacement in Camps: A Tool Kit of Best Practice and Lessons Learned Haiti 2010-2012", p 15.

5 Lack of access to land is an especially important issue in Haiti and even more so in Port-au-Prince. Indeed, the country is one of the world's poorest and one of the Western hemisphere's most densely populated, with Port-au-Prince in particular already growing by over 100,000 people a year before the earthquake. This already overstretched housing situation was pushed past the breaking point by the earthquake's destruction of housing stock and by a net influx of people into the city after the earthquake who were likely seeking to benefit from the large-scale humanitarian assistance that was focused on the capital.

See: Sherwood, Angela, Megan Bradley, Lorenza Rossi, Rosalia Gitau and Bradley Mellicker. March 2014. Supporting Durable Solutions to Urban, Post-Disaster Displacement: Challenges and Opportunities in Haiti. Brookings Institute, pg. 13, and interviews conducted for this evaluation.

remaining IDPs, and rental support came to be seen as the best option for helping them to leave and for closing camps efficiently.

The Rental Support Cash Grant approach was first carried out on a large-scale in post-earthquake Haiti in early 2011 by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) as well as by Concern Worldwide. More specifically, the IFRC's Federation-wide Strategic Framework of April 2011 introduced rental solutions, and these enjoyed very strong beneficiary uptake as well as supporting larger organizational efforts directed at camp decongestion.⁶ Concern's Camp Oscar Pilot Project was launched in January 2011 and sought to "guide camp residents away from camp service dependency and to find more durable shelter solutions" with a variety of assistance options, including rent assistance.⁷ Both of these early usages of rental support informed the subsequent, more widespread usage of the approach by these organizations as well by the various other humanitarian actors. Also significant in informing the later usage of the approach was the 16/6 project, whose returns component included rental support for one year. Notably, the 16/6 project helped to systematize many aspects of the programs.⁸

Rental support was provided by 10 implementing agencies:⁹

- CARE;
- Catholic Relief Services;
- Concern Worldwide;
- Goal;
- Handicap International
- Helpage;
- International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies;
- International Organization for Migration;
- J/P Haitian Relief Organization; and,
- World Vision International.

The Rental Support Cash Grant (RSCG) programs consist of a US\$500 rental subsidy to allow beneficiaries to rent a property of their choice for one year. The exception to this is the CARE program, where the renters stay for at least one year though in practice usually up to 2 years under a signed agreement with the property owner whose house is repaired in exchange for hosting a renter.¹⁰ If the agreed-upon rent is less than US\$500, the family can keep the remaining amount of the rental subsidy. Most of the implementing agencies also provide a small grant of approximately US\$25 to pay for moving out of the camp and into the new home, while all provide a second payment of between US\$125 and US\$250 if the family is still living in the home when a surprise verification visit is carried out between 6 and 12 weeks

6 Rees-Gildea, Peter. March 2012. "Haiti: Recovery Shelter Programme Review".

7 Return to Neighborhoods: Concern's Camp Oscar Pilot Project, from Concern Worldwide, 2011.

8 http://www.projet16-6.org/factsheet/Factsheet_December_2012.pdf

9 An 11th organization, Mouvmfan Famn Aktif Kafou (MOFKA), also carried out relocations on a small scale, though they are not part of this evaluation.

10 It should be noted that the CARE program represents a very small proportion of the total number of beneficiaries under the RSCG programs.

after they leave the camp.¹¹ Some implementing agencies also provide a further cash grant, while others provide livelihoods and other complementary programming, more specifically life skills training as well as livelihood and education grants. Additionally, some agencies offer health and psychosocial screening and referral.

The RSCG programs are documented as having helped approximately 75,000 beneficiaries up to October 2014, though this number under-represents the true number of beneficiaries, as it only refers to heads of households who were registered to officially represent their family unit. The size of each family unit of course varies – thus the number of actual beneficiaries of the programs is in fact considerably higher than 75,000.

2.2 EVALUATION OBJECTIVES

This evaluation represents the second external evaluation of the Rental Support Cash Grant (RSCG) applied to return and relocation programs in Haiti.¹² The evaluation objectives are to understand whether program beneficiaries (including landlords) have been able to obtain and maintain safe and secure accommodation after a year of rental subsidy, and to unpack the extent to which this is attributable to the RSCG. Secondly, the evaluation is to consider the efficiency of the RSCG's implementation (in terms of its usage of human and financial resources), as well as its relevance. Stemming from this report, the evaluation will also develop a series of lessons learned and recommendations for future implementations. While the original Terms of Reference for this evaluation asked for an assessment of the socio-economic impact on the local economy where Internally Displaced Persons were re-housed, this component was dropped after discussions with the Evaluation Steering Committee during the inception phase of the assignment. The original methodology for the evaluation also called for separate analysis of the data for each implementing agency, though this element was dropped after discussions with the Evaluation Steering Committee in favour of a more high-level comparative analysis that relied on groupings of implementing agencies with shared programming approaches (see Section 2.3.1.3 for a more detailed discussion of this decision).

The evaluation is to serve as a donor accountability tool, as a Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) tool that can inform current programs, as a tool to shape current development projects in the areas of return and to inform the work of development actors in Haiti, and finally as a tool to more broadly inform future emergency or post-disaster relief programs in urban environments like Haiti through lessons learned.

It is important to underline that this evaluation is considering multiple programs, each run by a particular implementing agency though coordinated through the cluster approach. In general, the report's analysis will consider the programs as a whole; however, where specifically noted and particularly in section 3.2, the focus is a comparative analysis of the three groupings of implementing agencies (those that provided the rental subsidy only, those that provided the rental subsidy and livelihoods, and those that provided the rental subsidy and a supplementary cash grant).

11 Fitzgerald, Emmett. "Helping Families, Closing Camps: Using Rental Support Cash Grants and Other Housing Solutions to End Displacement in Camps: A Tool Kit of Best Practice and Lessons Learned Haiti 2010-2012", pp 19-20.

12 The first external evaluation was carried out between September and January 2013 by the WolfGroup Performance Consultants; the report is entitled "External evaluation of the Rental Support Cash Grant Approach Applied to Return and Relocation Programs in Haiti".

2.3 EVALUATION FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

This evaluation framework identifies the main questions informing the study and provides the plan to answer these questions, supported by evidence provided in the beneficiary survey, interviews and document review. It defines the key terms and provides the sources of data, data collection instruments, and approach to analysis. In particular, this section details in prose the broad aspects of the methodology in the form of an evaluation matrix in Annex 2.

The evaluation matrix is an organizational tool that thematically groups evaluation questions to reflect the major issues of concern to the program. Further, as relevant, the matrix sub-divides the elements of the main questions into sub-questions that explicitly address the relevant issues under investigation. As such, the answers to these sub-questions work together to answer the overall questions, and are the primary focus of the data collection. The matrix also provides a structure to ensure that multiple data sources are used to answer each question, and a mix of stakeholder views is sought during the process to ensure balance and accuracy to the greatest extent possible. This evaluation's matrix is structured around the key evaluation criteria of effectiveness, efficiency, management and relevance.

This evaluation assignment was carried out in conformity with international evaluation standards including OECD-DAC and UNEG principles and guidelines. The evaluation was evidence-based and utilization focused, subject to the limitations of the resources available. Stakeholder participation was sought and incorporated into the evaluation team's understanding of the information collected, analysis performed, findings presented, recommendations made, and results disseminated. The consultants are independent, thus the conclusions reached are those of the evaluation team.

2.3.1 Data Collection Methods

The evaluation team employed a mixed-methods approach to data collection that included a desk review of documents, semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders, and a survey of program beneficiaries (heads of households). These elements will be described in more detail in the sub-sections below. All methods of data collection were based on a utilization focused approach emphasising lessons learned and good practices with an aim of informing future programming.

2.3.1.1 Document Review

An initial review of available documents was undertaken during the inception phase of this evaluation, serving to provide key background information to inform the other methods to be used, as well as identifying gaps in knowledge and data sources. Another round of document review was undertaken as part of the data analysis phase, focusing particularly on documents received from the implementing agencies and funders during the data collection phase. The methodology adopted in reviewing documents was based on content analysis, and was aimed at deepening understanding of the programs as well as overall coordination of the programs.

The documents reviewed included the following types of documents (for a complete list of documents reviewed, please see Annex 4):

- Planning and reporting documents, including evaluation reports

- Publications and brochures related to the programs
- Financial planning and reporting documents related to the programs

2.3.1.2 Semi-Structured Interviews

A total of 28 semi-structured interviews were carried out as part of the data collection phase. The interviewees were primarily identified in concert with IOM, though also included some relevant individuals identified by the evaluation team as well as based upon recommendations by particular funders and agencies. Interviews were conducted with the following categories of respondents:

- Program staff or financial staff with knowledge of program implementation (or sometimes with both) at eight of the ten implementing agencies;¹³
- Representatives of the programs' funders;
- Individuals with knowledge of the Cluster coordination mechanism;
- Representatives of the Government of Haiti with knowledge of the programs; and,
- Other key informants with direct knowledge of the programs and the Haitian post-earthquake context.

The semi-structured interviews were organised around the main themes of the evaluation matrix, as detailed in the interview protocols developed for each key informant group (see Annex 6). For each interviewee, questions were asked according to their potential and actual familiarity with the different components of the programs or of their coordination, based upon the questions and sub-questions in the evaluation matrix. As such, the exact structure and content of the interview was tailored according to the flow of the interview, the knowledge of the interviewee and the information received.

A detailed list of interviewees can be found in Annex 3.

2.3.1.3 Survey

It was noted earlier that the evaluation's primary concern is to understand whether program beneficiaries have been able to obtain and maintain safe and secure accommodation and to what extent this can be attributed to the RSCG. As a result, the survey is considered the primary data collection tool employed to understand the impact of the program on beneficiaries.

Survey Development

The evaluation team carried out a survey of program beneficiaries (heads of households) who had completed a year of rental subsidy by a Rental Support Cash Grant program.¹⁴ The goal of the survey was to engage the individuals who had participated in an RSCG program, and to determine whether the

¹³ Interviews were actively sought but ultimately were not possible with the remaining two agencies (The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and The J/P Haitian Relief Organization).

¹⁴ These time constraints were relaxed for CARE as the term for their RSCG support was longer than a year thus very few beneficiaries were available who had completed the program at the time of the evaluation.

program had a direct impact on their personal and economic well-being with a particular focus on whether they have been able to obtain and maintain safe and secure accommodation.

As suggested above, the survey sampling frame was designed to not only provide a representative sample of the over 49,621 heads of household who took part in the program in the allotted time frame and who were included in the databases provided by the implementing agencies who participated in the study, but also to provide robust statistical analysis by implementing agency that could be examined for information on successful implementation.

During the inception meeting with the Evaluation Steering Committee meeting, it was suggested that IOM had the ability to conduct up to 4000 interviews in the time allocated for survey data collection, based on an estimate of 4-5 interviews per day by each team of enumerators, with an estimate of approximately 20-30 minutes per interview (for a total of 60-90 minutes including travel time). Given these estimates, the Committee proposed that 4000 interviews would be achievable in the 16-20 day survey data collection period. After meeting with the Data Management Project Manager and the IOM Data Management Unit to discuss their data collection capabilities in Haiti's challenging survey context, we thus took 4000 surveys as an upper bound for our sample design. We were however prepared to accept some reduction in the number of surveys collected in the event of challenges in the field.

The sampling frame was therefore structured to provide an overall representative sample of the entirety of the programs (not disaggregated by agency) at the 95% confidence level, with a 2% margin of error (MoE), as well as representative samples of each implementing agency at 95% confidence level, with a margin of error of +/-4.5%, which could be altered to 5% (or higher) should the data collection team be unable to meet the required targets. We also included a 10% oversample for some groups in order to offset some predicted issues with evaluating data that was stratified by implementing agency, particularly for those agencies with small beneficiary populations. This was meant to help better secure representativeness in these smaller population groups.

Upon receiving the database of eligible heads of household from IOM during the inception mission – which included beneficiaries of IOM's program as well as those from the other implementing agencies' programs – respondents were selected at random from each implementing agency to meet the desired target sample (see Table 1, columns 1-2). Those beneficiaries that had been included in the pilot selection and those beneficiaries where there was no valid address and phone number were excluded from the selection process. Table 1 presents the preliminary sample:

Table 1. Initial Sample Targets

Implementing Agency	Heads of Household	Original Sample (4.5% MoE) w/ oversample
CARE	416	256
Concern	4,011	489
CRS	1,190	391
GOAL	709	329
HAI	740	339
Handicap International	122	113
IFRC	4970	501
IOM	30,177	562
J/P HRO	4618	501
World Vision	2,668	465
Total	49,621	3,946¹⁵

Questionnaire Development

The survey questionnaire was developed to address the main question in the evaluation matrix, related to the effectiveness of the programs in relation to beneficiaries. The principal question underscoring the survey development was, “Has the Rental Support Cash Grant program allowed beneficiaries to obtain and maintain safe and secure accommodation”. Specific questions also drew upon the questions contained in the document *Annex 2, Methodology* (part of the bundle of documents put out with the original call for proposals). The design of the survey was meant to target questions about perceived levels of personal safety, the maintenance of safe and secure accommodation, individual and familial well-being, as well as economic security for respondents in their rental housing units. Temporal periods targeted included the beneficiaries’ status/living situation prior to the earthquake and the beneficiaries’ status/living situation post-earthquake, with efforts made to understand potential causal factors in change of living situation.

The final survey instrument was designed to take enumerators no longer than 20-30 minutes per interview. Interviews were carried out in Creole. To ensure the enumerators were able to complete the survey in a timely fashion, we limited the number of open ended questions, instead choosing to use a structure that employed targeted follow up questions in cases where respondents reported sub-optimal conditions. The survey is designed to be conducted face-to-face. Responses would be recorded through the use of a personal handheld device (BlackBerry), provided by IOM to the enumerator for the duration of the surveying process.

¹⁵ Of which 3,516 were eligible for the survey as they were in metropolitan Port-au-Prince, the area where the IOM survey teams were able to carry out data collection.

A draft survey instrument was provided to the Steering Committee during the inception phase, and the resulting comments and feedback were incorporated into the final draft. The IOM Data Management Unit provided useful suggestions on the survey in terms of response categories and question wording, particularly highlighting essential contextual factors around geography, existing living accommodations post-earthquake, and inter-program differences in implementation.

Pilot Study

To ensure the appropriateness of the survey instrument and the timing of face-to-face interviews, as well as to uncover any potential issues with the survey questions in practice, the evaluation team conducted a pilot study. The pilot study was preceded by enumerator training, which took place on Monday October 20, 2014. Some technical issues (lack of SIM cards for all of the BlackBerry devices) caused the pilot to be pushed back to Tuesday October 21, 2014. It was carried out in Tabarre, which was selected due to its physical proximity to IOM, as well as the size of the beneficiary population in the commune. A total of 265 beneficiaries were selected at random from Tabarre across multiple agencies as potential participants in the pilot. A follow-up workshop was then held on Tuesday afternoon with the enumerators and a representative of IOM's survey team. Enumerators shared their experiences in the field and made recommendations for updates to the survey questions and suggestions for how to successfully reach beneficiaries in the field. The survey was updated that evening, with small changes made to the wording of questions and to the order of questions based on the enumerators' feedback.

Overall, the pilot demonstrated that the length of the survey was appropriate. It also allowed for adjustments to question wording and helped enumerators to be clear about techniques for finding beneficiaries as well as how to carry out the survey. The survey was officially launched on the morning of Wednesday October 22, 2014.

Survey Considerations and Sampling Re-Evaluation

By the end of the data collection process on November 7, it became apparent that the desired total of beneficiaries (3,946) would not be met. Upon cleaning, recoding and analysing the initial sample's data, it was evident that the survey teams had conducted 1724 surveys with complete (or near complete) information. An additional 426 had been included in the dataset, but were excluded from analysis because the records only contained socio-demographic information (and not survey data) from the implementing agency's original database.

These data were examined for two factors: (1) organizational representation (i.e. were there enough respondents from each implementing agency?); and (2) quality of responses recorded and volume of missing data. Upon review, it became clear that, despite the effort put forth by IOM's survey team, the required response-per-implementing-agency thresholds as set out in Table 1 had not been met. The evaluation team reviewed the data, and examined possibilities for reducing the level of statistical robustness (i.e. increasing the margin of error) to work with the existing data. After consultation with the IOM survey team, it was decided that the initial random draw (of 3,946 respondents) should be supplemented with another random draw based on how many additional interviews were required, and that the enumerators should go back into the field to collect a boost sample.

The purpose of a boost sample is to increase the number of respondents while maintaining the integrity of the stratified random sampling technique set out in the inception report through random selection. In order to maintain the original specifications (95% confidence level, 4.5% margin of error), we would have required a boost sample of over 1200 individuals. Given the significant time constraints, the evaluation team instead proposed a boost sample that would provide a 95% confidence level and a 5% margin of error. This reduced the targets to more moderate levels for data collection, while still maintaining an acceptable convention of statistical significance when disaggregating by implementing agency.

Table 2. Data Collection

Implementing Agency	Heads of Household	Original Sample (4.5% MoE) w/ oversample	Actual Valid (Collected as of November 7, 2014)	Proposed Sample (95% CL, 5% MoE)	Actual Valid (Collected as of November 17, 2014)
CARE	416	256	61	200	138
Concern	4,011	489	299	351	394
CRS	1,190	391	233	291	233
GOAL	709	329	120	249	140
HAI	740	339	168	253	198
Handicap International	122	113	36	93	41
IFRC	4970	501	138	357	182
IOM	30,177	562	314	379	466
J/P HRO	4618	501	222	355	250
World Vision	2,668	465	143	336	192
Total	49,621	3,946	1,724	2,718	2,234

*Note that because of the small original population of Handicap International heads of household (N=122), the original sample accounted for over 90% of the heads of household population. This high threshold was set in order to meet the outlined confidence level and margin of error. From a practical perspective, however, it was known that meeting this criterion would likely not be possible. Thus the targeted 53 responses should be understood as having been a theoretical target.

After receiving the second round of data collection on November 17, 2014, the analysis team reviewed the data and determined that the numbers provided would be sufficient to provide a robust level of analysis of the programs in their entirety (95% confidence level, 2.1% margin of error with no disaggregation by implementing agency), but still did not meet the abovementioned level of statistical robustness for agency-specific evaluation (see Table 2). Given the by-now very tight time constraints for the completion of the project, the analysis team proposed three scenarios to IOM and the Steering Committee:

Option 1: Trying again to reach our optimal level of methodological robustness (a sample with a 95% confidence level and a margin of error of 5%). This would have required going out in the field again for several days (possibly 4) to collect a further 757 respondents.

