



Maximising rural communities' livelihood options through engagement between non-state actors, government and the private sector

(Farming Together)

Tanzania, Burundi, Ethiopia

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Front cover: woman in Kigoma who was able to start a solar powered mobile phone charging business as a result of a loan from the village savings and credit group

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Acronyms and abbreviations

These abbreviations include those found in project documents as well as those used in this evaluation report. The letters in the 3rd column refer to the countries in which the abbreviations are used: MC= all three countries or a generally accepted term, T = Tanzania, B = Burundi, E = Ethiopia.

Acronym	Meaning	Country in which used
ACD-P	Assistant Country Director - Programmes	MC
ANSAF	Agricultural Non-State Actors' Forum	T
ARIs	Agricultural Research Institutes (generic)	MC
APECOS	Association de Prise En Charge des Orphelins du SIDA	B
ASDP	Agricultural Sector Development Programme	T
AVN	Aide Infirmier Veterinaire	B
BRARUDI	Brasserie du Rwanda-Urundi (beer brewery)	B
CANE	Collectif pour les Acteurs Non Étatiques (Collective for Non-State Actors)	B
CAVA	Cassava: Value Addition for Africa (a project being implemented by Natural Resources Institute, UK)	T
CPE	Child Protection Committees	B
CBO	Community Based Organisations	T
CCDC	<i>Commune</i> Committee for Community Development	B
CCRO	Certificates of Customary Right of Occupancy	T
CDC	<i>Colline</i> Development Committee	B
CIALCA	Consortium for Improving Agriculture-based Livelihoods in Central Africa	B
CMG	Citizen's Rights Monitoring Groups	T
CNTA	Centre National de Technologie Alimentaire (National Centre of Food Technology)	B
COSC	Coalition des Organisations de la Société Civile (Civil Society Organisations Coalition)	B
CPLS	Comité Provinciale de Lutte Contre le SIDA	B
CRM	Complaints Response Mechanism	MC
CSO	Civil Society Organization (generic)	MC
CWB	Concern Burundi	B
DADP	District Agricultural Development Plans (see ASDP)	T
DED	District Executive Director	T
DPAE	Directions Provinciales de l'Agriculture et de l'Elevage	B
DPLO	District Planning Office(r)	T
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction	MC
DSA	Daily Subsistence Allowance	MC
ESR	Endline Survey Report	MC
EUCORD	European Cooperative for Rural Development (Belgium)	B
EWS	Early Warning System	MC
FDC	Fonds de développement <i>Colline</i> (<i>Colline</i> Development Fund)	B
FES	Fuel efficient stove(s)	B
FFS	Farmer Field School(s)	B T
FGD	Focus Group Discussion	MC
FIM	Food Income and Markets (Concern project category)	MC
FORSC	Le Forum pour le Renforcement de la Société Civile	B
GBV	Gender Based Violence	MC
GSADR	Groupe sectoriel Agriculture et Développement Rural	B
HAP	Humanitarian Accountability Partnership	MC
ICRAF	International Centre for Research in Agroforestry (legal name for WAC)	MC
ICRISAT	International Crops Research Institute for Semi Arid Tropics	MC
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute	MC
IGA	Income Generation Activity	MC
INECN	Institut National pour l'Environnement et la Conservation de la Nature	B
IPM	Integrated Pest Management	MC
IRAZ	Institut de Recherche Agronomique et Zootechnique	B
ISABU	Institut des Sciences Agronomiques du Burundi (Burundi Institute of Agricultural Sciences)	B
KIMAS	Kikundi Mwavuli Masasi (Masasi People's Umbrella Organization)	T
KIHASI	Kilimo Hai na Asili	T
KII	Key Informant Interview	MC

Acronym	Meaning	Country in which used
LAA	Local Authorities Act	T
LGA	Local Government Authority	T
LGRP	Local Government Reform Programme	T
M&E	Monitoring & Evaluation	MC
MKURABITA	Mpango wa Kurasimisha Rasilimali na Biashara za Wanyonge Tanzania (Property and Business Formalising Programme for the Needy Tanzania)	T
NCD	New Castle Disease	MC
NGO	Non-Government Organisation	
NSA	Non-State Actors	MC
OVI	Objectively Verifiable Indicator	MC
PALD	Provincial Agriculture & Livestock Department	B
PEMWA	Patronage in Environmental Management & Health Care Warriors	T
PCDC	Plans Communaux de Développement Communautaire (<i>Commune Plans for Community Development</i>)	B
PPMG	Programme Planning and Monitoring Group (Concern)	MC
PSO	Partner Support Officer [Concern staff title]	T
q	Quintal (100 kg)	
RBA	Rights Based Approach	MC
REDESO	Relief to Development Society	T
RWH	Rain Water Harvesting	B
QDS	Quality Declared Seeds	T
QVGAM	Quarterly Village General Assembly Meetings	T
SACCO	Savings and Credit Cooperative Organization	T E
SALT	Sloping Agriculture Land Techniques	MC
SAM	Social Accountability Monitoring	T
SIDA	AIDS (French for)	B
SILC	Saving and Internal Lending Communities	B
SMART	Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant, Timebound (of Objectively Verifiable Indicators)	MC
SNNP	Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' (Region)	E
SPPDF	Synergie des Partenaires pour la Promotion des Droits des Femmes (Synergy of Partners for the Promotion of Women's Rights).	B
TAMISEMI	Tawala za Mikoa na Serikali za Mitaa (Regional Administration and Local Government)	T
TCRS	Tanganyika Christian Refugee Society	T
TMA	Tanzania Meteorological Agency	T
UKULUPA	Umoja wa Kilimo cha Umwagiliaji Luganga Pawaga (Union of Irrigated Agriculture - Luganga Pawaga)	T
UKIUMA	Umoja wa Kilimo cha Umwagiliaji Makifu (Union of Irrigated Agriculture - Makifu)	T
UWAKAMA	Umoja wa Wamwagiliaji Kata ya Mahenge (Union of Irrigators - "county" of Mahenge)	T
UPT	United Peasants of Tanzania	T
VICOBA	Village Community Banks	T
VEO	Village Executive Officer	T
VLA	Village Land Act	T
VLMC	Village Land Use Management Committee	T
WAC	World Agroforestry Centre (trading name of ICRAF)	MC
WAO	Ward Agricultural Extension Officers	T
WDA	Wolaita Development Association	E

Project Data

Contractual information

Budget Line(s)	EuropeAid/127763/C/ACT/TPS –21.03.01
Grant Contract No.	DCI-NSAPVD2009-201-011
Implementing agency	Concern Worldwide
Project title	Maximising rural communities' livelihood options through engagement between non-state actors, government and the private sector
Project location	Mtwara & Masasi districts of Mtwara Region, TANZANIA Iringa & Kilolo districts of Iringa Region, TANZANIA Kigoma and Kibondo districts of Kigoma Region, TANZANIA Bugabira & Busoni <i>Communes</i> in Kirundo Province, BURUNDI Offa <i>Woreda</i> (district) in Wolaita Zone of Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State, ETHIOPIA
Project duration	3 years
Project start date	16/02/2010
Original contract end date	15/02/2013
Project extension (months)	3.5 months
Project suspension (months)	-
Actual contract end date	31/05/2013
Names of Evaluator(s)	Paul D. Smith
Date of Evaluation	12 th August to 12 th October 2013
Date of Evaluation report	November 2013