Option 2: Foregoing the ‘optimal’ arrangement described in Option 1 and trying for what we agreed was the outside limit of acceptable methodological convention for inter-agency comparison (a sample with a 95% confidence level and a margin of error of 6.5%). In this scenario, we would have needed to go back into the field, but only to obtain 145 more respondents.

Option 3: To go with the data as is and to not include data broken down by organization within the main report at all, though to insert some data by organization into an Annex.

For the draft final report, option 3 was selected. However, at the presentation of the draft final report in Port-au-Prince (December 1, 2014), the Steering Committee indicated strong interest in again exploring the option of inter-agency comparison as well as another comparative approach whereby implementing agencies could be roughly grouped according to program type (RSCG core program only, RSCG core program + livelihoods training, RSCG core program + additional cash grant) and the different groupings compared. The evaluation team determined that, with the data already collected, comparing groupings was within acceptable parameters of methodological rigour, though with the caveat that the findings could only be considered to be a descriptive analysis and not a causal argument about how program type impacted upon outcomes. This is because with the survey alone, it was not possible to rule out competing causal reasoning as to how program type impacted upon outcomes. Thus additional analysis was added to this final report based on the rough groupings of implementing agencies according to program type.

2.3.2 Data Analysis

Data collected during the document review and the interviews as well as through the survey was subjected to qualitative and quantitative analyses. We detail our data sources in the evaluation matrix, however, where possible, data were triangulated across respondents and between data sources in order to ensure its empirical validity. The analysis was based on the logical framework of the project as well as on content analysis of responses to interviews and of project documentation and analysis (using Stata) of survey data. This allowed the evaluation team to assess the project’s effectiveness, relevance, efficiency and management.

Important to note is that we examined the final survey dataset for quality in terms of completeness and consistency across respondent answers. Examples of issues considered included whether or not a particular respondent answered all the questions, and whether or not they gave one response at the beginning of the survey and a contradictory response later on in the survey. While there were a few missing answers across survey questions (usually in the order of 5% or less – not at a level, therefore, that pose problems with non-response), overall we found the data to be of very high quality.

2.4 RISKS, LIMITATIONS AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES

The methodology was designed to produce a quality evaluation in accordance with OECD-DAC and UNEG evaluation standards, within the constraints presented by the available budget and time. Any

methodological choice implies limitations. Furthermore, given the iterative nature of data collection in a post-disaster recovery context, there were some challenges that arose during the data collection process. The table below summarises the main constraints and presents the mitigation strategies adopted over and above the survey issues – such as the late arrival of SIM cards and the decision to focus on the aggregate results of the programs – described in section 2.3.1.3.

Limitation/Risk	Mitigation Strategy
Significant numbers of documents from various implementing agencies arrived very late in the data collection process, and three agencies did not share any documentation at all.	Multiple attempts were made to obtain documents, including follow-up requests and asking for them in-person during interviews. We also extended our data collection period to be able to draw upon late-arriving documents. We ultimately had to accept that some documents would not be coming, with attendant impacts upon evaluation data.
Owing to the potential for high mobility among program beneficiaries and high rates of change in contact information (addresses and telephone numbers), it was expected that the enumeration team would encounter challenges in finding and interviewing all individuals on the first randomly selected list of survey respondents.	<p>In order to mitigate the challenge associates with finding individuals that may be highly mobile, the survey team attempted to select individuals with both address and phone numbers. In some cases, it was not possible to select individuals with both pieces of identifying information because of the agency-specific requirements of the sampling process. As a result, 212 individuals were selected to be contacted that had address information only (no phone), and 1389 individuals were selected to be contacted that had phone information only (no address).¹⁶ While this was not the preferred outcome, because some of the agency databases were less complete than others, we had to make the attempt to contact those individuals anyway to ensure representativity across agencies. (See recommendations for elaboration).</p> <p>Daily meetings between the evaluation team and the IOM survey team meant that we were able to respond to developments such as problems with locating beneficiaries. New finding techniques were discussed and adopted, including pre-telephoning before the in-person interview to asking neighbours where the person was to returning several times to try to find them. When these techniques proved insufficient, the evaluation team provided additional lists of respondents selected by random draw to replace those individuals who could not be found.</p>
In the original TORs, the temporal period for the	To keep the highest possible number of respondents

¹⁶ Of these 1601 beneficiaries, 29 turned out to not have usable phone or address data; 15 of the 29 were not found.

<p>evaluation survey was specified as being “beneficiaries (including landlords) who have completed a year of rental subsidy”, which was described as “beneficiaries who were relocated between 2011 and March – April, 2013, as well as house-owners.” This represents two different cut off points, since the evaluation only began in September 2014 and the survey only got under way in mid-October 2014 – thus having completed one year of rental subsidy could include beneficiaries who had finished up to the end of September 2014. Complicating this issue was that upon examining the full database including data from the ten implementing agencies during the data analysis and data synthesis phase, it became evident that some respondent fell outside the temporal parameters described above – for example, some program beneficiaries were listed as starting the program in 2020. This posed a challenge because the survey had relatively low respondent numbers relative to those sought – thus eliminating respondents could not be done lightly.</p>	<p>while still ensuring sound data that met the intent of the evaluation, the evaluation team focused upon the first part of the TORs’ temporal parameters, “beneficiaries (including landlords) who have completed a year of rental subsidy”. Thus we kept in beneficiaries who were relocated up to and including September 30, 2013 and who therefore reached the one-year point at the time of the submission of the inception report and some three weeks before the official launch of the survey on Wednesday October 22, 2014.</p>
<p>The significant number of non-respondents gave rise to a concern that these beneficiaries could be somehow different than the beneficiaries who were found, thus slanting the survey data toward a particular respondent group.</p>	<p>To determine whether there were substantive and statistically significant differences between the ‘found’ group of survey respondents and those individuals that could not be found, the analysis team performed a series of paired tests on key variables such as implementing agency, gender, age, and geographic location (commune). The outcome (illustrated in the findings section of the paper) of these tests illustrates no significant differences between groups on these indicators that caused any concern for response bias in the findings outlined below.</p>

3. Findings

This section presents the findings emerging from the data collection and analysis process. It is organised according to the main evaluation criteria for this evaluation of effectiveness, relevance, efficiency and management, and follows the lines of inquiry summarised in the evaluation matrix.

3.1 EFFECTIVENESS

The understanding of effectiveness being used here follows the OECD/DAC definition: “the extent to which the activity's stated objectives have been met”.¹⁷ This section is divided into two sub-sections. The first, Section 3.1.1, focuses on the overall effectiveness of the various programs taken together, giving consideration to potential differences based upon such factors as gender, age and community. The second, Section 3.1.2, considers the implementing agencies' programs comparatively based upon a rough division of them into three categories – RSCG only, RSCG + livelihoods training, RSCG + additional cash grant – with the aim of giving some consideration to the potential impact of programming differences on beneficiaries. These categories are explained further in the preamble to section 3.1.2.

FINDING 1: THERE IS STRONG EVIDENCE THAT RECIPIENTS OF THE RSCG OBTAINED SAFE AND SECURE RENTAL ACCOMMODATION, AN OBSERVATION THAT HOLDS TRUE ACROSS GENDER AND AGE GROUPS.

Assessments gathered in the survey looked both at objective measures of safety and security (e.g. the structural soundness of the housing unit), as well as individual perceptions of it. As noted in the document *Rental Support Cash Grant Programs: Operations Manual*, “in some contexts, it may be more appropriate to use a model of safety assessment which puts the emphasis on personal responsibility and provides information for families to check for themselves on the safety of the building [...] This issue of safety and responsibility is a difficult one on which Government should provide clear guidelines and which Implementing Agencies should not make independently”. In other words, there is recognition that, in implementing a humanitarian program, lived experiences vary widely between people and that such experiential elements also need to be taken into account in judgments about what constitutes safety and security.


In the case of this evaluation, perceptions were brought to bear through the beneficiary survey. The benefit of perceptual self-reported assessments of personal safety is that they are a reflection of personal evaluations that contain a temporal element. In other words, they take into consideration both current assessments of safety as well as retrospective and prospective evaluations. Compared to structural assessments alone, which only capture a one-shot observation of safety, perceptual evaluations can provide over time evaluations. They may suffer, however, from (limited) attrition (i.e. imperfect memory) and a tendency to self-report more positive circumstance to enumerators (social desirability). In other words, beneficiaries' observation of security and safety will be a reflection of their personal norm, which can best be evaluated through survey questions that look at multiple time points.

¹⁷ <http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=4775>

These caveats aside, the data provide a rich source of information on personal assessments of safety and security. Our goal is to highlight the three time points that are relevant to personal security assessments: (a) levels of perceived safety pre-earthquake, (b) levels of perceived safety post-earthquake while in the rental housing (during the period of rental subsidy), and (c) levels of perceived safety after the completion of the rental subsidy, whether the individuals remained in the same housing unit or moved to a different housing unit. The data presented here in Finding 1 refers to perceived and objective measures of safety and security from the pre-earthquake to the post-earthquake period in which the beneficiary lived in the RSCG-subsidised housing (i.e. only up until the completion of the grant).

Generally, we find that, when asking beneficiaries about their perceptions of safety before and after the earthquake, respondents overwhelmingly reported feeling safe at both points in time. Figure 3.1 illustrates a low to moderate level of change among respondents who felt unsafe prior to the earthquake. Of the 317 individuals who reported feeling either ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ unsafe prior to the earthquake (represented by the third and fourth bars in the graph), 211 of them reported feeling ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ safe in their RSCG rental housing. In other words, this represents a positive change in perceptions of safety among 69% of respondents who previously felt ‘somewhat unsafe’ and a positive change in perceptions of safety among 58% of respondents who previously felt ‘very unsafe’. Thus, the transition from pre-earthquake accommodation to the rental-subsidy program represents a positive change for approximately 10% of the surveyed population (211 of 2234 total respondents).

Figure 3.1 Change in Perceptions of Safety Pre-Earthquake to RSCG Rental Housing



Percentages reported; Chi2 = 638.049 p value<.001 (N=2,213; 21 missing responses). Note that each of the pie charts represent the total number of people who reported feeling ‘Unsafe’ (left) or ‘Safe’ (right) prior to the earthquake. Each piece of the pie chart represents the reported feelings of RSCG recipients in their housing. In other words, this shows the change in perceptions of safety from pre-earthquake to the time spent in their RSCG housing.

Structural evaluations of the RSCG funded rental houses largely pointed to beneficiaries residing in structurally sound accommodation. Over 50% of respondents reported having a cement roof; another 46% reported that their house had a tin roof. Access to sanitation within the home was confirmed across

respondent groups with over 98% of beneficiaries reporting that they had access to an indoor toilet (64% reported having access to private facilities). Again, an overwhelming majority (90%) had access to a water supply for their home, but only 21% reporting having private access. The remaining 79% relied on communal access to a water supply.

Significantly, there were no differences in evaluations of accommodation structural soundness between beneficiary gender or age groups. Only in the case of community location was there some slightly variation among evaluations of soundness, with accommodations in Cité Soleil and Croix-de-Bouquets rated less positively than the other rental communities. The reasons for these differences are not clear from the data available.¹⁸

In addition to the self-reported assessments of the rental housing, the survey also provided information related to the enumerators' assessments of safety and security of accommodation (recognizing that the enumerator evaluation is, in effect, a present day evaluation of program that may have been completed over a year ago).¹⁹ Over 80% of enumerators evaluated beneficiaries' RSCG rental houses as respecting the project's basic safety requirements.²⁰ More specifically, approximately 58% of accommodations were reviewed as being either 'somewhat' or 'very structurally sound'. Another 23% were reported as 'adequate'. Only 19% of rental accommodations were reviewed as being unsound in some way.

Overall what we can see then is strong perceptual and objective measures of safety and security for beneficiaries in their rental housing unit.

FINDING 2: THERE IS ALSO STRONG EVIDENCE THAT RECIPIENTS OF THE RSCG EITHER MAINTAINED THEIR EXISTING SAFE AND SECURE RENTAL ACCOMMODATION OR OBTAINED NEW ACCOMMODATION THAT WAS PERCEIVED AS SAFE AND SECURE AFTER THE END OF THE GRANT PERIOD. GENERALLY SPEAKING, SAFETY WAS NOT A SIGNIFICANT CONSIDERATION FOR MOVING.

We found further evidence that the RSCG recipients were able to maintain safe and secure accommodation after the completion of their rental subsidy, whether they remained in the RSCG rental housing or moved to new rental housing. Of those individuals who had completed their rental subsidy,

18 Geographic components (e.g. the community lived in prior to the earthquake, the community in which their RSCG rental was housed, and the community in which they currently live), could potentially impact respondents' perceptions of effectiveness, however, it is essential to note that, since implementing agencies operated in specific communities, geography will be serially correlated with implementing agency. Another way of conceiving of this is that geography is an approximation or 'stand-in' for implementing agency. Given the methodological notes above with respect to challenges in deriving a representative sample by implementing agency, all commentary below that references geography should be understood as descriptive of the sample, not generalizable to the RSCG population in its entirety.


19 The enumerators were asked to answer three questions evaluating housing condition: In your assessment, does the current accommodation respect project's basic safety and sanitation criteria? How structurally sound does the respondent's house appear? What state of repair was the respondent's house in [inside/outside]?

20 Meaning that they were not within a so-called red zone (an area of the city unsafe for building) and were judged to be safe for habitation.

49% of respondents moved to a new rental accommodation, whereas the remaining 51% stayed in RSCG rental accommodation after the completion of their one-year rental subsidy term.²¹

There is still a positive (though less pronounced shift than that highlighted in Finding 1) in perceptions of safety among respondents from their time in the subsidized RSCG housing compared to their evaluation of safety after the completion of their rental subsidy. Figure 3.2 illustrates a low to moderate level of change among respondents who reported feeling unsafe in their rental housing. Of the 275 individuals who reported feeling either ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ unsafe in their rental housing, 70 of them (25%) reported feeling ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ safe post-subsidy, suggesting that once individuals have received the subsidy, there is a greater level of perceived safety, but also suggesting that the experience of the rental subsidy had fostered positive change in their overall perceptions of safety in their accommodation.

Figure 3.2 Change in Perceptions of Safety Rental Housing/ Post Subsidy



Percentages reported; Chi2 = 638.049 p value<.001 (N=2,178; 56 missing responses)

There is overwhelming evidence that, generally speaking, beneficiaries felt safe in their RSCG-subsidized housing (while they were in the housing), with over 80% of all respondents reporting that they felt either ‘somewhat’ or ‘very safe’. While perceptual questions are important insofar as they convey the opinions and beliefs of the RSCG beneficiaries, judgments about objective criteria regarding the housing’s sanitation, water access and structural elements are equally as important to assess safety and security. When asked to evaluate their rental accommodation based on these criteria, a majority (54%) of respondents evaluated their housing to be in good condition, with another 9.5% reporting their housing to be in excellent condition. Only 5% evaluated their housing condition as being in ‘bad’ or ‘very bad’

21 More specifically, of the over 2234 survey respondents, 1135 or 51% remained in the rental housing that they had obtained for the purposes of the grant, whereas the remaining 49% moved to new accommodation.

condition. Note that there were no significant differences between male and female respondents or between respondents in different age groups.


Table 3.1 Enumerator Evaluations of Rental Accommodation by Self-Reported Perceptions of Safety

Self-Assessed Level of Safety in RSCG Housing		Very Unsafe	Somewhat Unsafe	Somewhat Safe	Very Safe	Total
Did the Rental Housing meet the program's safety requirements?	No	29.17	21.01	11.94	7.89	12.12
	Yes	70.83	78.99	88.06	92.11	87.88
	Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
		(24)	(119)	(670)	(317)	(1130)

Percentages reported (N in parentheses); Chi2 = 20.723 p value<.001 (N=1130; represents individuals who remained in RSCG rental housing only)

Bringing together enumerator and self-reported assessments of accommodation safety is a good indicator of how consistent, and therefore how reliable, assessments are. Table 3.1 illustrates the enumerators' assessment of whether the rental housing met the project's basic safety requirements, against the beneficiaries' self-reported evaluation of safety. Interestingly, there is a positive correlation between how the enumerator evaluated the housing and the respondent's assessment of how safe they felt. For respondents who reported feeling 'very' or 'somewhat unsafe', enumerators noted with greater frequency that their housing did not meet the project's basic level of safety. These negative evaluations drastically decrease for those beneficiaries who reported feeling safe in their accommodation (relationship significant at the .001 level).

Turning to reasons for why beneficiaries moved from RSCG rental housing, it is possible to surmise that safety may have been a motivating factor. Testing this hypothesis, we see little evidence that safety in accommodation was a primary concern for those who moved out of rental accommodation, as opposed to their counterparts who remained in housing. Figure 3.3 illustrates this finding by comparing perceptions of safety between these two respondent groups.

Figure 3.3 Perceptions of Safety Rental Housing by Respondent Mobility

Percentages reported; Chi2 = 1.855 p value < .603 (not sig) (N=2216; 18 missing responses). Results are not significant; chi2 not reliable given low expected cell frequencies.

The data above shows that only a small number of beneficiaries (N=56) reported feeling 'very unsafe' in their rental accommodation. Among these respondents, there was roughly the same proportion (3%) in the group that moved from their RSCG housing as in the group that stayed in it (2.12%). Indeed, among all other respondents, the opinions of those who moved and those who did not nearly mirrored each other. This finding, coupled with the lack of statistical significance of this indicator, suggests scant evidence of a relationship between self-assessed perceptions of safety and moving.

Looking further into motivations for moving, there appears to be no uniformity in reported motivations for doing so. Just over 20% of respondents reported moving owing to the price of their rental, and 15% reported moving because of problems with the landlord. Only 5.5% reported moving because of security concerns. A similar amount (5.6%) reported moving to be closer to family or simply because they found better housing (7%).


Physical condition of housing did not appear to be a motivation for moving. Evaluations of the condition of the housing were scarcely different between the respondents that moved and those who remained in housing, nor were there significant differences in the two groups' access to a water source or to indoor sanitation.²² And enumerator evaluations of the condition of the housing were higher (88%) for those individuals who had remained in the RSCG rental housing after the completion of their grant as opposed to those who moved to other rental accommodation, suggesting that moving often resulted in a drop rather than an increase in the overall quality of rental accommodation.

One final motivation for moving should be examined: the community where the beneficiary took up their RSCG housing subsidy. It is possible that there could be a connection between those individuals who moved and where their rental housing is located. Figure 3.4 illustrated that people moved in roughly equal proportions across communities with the exception of those respondents who lived in Carrefour. Approximately 87% of respondents (N=147) who settled in the Carrefour community remained in their

²² Interestingly, most (79%) of respondents did not live in a high-risk area before the earthquake. Only 2% of respondents reported living in a flood-prone area; 12% of respondents reported living near a ravine; and 5% of respondents reported living on a steep slope.