Financial information

Overall project budget	€ 4,018,949
EC funds contracted	€ 2,957,587
EC funds disbursed:	
Initial payment	€ 751,153.48 Date: 22/02/2010
Intermediate payment	€ 955,337.41 Date: 25/05/2012
Intermediate payment	€ 921,264.75 Date: 08/08/2013
Expenditure incurred by project	€ 3,840,729.95
Eligible expenditure	€ 3,823,304.22
Revised EC contribution	€ 2,813,951.90
Final payment outstanding at time of evaluation	€ 186,196.26

Grading of project performance

1. Relevance & quality of design	b
2. Efficiency of implementation	b
3. Effectiveness to date	b
4. Visibility	b
5. Impact	b
6. Effect on alleviating poverty	b
7. Potential sustainability	b
8. Reporting	b
Key: a = very good; b = good; c = inadequate; d = serious deficiencies (catastrophic)	

Executive Summary

Project objectives, expected outcomes and activities

The overall objective of this project was to contribute to the achievement of Millennium Development Goal 1 (to “Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger”) and to improve food security in Burundi, Ethiopia and Tanzania. The Specific Objective was to “improve livelihoods and empowerment of poor farmers in decentralised decision-making processes” by achieving the following project results:

- strengthening “local government structures to manage, regulate and coordinate local development”;
- diversifying “livelihoods for farmers through working with local institutions and the private sector”;
- increasing “involvement of non-state actors in key planning processes”.

Strengthening local government was achieved through training, visits, establishing disaster risk reduction systems and in Tanzania, giving a lot of support to the district land offices.

Activities in support of diversifying livelihoods included farmer training; introducing improved agricultural and land management methods; strengthening agricultural extension; provision of agricultural inputs, especially improved crop varieties; communal crop storage and marketing; crop processing; savings and credit groups; and a small number of producer groups (honey, pottery, fruit) and developing market linkages.

Increased involvement of non-state actors in planning was to be achieved through training of CSOs, building the capacity of village committees to monitor district council performance, awareness raising among villagers about government decentralisation policies, networking of CSOs and educational visits.

Relevance

The proposal was consistent with the national policies in all three countries, the EU's Country Strategies and National Indicative Programmes and to Concern's country strategies and general policies.

The agricultural and political contexts of Ethiopia were so different from the other two countries, that the potential for synergies were limited. Despite the annual team meetings for senior staff members in all three countries, the impression was that there were three projects rather than one. This lack of coherence was exacerbated by the fact that exchange visits were not arranged by Tanzania and Ethiopia and made visible by the fact that the project went under different names in each country. Concern needs to think through how multi-country projects are put together.

The geographical areas to work in were selected on relevant criteria though some areas in which Concern has worked in for a long time such as Iringa and Wolaita need to be revalidated. Beneficiary selection was, in theory, to prioritise the poorest and most vulnerable, but the degree to which that was put into practice varied from partner to partner and country to country. While there was a lot of training on cross-cutting issues, there remains some work to be done on thinking through how these are integrated into project activities such as processing and warehousing cooperatives, especially, as in Ethiopia, where it is illegal to restrict membership on any grounds.

Activities aimed at diversifying livelihoods were mostly relevant to the agricultural and socio-economic context. Some activities that were aimed at strengthening local government and at increasing involvement of non-state actors in planning were considered to be inappropriate in Ethiopia.

The quality of the logical framework was fair but there were considerable problems with measuring some of the indicators, especially household food stocks as an indicator for improved livelihoods and crop production as an indicator of diversified livelihoods. These were not very appropriate for measuring either improved or diversified livelihoods.

Where project staff members were uncomfortable with some of the activities and indicators, these should have been resolved during the joint coordination meetings if not before the project started. Some indicators (such as visits) were not indicators but activities (in fact some activities overlapped

with indicators) and some (such as monitoring of district development plans) were not indicators but means of verification. Some indicators could have been more “SMART¹” than they were.

Efficiency of implementation

Efficiency means not only the cost-effectiveness of the project but also the factors contributing to the efficient use of project funds and to achieving the project outputs. These include the project team, financial controls, M&E, timeliness and access to the project area.

The project management in country was generally very good and there was good rapport between project staff members and between the project staff members and headquarters staff. Concern has an effective internal complaints procedure though it is rarely used. There was good team work in each country with a sufficient number of staff meetings. In Tanzania, the large distances separating the three project regions Tanzania meant the manager was based in Dar es Salaam which was an inevitable choice but less than ideal. Concern staff were adequately qualified and experienced. There was excellent backup from the central offices and staff spent much of their time on field work. However, the project suffered from the lack of an overall manager based in one of the three countries (or rotating between them). Partner qualifications and experience varied greatly and the management of some was weak even if compensated by good field work. Working with the district government as a formal implementing partner in Tanzania was found to be particularly cumbersome because of financial arrangements.

The monitoring and evaluation systems were fair and there were tremendous efforts made to obtain meaningful baseline and endline data in surveys which had an appropriate number of respondents. Despite the drawbacks with the surveys, country and home staff should not become despondent. The methods need refining but the general approach is a great improvement on the quality of surveys done by NGOs only a few years ago. If anything, too much data was collected. The regular assessments of progress towards project results were good and reporting on these was on time and efficiently executed. Where some improvement is needed is in the simple computerised recording of interventions and number of beneficiaries on a village by village basis, taking care to avoid double counting (for example of beneficiaries who received more than one input or more than one training). Some partners would need further capacity development to achieve this. Several partners did not have copies of the project proposal or the logical framework and this should be rectified in future projects.

The financial efficiency was particularly good. Auditing was conducted regularly by external and internal auditors. The internal audit system in Tanzania soon identified financial mismanagement by some of its partners. Stores are properly controlled. Payments were mostly paid to partners on time. Tendering procedures were beyond reproach. There was a necessary budget revision in 2011. In Ethiopia, two *kebeles* were dropped when an NGO started duplicating project activities. As the budget was for 10 *kebeles*, it would have been better if the two *kebeles* were replaced by another two.

The amount spent on inputs and infrastructure that went directly to beneficiaries (including warehouses, the bridge in Ethiopia, machinery, and equipment for land offices and village registry buildings in Tanzania) was around 31.5% of the total expenditure. If we include training (mostly of government) the percentage increases to 55%. The approximate cost per direct beneficiary household was €200.

The artificial insemination (AI) scheme in Burundi had some teething difficulties with obtaining expertise. However there is a national centre for AI which is reasonably well equipped and DPAE staff at provincial level now have been trained in AI. There are considerable opportunities for AI to improve rural livelihoods. It is arguable that a better strategy would have been to use AI from Jersey bulls to inseminate local cows and to continue to upgrade the progeny over successive generations. There was also a question of whether the contract with ICRAF was good value for money.