RSCG rental housing. Note that there was no difference in self-reported perceptions of safety in Carrefour to other communities, providing further support for the finding that, generally speaking, respondents felt safe in their rental housing regardless of potential intervening factors.

Figure 3.4 Mobility of Respondent after RSCG and Community of Rental Housing



To better isolate whether safety in the community was a consideration in respondents’ decision to move from RSCG housing, Table 3.2 looks at continuity and change in community selection by beneficiaries. The communities listed on the left-hand, vertical axis represent the community where the respondent’s RSCG housing was located; the communities listed across the top (horizontally) represent the communities where individuals moved after the completion of the subsidy. Note that the table only contains respondents who moved after the completion of the subsidy, not those who remained in the same housing that they had during their RSCG housing.

Table 3.2 Mobility amongst Beneficiaries who Moved after the Completion of the RSCG Subsidy

Community of RSCG Housing	Community Moved to After Completion of RSCG Subsidy									
	Carrefour	Cite Soleil	Croix-Des-Bouquets	Delmas	Gressier	Petionville	Port-au-Prince	Tabarre	Thomazea	Total
Carrefour	15	0	0	1	1	1	5	0	0	23
Cite Soleil	1	49	3	2	0	0	1	1	0	58
Croix-Des-Bouquets	0	0	89	5	0	1	0	1	0	97
Delmas	3	6	33	317	1	7	20	10	0	398
Gressier	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
Petionville	0	1	1	6	0	69	7	0	0	84
Port-au-Prince	2	2	2	17	0	6	239	1	0	269
Tabarre	0	0	13	5	0	1	2	33	0	54
Thomazeau	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Other										5
Total	21	58	141	354	4	86	274	46	2	989

*Note: 'Other' refers to 5 respondents in total: 1 respondent who moved from an RSCG housing unit in Delmas to Anse d'Hainault, 1 respondent who moved from RSCG housing in Crois-des-Bouquets to Cap Haiti, 1 respondent who moved from RSCG housing in Cite Soleil to Coteaux, 1 respondent who moved from RSCG housing in Fonds Des Negres to Delmas and 1 respondent who moved from RSCG housing in Les Anglais to Petionville.

The table shows an extremely low level of inter-community movement among individuals who chose to change their housing unit after the completion of their subsidy. In 82% of cases where a beneficiary moved, they remained in the same community. Note that the same trend exists when looking at whether a respondent moved communities from their pre-earthquake housing to their RSCG rental subsidy. This high level of continuity in community suggests that either social, employment or familial ties were strong enough to keep them in their existing community, though further study would be required to definitively determine the reasons for this.

FINDING 3: THE RSCG PLAYED A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN OBTAINING SAFE AND SECURE ACCOMMODATION, BOTH DURING THE GRANT PERIOD AND AFTER ITS COMPLETION.

Isolating the effects of the RSCG on beneficiaries is largely a product of excluding competing hypotheses (e.g. could beneficiaries be doing well because of another grant that they had received during the same time period?). Over 98% of respondents reported that they did not receive any other cash grants from other organizations during the time period under investigation. Additionally, most beneficiaries (86%) received no other, non-RSCG benefits-in-kind from other organizations such as livelihoods training (only 2% received such training), health assistance (5%) or an emergency kit (6%). Therefore, it is reasonably safe to assume that the primary source of external support came from the RSCG.

Some recipients (46%) reported having received supplementary funding from the implementing agency. Over half of those recipients received under HTG1000, while another 21% received between HTG1001- HTG5000. Of those respondents who received additional funding, 61% put the funding toward the operation of a small business. Another 12% put the funding toward education. While there were no differences across age groups in the way that recipients spent the additional funding, the data do show that there is a significant (though small) difference in the way men and women spent the money: Women were approximately 10% more likely to put it toward creating small businesses than men.

While we cannot rule out all other plausible arguments that may be unrelated to the RSCG (e.g. respondents report feeling more safe because there has been an overall improvement in economic prosperity in Haiti or a reduction of crime across Port-au-Prince), we can say that reports of increased security and safety do not appear to be on account of any other humanitarian relief program.

FINDING 4: SELF-ASSESSED SOCIO-ECONOMIC WELL-BEING SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVED AS A RESULT OF THE RSCG, YET MORE OBJECTIVE MEASURES INDICATE THAT BENEFICIARIES' SITUATION WAS LARGELY IN LINE WITH THEIR PRE-EARTHQUAKE LEVELS.

The RSCG programs are humanitarian in nature rather than development oriented. This means that the fundamental goal of the programs has not been to engage in the long-term capacity building and community engagement that characterizes development work but rather to provide a humanitarian response to an emergency situation. Yet while helping people to improve on their pre-earthquake levels of socio-economic well-being is not the aim of the programs, there is nonetheless significant interest in understanding whether such improvements were a by-product of them. This is particularly linked to the evaluation's objective of understanding whether beneficiaries have been able to maintain safe and secure accommodation beyond the end of their cash grant, since doing so would particularly depend upon a beneficiary's socio-economic situation and prospects.

Using the data from the survey, it is possible to go beyond excluding other organizations from attribution and to look at the forward looking evaluations of how the rental programs impacted socio-economic well-being. In discussing the respondent's socio-economic well-being, we refer to both subjective self-assessments of well-being, as well as more objectives measures such as their access to food, shelter and basic needs.

When asked directly to what degree the RSCG improved beneficiary safety and protection in the long run, over 85% of respondents reported that the Rental Support program either 'somewhat' or 'very much' improved their safety. Less than 5% reported that the programs had a negative impact on their long-term safety. This finding holds true across age group, gender and implementing agency. This finding also holds true regardless of whether or not the beneficiary moved out of their RSCG rental accommodation. Only in the case of community of rental subsidy do we see some slight variation, with a slightly higher proportion of respondents in Cité Soleil (7%) and the provinces (9%) reporting that the program impacted them negatively, although these differences are marginal.

Another measure of how the RSCG played a significant role in obtaining safe and secure accommodation emerges in the respondents' retrospective evaluation of how their living situation is different at the time of the survey – that is, after they completed the grant – from their pre-earthquake conditions, and different from the time they spent in the camps. While the responses comparing pre-earthquake well-being to their time in the rental housing is not as positive as earlier reported perceptions of safety, a full 42% of respondents said that they were either 'somewhat' or 'much better off' now than they were before the earthquake. Another 20% reported having roughly the same level of well-being to before the earthquake. About one-third of respondents reported being worse off.

Similarly, we can evaluate how the respondents are faring in their current situation compared to the time spent in the IDP camps. Over 55% of respondents reported that they were better off in their current rental house than they were in the camps. Another 19% reported roughly the same level of well-being. Less than one-quarter of respondents suggest that they were worse off than they were in the camps. Again, we see no significant variation in responses across age or gender groups, but we do see evidence that much of the negative responses to this question are being driven by respondents in Cité Soleil and Tabarre (statistically significant at the .001 level).²³

Despite the generally good picture these data paint, more fundamental indicators of such well-being such as number of meals eaten a day indicate a slight drop in well-being. Prior to the earthquake, 23% of respondents reported eating three meals per day, and 60% of respondents reported eating two meals per day. While in the rental housing, these numbers had dropped to 10% and 57%, respectively. Roughly 43% (213) of those respondents who reported eating three meals per day before the earthquake reported dropping their intake to two meals a day, while a further 21% (103) reported dropping their intake to one meal per day.²⁴

Displacement can potentially be viewed as an indicator of diminished well-being if we perceive that individuals might move on account of feeling unsafe in a particular geographic area. Overall, the majority of respondents tended to relocate to the same community that they lived in prior to the earthquake suggesting that, in addition to the potential economic and personal hardships that they may have encountered after the earthquake, most people were staying in the same communities in which they previously had formed social ties. Communities that experienced higher than average levels of mobility were Cité Soleil (19%), Petionville (21%) and Tabarre (26%). This observation, in conjunction with the abovementioned findings pointing to inequality amongst communities, suggests that these communities may have housed beneficiaries that were at greater risk in the resettlement process than their counterparts in more stable districts.

23 Kruskal-Wallis tests for community variation in non-normally distributed ordinal answers significant at the .001 level.

24 Note: approximately 84% of respondents reported that they have children. Evaluations of socio-economic well-being did not differ between respondents who had children and those who did not.

FINDING 5: WHILE THE RSCG PROGRAMS PROVIDED ADEQUATE FUNDING FOR THE BENEFICIARIES TO REMAIN IN SAFE AND SECURE ACCOMMODATION DURING THE GRANT PERIOD, THEY HAD LIMITED CARRYOVER IN TERMS OF LONGER TERM ECONOMIC WELL-BEING.

The previous finding noted that the maintenance of safe and secure accommodation depends upon a beneficiary's socio-economic situation and prospects. This implies considering the effects of the grant both during the grant period but also beyond. While certain key elements of such analysis were beyond the remit of this evaluation – for example, the effects of livelihoods training on the prospects of beneficiaries – some concretely measurable factors do tell us something about how the economic well-being of grant recipients may have changed on account of their participation in the programs. To that end, we evaluated several indicators of economic well-being including the amount of money recipients were able to save after the rental program, the level of debt they had incurred by the time they had completed their rental grant, and the contribution of employment income to rent payment by beneficiaries. It is important to note that stimulating savings and/or lower levels of debt were not the deliberate aims of the programs; yet they nonetheless represent useful proximate indicators for assessing the ability to maintain safe and secure accommodation.

With respect to saving money from the cash grant money for future rent, a near majority (48%) of respondents reported having less than HTG1000 left over from the rental subsidy. One-quarter of respondents reported saving between HTG1000 and HTG5000 from their grant allotment. Few respondents (8%) reported saving any substantial amount that would put them on more secure footing for future months' rent. While those individuals residing in the provinces appeared slightly more able to save money from their rental subsidy (possibly owing to lower rent outside of the major urban areas), there were no perceptible differences between age or gender groups.


A second indicator of economic well-being is the level of debt that beneficiaries have after the completion of their rental subsidy. Over 90% of beneficiaries report having some debt after the earthquake. There is little noticeable difference between respondents based on gender, age group, or grant implementing agency. Similarly, there is little generalizable information in terms of how much was owed. While the most typical response for beneficiaries who reported debt was that they owed between HTG10,000 and HTG20,000, there was sufficient variation in the amount owed that did not correlate with any potential explanatory variable such as gender, age or community.

What we do know about the debt circumstances of respondents is that where money was left over, it was primarily invested in small businesses (50% of respondents). By comparison, far fewer respondents used left over grant money to assist family (5%), pay debts (15%) or pay for services such as utilities (6%).

The observation of such scarcity among the beneficiary population in terms of long-term savings suggests that paying for future accommodation might be difficult. From what we can observe in the survey data, a plurality of respondents (29%) were using the proceeds of self-employment to pay for their housing now that the grant period has ended. Another 15% of respondents were relying on part or full time employment, while 18% of respondents were relying on assistance from family and friends. When compared to their situation prior to the earthquake, we can observe from Table 3.5 that there is a

relationship between a respondent's pre-earthquake employment condition and the source of their post-RSCG rental income. Of those individuals who were self-employed prior to the earthquake, almost half (47.7%) are paying for their rental at present using self-employment income. Yet, among individuals who held full time employment prior to the earthquake, only 20.6% have been able to secure full-time employment. Similarly, 35% of respondents who previously held part-time employment do so now. In summary, the data in Figure 3.5 suggest that there is some continuity between the employment situation held by the respondents prior to the earthquake and their current employment situation; however, the overall low numbers reported above suggest that, while employment is the primary way of providing for rental payment, there remains low levels of employment in the beneficiary population overall. Given the overall Haitian economic context, this is perhaps not very surprising.

Figure 3.5 Pre-Earthquake Employment by Source of Rental Payment



Percentages reported; Chi2 = 1.1e+03 p value<.001 (N=2173; 61 missing responses)

FINDING 6: RESPONDENTS REPORTED A POSITIVE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK AFTER HAVING COMPLETED THE GRANT. OBJECTIVE MEASURES SUCH AS MONTHLY INCOME REMAINED STABLE (I.E. DID NOT SUBSTANTIALLY DECLINE) RELATIVE TO PRE-EARTHQUAKE LEVELS AMONG THOSE RESPONDENTS WHO RESUMED SELF-EMPLOYMENT.


In addition to the observations on employment made above, the survey data allow us to query longer term or sustainable indicators of economic well-being, such as respondents' economic outlook or more in-depth information about their current employment situation. This information must be contextualized by keeping in mind Haiti's generally very weak economic indicators. That is, despite the fact that it has recently achieved overall low levels of economic growth, unemployment remains very high and the country remains one of the poorest in the world. According to the World Bank, nearly 60% of Haitians live under the national poverty line of US\$2 per day, and over about 25% live under the extreme national poverty line of US\$1 per day.²⁵

²⁵ <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/haiti/overview>

Starting with the perceptual indicator, when asked to what degree the RSCG programs had improved their economic outlook, respondents overwhelmingly reported an improvement to their prospective economic opportunities. Over 40% of respondents reported that their economic opportunities were ‘much better’, while another 43% of respondents reported that their opportunities were ‘somewhat better’. Only 5% had reported that they were somehow worse off economically. There is no observable difference between age or gender groups in their outlook, however there is a slightly higher level of pessimism about economic opportunity in Croix-de-Bouquets (11%), Tabarre (10%) and the provinces (14%). These differences, though slight, are statistically significant.

Prior to the earthquake, 57% of respondents reported being self-employed, while another 24% reported having either part or full time employment. Of those who reported having working for themselves prior to the earthquake, 66% reported starting a business following the earthquake (59%, or 653 of these respondents reported that it was the same business they had before the earthquake). While this does represent a significant degree of continuity from the pre-earthquake period, it also suggests that approximately one-third of respondents were unable to revive their previous livelihood. Interestingly however, there a slight decline in the amount of monthly income generated by self-employed beneficiaries: Prior to the earthquake, 52% of respondents were earning less than HTG1000 per month; after the earthquake, 65% of respondents report generating that level of monthly income. Pre-earthquake, 28% of respondents reported earning between HTG1001 to HTG5000 per month; this number declined slightly to 22.7% after the earthquake. Here, we see slightly though statistically significant differences between age and gender groups, with younger individuals and women earning less than their older or male counterparts.

Figure 3.6 Pre- and Post-Earthquake Self-Employment Monthly Income



Percentages reported (N in parentheses); Chi2 = 304.75 p value<.001 (N=577 valid – having a business pre and post earthquake)

Looking at the monthly income difference of self-employed beneficiaries, Figure 3.6 illustrates that most respondents remained in the same income band before and after the earthquake. Just over 68% of self-

employed respondents who earned between HTG1 and HTG1000 before the earthquake remained in that income band, while 75% of respondents who earned between HTG1001 and HTG5000 per month before the earthquake remained in that income band as well. There is, however, some support for the findings that some individuals were able to increase their income after the earthquake. A full 31% of respondents who previously earned less than HTG1000 per month report higher self-employment earnings after the earthquake, while only 10.7% of those who earned between HTG1001 and HTG5000 per month before the earthquake are earning a smaller salary afterwards. In other words, there was a slight, but positive income shift among the bulk of individuals who were self-employed.

FINDING 7: THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCE IN TERMS OF AGE, GENDER, COMMUNITY OR AGENCY-SUPPORT COMPOSITION OF THE GROUP OF RECIPIENTS THAT WERE SURVEYED AND COULD NOT BE FOUND TO THOSE WHO WERE SURVEYED.

The surveyors attempted to sample a total of 5056 individuals of the complete dataset. Of these 5056 attempts, 2234 were reached (response rate: 44%). Compared to similar surveys conducted in a context like that in Haiti, 44% represents a very high rate of response, which, we believe, is a testament to the effort put forth by the enumeration team. It is not possible, given the information we have, to speculate what this means in terms of the success or failure of the programs; at this point, we can only say that those individuals were not found whether because they had moved on from their previously recorded accommodation without notifying the implementing agency who had furnished them with the grant in the first place or that the contact information in the database was not correct.


One potential concern about working with a sample population in a high-risk area or a post-disaster relief area is the potential difficulty in finding respondents that constitute a representative sample. If the group of individuals who were found by the enumerators and surveyed is substantively different from the group that was not found, there could be suggestions of bias in the survey responses. That said, the premise of selecting a randomised sample, which we rigorously adhered to, mitigates the threat of bias. Nevertheless, some group comparison is helpful in assessing the robustness of the sample.

Figures 3.7 to 3.10 compare the surveyed group to those potential respondents who were not found by enumerators across key identifying variables (age, gender, grant starting point, implementing agency). Using a combination of t-tests and chi-square to determine the statistical differences between the groups, we find in some cases no statistical differences between groups (gender), or only marginal valid differences between groups (age group, year and implementing agency).

In the case of gender of respondents, we have almost identical distribution of male and female respondents across the response and non-response groups. T-test comparisons of the groups show that the slight differences are not statistically significant at even the .05 level. Comparing the response groups to the non-response group across age, start date of rental grant and implementing agency, we see some small differences that are significant. For example, the enumeration teams had greater success in finding respondents who were over 35 years of age than they did finding respondents who were under 35 years of age. Similarly, the enumeration teams had greater success in finding respondents who started


receiving the rental grant in 2012 and 2013 than they did finding respondents who received the grant before those dates. Finally, the enumeration teams had greater success in finding respondents who received grants from Concern, CRS and IOM than they did finding respondents who received grants from other implementing agencies. We should underscore, however, two important factors to remember when considering these differences: (1) problems with finding younger respondents in follow up surveys is a known and well-documented problem in the survey research literature, and (2) the differences in finding people by implementing agency was a known issue that prompted considerable discussion and a decision to focus on finding an overall representative sample for the programs. Consequently, the observations made here do not derogate or abrogate from the survey responses reported above. They also do not detract from the overall observation that the data presented in the survey is of high quality and meets the requirements of a representative sample at the 95% confidence level, with a 2.1% margin of error.

Figure 3.7 Level of Response by Age Group




Percentages reported; Chi2 = 225.76 p value<.001 (N=3704 valid of 5056 total attempted)

Figure 3.8 Level of Response by Gender




Percentages reported; Chi2 not significant; (N=4398 valid of 4806 total attempted)

Figure 3.9 Level of Response by Year of Implementation



Percentages reported; Chi2 = 165.41 p value<.001 (N=3885 valid of 5056 total attempted)

Figure 3.10 Level of Response by Organization



Percentages reported; Chi2 = 504.56 p value<.001 (N=5056 valid of 5056 total attempted)

FINDING 8: OVERALL, THE RSCG PROGRAMS WERE ENABLED BY THEIR ADAPTATION TO THE PARTICULAR CONTEXT IN HAITI, BY RELATIVE CONSENSUS ON THE APPROACH BETWEEN KEY ACTORS AND BECAUSE THEY WERE REASONABLY FLEXIBLE. CHALLENGES RELATED TO DATA TO SOME DEGREE IMPACTED UPON OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS, AND MORE FUNDAMENTALLY THE RELATIVE SUCCESS OF THE RSCG PROGRAMS MUTED PRESSURE FOR FULL CONSIDERATION OF ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES.