The project in Tanzania got off to a quick start as all the staff members were already in place. In Burundi, the project started about 3 months late, mainly due to recruitment delays. The project in Ethiopia was about 5 months late starting because of partner's recruitment delays and the need to establish an office in Offa. Staff turnover in Tanzania was high; in Ethiopia, all the WDA community development workers left in their first year after disputes over salaries; in Burundi most staff members stayed for the duration of the project. Payments from the EC to Concern and from Concern

¹ Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant, Timebound (of Objectively Verifiable Indicators)

to partners were made mostly without undue delays. Inputs were mostly delivered on time. The project in Tanzania was often frustrated by delays in having funds released from district council bank accounts to the land offices. In Burundi, there were delays in the procurement of the Jersey cows and elections in Tanzania meant the visit from Burundi government and CSOs was postponed. There was a 3½ month no-cost extension to the project as Burundi wanted their endline survey to be done after the main harvest as the baseline was.

The inputs supplied to beneficiaries were of good quality and training materials were acceptable. The improved crop varieties brought particular benefits to many families. Project outputs were generally very good though the canals in Tanzania were not constructed to a very high standard owing to a lack of proper supervision by the government district engineers. The warehouses in Burundi and Ethiopia were built to very high standards indeed. Institutional outputs such as the groups that were trained were also generally good, though the project in Ethiopia started working with the fruit and vegetable cooperative far too late on in the project cycle.

The lack of adequate supervision by the EC is a major criticism. It has been brought about by the fact that the EC do not seem to be geared up to supervising development projects in more than one country. Adequate resources need to be allocated to the desk officer responsible to visit all the countries each year and if possible, visit reports sent to the implementing agencies.

An issue that often came up was that government staff members contributing to the project (and attending workshops) involving overnight stays were given Concern DSAs in Tanzania, partner DSA rates in Ethiopia, and government DSA rates in Burundi. This issue needs to be resolved, preferably with other NGOs. Some thought should be given to non-financial ways of motivating government officials.

Access was mostly good but in Ethiopia, four *kebeles* were inaccessible this year between May and October and in previous years for at least 3 months. This inevitably influenced the ability of staff to monitor and supervise project activities.

Effectiveness

Project staff members in some countries were uncomfortable about some of the planned activities and project indicators that had a “political” connotation, especially in Ethiopia because of the political context and especially after the legislation in 2011 which restricted foreign-funded NGOs engaging in certain issues. Nevertheless, the activities in the logical framework were generally implemented except that:

- training on land rights was not done in Burundi because the law was clarified only after the project started (setting up of *commune* land offices did not start until 2013) and was not done in Ethiopia because of the 2011 law forbidding foreign-funded NGOs to become involved in people’s rights;
- visits around decentralisation were not organised in Tanzania (it was said to be irrelevant because Tanzania has a more advanced decentralised system than the other two countries) and only in Burundi was an external visit arranged;
- there were no community seed storage facilities developed in Tanzania;
- market linkages were rather weak in all countries, mainly depending on private businessmen to collect produce;
- there was no group crop processing developed in Ethiopia as this activity was considered premature for the context in the project area;
- there was little awareness building for CSOs on national laws and policies regarding the opportunities for them to participate in key planning processes;
- there was no attempt in Ethiopia to build capacity of *kebeles* to monitor *woreda* plan implementation as this was considered to be already happening according to government guidelines;
- the awareness building about decentralisation policies was weak in Burundi and mostly not done in Ethiopia.

Notwithstanding these problems, it was concluded that:

- The project has made a substantial contribution towards strengthening district government structures in all three countries (especially the land offices in Tanzania and the agriculture and planning departments and disaster risk reduction focal points in all three countries).
- The project has contributed to diversified livelihoods in all three countries but there could have been more emphasis on processing, especially in Ethiopia and Burundi and to non-agriculturally based livelihoods in all three countries. Market links with private sector were not strong in any of the countries.
- CSO partners have increased their involvement in government planning though to the greatest extent in Tanzania. Involvement of the CBOs in Iringa and Kilo (Tanzania) in district planning has been minimal though they are involved at a local level. There were no examples of the private sector becoming involved in government planning.

Having achieved the project Expected Results to a considerable extent, the Specific Objective has been achieved also: livelihoods have been improved for poor farmers, women and vulnerable and their concerns are now taken into account more in village councils and therefore, at district levels also. The degree to which the poor have been “empowered” varies from country to country, being greatest in Tanzania and weakest in Ethiopia. In particular, the Tanzanian decentralisation and land registration agenda is quite advanced and in Burundi, they are beginning to happen though land registries did not start being built until after the end of the project. Despite decentralisation and land registration being part of Ethiopian government policy, the Ethiopian team did not believe the project could contribute very much to these agendas in the local context.

We can conclude that the project has made a substantial contribution in all three countries to eradicating extreme poverty and hunger and to improving food security, the overall objective.

Coordination with other NGOs was good and avoided duplication except for the duplication in Ethiopia already referred to.

Apart from Burundi, signage on project infrastructure contributions was poor and in all three countries, there was inadequate attention to EC instructions regarding attribution of the source of funding and the title of the project on documents. A simple EC logo is not sufficient.

Impact

The total number of direct beneficiaries was around 20,000. All households in the selected villages/collines/kebeles will benefit from some of the sensitizations and trainings provided, for example on land registration, decentralization, HIV, women's rights, etc. which would be a total of 79,000 households. In addition, the project has built or improved capacity of village and district governments, CSO and CBO partners and the various groups established in the three countries.

The project has contributed substantially towards improved crop production, food security and increased household income. Many beneficiaries now have sufficient income to improve their homes, obtain better access to medical services and education and buy life enhancing assets such as radios. Women feel more empowered and AIDS victims and Batwa pygmies less stigmatised. These impacts are likely to be felt not just by beneficiaries but also by the wider society through example and sharing of information.

All the district and village government officials interviewed during the evaluation were very positive about the project and said they had benefited from the training they received. They generally believed their management capacity and leadership skills had been improved and some even said their job prospects had been enhanced.

Sustainability

In all three countries, the decentralisation process, including increased influence of village councils on district level planning, will continue to gain momentum, not least because the central governments have adopted policies that support this process.

In **Tanzania**, the momentum in land registration achieved during the project inevitably will decline as a result of cessation of the extra funding the project provided. However, people increasingly are prepared to pay the small amount of money required for the district land offices to undertake land registration, independently of central funding.

In **Burundi**, it remains to be seen if land registration process recently legislated for eventually takes off. In **Ethiopia**, the project felt unable to address the land certification process apart from the facilitating certificates being issued for the Forest Conservation Cooperatives.

The Disaster Risk Reduction systems are well established in the three countries at village levels and have strong links with the district focal points. They will continue if government provides continued encouragement.

Farmers who have adopted improved methods will continue with them as long as they remain convinced that the methods contribute to improved yields. Increased production as a result of farmers growing improved varieties should be sustainable in the short term (3 to 5 years) after which they will need to obtain fresh genetic material.

Continued growing of crops introduced by the project will depend to a large extent on the market and, as seen in Ethiopia with the ginger initiative, on there being no major disease or pest attacks.

The genetic advantages of the improved goats and poultry introductions may eventually be lost by uncontrolled mating. In Burundi, the dairy cow scheme will expand if it can continue to receive government support and possibly, NGO assistance as well.

The continuation of the voluntary paraprofessionals in Tanzania will depend to some extent on their being able to earn sufficient income though many are very motivated to continue unsupported. In Burundi, it remains to be seen if the enthusiasm of extension agents will continue now the project supported bonus system has stopped.

The crop processing, warehouse and producer groups established in each country are likely to continue as they have been given good training by the project and know the need to set aside money for maintenance and replacement of equipment.

The savings and credit groups in all three countries seemed to be strong enough to continue without project support.

Cross-cutting issues

The project has made great efforts to incorporate in their activities, cross-cutting issues such as gender equality, good governance, HIV awareness, discrimination, human rights and democracy. However in Ethiopia, project staff members felt rather constrained by the 2011 legislation restricting NGO involvement in some of the cross-cutting issues.

Introduction

The project

The project proposal was in response to a call from the EC for concept notes under thematic programme “*Non-State Actors and Local Authorities in Development: Actions in partner countries (Multi-country)*”. The thematic programme focuses on strengthening the capacity of civil society organisations and local authorities as a pre-condition for a more equitable, open and democratic society through support to their own initiatives. The overarching objective of the EC programme is poverty reduction in the context of sustainable development. The call specifically requested that proposals should be for more than one country in order to encourage mutual learning and synergies.

The overall objective of this project was to contribute to the achievement of Millennium Development Goal 1 (to “Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger”) and to improve food security in Burundi, Ethiopia and Tanzania. Specifically, the action envisaged the improvement of “livelihoods and empowerment of poor farmers in decentralised decision-making processes” by

- strengthening “local government structures to manage, regulate and coordinate local development”;
- diversifying “livelihoods for farmers through working with local institutions and the private sector”;
- increasing “involvement of non-state actors in key planning processes”.

The project worked with a range of different types of partners including community based organisations (CBOs) such as the irrigation groups in Iringa, Tanzania, local civil society organisations (such as KIMAS in Tanzania), national civil society organisations (CSOs) such as APECOS in Burundi, and district government departments in Tanzania. The pros and cons of working with these are discussed in the evaluation. The CSO partners have been encouraged to attend district government forums and stakeholder meetings so they can better contribute to government planning and coordination. Partner capacity building was a key feature in all countries.

In all countries, there was a lot of training of local government officials, not only on planning but also on disaster risk reduction, and in Tanzania and Burundi, on the government’s decentralisation policies and cross-cutting issues such as human rights and gender equality. Disaster risk reduction committees were established in villages and in Burundi, at *commune* level also. In Tanzania, a major intervention was to support the issuing of Certificates of Customary Right of Occupancy (a document which recognises usufruct of land that was acquired by custom rather than through legal sale) and the setting up of land tribunals to settle disputes. Land registration for Batwa pygmies who were settled on land in Burundi with support from the project has so far failed because of government inertia. The use of ANSAF in Tanzania to support the project in improving the transparency of district government performance in development is noteworthy.

In line with Concern’s policies, the second expected result was particularly targeted at the very poor and vulnerable in communities. Training of farmers on improved methods was a key feature in all countries. Inputs (improved planting materials, chemicals and animals) were supplied to poor farming families on a substantial scale in Burundi and Ethiopia and to a lesser extent in Tanzania. Farmer training was through voluntary extension agents and farmer field schools in Tanzania; through government extension agents (incentivised by the offering of bonuses for good performance) and lead farmers on group farms in Burundi; and through *kebele* extension agents on farmers’ fields in Ethiopia. In all countries, the training was supported by Concern, partner and district level government staff. The introduction in Burundi of Jersey dairy cows inseminated artificially, the banana multiplication strategy, the rainwater harvesting and greenhouses are notable interventions. In Ethiopia the project introduced ginger cultivation but this year ginger production had to be abandoned because of the spread of an unknown virus.

Crop processing (rice, cassava, sunflower) groups were more widely introduced in Tanzania than in Burundi (there were no processing groups in Ethiopia) and these have significantly improved members’ livelihoods. Communal warehouses were widely introduced in Burundi and one was built in Ethiopia. In all countries, the project tried to create links between producers and market middlemen

and businesses. Various forms of irrigation improvement were undertaken in all three countries. The land reclamation work on four sites in Ethiopia was exemplary.

In all countries there was training on cross-cutting issues such as human rights, gender, HIV, discrimination though there was less emphasis on these in Ethiopia because of legislation in 2011 which restricted NGOs abilities to engage in such issues. Projects generally have attempted to incorporate these cross-cutting issues into their work among poor and vulnerable farmers and households as well as simply delivering training.

Scope and objective of the evaluation

The evaluation covers the three participating countries, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Burundi. Within those countries the following geographic areas were targeted: Mtwara, Masasi, Nanyumbu, Kigoma, Kibondo, Iringa and Kilolo Districts in Tanzania; Offa *woreda* in Ethiopia and two *communes* in Kirundo Province in Burundi. The scope of the evaluation was to assess the achievement of targets, the activities, resources and strategies deployed and the quality of implementation. A major output from the evaluation was to summarise the lessons learned and to use these to feed into and recommendations for further programming.

The evaluation first considers the extent to which the project has achieved the results and objectives set out in the logical framework. The second part evaluates the project according to commonly accepted criteria evaluating development assistance set out by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development². The third part considers the impact of the project on cross-cutting issues such as gender, environment, governance and HIV/AIDS. The third section also examines the project in the light of Concern's policies and the standards of the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership³ (HAP). The fourth section pulls together the important observations and recommendations that may be used to inform future projects and improve practice in the three countries. There are then Annexes for each country which cover the same above criteria and standards. While there are some recommendations given in the text of the Annexes, these have been adapted to make them more generic so that the lessons learned in each country can be used more generally and are summarised in the section on Lessons Learned in the main part of this report. The Annexes also include a summary of the activities that were given in the Logical Framework and tables that summarise the interventions. These could have been included as appendices to the Annexes but have been left in the main text (in smaller font) in order to provide the context by which the achievement of the objectives has been judged.

Methodology used

The evaluation took place over 60 days in August, September and October of 2013. The first five days were spent reading through the proposal and various reports written and surveys undertaken in the three countries, making notes and compiling evaluation questions. Several Skype conversations with the current and former desk officers for the project took place during the preparation phase to discuss mostly some problems around the objectively verifiable indicators in the logical framework, particularly the question of food stocks to measure the specific objective (improved livelihoods and empowerment) and crop production to assess the second Expected Result 2, diversified livelihoods. Appendix 3 examines the problems with the logical framework and the surveys that attempted to assess the indicators.