A full and complete examination of the enabling factors and challenges impacting upon the effectiveness of the RSCG programs was beyond the remit for this assignment, since it would require a targeted, purposive study. Nonetheless, it is possible to offer a preliminary set of considerations.

Perhaps the most important enabling factor is that the programs were a contextually-sensitive response to the particular circumstances in Haiti at the time. These circumstances included a very large number of IDPs in camps with poor living conditions (especially due to health challenges and safety issues); the desire on the part of many to relocate out of the camps; pressure to close the camps as a result of governmental priorities, the risk of eviction and the possibility of further disasters due to their often precarious siting; relative lack of access to land to build new houses in Port-au-Prince and the fact that building takes longer and is more expensive than moving to a rental unit; and relatedly, a very high proportion of camp residents who had been renters before and thus did not have houses to rebuild/repair. As a result, there was a need to move a large number of people in a relatively short period of time into new housing, and to do so in a manner that was as sensitive as possible to the needs and priorities of beneficiaries. Given the particular circumstances extant in Haiti, having the people re-enter the rental market by choosing their own home and having it paid for for a fixed period of time seems to have been a relatively effective response.

The effectiveness of the response was further enhanced by relative consensus on the core of the approach between the various implementing agencies, and quite good coordination between them in implementing it (an observation that we return to in a later finding). Furthermore, most of the programs did display some flexibility in adapting to changing circumstances, for example by putting in place particular measures to respond to the needs of the most vulnerable including the aged and people with a handicap.

These enabling factors were negatively impacted by challenges in terms of data about the absorptive capacity of the rental housing market, weak tracking of beneficiaries, and poor understanding of the impact on the local community and the local economy. Such data challenges meant for example that it was not always clear how fast camps could be closed while still ensuring that beneficiaries could find appropriate rental housing in a location where they would be most likely to successfully reintegrate. There are also questions about how many beneficiaries moved and built homes in so-called informal settlements such as Canaan. Relatedly, it seems possible that the ability of the rental support cash grant to rehouse large numbers of IDPs quite quickly precluded more serious conversations about other approaches that might have been preferable in some circumstances, for example formalizing informal settlements. Strategies adopted to respond to these various challenges were sometimes ad hoc and could certainly have been improved, yet did display some flexibility

3.2 EFFECTIVENESS BY PROGRAM TYPE

As was noted in the methodology section, a decision was taken to carry out a comparative analysis by RSCG program type, based upon a grouping of programs into three categories: 1) RSCG core program only, 2) RSCG core program + livelihoods training and 3) RSCG core program + additional cash grant. The first category was understood as a rental support cash grant of US\$500 plus between US\$150 and US\$250 given between 6 and 12 weeks after the beneficiary has left the camp plus moving expenses of approximately US\$25; the second was understood as that core package plus additional money given; and the third package was understood as the core package plus livelihoods training. Based on these categories, agencies were grouped as shown in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3 Implementation Agencies by Program Type

Grant Type	Implementing Agency
RSCG core program only	International Organization for Migration J/P Haitian Relief Organization
RSCG core program + Livelihoods	Goal CARE Helpage Concern Worldwide Catholic Relief Services Handicap International
RSCG core program + Additional Cash	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies World Vision International

It should be emphasized that these groupings are very rough, particularly because of data limitations regarding the specifics of some of the implementing agency's programs, but also because they fail to capture change in an agency's program over time and between implementation locations. As suggested in the methodology section, the decision to complete analysis on the basis of evaluating responses by program type is predicated on the understanding that the analysis is limited to descriptive statements about the relationship between program types and outcomes. We cannot point to a causal relationship between the benefits of a certain program type (for example including livelihoods training versus not including it) and beneficiary outcomes. While the number of beneficiaries by program type does meet acceptable methodological standards (i.e. a 95% confidence level and a 4.5% margin or error), we cannot reasonably exclude plausible alternative explanations that could only be learned from a purposive study.


Despite these caveats, the comparison by program type does allow us to undertake some initial broad analysis that can offer some preliminary insights related to beneficiaries and different aspects of the RSCG programs.

FINDING 9: THERE WAS NOT A STRONG RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A PARTICULAR PROGRAM TYPE AND REPORTED LEVEL OF SAFETY AND SECURITY. TO THE EXTENT THAT THESE RELATIONSHIPS DID SUGGEST ANY DIFFERENCE ACROSS RECIPIENT GROUPS, THE DIFFERENCES WERE MARGINAL.

Finding 9 is, in effect, a nuance on Finding 1: generally, feelings of safety are quite high across all three program type groups. This implies that program type does not condition the response. There is a slight reduction in the number of reported cases of feeling ‘somewhat’ or ‘very unsafe’ among recipients of the RSCG core package plus an additional cash grant (9% versus the average of 12.6%), however, even where these differences do exist, they are slight enough that they fall into the margin of error.

Assessing mobility as an indicator of perceived safety is another way to triangulate whether program type had any perceptible impact on beneficiaries, since beneficiaries who feel unsafe might move to seek out a safer neighbourhood. There is a slightly higher rate of mobility amongst those beneficiaries who received RSCG plus an additional cash grant (56% vs. an average of 48% – see Figure 3.11). Amongst those who moved, recipients of the RSCG core package plus an additional cash grant were slightly more likely to report feeling ‘somewhat’ or ‘very safe’ in their new household, and were (by 3-4% points) more likely to have access to sanitation facilities and a water supply (though no more likely to have private access to these things).

Figure 3.11 Mobility by Program Type




Percentages reported (N in parentheses); Chi2 = 20.8394 p value<.001

On the other hand, there appears to be no variation across program type on more objective measures of household safety such as assessments of the condition of their RSCG housing (see Figure 3.12). Recipients of all three program groups reported similar levels of standard of housing, with over 70% reporting that the condition of their housing was either ‘good’ or ‘very good’. There was no variation across groups in areas such as access to sanitation or water supply (whether communal or private), nor was there any variation among enumerator assessments of housing safety or housing condition by program type. Figure 3.12 does illustrate that recipients of the RSCG core package plus livelihoods training were a bit more likely to report their housing condition as being slightly worse than that reported by beneficiaries in the

other groups, but we have no reason to causally attribute this to program type. Somewhat counter intuitively, following the completion of the RSCG grant, respondents who received the RSCG core package plus a cash supplement were no more likely to be living in a structurally ‘better’ house (e.g. one constructed from brick/with a cement roof) than other program beneficiaries. Therefore, it appears that additional cash did not necessarily translate into better living conditions for program beneficiaries.²⁶

Figure 3.12 Housing Condition by Program Type



When asked to evaluate their retrospective and prospective personal or household safety as a result of the rental support cash grant, we again find very little variation amongst respondents across the three program groups. There was a slightly lower rate of individuals responding ‘much better’ among those who received the RSCG core package only (28% versus an average of 32%), though this difference was not statistically significant.

If we look at the geographical trends among beneficiaries by program type, we can see that a much higher proportion of individuals who received the RSCG core package plus an additional cash grant moved to (or within) Cite Soleil after completing the RSCG (25% of respondents versus only 1-2% from the other program type groups). Of course this finding is an artefact of the fact that the implementing agencies worked in particular geographical regions and thus there is often correlation between agency and geographical region. What it does suggest, however, is that even where people received additional cash as a part of their RSCG benefit, they were not prone to moving out of the area in which they had previously lived (pre-earthquake), even if that area posed greater security risks. We also see evidence of a higher proportion of recipients of the RSCG core package residing in and remaining in Delmas (46%). This is slightly different than the 42% of recipients of the RSCG core grant plus livelihoods training, and

²⁶ It is worth noting that Q64, which asks whether the respondent received any other cash benefit, does not reflect the program type breakdown. This supports the Steering Committee’s comment in the draft final report that the question likely was not properly understood by respondents.


quite different from the 25% of respondents who received the RSCG core package plus an additional cash grant.

The lack of robust observations in this Finding may suggest that program type had no relationship with beneficiary well-being or safety. This interpretation would be inappropriate. Rather, it is more correct to understand these results in the context of a lack of appropriate questions in the survey to isolate program type effects. Unpacking these relationships properly could only flow from a more robust analysis of the impact of program type.

FINDING 10: THERE IS NO PERCEPTIBLE LINK BETWEEN RESPONDENTS WHO REPORTED POSITIVE ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES/OUTLOOK, AND THOSE WHO RECEIVED LIVELIHOODS TRAINING OR AN ADDITIONAL CASH GRANT IN ADDITION TO THE RSCG CORE PACKAGE.

It might seem intuitively appealing to anticipate that beneficiaries who received a greater amount of money or additional benefit in the form of livelihoods training would be more likely to report better economic outlook or opportunity; yet we see only marginal evidence of this. Assessments of the degree to which the RSCG improved economic opportunities varied only a bit between groups, with respondents who received the RSCG core package alone tending to report that their economic opportunities were ‘neither better nor worse’, ‘somewhat worse’ or ‘much worse’ at a higher rate than other respondents (see Figure 3.13), and reporting a lower rate of ‘much better’ (37% to the average of 41%) than the other groups. This would seem to indicate that having the RSCG alone (and no additional benefit) may have had a slight dampening effect on perspectives toward economic outlook.

Figure 3.13 Degree to which the programs were seen as improving economic opportunity



While there is no noted difference in the number of respondents who started a business in the post-disaster recovery period, those respondents who received the RSCG core package plus a cash grant had a higher than average likelihood (73% versus 61% average) of reporting using the funds to start a small business. There is also a very slight relationship between receiving additional cash and being able to save more money at the end of the grant period. Similarly, there is a slightly lower proportion (91%) of people who report having economic difficulties who received RSCG plus additional cash (89%), however, this size of this difference falls within the margin of error.

On the other hand, those recipients of the RSCG core package plus livelihoods training who reported starting a business post-earthquake were slightly more likely (14%) to be bringing in more money (over 5000 HTG per month) than those recipients who received the RSCG core package alone (9%) and those who received the RSCG core package plus an additional cash grant (12%). Another interesting observation pertaining to the group that received livelihoods training is their increased likelihood of using proceeds from self-employment to pay for rent upon the completion of the rental subsidy (32% of respondents with livelihoods training versus only 25% of those who received the RSCG core package only or the core package plus an additional cash grant).

Finally, looking at whether there was variation in the objective indicators of socio-economic well-being such as expenditures of beneficiaries, it appears that recipients of the RSCG core package plus an additional cash grant were not more likely to be in a rental home that is more costly (and therefore potentially in a safer area). They were also slightly more likely to report higher levels of daily meal consumption, and to report moving into a home with two or more rooms in greater numbers (27%) than those who received the RSCG core package alone and those who received the RSCG core package plus livelihoods training (only 16% of these respondents moved into a home with 2 or more rooms).

Though the findings on the subject of economic outlook and socio-economic well-being seem on the surface to point toward a slightly stronger relationship between program type and positive benefits of the program, we encourage caution in this interpretation, and suggest that future studies consider the possibility of including survey questions that target the impact of program type specifically to better get at causality.

3.3 RELEVANCE

The concept of relevance is defined by the OECD/DAC as the extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners' and donors' policies. In this finding, we particularly focus upon the relevance of the programs' intended results relative to the context in which it was implemented and the needs of beneficiaries, as well as relative to the priorities of implementing agencies, funders and government.

FINDING 11: THE PROGRAMS WERE HIGHLY RELEVANT TO THE LOCAL CONTEXT IN HAITI AT THE TIME OF IMPLEMENTATION, TO THE BENEFICIARIES, AS WELL AS TO THE PRIORITIES OF IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES, FUNDERS AND GOVERNMENT.

As was noted in the context section at the beginning of this report, the local context in Haiti after the January 2010 earthquake was one of devastation and extreme disruption. Hundreds of thousands of homes were destroyed and many more damaged, and 1.5 million people ended up living in about 1500 camps. By early 2011 however, more and more people were seeking to leave those camps for reasons that include the fact that many of them were dangerous, had problems with disease and inadequate basic services, and more fundamentally because people wanted to restart their lives after the earthquake. At the same time, the Government of Haiti wanted to encourage people to move out so that the camps could be closed and the residents in particular and the country more generally could continue the process of moving on from the earthquake. Adding to the impetus was the fact that many of the camps were in areas where they were exposed to risk from further natural disasters such as flooding (as occurred during Hurricane Isaac in August 2012), as well as the fact that some were on private land and thus there was a risk of eviction.

The vast majority of people in the camps had been renters before the earthquake thus they did not have a home to repair or rebuild; at the same time, there was very poor access to new land upon which to build even if they had the resources to do so. Moreover it seems likely that the longer people stayed in the camps the more that those camps were felt to be permanent or at least long-term, with a resultant dampening effect on those still there making the move to leave even if they had the financial resources to pay for doing so. The Rental Support Cash Grant programs were clearly contextually relevant therefore since they offered rental support and help moving so that people could re-establish themselves in rental housing. They were furthermore relevant to the beneficiaries since they gave them the resources and the support to make the move that most wanted to make within the constraints imposed by the context, and ensured that certain minimum standards were met in terms of housing safety along with some extra financial support to ease the transition.

Interviews with representatives of the Government of Haiti as well as document review confirmed that by September 2011, the governmental priorities included as a central tenet moving people out of the camps and closing them down.²⁷ Given the contextual constraints as well as the capacities and resources of the camp residents, providing rental support and help moving as well as some extra financial resources was clearly relevant to the priorities of the Government of Haiti.

²⁷ http://www.projet16-6.org/factsheet/Factsheet_December_2012.pdf

Similarly, the programs were highly relevant to the various implementing agencies as well as to the funders, a fact that was underlined in all interviews and through document review. More particularly, while the objectives of each agency varied slightly, they all have the objective in Haiti of providing humanitarian aid in response to the earthquake. Clearly these programs, with their targeting of the most vulnerable Internally Displaced Persons in general or particular sub-groups within that larger group such as people with a handicap or the aged, represent humanitarian aid. Thus they are highly relevant to all the implementing agencies. And they are similarly relevant for the funders, whose grants were given with the aim of supporting humanitarian programming in post-earthquake Haiti.²⁸

3.4 EFFICIENCY AND MANAGEMENT

FINDING 12: THE RSCG PROGRAMS WERE LARGELY SUCCESSFUL AT IDENTIFYING AND REACHING THEIR INTENDED BENEFICIARIES, AND DID SO IN THE EXPECTED NUMBERS GIVEN THE LIMITATIONS OF THE RENTAL HOUSING MARKET.

The intended beneficiaries of the Rental Support Cash Grant programs were camp residents. Yet the implementing agencies faced a dilemma in targeting these beneficiaries that became clear from the earliest stages of implementation: the programs, with their promise of money and aid in a national context that was and remains very challenging, tended to act as a magnet for people outside the camps who while having housing were still facing very difficult situations and thus sought to register as beneficiaries. For example, an interviewee noted that one camp had an estimated 2700 families but that when the agency showed up to register the camp residents, it found 4500 tents of families who claimed to live there. The difference was made up of people from the surrounding neighbourhoods who had pretended to live in the camp to qualify for benefits.

Given that the programs sought to target the most vulnerable, that is, those without a home and actually living in the camps, a methodology was put in place whereby the implementing agency with help from the police and MINUSTAH, for the bigger camps, would without any prior warning block off access to the chosen camp at night, and then proceed to register a head of household as a representative of each family resident in the camp. The logic driving the approach was that only people actually living in the camps would be there in the middle of the night, and thus the agency could be reasonably sure that those registered were actually camp residents.

This process, while in many ways experienced as intrusive by camp residents, certainly helped significantly to target the intended beneficiaries. This is not to say that the process was perfect, since people with outside housing could have been sleeping in the camps. There was also the possibility that

²⁸ As will be examined in later findings, some respondents claimed that the programs have elements that could be characterized as development-oriented in nature. Yet in the view of the evaluation team, the programming constituted part of a humanitarian response. The confusion arises because the humanitarian response unfolded over a long period of time and had to respond to situations that could be traced to the earthquake but also linked to more fundamental developmental problems in Haiti. The objectives of the programming are related to the former and only tangentially to the latter – hence it constitutes humanitarian programming.

camp residents could be away at the time of registration, for example because they were visiting family in the regions outside Port-au-Prince. Yet this latter group could seek to be included in the program through a complaints process that was put in place whereby they would become beneficiaries if they could prove that they were camp residents. This process seems to have helped the programs draw in camp residents while excluding non-residents – one interviewee gave some idea of the scale of the challenge when he noted that of 600 complaints received following registration at one camp, 70 were found to indeed live there.²⁹

An issue that became increasingly important later in the cycle of programming was the issue of whether to register camp residents for a program if they do not have their Department of Civil Protection (DPC) Displacement Registration Card. These cards were given out to IDPs in the camps during the initial registration process that began in early 2010 in partnership between the Department of Civil Protection and the International Organization for Migration.³⁰ Possession of the card would mark the cardholder as a camp resident, and would be an additional check and balance to be sure that the correct beneficiaries were being focused upon. Thus from the point of view of some key actors, it did not make sense to register people if they did not have the card; yet most implementing agencies disagreed and have carried on registering individuals that are sleeping in the camp at the time of registration for the program, based on the logic that the cards could reasonably have been lost or damaged over the intervening years (especially because the cards were not plasticized). This opens up the possibility that some program beneficiaries are not the intended ones, though the scale of this issue is not such as to undermine the overall finding.

In addition to being largely successful at targeting its intended beneficiaries, the RSCG programs were overall able to reach the sought after numbers of beneficiaries. That is, while the lack of complete documentation from every implementing agency makes it impossible to track this result in detail by program, the clear trend is a positive one.³¹ This latter observation emerged in interviews as well, with implementing agencies describing occasional slowdowns in particular programs though ultimately success in meeting their numbers. To take just one example, at the peak of its programs, IOM was relocating approximately 4,000 people a month.

Of course the program's aim of relocating beneficiaries has needed to be balanced with the absorptive capacity of the rental housing market. This proved challenging to definitively determine, particularly since much of Port-au-Prince's rental market is informal. Indeed, many interviewees noted that they would have liked to have stronger information about this situation as they went along, since it would have played a key role in dictating the pace of camp closures. According to one interviewee with IOM, the method adopted was to monitor the situation as camps were being closed, and if beneficiaries were finding it hard to find accommodation within a few days then to slow down the process until the market could catch back up. In the absence of better information, this method seems to have largely worked.