The next stage of the evaluation, taking 50 days, was to visit the three countries. There, the evaluation took the form of:

- discussions with senior management at the central offices;
- discussions with staff and partners at the project locations (though many key people had left Concern or moved to different locations);
- focus group discussions (FGDs) with members of the various groups (processing, savings, warehouse) and with their management sometimes together, sometimes separately;
- interviews with beneficiaries and some non-beneficiaries, mostly in small groups;

² <http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm>

³ <http://www.hapinternational.org/who-we-are/about-us.aspx>

- meetings with senior government personnel responsible for planning, land registration, agriculture, and disaster risk reduction at district, *woreda* and *commune* levels and in Burundi also at provincial level;
- an inspection of the training and monitoring and evaluation tools being used at the project offices;
- interviews with extension agents;
- field visits to inspect infrastructure, machinery, agricultural innovations introduced by the project;
- in Ethiopia, having a debriefing session with the *woreda* government and in Burundi and Ethiopia, having a debriefing and final discussion with senior Concern management.

The final stage of the evaluation was going through the field notes and writing of the reports and appendices back in the UK. This stage required a lot of e-mail requests for supplementary information from the country staff (Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Coordinators, project managers and Assistant Country Directors responsible for Programmes) and I am very thankful to them for their patience.

Evaluation according to logical framework indicators

Introduction

The overall objective of the project was to contribute to the Millennium Development Goal 1 (elimination of hunger and extreme poverty). This section will examine the degree to which the project has achieved the results and objectives set out in the Logical Framework (Appendix 2). In order to follow the logic that activities → results → specific objective → overall objective, I have treated them in that order, leaving comments on the overall objective until the end of the section.

There were many problems with the Logical Framework indicators. Some were not indicators at all but means of verification (monitoring of government implementation of their plans) or activities (exchange visits), while others were extremely difficult to measure, notably food stocks and increased food production. Detailed comments on the Logical Framework and the surveys that tried to measure them are given in Appendix 3.

Activities

The activities for each country are described in detail in the country annexes. This section gives a summary of the extent to which each country has implemented the activities described in the Logical Framework.

Activities for Expected Result 1: Strengthened local government

The activities were meant to contribute towards “*strengthened local government structures to manage, regulate and coordinate local development*”. A summary of the some of the activities for Expected Result 1 and Expected Result 3 for the three countries is given in Table 1. The table does not contain all the information given in the Annexes as in some cases the data were presented differently for each country, were difficult to disaggregate or were given only qualitatively. In some instances, the figures are estimated.

Table 1. Activities for Expected Result 1 & Expected Result 3 for the three countries

Activity	Tanzania		Burundi		Ethiopia	
	No.	Beneficiaries	No.	Beneficiaries	No.	Beneficiaries
Village councils trained in planning	70	630	26	480	10	43
District councils trained in planning	0	0	2	120	1	86
Government officials trained on land registration	23 district land officers + 27,742 villagers including leaders		120 from <i>collines</i> & <i>communes</i>			0
Villagers trained on land rights			674 Batwa			0
Villagers trained in DRR		3,210	0	0		50
Village DRR committees established & trained	70	630	53	301	10	?
Government officials trained on DRR	210 at village level		125 at <i>commune</i> and province		252 at <i>woreda</i> and <i>kebele</i>	
Leaders trained in decentralisation	840 in village		120 at <i>colline</i> and <i>commune</i> inc. CSOs			0
Community members trained in decentralisation		1,258	NA			0

Capacity building

The 1st activity was to “*build capacity of relevant government personnel on decision-making, financial allocations and effective planning*”.

In **Tanzania**, the emphasis was on training village councils on their role in developing district level planning, and the legal requirement to hold Quarterly Village General Assembly Meetings (QVGAMs) where villagers could raise issues of concern. In practice, a lot of the training was on the more general role of contributing towards the district development plans as agriculture is not considered separately at village and ward⁴ levels. Of course, village councils cannot make “*financial allocations*”, only requests. Most of the training budget in Tanzania was spent on government capacity building.

In **Burundi**, there was a wide range of training at both *colline* and *commune* levels for example the role of CDCs⁵, conflict resolution and infrastructure maintenance. Only a small part of the training was on decentralised planning. There is a general feeling among villagers that the government’s decentralisation policies are not really being implemented. While *communes* and *collines* can make requests, decisions are made at national and to a lesser extent provincial level.

In **Ethiopia**, the focus of training on planning and budgeting was for the *woreda* staff. There was no training on decentralised planning at the *kebele* level. However there is a potential in Ethiopia for *kebele* leaders to influence *woreda* plans and this was not adequately explored by the project.

To summarise, the project has built government capacity in planning and budgeting in all three countries, but the greatest impact was in Tanzania.

Training on land rights and registration

The project in **Tanzania** facilitated the training of 23 district land office staff in land registration. It also raised awareness in all project villages (27,642 attendees) about land rights and the benefits and procedures of having land registered.

In **Burundi** there was no expenditure on this item recorded in the final accounts. However, the list of training includes training of 120 CCDC and CDC members on the “*land registration code*”. The 2011 legislation on Land Tenure Reform was supposed to simplify registration, but in practice, little is being done by the government to implement it and in any case the certificate issued under this Act falls short of full land title. There was not a lot of effort put into this activity.

In **Ethiopia**, there was no training on land rights as it was considered by project staff that this would have been politically unacceptable in the Ethiopian context. All land in Ethiopia belongs to the state. Users can rent out their land but not sell it, though certificates of usufruct can be issued together with a map of the farm.

This activity was most appropriate for the Tanzanian context. The other two countries struggled with it to some extent.

Training on Disaster Risk Reduction

The 3rd Activity was to train “*local councils on Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) initiatives*”.

In **Tanzania**, 9 DRR committee members were selected in each village by the community. A total of 630 committee members and 210 village leaders (chairperson, secretary and treasurer) participated in the training. District committees already existed but their involvement in the project helped to build up their capacity also.

In **Burundi**, training was facilitated for provincial and *commune* platform members and to 301 committee members at *colline* level (all 26 project *collines* plus 27 others that were not project *collines*).

In **Ethiopia** the project facilitated the training 169 *kebele* and *woreda* government staff and council members in DRR and an additional 109 community members in disaster response.

This activity was quite a strong component in all three countries.

⁴ For an overview of the various administrative boundaries in the three countries, see Appendix 4.

⁵ *Colline* Development Committee

Exchange visits

The 4th activity was to organise “Exchange visits of local government representatives around the issue of decentralisation”.

This activity is one example where the activity overlaps with an OVI. OVI 2 for this Expected Result is that “local authorities in all 3 programme countries have participated in internal and external exchange visits and can demonstrate learning and sharing”. It does not refer to “decentralisation” though the final narrative report for Burundi specifically says that the **Burundi** government representatives went to Tanzania (*inter alia*) to learn about decentralised decision making and internal visits in **Ethiopia** also had a decentralisation component.

Presumably because decision making is already supposed to be decentralised, the final report for **Tanzania** simply says that this activity “was not appropriate for Tanzania” though visits were arranged around other topics. This activity/OVI will be discussed in more detail under the OVIs.

Activities for Expected Result 2: Diversified Livelihoods

A summary of farmer training and activities for crop storage, water management, processing, marketing and land access is given in Table 2. Approaches to alternative income generation are shown in Table 3.

Table 2. Farmer training and activities for crop storage, water management, processing, marketing and land access

Activity	Tanzania		Burundi		Ethiopia	
	No.	Beneficiaries	No.	Beneficiaries	No.	Beneficiaries
Farmers trained		7,175		6,889		2,276
Extension agents trained		220		26		137
Community produce stores	1	43	8	2,685	1	350
Watershed & water management						
Canal improvement	2,769 m (3,800 ha)	185	NA		94 ha	89
Manual pumps (vegetables)	480	3,375	10	375	0	0
Rainwater harvesting (vegetables)	0	0	12	450	0	0
Greenhouses	0	0	2	83	0	0
Drip irrigation systems	0	0	2	75	0	0
Land reclamation	0	0	0	0	4 sites	330 ha
Spring protection	0	0	0	0	3 ⁶	1,500
Processing groups	13	1,648	2	560	0	0
Fruit & vegetable marketing Cooperative	0	0	0	0	1	75
Bridge for market access	0	0	0	0	1	5,026 +
Kitchen gardens	202	202	0	0	0	0
Land registration certificates	5,212		674 (pending)		3	154
Land tribunals	70	490				

⁶ 4 built but only 3 working

Farmer training

The 1st activity was “*training for farmers in appropriate farming techniques*”.

In **Tanzania**, about 6,990 farmers were trained in Farmer Field Schools and a further 185 on irrigation management. The focus in FFS was on low cost methods such as line planting and correct crop spacing. In Kibondo there was some training on conservation agriculture, mainly using soil amelioration and conservation plants such as lablab. Other topics included rice cultivation, agroforestry and soil conservation. Training was carried out by volunteer paraprofessionals trained by the project and to a lesser extent by government ward extension officers.

The project in **Burundi** trained about 6,900 farmers in 222 pre-existing agricultural groups. Topics covered plant density, seed selection, fertiliser use, seed conservation, macro-propagation techniques for banana, management of mother gardens for banana propagation, multiplication of sorghum seed and cassava cuttings, soil conservation, agroforestry practices, efficient land use, rainwater harvesting ponds, greenhouse management, animal health and pest control. ICRAF⁷ helped with training on water-harvesting and greenhouse construction and management. Training was delivered through a system of 75 “lead farmers” (about 3 per *colline*) who had received special training from DPAE⁸ staff supported by government *colline* extension agents and Concern agriculturalists.

In **Ethiopia**, about 2,300 farmers were trained in integrated pest management, basic crop agronomy (spacing, line planting, etc.), horticulture, cash crops such as coffee and ginger, cultivated pasture management, land reclamation and animal health. Training was by government *kebele* extension agents supported by the *woreda* agricultural department and WDA agricultural staff.

Strengthened agricultural extension services

The 2nd activity was to “*strengthen agricultural extension services through government and community-based models*”.

The project in **Tanzania** trained 220 paraprofessionals in agronomy and animal health (including vaccination techniques) to complement the few government ward agricultural extension agents. There were normally two per village (one male, one female) though in Kibondo, REDESO trained ten paraprofessionals in each village because of demand. No paraprofessionals were trained in Iringa where the government Agricultural Department staff provided training directly. The paraprofessionals were able to earn some income from vaccinating poultry and in some cases when visiting farmers growing quality declared seed and processing groups that had their own farms. Farmer field schools (FFS) were organised twice a week on a dedicated plot during the growing season for the first two years. Subsequently the paraprofessionals focused on one to one advice on the farmers own land. The wealth category of farmers who attended FFS varied greatly from partner to partner. In some villages, anyone could join, in others it was more focused on the poorest farmers.

In **Burundi**, the project facilitated the additional training for 26 government *colline* extension staff by DPAE officers from the *commune* and by project agriculturalists. A system of bonuses was introduced whereby *colline* extension workers could supplement their salaries by 50% if they met at least 80% of targets set by the project in collaboration with the *commune* staff (who also received a bonus). Targets were set by the project in collaboration with the *commune* staff (who also received a bonus). The system was successful in that targets were generally met but it was dependent on funding from outside the government.

In **Ethiopia**, the project facilitated the additional training of 67 agricultural extension workers, 50 para-veterinarians and 20 animal health extension workers, all government staff at *kebele* or *woreda* level. Training was undertaken by senior government staff supported by WDA agriculturalists. The project also supplied the *woreda* animal health service with veterinary drugs and vaccinations against commonly occurring diseases.

⁷ International Centre for Research in Agroforestry, a sub-contractor for the project

⁸ Directions Provinciales de l'Agriculture et de l'Elevage

Community seed and produce storage

The 3rd activity was the “*development of community seed and produce storage facilities*”.

There were no community seed or produce storage facilities developed in **Tanzania**, though the processing groups did have some storage space (see below).

In **Burundi** eight warehouses were constructed and equipped by the project. The capacity is around 150 tonnes but the largest amount stored in one warehouse visited had been around 50 tonnes. The warehouses are owned by the members and have been registered as cooperatives. The project facilitated appropriate training in cooperatives and business management. The eight cooperatives have a total of 2,685 members. The warehouses both store produce and sell it on to businessmen. The warehouse cooperatives also offer credit facilities to farmers. Shops to sell farm inputs were set up in 5 of the 8 warehouses.

There was only one warehouse constructed in **Ethiopia**, in Gesuba the Offa *woreda* administrative centre. The capacity is about 800 tonnes and has so far been underused. The warehouse management has had appropriate training in business management and the warehouse has been registered as a cooperative. It has three functions, buying and selling produce (the main activity), storage and a farm input shop. Members receive prices which are slightly above the market rate at harvest. Members are given first option to buy the produce back at slightly below the market rate when prices are high 3 or 4 months after harvest. Remaining produce is auctioned off. The management indicated that this system was paying for their costs and was sustainable.

Watershed management and small-scale irrigation

The 4th activity was “*watershed management, including rain-water harvesting and small-scale irrigation*”.

In **Tanzania**, this activity mainly took the form of the improvement (mainly lining and some diversion structures) of 2,769 m of canals in Iringa and Kilolo districts. The schemes irrigate about 3,800 ha. Around 180 water users were trained in water management. In Kibondo, about 480 treadle pumps were distributed to vegetable growing groups who also received seeds, a total of 3,375 direct beneficiaries. Water was pumped from shallow wells.

The project in **Burundi** built 12 rainwater harvesting systems which collected surface runoff into ponds with a volume of between 120 and 480 m³ that are lined with heavy duty plastic. Each irrigated about 1 ha of vegetables at two sites using drip irrigation and in two sites in conjunction with greenhouses also installed under the project. Vegetable were able to be grown outside of the normal season and so could be sold at a high price. Each rainwater harvesting system is run by one of the pre-existing agricultural groups already described.

In **Ethiopia**, the project supported the reclamation of 330 ha of degraded public land on 4 sites on a cash-for-work basis. The sites were fenced and planted with fruit and other trees. Forest Conservation Cooperatives with a total of 154 members were registered at 3 of the 4 sites. The project also improved a section of the Dakaya irrigation scheme by lining a short stretch of the existing canal with concrete. The extra water enabled 89 households to grow two crops a year instead of one on the 94 ha of irrigated land. Additionally, 3 springs were protected providing enough water for about 1,500 people.

Alternative income generation

The 5th activity was “*training and support on alternative income generating techniques*”.