29 The World Bank. 2014. Rental Support Cash Grant Programs: Operations Manual, p. 11, also key informant interviews.

30 Return/Resettlement of IDPs Standard Operating Procedures for Updating Displacement Register, Haiti Camp Coordination Camp Management Cluster, June 2011.

31 <http://www.iomhaitidataportal.info/dtm/>

FINDING 13: WHILE PROGRAM ACTIVITIES SEEM TO HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED WITHIN PLANNED TIMELINES, DATA GAPS FOR PARTICULAR ORGANIZATIONS AS WELL AS LACK OF DOCUMENTATION FOR OTHER ORGANIZATIONS MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO DRAW DEFINITIVE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE USAGE OF FINANCIAL RESOURCES AND THE APPROPRIATENESS OF PROGRAM MONITORING.

Review of documents and key informant interviews highlighted no major issues in terms of planned activities being outside anticipated timelines. However, issues in terms of completeness of data make it impossible to comment on the overall usage of financial resources or the appropriateness of program monitoring. That is, while the data available from some organizations – based on document review and interviews – does seem to indicate that there are no concerns in this regard, there was insufficient specific and detailed information to make a definitive judgment in this regard, with analysis further compromised by the lack of data from other organizations. Such data issues are perhaps not surprising given the high turnover in personnel in the RSCG programs as well as the emergency nature of the response (since it is not uncommon for emergency response processes to not emphasize thorough and detailed documentary processes).

FINDING 14: THE RSCG HAS BEEN QUITE EFFECTIVELY COORDINATED THROUGH A CLUSTER APPROACH THAT HAS BROUGHT TOGETHER THE RELEVANT ACTORS ON A REGULAR BASIS AND THAT HAS HELPED TO ENSURE THE RELATIVELY SMOOTH FUNCTIONING OF THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE.

The coordination of the Rental Support Cash Grant programs has been carried out through a Cluster approach that has brought together key international and national stakeholders including non-governmental organizations, international organizations, donor representatives and the Government of Haiti. This includes all the implementing agencies carrying out the RSCG other than J/P Haitian Relief Organization.

The Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) Cluster has been led by IOM since January 2010, while IOM has been the lead agency for the combined Emergency Shelter and CCCM Cluster since September 2011. The focus of the Cluster is on camp management activities, provision of emergency assistance, transitional shelters and distribution of non-food items. Its core functions are:

- Coordination with the key stakeholders
- Preparedness and capacity building
- Needs assessment and planning
- Information management and reporting
- Application of international standards
- Monitoring of cross cutting issues
- Advocacy and resource mobilization

Important policy decisions are also taken by a limited group of stakeholders: the Strategic Advisory Group

(SAG) and a series of working groups that meet to discuss specific operational matters, the Technical Working Groups (TWiGs).³²

There are two main ways of assessing the quality of the coordination for the RSCG. The first is to look at the delivery of programming, searching for slowdowns, areas of significant conflict or other problems that could be linked to coordination issues. Taken as a whole, and given the challenging context of working in Haiti particularly post-earthquake with many different actors carrying out activities in close proximity to one another, it seems clear that the coordination has been relatively effective. That is, there have been no major problems or slowdowns beyond what would be expected in such a context. Relatively speaking then, based on this metric the coordination has been quite good. At the same time, there have been some good initiatives taken by the Cluster, for example to develop learning tools to ensure that institutional learning is not lost when staff move on to a new assignment.

The other way is through the semi-structured interviews with key informants carried out as part of this evaluation. Respondents described coordination as relatively good and as facilitating work between agencies for example through sharing of beneficiary lists. One respondent noted that while the Cluster meetings are sometimes quite abstract, the working groups are an effective place for learning about concrete solutions and for sharing ideas.

Several interviewees said that since the Government of Haiti became involved around two years ago, coordination has improved and decision-making is a bit faster as a result of this key actor becoming formally engaged in the planning and coordination process on a regular basis. Yet this point of view was contradicted by most others, who while recognizing that the ultimate goal is for the government to take full control felt that the greater governmental involvement has slowed the process down. The issue here seems to be one of balance between a humanitarian response and a development response, more particularly of where the point of balance is. From the point of view of the government, the initial post-earthquake need for a strong humanitarian response has decreased significantly and what is needed now is a more development-oriented response focused on the neighbourhoods; yet this point of view is not shared by the various humanitarian actors working in the country, who still see a stronger need for a humanitarian response, at least in the short-term.

These observations aside, there still seems to be relatively good cooperation and coordination between the national government and the various other Cluster members. There are also good working relationships with City Hall. More fundamentally then, interviews show that coordination between the relevant actors through the Cluster approach has been relatively good for a post-natural disaster humanitarian response.

32 <http://www.eshelter-cccmhaiti.info/2013/pages/34-what-is-the-cluster.php>

4. Conclusions/Lessons Learned

This evaluation highlights some important conclusions specific to the programs and which to some extent are generalizable as lessons learned/good practices. Section 4.1 outlines the conclusions, while Section 4.2 focuses upon the lessons learned/good practices.

4.1 CONCLUSIONS

The rental support cash grant programs have been a successful response to the particular circumstances extant in Haiti at the time of their implementation. The effectiveness of the programs was underlined by the fact that beneficiaries overwhelmingly obtained and maintained safe and secure rental accommodation both during and beyond the end of the grant period. This observation was true across gender and age groups. And significantly, there is good evidence linking these results with the RSCG.

Regarding socio-economic well-being, beneficiaries judged that they had enjoyed improvements as a result of the RSCG, though other, more indirect measures indicate that their situation resembled, to some degree, pre-earthquake levels. It also seems clear that the RSCG programs provided adequate funding for beneficiaries to remain in safe and secure accommodation throughout the course of the grant period, though with limited impact on longer-term economic well-being. In this sense, they maintain their overarching goal as a humanitarian response. Respondents also reported having a positive economic outlook after the completion of the grant. Yet efforts to specify what particular elements in agencies' programs contributed more or less to the results – for example livelihoods training or an extra cash grant given – were overall quite inconclusive, though merit further study. Overall, the effectiveness of the RSCG programs was enabled by their adaptation to the particular context in Haiti, as well as by the relative consensus on the approach between key actors. Challenges related to data – in terms of the absorptive capacity of the rental housing market, weak tracking of beneficiaries, and poor understanding of the impact of the programs on the local community and the local economy – to some degree impacted upon overall effectiveness, and more fundamentally the relative success of the RSCG programs muted pressure for full consideration of alternative approaches.

The programs were eminently relevant to respond to the needs and priorities of beneficiaries, as well as to the contextual challenges that existed in Haiti during the time of implementation. Furthermore, they were well aligned with the priorities of the Haitian government, the implementing agencies and the donors. Finally, the efficiency of the programs successfully targeted the intended beneficiaries (camp residents and in some cases, landlords) through a variety of strategies, while their combined management through a cluster approach was relatively smooth given the conditions and number of actors involved. Taken together then, these conclusions underline that the RSCG programs were a success given the outcomes sought in the context of this evaluation

4.2 LESSONS LEARNED

Lesson 1: In order for an intervention like the rental support cash grant programs to be successful, it must be sensitive to and reflective of the needs and limitations of the particular context.

Finding 8 underlined that the rental support cash grants have been a contextually sensitive response to the particular circumstances that existed in Haiti following the 2010 earthquake, including the scale of

the project, the demand to move people out of temporary camps in a short time frame, and the reality that individuals who lived in camps had previously been renters before the earthquake with poor access to land in Port-au-Prince for the construction of new housing. Notwithstanding these challenges, there is evidence that the RSCG programs were a highly effective tool for responding to a humanitarian crisis of this nature because implementation was done in a way that took careful consideration of the context. This contextual analysis should be repeated in any future responses, including taking into account such issues as the priorities of potential beneficiaries and of other key actors, the circumstances in which the intervention would be implemented (for example, the nature of the challenge and its scale, access to land for building vs. renting and the time pressures), as well as the resources available.

Lesson 2: Humanitarian contexts change over time, thus relocation programs should remain flexible and should adapt to those changing circumstances.

This lesson flows from the observation that some RSCG implementing agencies adjusted their approach over the multi-year lifetime of their programs – for example in terms of the particularities of the package that they offered to beneficiaries – in response to shifts in the implementation context or a newly emerging understanding of beneficiary needs much more than others. Yet humanitarian contexts are usually characterized by their shifting nature and a concomitant need for the response to adapt to those changes. What was most appropriate at one time might become less appropriate when the circumstances change, an observation that is particularly true for a response that takes place over years as is the case with the RSCG programs. A challenge here is that organizations tend to seek out a solution, and then put in place an infrastructure to deliver that solution; yet once in place, the organizational infrastructure can prove difficult to adapt to changing circumstances. There is therefore a need to build in mechanisms for change and adaptation in a response, and to manage such change proactively.

Lesson 3: Information is a valuable commodity in a humanitarian context, in terms of implementation but also in terms of planning.

The contextual assessment underpinning Lesson 1 and the adaptability referred to in Lesson 2 are highly dependent on good information about the context and the changes in it, the priorities, capacities and constraints of beneficiaries and other key actors, as well as the effectiveness of ongoing programming based upon a more focused consideration of what is working and what could be improved. Putting resources into information gathering and analysis of that information should thus be a priority, coupled with building in mechanisms to ensure that new data filters up to decision-makers so as to inform both the implementation and the planning processes. Information also needs to be shared between relevant key actors, with efforts made to avoid duplication in information gathering and analysis.

Lesson 4: Coordination and communication are crucial success factors in a complex response, particularly when humanitarian priorities begin to overlap with development priorities.

The RSCG programs have been carried out in a disaster context where many national and international actors have worked in close proximity to each other. The ability of the various humanitarian actors to communicate with each other and to coordinate together has been a crucial success factor in the response. Yet in a context with deep developmental challenges such as in Haiti, overall response

effectiveness also depends upon facilitating the gradual move toward a developmental response by coordinating between humanitarian and developmental actors and ensuring a smooth blend between their various activities. This process can be challenging, and depends upon constant open dialogue among the different key actors and stakeholders. It also requires joined up thinking in terms of better linking the humanitarian and development funding apparatus to ensure cohesive planning and activities.

Recommendations

The following recommendations flow from the findings in the report:

Recommendation 1: Implementing agencies, likely under the coordination of the Cluster, should gather more complete information on availability and inflation in the rental housing market, should update it on a regular basis, and should share it with other key actors.

One of the challenges in determining the pace for moving beneficiaries out of camps was the availability of appropriate rental housing and whether the pace of new renters was causing inflation in rental housing prices. As was described earlier in this report, implementing agencies were forced to rely on the method of monitoring whether beneficiaries were able to find housing within a few days at a reasonable price, and of adjusting programming in relation to this indicator. RSCG program planning and implementation could be made more effective by procuring higher quality information. This would require agencies to budget for staff to be able to more formally monitor the local housing market in destination neighbourhoods on an ongoing basis (i.e. every few months in a dynamic context like in Haiti). Furthermore, this information should be shared through the Cluster to avoid duplication of efforts.

Related to Finding 8.

Recommendation 2: Implementing agencies should gather more data on beneficiaries and should keep contact information up to date, in order to effectively adapt interventions and to facilitate follow up with beneficiaries.

Humanitarian response programs like the RSCG are a crisis-response tool often put in place in challenging circumstances. In such contexts, it can be very difficult to gather full information for each beneficiary and to maintain the correct identifying/contact information. Nevertheless, such information is crucial to ensure effective program implementation, adaptation and planning, as well as to carry out any future evaluations. Information gathered should include details on all the RSCG benefits given to the beneficiary, information on the beneficiary family members associated with the head of household, as well as more extensive contact information for each beneficiary – thus at least a phone number and an address as well as, if possible, accurate GPS coordinates, but also contact information for other significant family members and/or neighbours. Keeping this information up to date could be facilitated using an incentive approach that provides the beneficiary with a small additional cash supplement to come to the office of the implementing agency at some point toward the end of the rental support period to provide updated contact information. Another possibility is to split the rental subsidy payments into two six-month terms and have the beneficiary collect a second payment halfway through the grant period in exchange for providing updated contact information.

Related to Finding 8.

Recommendation 3: To ensure effective adaptation and the ongoing effectiveness of a particular RSCG intervention, a small number of beneficiaries should be followed up with at multiple points during and immediately after their grant period.

The number of respondents who could not be found during the survey gives rise to the question of whether it is simply because contact information was poor – an issue that would be addressed through recommendation 2 – or whether they have in fact moved. If the latter, then it would be important to find

out if there is any pattern in terms of where they are going and why, so that this information could properly inform ongoing humanitarian programming. Implementing agencies should thus consider choosing individuals to follow up with during and immediately after their grant period, perhaps at the 6th month, 11th month and 15th month points. The follow-ups could take the form of a very short, in-person qualitative interview, and the second follow up could coincide with the updating of contact information described in recommendation 2.

Related to Finding 8.

Recommendation 4: The development and sharing of learning tools through the Cluster is a strong initiative that should be continued and enhanced.

One of the key challenges for humanitarian organizations is the relatively short time periods in-country for staff, who can be reassigned at short notice in response to another emergency. This in turn has implications for local institutional memory, with lessons related to a particular initiative risking getting lost as staff move on to another assignment. The initiative taken by the Cluster to preserve institutional memory through the development and sharing of learning tools is an important one and should be enhanced and built upon, so that practitioners are able to understand and ultimately translate local learning into other contexts rather than simply lose it.

Related to Finding 13.

Recommendation 5: The impact of livelihoods programming and extra funding should be comparatively evaluated in a future evaluation.

The RSCG programs shared a common core approach – the cash grant for rental support – but also had some important differences in terms of livelihoods training and extra cash grants. The results of this extra programming should be examined further through a dedicated evaluation, since there are important implications in terms of whether and how such elements should be included in future humanitarian programming or whether it would be better to focus resources on core humanitarian activities and to carry out such development type activities within the context of a comprehensive development phase. Indeed, preliminary results detailed in the findings suggest that differences in outcomes were not represented in the indicators focused upon. Yet, qualitative data suggests that the type of benefit received by the beneficiary did have an impact on long-term safety. A future evaluation should also consider the effectiveness of the extra programming in the absence of a larger, more comprehensive development approach that would also for example focus on the absorption communities.

Related to findings 8, 9 and 10.

Recommendation 6: The impact of the RSCG programs on the local community and local economy should also be evaluated in a future evaluation, to better understand any negative or positive consequences of the programming beyond simply the beneficiaries.

The RSCG programs were notable for their beneficiary-focused approach in responding to the crisis in Haiti. Yet the larger impact of the programs on the local communities into which the beneficiaries moved is not clear, for example in terms of inflation in the price of rental housing because of a large influx of people with a fixed amount of rent money, reduced availability of rental housing for non-beneficiaries, or integration problems for the beneficiaries. Relatedly, it is not clear what impact the arrival of large numbers of beneficiaries had on the local economy, where many of them presumably sought to establish

themselves and to earn money. These issues should be examined through a purposive evaluation, to fully understand the impact of the RSCG programs and thus what might be expected if they are put in place in other contexts.

Related to Finding 8.

Annex 1. Terms of Reference

I. Introduction

Following the devastating 7.0 magnitude earthquake which struck Haiti on 12 January 2010, more than an estimated 1.5 million individuals were displaced throughout some 1,500 camp sites¹.

The humanitarian response in post-earthquake Haiti was coordinated through the Cluster approach, which aims at improving the effectiveness of the humanitarian response by ensuring coordination, promoting partnership among different stakeholders and by encouraging greater predictability and accountability. The different Clusters provided coordination among stakeholders, including the Government of Haiti, donors and humanitarian agencies.

Under the coordination of the Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) and Shelter Cluster (CCCM / Shelter Cluster), humanitarian actors provided different shelter/housing solutions to help families leave camps. Broadly-speaking these solutions have fallen into five categories:

- Transitional Shelters (T-shelters): Provision of medium-term shelter lasting between 3 and 5 years (10 in some cases).
- Yellow House Repairs: Rehabilitation of damaged houses.
- Rental vs retrofitting: Retrofitting of houses with the obligation of the owner of the house to rent to an IDP family.
- Permanent Housing Reconstruction: Construction of new houses replacing demolished houses (permanent housing reconstruction in general was hindered by land tenure issues).
- Rental Support Cash Grants: Provision of rental subsidies to allow beneficiaries to rent a property of their choice for one year (*piece kay*).

In the complexity of the humanitarian response in Haiti, the key strategic role of Rental Support Cash Grants was to offer a solution to those most vulnerable who did not have access to land, taking into account that the vast majority of those living in camps were renters before the earthquake. The Return and Relocation Strategy, adopted by the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT)² in January 2011, was the first official document to include Rental Support Cash Grant as a return option³. By introducing this option, more than 55 500 families had received rental subsidies in 2013, 339 camps had been closed and an additional 9,200 rental subsidies were planned and ongoing in early 2014. In Haiti, at least nine agencies achieved camp closure through Rental Support Cash Grant programs from 2011 through to 2014:

- Catholic Relief Services (CRS)
- Concern Worldwide
- International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)
- International Organization for Migration (IOM)
- J/P Haitian Relief Organization (J/P HRO)
- World Vision International
- CARE
- Goal
- Helpage

Three years after most organizations providing Rental Support Cash Grant made this option available to displaced families and over a year after the first evaluation was performed⁴, it has become evident that a second evaluation is required in order to understand the overall impact the Rental Support Cash Grant has had in addressing the needs of its direct beneficiaries.

II. External evaluation objectives

The overall objective of the evaluation is to assess the socio-economic impact of the Rental Support Cash Grants for return and relocation in Haiti by determining to what extent the RSCG approach was effective in assisting the rehousing of those in camps to safe and secure accommodations. In order to do so, it is important to examine the living conditions of its direct beneficiaries prior to the earthquake, during displacement and after receipt of the cash grant. This evaluation is a *post*-project evaluation.

The evaluation aims to: A) serve as a donor accountability tool, B) provide information in order to adjust current programs (as a monitoring and evaluation tool), C) shape current development projects in the areas of return, serving as well as a source of information for development actors working in land and housing in Haiti, amongst others, D) influence future emergency programs in urban environments like that of Haiti through the capitalization of lessons learned and good practices.

Examine the living conditions as well as the socio-economic impact on the local economy through the Rental Support Cash Grant of beneficiaries (including landlords) who have completed a year of rental subsidy. To this end, the study will be performed on beneficiaries who were relocated between 2011 and March – April, 2013, as well as house-owners. The evaluation specific objective is to examine the living conditions as well as the socio-economic impact on the local economy through the Rental Support Cash Grant of beneficiaries (including landlords) who have completed a year of rental subsidy. To this end, the study will be performed on beneficiaries who were relocated between 2011 and March – April, 2013, as well as house-owners.

Annex 2. Evaluation Matrix

This draft evaluation matrix summarises the main themes of investigation for the study, and presents the data sources and methods of analysis that the evaluation team intends to use. It should be noted that these are mainly top-line questions, and will be fleshed out and adapted, as necessary, during the data collection and analysis phase. It is intended to respond to the need to focus the analysis on the criteria of effectiveness and efficiency/management. The consultants will adhere to the parameters of OECD-DAC evaluation criteria, combined with the principles of evaluation of humanitarian action developed by ALNAP.

Issue	Main Questions	Sub Questions	Sources of Data	Methods of analysis
Effectiveness	Has the Rental Support Cash Grant (RSCG) program allowed beneficiaries to obtain and maintain safe and secure accommodation?	<p>Did the RSCG allow beneficiaries to obtain safe and secure accommodation?</p> <p>What was the role of the RSCG in obtaining safe and secure accommodation? (vs. other sources of income, including additional support mechanisms/interventions)</p> <p>What, if any, were the effects of the RSCG on the beneficiaries' socio-economic well-being (beyond accommodation)?</p> <p>If safe and secure accommodation was not obtained through RSCG, why not?</p>	Beneficiaries	Statistical analysis of survey responses
		<p>Did the RSCG allow beneficiaries to maintain safe and secure accommodation?</p> <p>Were beneficiaries able to stay in safe and secure accommodation post-RSCG (same or different housing unit of similar standard)?</p> <p>Did the RSCG allow beneficiaries to save in order to afford similar rent after the end of the program?</p> <p>If beneficiaries were not able to maintain safe and secure accommodation post-RSCG, why not?</p>	Beneficiaries	Statistical analysis of survey responses

Issue	Main Questions	Sub Questions	Sources of Data	Methods of analysis
Efficiency and Management	Relevance	Were the programs relevant to the beneficiaries, to the local context and to the priorities of the key actors (including implementing agencies, funders and government)?	Program documents, interviews Survey	Statistical analysis of survey data Content analysis
	How well did the RSCG use human and financial resources?	Was the RSCG able to identify the most appropriate potential beneficiaries? Did the program components (i.e., different projects) reach their target number of beneficiaries? Did the effects of the RSCG reach different genders, age groups and communities differently?	Program documents, interviews Survey	Statistical analysis of survey data Content analysis
	Enabling environment	What factors facilitated or contributed to the effective implementation of the RSCG? What factors impeded the effective implementation of the RSCG?	Program documents, interviews	Content analysis
	Coordination	What were the mechanisms of coordination among the RSCG participating agencies? Were the coordinating mechanisms effective? Were all relevant agencies included in the RSCG and in its coordination mechanisms?	Program documents, interviews	Content analysis
	Program management	Were financial resources available used as planned? If not, why? Were program activities conducted within planned timelines? If not, why? Was program monitoring appropriately conducted? If not, why?	Planning and reporting documents, both narrative and financial	Content analysis

Annex 3. Interviewees

The following table lists all the interviews that were conducted as part of the data collection phase:

List of Interviewees		
Name and Title	Organization	Interview Date
Simon Ashmore, former Head of Delegation, Haiti and Central African Republic	Formerly with the International Committee of the Red Cross	October 12, 2014
Angela Sherwood, International Migration Researcher and Haiti Specialist	N/A	October 13, 2014
Fanette Blanc, CCCM Protection Unit Project Manager	International Organization for Migration (IOM)	October 15, 2014
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Joelle Fontilus, Officier de Projet, Retour et Relogement	Unité de Construction de Logements et de Bâtiments Publics (UCLBP)	October 24, 2014
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Marie-France Provencher, First Secretary (Development)	Embassy of Canada in Haiti (Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development – DFATD)	October 30, 2014
Yves Horent, Humanitarian Adviser, Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department	Department for International Development, United Kingdom	November 7, 2014
Fabien Sambussy, CCCM Programme Manager	International Organization for Migration (IOM)	November 8, 2014
Sandra Berberi, First Secretary (Development)	Embassy of Canada in Sénégal (Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development – DFATD)	November 11, 2014.
Maggie Stephenson	University College London, formerly with UN Habitat Haiti	December 10, 2014.

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Annex 5. Survey Questionnaire for Beneficiaries

Q ID	Question	Conditional question
q1	Respondent Name	
q2	Respondent Phone Number	
q3	Respondent Gender	
q4	Respondent Age	
q5	Commune	
q6	Sector / Neighbourhood	
q7	ID Type	
q8	ID Number	
q9	Which commune did you live in before the earthquake?	
q10	What kind of accommodation did you live in before the earthquake?	
q11	What kind of roof did this house have?	
q12	What condition was this house in?	
q13	Was this house in a ravine, on or near a riverbed, in a flood prone area, or on a steep slope?	
q14	How did you pay for your accommodation before the earthquake?	
q15	Before the earthquake, how many rooms did you have that were used exclusively for sleeping?	
q16	Before the earthquake, how many people (including you) lived in your house?	
q17	Before the earthquake, did you have access to a latrine/toilet?	
q18		If yes, was it communal or private?
q19	Before the earthquake, did you have access to a water source?	

q20		If yes, was it communal or private?
q21	Before the earthquake, how safe did you feel in your home?	
q22	Did you have a job (working for someone else) before the earthquake?	
q23	If yes, what was your average salary per month?	
q24	Did you have a business (working for yourself) before the earthquake?	
q25	If yes, what was the average business profit per month?	
q26	On average, how many meals per day did your family consume?	
q27	On average, how confident did you feel that you would be able to meet your family's basic needs on a weekly basis?	
q29	What commune did you move to after receiving the Rental Support Cash Grant?	
q30	Why did you decide to move to that commune?	
q31	Why did you select the house that you moved into with the Rental Support Cash Grant?	
q32	What kind of house did you move into with the Rental Support Cash Grant?	
q33	What kind of roof did this house have?	
q34	What condition was this house in?	
q35	How many rooms did the house that you were living in with the Rental Support Cash Grant have that were used exclusively for sleeping?	
q36	How many people (including you) lived in the house that you rented with the Rental Support Cash Grant?	
q37	How safe did you feel in the house you were living in with the Rental Support Cash Grant?	
q38	Did you have access to a latrine/toilet? If yes, is it communal or private?	
q39		If yes, was it communal or private?
q40	Did you have access to a water source?	

q41		If yes, was it communal or private?
q42	Are you still in the same house that you selected for the Rental Support Cash Grant Program? If no, let's talk about your current house.	
q43		If no, why did you move to a different house?
q44		If no, what commune did you move to?
q45		If no, why did you decide to move to that Commune?
q46		If no, why did you select your current house?
q47		If no, what kind of house do you currently live in?
q48		If no, what kind of roof does your house have?
q49		If no, what condition is your house in?
q50		If no, how many rooms does your house have that are used exclusively
q51		If no, how many people (including you) live in the house you are
q52		If no, how safe do you feel in your home?
q53		If no, are you in a house that has access to a latrine/toilet?
q54		If yes, was it communal or private?
q55		If no, are you in a house that has access to a water source?
q56		If yes, was it communal or private?

q57	Do you currently own your property?	
q58		If yes, how much did the property
q59		If yes, how did you pay for the land and/or construction?
q60		If no, how much is your rent per year?
q61		If no, for how many months is this rental price guaranteed?
q62	How much money, if any, was left over from the cash grant for the rent?	
q63		If any, what did you use the money for?
q64	Did you receive extra money from the organization	
q65		If yes, how much extra money did you receive?
q66		If yes, what did you use the money for?
q67	Did you receive any other benefits in kind (such as health insurance, house reform, emergency kit)?	
q68	Did you receive any other cash grants from other organizations?	
q69		If yes, how much additional money did you receive?
q70		If yes, what did you use the money for?
q71	Do you have any children?	
q72		If yes, how many children between the age of 6 and 12 do you have that can go to school?

q73		If yes, how many of these children are currently in school?
q74		If yes, how many of these school age children went to school when you
q75	Do you have any other dependants (elderly unable to work, handicapped persons or children under the age of 5)?	
q76	How many dependents?	
q77	How many meals a day do you eat?	
q78	How many meals a day did you eat while in the camp?	
q79	How is your living situation different now than before the earthquake?	
q80	How is your living situation different now than when you were in the camp?	
q81	To what degree did the Rental Support Cash Program improve your safety and protection in the long run?	
q82	Have you had economic difficulties after the earthquake such as debt?	
q83		If so how much debt are you in?
q84	Did you start (or restart) a business after the earthquake?	
q85		If yes, is it the same business that you had before the earthquake?
q86		If yes, what is your average monthly income from your business?
q87	What are your total monthly expenses now?	
q88	Now that the Rental Support Cash Program has ended, how do you pay for your housing?	
q89	Do you intend to return to a camp if you are unable to secure proper housing in the next six months?	

- q90 How will you pay for housing over the next two years?
- q91 To what degree did the Rental Support Cash Program improve your economic opportunities in the long run?
- q92 In your assessment, does the current accommodation respect project's basic safety and sanitation criteria?
- q93 Do you have any reason to believe that the respondent was not being honest about any questions?
- q94 How structurally sound does the respondent's house appear
- q95 Is the house in a ravine, on or near a riverbed, in a flood prone area, or on a steep slope?
- q96 What type of house does the person live in now?
- q97 What kind of roof does the house have?
- q98 What state of repair was the respondent's house in [inside]?
- q99 What state of repair was the respondent's house in [outside]?

Annex 6. Key Informant Interview Protocols

Interview Protocol for Project Management / Finances Staff

Introduction

Large-N Analysis has been hired to conduct the Second External Evaluation of the Second External Evaluation of the Rental Support Cash Grant (RSCG) approach applied to Return and Relocation programs in Haiti. As part of that process, we are carrying out interviews aimed at helping us to better understand the context of implementation and the factors that may enable or hinder the effectiveness of the program. Please note that your responses are confidential, and that the information gathered through these interviews will only be reported in aggregate, anonymous form.

Your participation in these interviews is extremely important, and we thank you for taking the time to do so.

1.1 General information

- Please briefly describe your role(s) in your organisation.
- Please briefly describe your involvement in the RSCG.
- Please briefly describe your organization's approach to implementation of the RSCG (additional programs?).

1.2 Implementation Context

- Main challenges
- Main enabling conditions

1.3 Implementation

- Method of identification of beneficiaries
- Planned vs. actual beneficiaries reached –reasons for variance?

1.4 Project Management

- Were activities conducted within planned timelines? Reasons for variance?
- Challenges in terms of human resources (number and or capacity)?
- Challenges in terms of financial resources (amounts and/or disbursement mechanisms)?

1.5 Cluster Coordination

- Level of participation in coordination mechanisms
- Advantages and disadvantages of coordination mechanism

1.6 Lessons learned

- What should be done the same way, what should be done differently?

Interview Protocol for Project Donors

Introduction

Large-N Analysis has been hired to conduct the Second External Evaluation of the Second External Evaluation of the Rental Support Cash Grant (RSCG) approach applied to Return and Relocation programs in Haiti. As part of that process, we are carrying out interviews aimed at helping us to better understand the context of implementation, and the extent to which the program has responded to donor expectations. Please note that your responses are confidential, and that the information gathered through these interviews will only be reported in aggregate, anonymous form.

Your participation in these interviews is extremely important, and we thank you for taking the time to do so.

1.1 General information

- Please briefly describe your role(s) in your organisation.
- Please briefly describe your involvement in the RSCG.

1.2 Overall relevance to donor priorities

- What were your expectations of the RSCG? Were they met?
- How does RSCG fit within your organisational priorities in Haiti?

1.3 Context of implementation

- Main challenges
- Main enabling conditions

1.4 Program management

- Levels of responsiveness of implementing agencies to donor's reporting practices
- Advantages/disadvantages of cluster approach

1.5 Lessons learned

- What should be done the same way, what should be done differently?

Interview Protocol for Government Agencies

Introduction

Large-N Analysis has been hired to conduct the Second External Evaluation of the Second External Evaluation of the Rental Support Cash Grant (RSCG) approach applied to Return and Relocation programs in Haiti. As part of that process, we are carrying out interviews aimed at helping us to better understand the context of implementation, and the extent to which the program has responded to the Government of Haiti's needs and priorities. Please note that your responses are confidential, and that the information gathered through these interviews will only be reported in aggregate, anonymous form.

Your participation in these interviews is extremely important, and we thank you for taking the time to do so.

1.1 General information

- Please briefly describe your role(s) in your organisation.
- Please briefly describe your involvement in the RSCG.

1.2 Overall relevance to Government of Haiti's priorities

- What were your expectations of the RSCG? Were these met?
- How does RSCG fit within or complement your priorities?

1.3 Lessons learned

- What should be done the same way, what should be done differently?

Annex 7. Data by Implementing Agency

What kind of accommodation did you live in before the earthquake?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
Brick	126	376	226	132	188	39	174	439	249	186	2,135
Shack	11	7	3	2	5	1	6	15	1	4	55
T-Shelter	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Wood	1	10	2	6	5	1	2	11	0	2	40
Total	138	393	233	140	198	41	182	465	250	192	2,232
Pearson chi2(27) = 58.9424 Pr = 0.000											
What kind of roof did this house have?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
Cement	77	237	129	46	78	23	103	247	138	105	1,183
Tin	61	155	104	94	119	18	79	219	112	87	1,048
Total	138	392	233	140	197	41	182	466	250	192	2,231
Pearson chi2(9) = 48.5379 Pr = 0.000											
What condition was this house in?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
Very Bad	0	4	0	0	1	0	1	2	0	0	8
Bad	4	29	22	12	18	1	10	41	15	8	160
Neither Good/Bad	38	123	69	39	55	11	54	118	55	46	608
Good	76	203	120	74	107	20	91	246	152	114	1,203

Very Good	20	34	19	15	16	8	26	55	27	24	244
Total	138	393	230	140	197	40	182	462	249	192	2,223
Pearson chi2(36) = 45.8831 Pr = 0.125											
Was this house in a ravine, on or near a riverbed, in a flood prone area, or on a slope?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
Flood Prone Area	13	3	4	1	9	0	7	10	5	1	53
No	116	348	171	85	153	38	141	358	187	148	1,745
Ravine	7	32	39	30	10	1	23	58	45	17	262
Riverbed	1	0	3	0	10	0	3	7	0	1	25
Steep Slope	0	7	11	23	7	1	8	28	10	17	112
Total	137	390	228	139	189	40	182	461	247	184	2,197
Pearson chi2(36) = 203.5051 Pr = 0.000											
How did you pay for your accommodation before the earthquake?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
Diaspora remittance	2	4	1	2	2	0	4	8	3	1	27
Don't Know / Refused	1	3	3	0	1	1	1	2	0	0	12
Free Housing	5	2	2	3	11	0	3	6	1	3	36

Friends/Family contribution/Assistance	20	60	45	20	34	5	36	90	57	26	393
Full-time Employment	8	20	18	11	9	2	15	37	26	21	167
NGO Support	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	7
Other	9	30	18	21	17	5	16	41	16	19	192
Part-time Employment	30	52	41	39	32	5	42	90	42	52	425
Self-Employment	62	218	99	42	90	22	62	187	102	68	952
Total	137	394	227	138	196	40	179	461	249	190	2,211
Pearson chi2(72) = 148.2172 Pr = 0.000											
Before the earthquake, how many rooms did you have that were used exclusively for sleeping?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
1	93	272	131	99	119	26	107	260	154	105	1,366
2	38	101	76	28	58	12	56	145	72	70	656
3	1	12	16	7	14	3	12	38	18	14	135
4	3	7	2	6	3	0	5	13	3	2	44
5	2	0	2	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	7

6	0	0	3	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	5
7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	2
8	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	3
9	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	2
Total	137	394	230	140	197	41	181	462	248	191	2,221
Pearson chi2(81) = 110.5816 Pr = 0.016											
Before the earthquake, how many people (including you) lived in your house?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
1	2	10	3	2	1	0	5	2	3	0	28
2	16	29	12	13	9	2	10	33	17	10	151
3	17	85	39	30	33	10	36	82	54	38	424
4	31	104	55	31	33	5	33	111	52	42	497
5	29	71	47	28	40	8	38	86	65	39	451
6	16	44	31	17	32	10	28	66	24	24	292
7	11	37	24	7	20	2	12	34	16	14	177
8	12	7	13	4	14	4	9	25	12	11	111
9	1	1	2	2	6	0	3	10	3	7	35
10	2	4	4	6	9	0	7	13	2	5	52
Total	137	392	230	140	197	41	181	462	248	190	2,218
Pearson chi2(81) = 115.7676 Pr = 0.007											

Before the earthquake, did you have access to a latrine/toilet?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
No	4	7	6	4	7	1	0	13	2	2	46
Yes	133	386	223	136	190	40	182	450	247	189	2,176
Total	137	393	229	140	197	41	182	463	249	191	2,222
Pearson chi2(9) = 11.6312 Pr = 0.235											
If yes, was it communal or private?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
Communal	55	197	71	24	53	15	63	156	86	57	777
Private	78	189	152	112	137	25	119	294	161	132	1,399
Total	133	386	223	136	190	40	182	450	247	189	2,176
Pearson chi2(9) = 70.1659 Pr = 0.000											
Before the earthquake, did you have access to a water source?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
No	1	51	45	19	20	2	12	49	22	12	233
Yes	136	342	185	121	177	39	170	414	227	180	1,991
Total	137	393	230	140	197	41	182	463	249	192	2,224

Pearson chi2(9) = 46.8787 Pr = 0.000											
If yes, was it communal or private?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
Communal	108	299	156	90	134	31	129	302	195	132	1,576
Private	28	43	29	31	43	8	41	112	32	48	415
Total	136	342	185	121	177	39	170	414	227	180	1,991
Pearson chi2(9) = 40.8724 Pr = 0.000											
Before the earthquake, how safe did you feel in your home?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
Very Unsafe	4	26	6	5	6	3	1	18	3	1	73
Somewhat Unsafe	8	63	29	11	21	6	24	52	20	13	247
Somewhat Safe	81	226	132	66	98	18	92	210	142	126	1,191
Very Safe	44	78	63	58	70	14	65	181	83	52	708
Total	137	393	230	140	195	41	182	461	248	192	2,219
Pearson chi2(27) = 99.3944 Pr = 0.000											
Did you have a job (working for	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total

someone else) before the earthquake?											
No	110	323	181	102	164	30	128	356	171	118	1,683
Yes	27	68	49	38	33	11	54	105	78	73	536
Total	137	391	230	140	197	41	182	461	249	191	2,219
Pearson chi2(9) = 50.1110 Pr = 0.000											
If yes, what was your average salary per month?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
\$0-\$1000	110	327	185	104	167	31	130	361	171	119	1,705
\$1001-\$5000	17	30	23	20	15	6	27	45	45	42	270
\$5001-\$10000	5	20	16	9	7	2	15	29	24	15	142
\$10001-\$20000	4	10	5	3	6	0	6	18	5	14	71
\$20001-\$50000	1	1	0	3	1	1	2	6	1	0	16
\$50001+	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Total	137	388	230	140	196	40	180	459	246	190	2,206
Pearson chi2(45) = 99.6599 Pr = 0.000											
Did you have a business (working for yourself) before	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total

the earthquake?											
No	62	130	105	74	55	13	93	199	118	90	939
Yes	71	253	121	61	136	26	85	251	127	98	1,229
Total	133	383	226	135	191	39	178	450	245	188	2,168
Pearson chi2(9) = 50.3275 Pr = 0.000											
If yes, what was the average business profit per month?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
\$0-\$1000	70	165	118	78	75	20	104	225	134	104	1,093
\$1001-\$5000	36	140	49	33	76	11	40	110	56	50	601
\$5001-\$10000	12	35	26	11	18	6	15	55	25	14	217
\$10001-\$20000	8	22	19	4	13	1	13	29	19	10	138
\$20001-\$50000	4	13	4	7	4	1	2	15	5	6	61
\$50001+	0	1	2	0	1	0	1	3	1	0	9
Total	130	376	218	133	187	39	175	437	240	184	2,119
Pearson chi2(45) = 68.8821 Pr = 0.013											
On average, how many meals per day did your family consume?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	4