A summary of the approach to this activity in the three countries is given in Table 3. The largest component was to provide agricultural inputs. Input provision warranted a separate activity in the Logical Framework. Some form of savings and credit groups were established in all three countries and these helped the relatively few members to set up or expand small businesses. One woman in Kigoma, Tanzania started a solar-powered mobile-phone charging business with a small loan. Bee-keeping and pottery-based groups were promoted in Burundi and Ethiopia. Ethiopia trained 15 tailors. However it is a pity that there was not more emphasis on non-agricultural sources of income. Some

participatory research would be required to identify potential businesses. The Practical Action web site has a lot of ideas⁹.

Table 3. Approaches to diversified livelihoods

Sub-activity	Tanzania	Burundi	Ethiopia
Savings & Credit Groups / Cooperatives	21 informal Village Community Banks (VICOBA) formed with a total of 522 members. Training & capital start-up grants given.	23 Saving and Internal Lending Communities (SILCs) established with a total of 539 members. Training & start-up materials such as stationery given.	1 Saving and Credit Cooperative established & support for 9 through training. Total number of members was 217.
Vegetable growing (excluding kitchen gardens – see Table 2)	480 pumps & seed given to vegetable growing groups (3,375 beneficiaries)	Mainly associated with the 8 RWH systems, in two cases in greenhouses, in two cases with drip irrigation.	None
Provision of planting material	40 tonnes of sorghum seed + cassava cuttings	Approximately 23,000 improved bananas, 6.5 million cuttings of sweet potato, taro and short-duration, mosaic resistant cassava, 11.2 tonnes of maize and sorghum, 50 tonnes of legume crops & 100 kg of vegetable seed, 24,000 fruit tree saplings, 14,000 pineapple cuttings and 1 million seedlings of soil amelioration trees - all to the 6,889 agricultural group members.	To 2,276 trained farmers: 47,000 fruit tree, ensete and coffee seedlings; 287 q of ginger; 2.1 tonnes of haricot beans, 13,780 suckers of banana, 118,750 cuttings of (short duration, dwarf, mosaic resistant) cassava, 239 q taro, 37 q grass seed & some vegetable seed
Seed multiplication system	119 farmers in 13 groups trained to produce Quality Declared Seed	Plots run by groups grew seed and cassava for cuttings. Improved bananas given to lead farmers, Groups distributed seed, cuttings to group members. Lead farmers distributed banana suckers.	Haricot bean, ginger and taro tubers distributed to beneficiaries on condition they paid back an equal amount to the project for further distribution.
Provision of livestock	232 goats & 2360 poultry to around 630 farmers	118 farmers received Jersey cows. About 55 calves have been passed on as a result of AI. 322 farmers received a goat and passed on about 276 kids to other farmers.	None
Provision of drugs and vaccine	In Kibondo, vaccine for NCD ¹⁰ was provided free of charge by the project through paraprofessionals	2 private vet pharmacies were provided with a stock of drugs and through a voucher system beneficiaries could access drugs at 20% of cost.	Woreda animal health service supplied with veterinary drugs and vaccinations against common diseases
Fertiliser distribution	No	Fertilisers distributed free to group members for first two years	Yes to the 2,276 farmers who were trained
Bee-keeping	No	9 small groups with total of 273 members	One honey cooperative with 74 members + 26 other beneficiaries
Pottery / stoves	No	4 Batwa groups with 167 members trained in manufacture & marketing of clay fuel-efficient stoves	15 potters trained
Tailoring	No	20 trained	No

⁹ <http://practicalaction.org/manufacturing-handicraft-process-industries-answers>

¹⁰ Newcastle Disease

Market links

The 6th activity was to “*facilitate links between beneficiaries & markets including cross-border trade*”.

Nothing was done to explore the potential for cross-border trade in Tanzania or Ethiopia. Burundi had a market analysis and explored the possibility of trade with Tanzania and Rwanda but there are still too many difficulties in cross-border trade even within the East African Community.

Farmers were trained on how to look for internal markets in **Tanzania**. In Mtwara, farmers were put in touch with the CAVA-Africa¹¹ project that is involved in marketing cassava. In most cases, businessmen came to buy processed products in the village, though the Kigoma vegetable producers seem to have been more proactive in packaging and marketing their produce in towns.

In **Burundi**, the situation is similar though some sunflower growers have annual contracts with the Mutwenzi Agro-Pastoral Centre. The project arranged for the distribution of information leaflets about the fuel-efficient stoves to *commune* markets. The project arranged for the distribution of information leaflets about the fuel-efficient stoves to *commune* markets and organised a series of sales exhibitions in the six main markets of Bugabira and Busoni *communes* in order to increase awareness of the improved stoves and to increase sales.

The Woyo bridge was the main contribution in **Ethiopia**. The bridge will help the farmers in six Ofa *kebeles* (including 1,336 households in Ofa Heramo, one of the project *kebeles*) and parts of surrounding *woredas* to transport their produce to Gesuba market.

Processing and marketing

The 7th activity was to “*support farmers to add value to their crops by engaging in processing and marketing*”. There is an overlap between this activity and the previous one. “*Marketing*” has generally been interpreted to mean the marketing of the processed crops.

In **Tanzania**, the project supported approximately 1,172 farmers to engage in the processing and marketing of sunflower (two groups in Kigoma) and cassava products (11 groups in Mtwara region) and about 476 farmers (two groups in Iringa) in rice processing. Cassava farmers organise themselves to transport their products to big markets in towns though most cassava flour is sold outside the community. The project helped farmers to attend some trade exhibitions. Most of the sunflower oil is sold locally. Farmers take the processed rice back to their homes and sell it privately. All groups were supported with equipment (only one of the two rice processing groups), buildings and training.

In **Burundi**, there were two processing groups supported. The main one was the Murore Cooperative which produces a mixture of mainly cassava, sorghum and soya which is used for making gruel. The group, which has 406 members, was supported with machinery, building improvements and training. The other enterprise helped by the project was the Mutwenzi Agro-Pastoral Centre which, inter alia, processes sunflower for sale in large towns, mainly Bujumbura. The project assisted with electric supply and building improvements. This support was mainly to provide a market to sunflower growers in project *collines* than to help the centre itself which is owned by the Catholic Diocese of Muyinga.

There was no crop processing activity in **Ethiopia** other than the distribution of some hand-held cassava crushers.

Increased access to land

The 8th activity was to “*increase access to land, including community gardens and land registration*”.

The project in **Tanzania** facilitated the issuing of 5,212 Certificates of Customary Right of Occupancy (CCROs), 48% of which were in Iringa and Kilolo districts. The project trained district land officers and provided them with surveying equipment and software. It also built or improved land registries in each of the 70 project villages. Strictly speaking the CCROs do not increase access to land but does improve security of tenure. In theory the CCROs also can be used as surety to obtain loans but we did not meet anyone who had been successful. The project also helped to set up 202 kitchen gardens but not all of these were on new land.