1	14	66	58	25	42	8	29	79	26	26	373
2	97	249	116	84	117	23	108	253	160	106	1,313
3	22	72	49	29	34	10	41	116	55	50	478
4	0	2	0	1	2	0	0	5	1	0	11
5	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	4	1	7
Total	133	391	225	139	195	41	178	455	246	183	2,186
Pearson chi2(45) = 74.1689 Pr = 0.004											
On average, how confident did you feel that you would be able to meet your family's needs?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
Very Unconfident	8	21	16	4	9	0	13	34	16	7	128
Somewhat Unconfident	20	65	51	36	36	8	32	86	52	32	418
Somewhat Confident	78	233	112	84	111	27	94	226	120	116	1,201
Very Confident	29	70	43	14	41	5	39	109	57	33	440
Total	135	389	222	138	197	40	178	455	245	188	2,187
Pearson chi2(27) = 44.0343 Pr = 0.021											
What commune did you move to after	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World	Total

receiving the Rental Support Cash Grant?						International				Vision	
Anse d'Hainault	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Camp Perrin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Carrefour	126	1	1	1	2	0	1	15	1	1	149
Cavaillon	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Cite Soleil	0	4	0	0	2	0	42	17	0	42	107
Croix-Des-Bouquets	0	6	8	0	63	20	15	26	6	25	169
Delmas	0	252	103	3	82	19	72	103	201	18	853
Fonds Des Negres	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Gressier	1	0	0	4	0	0	0	1	0	0	6
Leogane	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Les Anglais	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Ouanaminthe	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Petionville	0	1	1	44	5	0	5	38	7	53	154
Port-a-Piment	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Port-au-Prince	4	109	96	80	7	0	7	197	10	43	553
Quartier Morin	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Tabarre	0	3	9	0	30	2	25	31	4	0	104
Thomazeau	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	2
Total	132	376	220	134	191	41	170	428	230	185	2,107

Pearson chi2(153) = 3421.6820 Pr = 0.000											
Why did you decide to move to that commune?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
Close to Family	18	70	54	29	44	5	51	77	45	43	436
Education	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	1	3	0	7
Other	22	83	39	23	43	14	29	153	54	31	491
Place of Origin	84	187	119	70	73	16	64	148	89	85	935
Security	9	41	13	11	26	2	28	66	44	23	263
Services (Hospitals, WASH, Transport, Banks, etc.)	3	5	3	6	8	4	4	11	7	4	55
Work	1	2	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	2	9
Total	137	390	228	139	195	41	178	457	243	188	2,196
Pearson chi2(54) = 155.1767 Pr = 0.000											
Why did you select the house that you moved into with the Rental Support Cash Grant?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
Close to Family	18	65	51	19	39	6	30	71	44	39	382
Education	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	3	2	0	8

Other	50	99	60	42	47	13	49	156	70	43	629
Place of Origin	43	116	61	44	34	9	32	78	36	50	503
Price	16	45	29	16	35	5	29	61	43	27	306
Security	6	61	22	14	31	5	36	76	46	29	326
Services (Hospitals, WASH, Transport, Banks, etc.)	0	2	3	5	5	3	4	6	6	3	37
Work	3	1	1	0	2	0	0	5	0	1	13
Total	136	391	227	140	194	41	180	456	247	192	2,204
Pearson chi2(63) = 131.0089 Pr = 0.000											
What kind of house did you move into with the Rental Support Cash Grant?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
Brick	124	368	218	130	193	40	174	446	241	184	2,118
Shack	9	15	5	6	1	0	4	9	5	4	58
T-Shelter	0	1	4	1	0	0	0	2	1	2	11
Tent	1	1	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	5
Wood	2	6	2	3	2	1	1	4	1	2	24
Total	136	391	230	140	196	41	181	461	248	192	2,216
Pearson chi2(36) = 46.5993 Pr = 0.111											

What kind of roof did this house have?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
Cement	69	213	125	65	85	23	95	255	145	102	1,177
Tarp	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	4
Tin	67	180	104	74	111	18	83	206	104	90	1,037
Total	137	393	229	140	196	41	180	461	249	192	2,218
Pearson chi2(18) = 30.4561 Pr = 0.033											
What condition was this house in?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
Very Bad	1	2	3	1	1	0	1	2	1	0	12
Bad	8	22	21	3	5	2	8	17	13	5	104
Neither Good/Bad	33	149	84	43	48	12	51	119	66	47	652
Good	82	188	102	80	125	21	89	263	141	120	1,211
Very Good	12	27	15	11	15	5	31	52	26	17	211
Total	136	388	225	138	194	40	180	453	247	189	2,190
Pearson chi2(36) = 77.7706 Pr = 0.000											
How many rooms did the house that you were living in with the Rental Support Cash Grant?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total

1	125	331	180	119	170	32	143	383	199	130	1,812
2	10	60	41	19	22	8	33	62	45	51	351
3	1	1	5	1	3	0	2	8	2	8	31
4	0	1	2	0	0	0	1	3	3	2	12
5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
6	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
8	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
10	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	5
Total	136	394	229	139	196	41	180	458	249	192	2,214

Pearson chi2(63) = 91.0069 Pr = 0.012

How many people (including you) lived in the house that you rented with the Rent Support Cash Grant?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
1	6	10	2	5	6	0	2	16	4	6	57
2	17	45	21	14	20	2	13	49	28	12	221
3	25	94	49	31	38	10	39	112	67	40	505
4	29	109	53	34	35	7	38	120	63	43	531
5	21	69	41	23	40	10	41	87	38	43	413
6	21	34	29	15	25	5	20	43	32	19	243

7	10	16	20	5	13	3	9	17	6	12	111
8	6	9	7	7	12	4	10	8	8	7	78
9	2	3	2	2	3	0	3	5	1	6	27
10	0	3	3	1	1	0	3	2	1	0	14
11	0	1	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	2	8
12	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	2	5
13	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
14	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
15	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	3
Total	137	394	229	139	196	41	181	460	249	192	2,218

Pearson chi2(126) = 152.1100 Pr = 0.057

How safe did you feel in the house you were living in with the Rental Support Cash Grant?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
Very Unsafe	3	22	7	4	2	0	2	13	1	2	56
Somewhat Unsafe	13	52	32	10	20	3	16	46	20	14	226
Somewhat Safe	80	248	146	83	105	30	112	232	144	126	1,306
Very Safe	41	71	44	43	69	8	51	169	84	50	630
Total	137	393	229	140	196	41	181	460	249	192	2,218

Pearson chi2(27) = 89.4107 Pr = 0.000											
Did you have access to a latrine/toilet? If yes, is it communal or private?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
No	3	10	6	2	2	0	0	4	5	1	33
Yes	134	383	223	137	194	40	179	456	244	191	2,181
Total	137	393	229	139	196	40	179	460	249	192	2,214
Pearson chi2(9) = 11.9226 Pr = 0.218											
If yes, was it communal or private?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
Communal	58	168	70	29	57	21	72	151	91	63	780
Private	76	215	153	108	137	19	107	305	153	128	1,401
Total	134	383	223	137	194	40	179	456	244	191	2,181
Pearson chi2(9) = 40.9507 Pr = 0.000											
Did you have access to a water source?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
No	3	46	44	19	19	1	14	42	18	15	221
Yes	134	347	185	121	177	40	166	418	231	176	1,995

Total	137	393	229	140	196	41	180	460	249	191	2,216
Pearson chi2(9) = 41.3394 Pr = 0.000											
If yes, was it communal or private?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
Communal	110	311	157	82	130	35	121	307	194	133	1,580
Private	24	36	28	39	47	5	45	111	37	43	415
Total	134	347	185	121	177	40	166	418	231	176	1,995
Pearson chi2(9) = 59.0317 Pr = 0.000											
Are you still in the same house that you selected for the Rental Support Cash Grant?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
No	10	181	130	68	97	16	106	264	109	102	1,083
Yes	127	211	99	72	99	25	75	198	140	89	1,135
Total	137	392	229	140	196	41	181	462	249	191	2,218
Pearson chi2(9) = 126.8553 Pr = 0.000											
If no, why did you move to a different house?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
Close to Family	1	12	12	3	7	0	8	12	2	2	59

Education	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Found A Better House	1	15	5	5	5	0	6	20	9	11	77
Other	2	61	41	19	40	5	44	126	52	47	437
Place of Origin	0	2	5	3	2	0	0	6	1	3	22
Price	0	36	36	17	18	4	25	44	14	22	216
Problems with Landlord	3	20	18	15	18	6	17	36	19	7	159
Security	1	25	4	0	6	0	2	9	6	5	58
Services (Hospitals, WASH, Transport, Banks, etc.)	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	3	1	7
Work	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	5
Total	8	174	123	64	97	15	103	254	106	98	1,042
Pearson chi2(81) = 138.3668 Pr = 0.000											
If no, what commune did you move to?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
Anse A Veau	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Cap Haitien	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Carrefour	7	4	1	0	2	0	1	7	1	0	23
Cite Soleil	0	4	0	0	1	1	25	13	0	17	61
Coteaux	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1

Croix-Des-Bouquets	0	8	12	0	46	10	16	26	10	16	144
Delmas	0	111	48	1	28	3	33	57	82	7	370
Gressier	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	4
Petionville	0	1	3	27	1	0	1	21	5	30	89
Port-au-Prince	1	44	50	34	5	0	9	111	3	27	284
Tabarre	0	0	6	0	14	1	13	16	1	0	51
Thomazeau	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	2
Total	8	173	120	64	97	15	101	253	103	97	1,031
Pearson chi2(99) = 1052.3994 Pr = 0.000											
If no, why did you decide to move to that Commune?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
Close to Family	4	45	33	14	29	4	33	58	19	25	264
Education	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	3	9
Other	0	42	27	13	24	7	26	91	29	25	284
Place of Origin	4	59	48	29	31	2	26	70	35	34	338
Security	0	21	7	6	7	1	11	26	13	9	101
Services (Hospitals, WASH, Transport, Banks, etc.)	0	3	3	1	2	0	2	5	3	3	22
Work	0	3	3	0	1	0	3	3	3	0	16
Total	8	174	122	63	94	15	102	254	103	99	1,034
Pearson chi2(54) = 60.3403 Pr = 0.257											

If no, why did you select your current house?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
Close to Family	5	40	30	12	25	1	32	50	10	22	227
Education	0	1	1	0	2	0	1	1	1	0	7
Other	1	56	35	23	32	5	27	96	40	26	341
Place of Origin	0	21	24	10	9	1	12	32	9	14	132
Price	2	35	19	14	14	5	17	51	21	21	199
Security	0	18	8	2	12	2	13	23	20	12	110
Services (Hospitals, WASH, Transport, Banks, etc.)	0	1	5	2	0	1	0	1	1	3	14
Work	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	5
Total	8	173	123	63	95	15	102	255	103	98	1,035
Pearson chi2(63) = 83.6385 Pr = 0.042											
If no, what kind of house do you currently live in?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
Brick	6	151	99	45	67	10	82	196	88	78	822
Shack	2	8	3	8	12	2	8	14	5	7	69
T-Shelter	0	2	13	5	7	2	4	17	4	2	56
Tent	0	2	3	4	3	1	8	14	6	7	48
Wood	0	10	5	2	8	0	2	16	2	4	49

Total	8	173	123	64	97	15	104	257	105	98	1,044
Pearson chi2(36) = 62.9625 Pr = 0.004											
If no, what kind of roof does your house have?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
Cement	2	90	53	21	26	3	38	94	42	34	403
Tarp	0	4	6	6	4	4	6	12	8	8	58
Tin	6	79	65	37	65	8	59	148	55	56	578
Total	8	173	124	64	95	15	103	254	105	98	1,039
Pearson chi2(18) = 42.0413 Pr = 0.001											
If no, what condition is your house in?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
Very Bad	0	5	6	3	12	2	7	22	7	8	72
Bad	1	17	12	14	20	2	18	39	14	13	150
Neither Good/Bad	2	66	54	27	23	6	37	96	32	27	370
Good	5	76	40	18	34	4	31	81	44	41	374
Very Good	0	9	11	2	5	1	9	16	8	9	70
Total	8	173	123	64	94	15	102	254	105	98	1,036
Pearson chi2(36) = 49.2871 Pr = 0.069											
If no, how many rooms does your house have that are used exclusively for sleeping?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total

0	127	210	99	72	100	25	75	199	141	91	1,139
1	7	130	99	51	76	13	82	201	82	71	812
2	1	39	18	11	17	1	20	48	17	20	192
3	0	4	2	0	2	1	1	4	3	3	20
4	0	1	4	1	1	0	0	2	2	1	12
5	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2
Total	135	384	223	135	196	40	178	455	245	186	2,177

Pearson chi2(45) = 149.9386 Pr = 0.000

If no, how many people (including you) live in the house you are currently living in?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
0	127	210	99	72	99	25	75	198	140	89	1,134
1	1	5	3	1	3	0	1	6	2	3	25
2	1	25	12	10	10	0	8	28	11	8	113
3	0	39	22	9	16	5	20	58	13	13	195
4	3	43	24	14	18	2	23	68	30	26	251
5	1	23	23	13	20	5	20	42	22	24	193
6	2	20	15	6	11	0	13	28	19	11	125
7	0	3	10	4	9	2	9	11	3	5	56
8	0	7	5	4	5	0	5	9	3	6	44
9	0	4	3	0	1	1	4	4	0	2	19

10	0	3	2	2	1	0	0	2	1	0	11
11	0	1	4	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	7
13	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2
15	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Total	135	383	223	135	196	40	178	455	245	187	2,177
Pearson chi2(126) = 240.8579 Pr = 0.000											
If no, how safe do you feel in your home?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
Very Unsafe	0	12	9	6	15	4	7	17	8	3	81
Somewhat Unsafe	2	25	24	13	22	2	22	54	20	18	202
Somewhat Safe	2	97	65	37	40	5	56	126	45	56	529
Very Safe	4	40	26	8	21	4	18	60	32	21	234
Total	8	174	124	64	98	15	103	257	105	98	1,046
Pearson chi2(27) = 40.4049 Pr = 0.047											
If no, are you in a house that has access to a latrine/toilet?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
No	3	12	8	12	21	3	6	29	8	11	113
Yes	5	162	116	52	77	12	98	228	97	87	934

Total	8	174	124	64	98	15	104	257	105	98	1,047
Pearson chi2(9) = 32.0491 Pr = 0.000											
If yes, is it communal or private?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
Communal	2	70	41	13	26	5	52	101	28	30	368
Private	3	92	75	39	51	7	46	127	69	57	566
Total	5	162	116	52	77	12	98	228	97	87	934
Pearson chi2(9) = 22.6903 Pr = 0.007											
If no, are you in a house that has access to a water source?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
No	0	23	23	14	8	3	7	29	9	10	126
Yes	8	151	101	50	90	12	97	228	97	88	922
Total	8	174	124	64	98	15	104	257	106	98	1,048
Pearson chi2(9) = 18.9191 Pr = 0.026											
If yes, is it communal or private?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total

Communal	6	133	79	36	75	8	82	181	84	62	746
Private	2	18	22	14	15	4	15	47	13	26	176
Total	8	151	101	50	90	12	97	228	97	88	922
Pearson chi2(9) = 19.5975 Pr = 0.021											
Do you currently own your property?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
No	126	379	210	119	178	37	170	425	233	170	2,047
Yes	8	10	17	20	17	3	9	30	11	18	143
Total	134	389	227	139	195	40	179	455	244	188	2,190
Pearson chi2(9) = 31.2119 Pr = 0.000											
If yes, how much did the property cost you?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
0 - 5,000	0	1	1	7	4	2	1	4	1	4	25
10,001 - 15,000	1	1	1	3	0	0	0	1	0	4	11
15,001 - 20,000	1	1	1	3	3	0	0	4	1	1	15
20,001 - 30,000	1	1	1	0	3	0	2	4	4	2	18
30,001 - 40,000	2	0	2	2	0	0	0	2	0	1	9
40,001 +	1	3	3	4	2	0	3	3	1	3	23
5,001 - 10,000	0	1	1	0	2	0	1	8	3	3	19

Total	6	8	10	19	14	2	7	26	10	18	120
Pearson chi2(54) = 58.9792 Pr = 0.298											
If yes, how did you pay for the land and/or construction?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
Diaspora remittance	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	2
Don't Know / Refused	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2
Free Housing	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	4
Friends/Family contribution/Assistance	2	0	1	2	4	0	0	6	0	2	17
Full-time Employment	1	1	2	2	1	0	1	2	2	1	13
NGO Support	1	1	1	1	3	0	0	1	0	3	11
Other	1	2	2	4	3	1	2	3	3	5	26
Part-time Employment	1	2	4	9	3	0	3	5	3	6	36
Self-Employment	2	1	2	1	3	1	2	10	3	4	29
Total	9	7	14	19	17	2	10	29	12	21	140
Pearson chi2(72) = 55.0301 Pr = 0.931											

If no, how much is your rent per year?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
\$0-\$1000	28	29	33	27	38	5	24	68	19	34	305
\$1001-\$5000	1	22	7	0	8	1	3	21	4	3	70
\$5001-\$10000	3	112	27	9	19	7	16	63	10	26	292
\$10001-\$20000	88	194	125	75	102	25	102	234	113	100	1,158
\$20001-\$50000	7	24	21	25	19	3	26	59	83	17	284
\$50001+	0	0	2	1	1	0	2	4	5	5	20
Total	127	381	215	137	187	41	173	449	234	185	2,129
Pearson chi2(45) = 301.7187 Pr = 0.000											
If no, for how many months is this rental price guaranteed?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
\$0-\$10	12	68	62	33	60	9	42	116	46	57	505
\$11-\$20	114	307	154	102	122	29	128	321	191	121	1,589
\$21-\$50	8	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	12
\$50+	0	3	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	3	9
Total	134	378	217	136	183	39	171	439	237	181	2,115
Pearson chi2(27) = 134.3543 Pr = 0.000											
How much money, if any, was left over	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World	Total

from the cash grant for the rent?						International				Vision	
\$0-\$1000	73	113	70	84	107	20	89	220	155	59	990
\$1001-\$5000	20	73	75	33	44	5	47	107	52	49	505
\$5001-\$10000	22	123	49	12	19	7	17	72	16	39	376
\$10001-\$20000	2	54	8	3	13	4	8	27	3	25	147
\$20001-\$50000	0	4	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	5	12
\$50001+	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Total	119	367	202	132	184	36	161	427	227	177	2,032
Pearson chi2(45) = 301.6457 Pr = 0.000											
If any, what did you use the money for?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
Assist Family	4	20	5	2	5	1	1	18	4	8	68
Buy Land	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	4	0	1	8
Education	2	17	8	3	10	4	5	10	6	18	83
Other	10	26	23	11	11	3	10	34	29	21	178
Pay debts	10	35	26	10	14	2	23	39	15	13	187
Pay for Services (electricity, water, hospitals, etc.)	3	16	8	4	4	2	5	14	8	6	70
Small Commerce	27	150	82	25	46	8	41	118	39	67	603
Total	56	265	152	56	90	20	86	237	101	134	1,197

Pearson chi2(54) = 77.5695 Pr = 0.019											
Did you receive extra money from the organization?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
No	69	183	135	49	88	24	113	270	136	115	1,182
Yes	64	207	90	87	105	15	62	180	108	76	994
Total	133	390	225	136	193	39	175	450	244	191	2,176
Pearson chi2(9) = 53.0495 Pr = 0.000											
If yes, how much extra money did you receive?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
\$0-\$1000	70	183	136	51	89	24	115	276	150	115	1,209
\$1001-\$5000	6	22	59	83	24	8	7	153	81	15	458
\$5001-\$10000	57	82	28	1	36	6	26	17	11	3	267
\$10001-\$20000	0	92	3	0	41	2	23	3	1	57	222
\$20001-\$50000	0	2	0	0	1	0	4	0	1	0	8
\$50001+	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Total	133	382	226	135	191	40	175	449	244	190	2,165
Pearson chi2(45) = 799.3694 Pr = 0.000											

If yes, what did you use the money for?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
Assist Family	7	9	3	4	7	2	2	16	9	1	60
Buy Land	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	2
Education	6	37	19	1	15	1	3	21	9	8	120
Other	2	12	8	2	12	1	2	19	10	2	70
Pay debts	3	16	10	4	4	2	5	22	8	6	80
Pay for Services (electricity, water, hospitals, etc.)	2	7	4	2	5	1	5	12	11	2	51
Small Commerce	44	121	46	71	61	9	44	89	60	55	600
Total	64	202	90	85	104	16	62	179	107	74	983
Pearson chi2(54) = 102.9612 Pr = 0.000											
Did you receive any other benefits in kind (such as health insurance, house reform, emergency kit)?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
Extra cash grant (large families)	1	8	3	2	3	1	0	2	2	1	23
Health Insurance	0	0	25	0	55	1	4	4	2	0	91
House reform grant	3	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	9

/ kit											
Kits (emergency, kitchen, vulnerability, etc.)	2	32	15	16	7	5	9	26	19	3	134
Livelihood training / Cash	5	9	8	4	3	0	1	1	8	4	43
None	117	320	165	113	121	32	150	390	211	176	1,795
Psycho-social assistance	0	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	4
Total	128	369	218	135	191	40	167	424	243	184	2,099
Pearson chi2(54) = 448.4070 Pr = 0.000											
Did you receive any other cash grants from other organizations?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
No	134	381	222	132	186	37	172	455	244	189	2,152
Yes	3	3	3	5	7	2	1	2	1	1	28
Total	137	384	225	137	193	39	173	457	245	190	2,180
Pearson chi2(9) = 26.2092 Pr = 0.002											
If yes, how much additional money did you receive?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total

0	134	381	222	132	186	37	174	455	244	189	2,154
1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
1700	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
2500	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
4000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
5000	1	0	0	4	0	0	0	1	1	0	7
6000	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
6500	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
7500	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
10000	0	2	2	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	8
12500	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
13500	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
15000	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
15840	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Total	136	385	224	137	193	39	175	456	245	190	2,180
Pearson chi2(117) = 245.6089 Pr = 0.000											
If yes, what did you use the money for?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
Assist Family	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Buy Land	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Education	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1

Other	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Pay debts	0	0	0	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	4
Pay for Services (electricity, water, hospitals, etc.)	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	2
Small Commerce	1	4	2	2	3	1	0	0	1	1	15
Total	1	4	2	5	7	2	1	1	1	1	25
Pearson chi2(54) = 64.6667 Pr = 0.152											
Do you have any children?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
No	31	49	41	30	27	3	36	68	47	14	346
Yes	105	343	188	110	169	38	145	394	202	178	1,872
Total	136	392	229	140	196	41	181	462	249	192	2,218
Pearson chi2(9) = 30.2724 Pr = 0.000											
If yes, how many children between the age of 6 and 12 do you have that can go to school?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
0	71	168	91	66	109	10	91	217	113	60	996
1	37	115	74	40	36	14	53	139	71	51	630

2	17	61	46	20	23	10	25	64	39	46	351
3	8	33	10	8	15	6	6	18	8	17	129
4	3	7	4	2	4	0	2	7	9	9	47
5	0	3	1	0	0	1	0	3	3	3	14
6	0	0	1	1	5	0	2	4	2	1	16
7	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	4
8	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
9	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
10	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2
Total	136	389	228	138	193	41	181	454	245	187	2,192
Pearson chi2(90) = 141.0336 Pr = 0.000											
If yes, how many of these children are currently in school?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
0	54	132	85	61	92	9	78	180	102	45	838
1	34	132	81	32	39	12	54	130	68	64	646
2	30	72	38	22	30	13	26	92	45	48	416
3	9	31	11	13	15	5	9	29	17	22	161
4	6	13	5	5	5	1	3	10	5	5	58
5	2	3	3	2	3	0	1	3	3	3	23
6	0	1	1	1	0	0	3	4	2	0	12

7	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	3	0	2	7
8	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
9	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
10	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Total	135	384	225	136	186	40	176	451	242	189	2,164
Pearson chi2(90) = 121.8531 Pr = 0.014											
If yes, how many of these school age children went to school when you were in the camp?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
0	61	155	104	72	94	15	87	201	107	60	956
1	31	131	64	29	31	11	44	128	67	55	591
2	25	58	38	18	29	7	20	76	37	41	349
3	9	28	11	9	18	4	14	27	18	22	160
4	5	6	5	4	5	2	4	5	8	6	50
5	3	4	2	3	6	1	1	5	2	2	29
6	0	2	2	0	2	0	3	5	2	0	16
7	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	3	0	2	8
8	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	3
Total	135	385	226	136	187	40	174	450	241	188	2,162

Pearson chi2(72) = 89.1147 Pr = 0.084											
Do you have any other dependants (elderly unable to work, handicapped persons or children under the age of 5)?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
No	94	244	137	75	147	16	115	287	163	116	1,394
Yes	43	144	92	62	49	25	64	171	84	76	810
Total	137	388	229	137	196	41	179	458	247	192	2,204
Pearson chi2(9) = 30.7356 Pr = 0.000											
How many dependents?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
1	23	79	51	33	27	17	31	87	42	38	428
2	4	20	13	12	6	3	13	22	17	18	128
3	2	5	6	3	3	0	2	8	3	3	35
4	0	0	1	1	3	3	3	1	2	2	16
5	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	4
6	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	3
8	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1

Total	29	105	71	51	40	23	51	120	65	61	616
Pearson chi2(63) = 62.9272 Pr = 0.479											
How many meals a day do you eat?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	5
1	28	118	83	47	69	18	64	160	73	58	718
2	94	236	113	80	116	19	97	245	150	105	1,255
3	14	32	33	12	9	4	15	46	23	25	213
4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	3
5	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	4	0	0	7
Total	136	390	229	139	195	41	178	459	246	188	2,201
Pearson chi2(45) = 66.6180 Pr = 0.020											
How many meals a day did you eat while in the camp?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2
1	47	155	101	53	78	15	77	177	98	55	856
2	73	187	102	72	92	19	84	215	117	101	1,062
3	14	43	24	13	23	7	16	60	30	34	264
4	0	2	1	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	6

5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Total	134	388	228	138	195	41	177	455	245	190	2,191
Pearson chi2(45) = 36.0999 Pr = 0.826											
How is your living situation different now than before the earthquake?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
Much Worse	36	90	47	26	46	13	38	93	39	46	474
Somewhat Worse	24	55	34	26	28	10	26	94	34	29	360
Neither Better/Worse	24	80	48	37	30	9	48	87	50	37	450
Somewhat Better	18	48	22	19	28	3	25	57	35	28	283
Much Better	34	120	77	32	64	6	43	130	91	51	648
Total	136	393	228	140	196	41	180	461	249	191	2,215
Pearson chi2(36) = 49.8313 Pr = 0.062											
How is your living situation different now than when you were in the camp?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
Much Worse	9	48	40	12	16	2	26	35	24	16	228
Somewhat Worse	16	46	51	16	32	6	23	64	45	25	324

Neither Better/Worse	14	75	45	30	39	6	42	90	48	26	415
Somewhat Better	20	57	26	19	29	8	30	61	34	36	320
Much Better	77	165	66	61	80	19	59	210	97	88	922
Total	136	391	228	138	196	41	180	460	248	191	2,209
Pearson chi2(36) = 81.1269 Pr = 0.000											
To what degree did the Rental Support Cash Program improve your safety and protection in the long run?											
	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
Much Worse	1	10	2	0	4	0	1	7	5	1	31
Somewhat Worse	2	6	10	1	6	2	7	20	4	11	69
Neither Better/Worse	14	30	20	25	17	6	26	60	22	9	229
Somewhat Better	79	216	119	81	98	20	89	249	136	104	1,191
Much Better	40	130	76	33	71	13	56	123	81	67	690
Total	136	392	227	140	196	41	179	459	248	192	2,210
Pearson chi2(36) = 63.9053 Pr = 0.003											

Have you had economic difficulties after the earthquake such as debt?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
No	17	33	12	21	23	4	12	34	28	28	212
Yes	120	360	217	119	175	37	169	429	221	164	2,011
Total	137	393	229	140	198	41	181	463	249	192	2,223
Pearson chi2(9) = 23.5049 Pr = 0.005											
If so how much debt are you in?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
\$0-\$1000	43	73	31	43	41	7	24	81	54	47	444
\$1001-\$5000	34	75	41	35	39	13	16	73	36	26	388
\$5001-\$10000	25	81	40	16	31	8	37	76	44	27	385
\$10001-\$20000	20	84	58	23	46	5	37	110	60	40	483
\$20001-\$50000	14	66	42	15	31	5	53	81	39	37	383
\$50001+	1	8	5	3	7	2	8	21	7	4	66
Total	137	387	217	135	195	40	175	442	240	181	2,149
Pearson chi2(45) = 108.6951 Pr = 0.000											
Did you start (or	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World	Total

restart) a business after the earthquake?						International				Vision	
No	73	142	128	54	85	21	96	272	144	80	1,095
Yes	64	246	100	85	112	20	83	187	103	110	1,110
Total	137	388	228	139	197	41	179	459	247	190	2,205
Pearson chi2(9) = 70.6733 Pr = 0.000											
If yes, is it the same business that you had before the earthquake?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
No	17	85	40	38	39	10	38	72	50	54	443
Yes	46	162	56	45	71	10	44	111	54	54	653
Total	63	247	96	83	110	20	82	183	104	108	1,096
Pearson chi2(9) = 19.2949 Pr = 0.023											
If yes, what is your average monthly income from your business?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
\$0-\$1000	84	158	134	60	102	21	98	289	158	90	1,194

\$1001-\$5000	15	103	41	36	41	8	33	72	38	29	416
\$5001-\$10000	11	26	10	10	15	0	7	21	9	9	118
\$10001-\$20000	4	13	11	5	5	0	7	12	4	8	69
\$20001-\$50000	1	10	1	3	3	1	0	8	2	2	31
\$50001+	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Total	116	310	198	114	166	30	145	402	211	138	1,830

Pearson chi2(45) = 92.0106 Pr = 0.000

What are your total monthly expenses now?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
\$0-\$1000	11	29	9	5	23	5	8	22	9	7	128
\$1001-\$5000	49	176	80	52	95	21	60	159	103	87	882
\$5001-\$10000	40	94	70	46	47	7	60	143	57	34	598
\$10001-\$20000	17	40	31	24	18	1	31	75	45	31	313
\$20001-\$50000	2	12	6	3	4	1	7	24	9	8	76
\$50001+	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	3
Total	119	352	196	130	187	35	166	425	223	167	2,000

Pearson chi2(45) = 92.2106 Pr = 0.000

Now that the Rental Support Cash Program has ended, how do you pay for your housing?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
Diaspora remittance	1	7	0	0	0	0	1	4	2	1	16
Don't Know / Refused	33	56	27	16	37	16	29	58	40	40	352
Free Housing	3	3	0	0	7	0	5	6	6	1	31
Friends/Family contribution/Assistance	6	54	51	18	41	5	45	98	49	25	392
Full-time Employment	4	8	7	3	4	2	6	17	6	7	64
NGO Support	1	4	3	2	3	1	2	3	5	0	24
Other	17	72	37	34	40	10	18	89	45	46	408
Part-time Employment	13	42	36	19	15	1	25	66	34	23	274
Self-Employment	55	144	62	43	45	5	46	119	59	46	624
Total	133	390	223	135	192	40	177	460	246	189	2,185
Pearson chi2(72) = 166.2332 Pr = 0.000											
How will you pay for housing over the	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total

next two years?											
Diaspora remittance	0	3	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	7
Don't Know / Refused	44	98	63	28	73	17	57	139	74	76	669
Free Housing	3	1	1	0	4	1	2	2	4	1	19
Friends/Family contribution/Assistance	3	44	33	12	20	4	35	46	33	12	242
Full-time Employment	3	6	4	3	3	1	6	17	7	5	55
NGO Support	3	10	6	0	7	1	5	3	6	0	41
Other	19	78	33	36	31	10	24	102	47	40	420
Part-time Employment	10	26	24	16	12	2	13	49	22	14	188
Self-Employment	51	122	56	35	41	5	33	95	46	38	522
Total	136	388	220	130	192	41	176	454	240	186	2,163
Pearson chi2(72) = 146.7700 Pr = 0.000											
To what degree did the Rental Support Cash Program improve your economic opportunities in the	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total

long run?											
Much Worse	1	7	3	3	5	1	3	10	5	2	40
Somewhat Worse	1	9	12	2	12	3	6	24	5	5	79
Neither Better/Worse	12	32	19	15	12	8	20	56	24	11	209
Somewhat Better	59	176	84	62	78	13	77	212	110	86	957
Much Better	63	167	105	56	86	16	72	155	104	84	908
Total	136	391	223	138	193	41	178	457	248	188	2,193
Pearson chi2(36) = 51.9728 Pr = 0.041											
In your assessment, does the current accommodation respect project's basic safety and sanitation criteria?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
No	5	78	46	35	39	8	37	95	35	44	422
Yes	132	314	184	105	158	33	149	367	212	146	1,800
Total	137	392	230	140	197	41	186	462	247	190	2,222
Pearson chi2(9) = 31.4118 Pr = 0.000											

Do you have any reason to believe that the respondent was not being honest about any of the questions?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
No	12	163	110	62	49	8	40	171	82	42	739
Yes	125	229	119	77	148	32	141	283	167	144	1,465
Total	137	392	229	139	197	40	181	454	249	186	2,204
Pearson chi2(9) = 112.4356 Pr = 0.000											
How structurally sound does the respondent's house appear?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
Very Unsound	2	21	17	18	20	4	17	57	19	16	191
Somewhat Unsound	13	48	27	12	19	6	19	49	22	27	242
Neither	27	102	49	39	38	12	48	105	51	34	505
Somewhat Sound	70	181	107	54	83	15	70	184	106	83	953
Very Sound	25	38	29	15	36	4	27	64	50	27	315
Total	137	390	229	138	196	41	181	459	248	187	2,206
Pearson chi2(36) = 64.3580 Pr = 0.003											

Is the house in a ravine, on or near a riverbed, in a flood prone area, or on a slope?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
Flood Prone Area	17	10	11	0	16	1	14	24	4	6	103
No	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Ravine	4	29	29	41	11	0	15	57	31	21	238
Riverbed	0	0	2	2	15	2	3	2	0	0	26
Steep Slope	8	12	22	18	12	0	13	44	21	28	178
Total	29	52	64	61	54	3	45	127	56	55	546
Pearson chi2(36) = 193.4995 Pr = 0.000											
What type of house does the person live in now?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
Brick	125	360	198	114	165	36	158	392	230	164	1,942
Shack	9	11	5	11	14	2	10	17	7	10	96
T-Shelter	0	3	18	6	8	2	5	19	6	4	71
Tent	1	3	4	4	3	1	7	13	4	6	46
Wood	2	15	4	5	7	0	1	19	1	5	59

Total	137	392	229	140	197	41	181	460	248	189	2,214
Pearson chi2(36) = 78.1442 Pr = 0.000											
What kind of roof does the house have?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	Handicap International	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	World Vision	Total
Cement	65	212	102	48	74	14	80	206	127	91	1,019
Tarp	1	4	6	7	4	4	6	14	7	7	60
Tin	71	176	121	85	118	23	95	238	114	92	1,133
Total	137	392	229	140	196	41	181	458	248	190	2,212
Pearson chi2(18) = 44.3089 Pr = 0.001											
What state of repair was the respondent's house in [outside]?	CARE	CONCERN	CRS	GOAL	HAI	HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL	IFRC	IOM	J/P HRO	WorldVision	Total
Very Bad	1	8	5	13	16	2	10	35	10	10	110
Bad	5	28	29	9	24	7	16	49	21	25	213
Neither Good/Bad	38	204	121	69	77	16	83	191	95	62	956
Good	76	132	66	44	66	13	51	146	95	75	764
Very Good	17	19	8	4	12	3	20	38	27	17	165

Total	137	391	229	139	195	41	180	459	248	189	2,208
Pearson chi2(36) = 129.6389 Pr = 0.000											