¹¹ Cassava: Value Addition for Africa, a project being implemented by Natural Resources Institute, Greenwich, UK

In collaboration with the government, Concern in **Burundi** supported the delimitation, surveying and distribution of 674 plots of 0.5 ha of land just outside the Murehe Forest Reserve to Batwa households. The Batwa were landless and finding it impossible to live in the forest because of environmental degradation.

In **Ethiopia**, the main contribution was the reclamation of the 329 ha of badly eroded common land and bringing it into productive use under the management of Forest Conservation Cooperatives.

Activities for Expected Result 3: Increased involvement of non-state actors in planning

These activities were meant to contribute to the Expected Result that there would be “*increased involvement of non-state actors in key planning processes*”.

Awareness raising for CSOs

The 1st activity was “*awareness raising for civil society organisations on national laws and policies, with an emphasis on the opportunities for participation in key planning processes*”.

In none of the countries has there been much in the way of awareness raising of government policies on community and CSO participation in planning (though they do exist in Tanzania¹², Burundi¹³ and Ethiopia¹⁴).

In **Tanzania**, the CSO partners have been encouraged to attend the district Stakeholder Forums through which these policies are being worked out (though they did not always attend). In Tanzania, CSOs have a strong voice in the district planning process.

In **Burundi** (*commune* and province) and Ethiopia (*woreda*) Concern and partner CSOs have attended government - NGO forums and these have discussed *commune* and provincial plans.

Monitoring of district government performance by village representatives

The 2nd activity was to “*build the capacity of village committees, village councils and other local representative bodies to monitor district council performance where appropriate*”.

In **Tanzania**, the main actor in this activity was ANSAF, which trained village officials and councillors, as well as CSOs in Iringa and Kilolo districts, on the rights-based approach to Social Accountability Monitoring of government planning. Although not mentioned specifically in the Logical Framework, the Service Charters and Score Cards, mentioned in the proposal narrative as being tools whereby villagers would monitor district level performance, were never developed.

In **Burundi**, in order to increase monitoring and evaluation of decentralisation and local governance, the project facilitated a 2-day workshop for *commune* officials, focused on locally adapted monitoring and evaluation techniques, tools and approaches and supported CDCs in implementing monitoring report templates used to monitor progress in PCDC implementation (*Commune Plans for Community Development*).

There was no specific activity on the part of the project in **Ethiopia** to build the capacity of the *kebele* cabinet and councils to monitor *woreda* cabinet performance as this is supposed to be done through the *kebele* representation to the *woreda* council.

Awareness of decentralisation process

The 3rd activity was to “*facilitate increased awareness of the decentralisation process among citizens so they may take full advantage of the available opportunities to participate in decision-making processes and access public services*”.

In **Tanzania**, this activity was mainly through reviving the Quarterly Village General Assembly Meetings (QVGAMs) which are required by law, but were not taking place in many of the project villages. Village leaders from all 70 project villages were trained on topics that included their roles as village leaders, the duty to conduct quarterly village meetings, accountability, transparency and ways to support the

¹² for example in the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty” (p.56)

¹³ The Burundi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2007, § 233, p. 38)

¹⁴ Ethiopia Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (Growth and Transformation Plan 2010/11–2014/15), pp 96-97

village land tribunal in resolving land disputes. Village council and community members were sensitised on their right to participate in the development of DADPs¹⁵.

In **Burundi**, government capacity building included: the national decentralisation policy, participatory planning and budgeting at *commune* level. However, the extent to which the ideas of decentralisation had penetrated to *colline* level officials and “citizens” seemed quite low during the evaluation.

Although it is government policy in **Ethiopia** that *kebeles* are given more power to influence the plans being made at by the *woreda* government, no direct interventions were made to increase awareness of the possibility of increased decentralisation by Concern or WDA as it was considered too politically sensitive.

Collaboration between NGOs

The 4th activity was to “*collaborate with national and local NGO platforms*”.

There was good collaboration between Concern, their partners and local NGO platforms in all areas where the project was working and nationally, Concern senior staff members attend various forums to coordinate actions by NGOs in various sectors.

In Burundi the project has worked closely with the Kirundo Coalition of Civil Society Organisations and other NGO forums. Nationally senior Concern management are members of several forums.

There has been no collaboration of the project staff themselves with national or local NGO platforms in Ethiopia though Concern is a member of several national forums and regularly meets with other NGOs for coordination. Project staff from Concern and its partner the WDA only participated in the GO-NGO forums at *woreda* level.

Exchange visit for non-state actors

The last activity was to organize “*exchanges and learning between NSAs*” (non-state actors). This activity overlaps with the 3rd OVI (*CSOs have participated in internal and external exchange visits...*) for this result. Taking this activity literally, I am aware of only a few exchanges between NSAs. In Tanzania, two area facilitators from TCRS¹⁶ in Kigoma and four paraprofessionals of Kigoma District conducted an exchange visit to REDESO¹⁷ in Kibondo to learn about organic farming. In Burundi, in order to create links between COSC Kirundo and other national forums, an exchange visit was organised to FORSC¹⁸ and SPPDF¹⁹.

Expected Result 1: Strengthened Local Government

OVI 1: Monitoring of implementation of government plans

The first OVI was that there would be “*regular joint monitoring by Concern and partners of progress against local government development plans in all 3 programme countries*”.

This OVI obviously came from the Tanzanian proposal on which the 3 country proposal was based. It is not really an OVI but a Means of Verification. The OVI should have been something like “*In the project area, a higher proportion of district government plans related to agriculture are implemented each year and discrepancies between budget and expenditure decrease each year*”.

In **Tanzania**, the Agricultural Non-State Actors’ Forum (ANSAF) is widely recognised, by both government and civil society organisations, as being a leader in Social Accountability Monitoring and holding especially district government to account, both to the electorate and to higher levels of government. The project provided a grant to ANSAF and ANSAF trained project staff, partners and community leaders in some of the project districts. This covered the processes involved in government monitoring, mainly obtaining copies of district budgets and expenditures to compare discrepancies between what was planned and what actually happened.

¹⁵ District Agricultural Development Plans

¹⁶ Tanganyika Christian Refugee Society, the project partner that was dropped in year 2 because of financial management issues

¹⁷ Relief to Development Society, a project partner

¹⁸ Forum pour le Renforcement de la Société Civile

¹⁹ Synergie des Partenaires pour la Promotion des Droits des Femmes

Though there is a national policy for CSOs to become involved in monitoring government expenditure and the implementation of government plans in **Burundi**, the mechanisms for Concern or any other CSO to monitor plans in the same way that ANSAF does in Tanzania are limited. There is a need for a CSO such as ANSAF (Tanzania CSO) that can be dedicated to this. There are however regular Focal Point (stakeholder) meetings in which Concern and other CSOs discuss development plans.

The OVI is not reported on in the final report for **Ethiopia**, and during the evaluation I was told that monitoring of government plans by the Wolaita Development Association (WDA) or Concern did not happen. The nearest thing to monitoring took place during the GO-NGO forums but these are mainly for coordination.

The OVI was met in Tanzania and to some extent in Burundi. Even in Tanzania, ANSAF was not monitoring all the project districts.

OVI 2: Exchange visits

The 2nd OVI was that *“local authorities in all 3 programme countries have participated in internal and external exchange visits and can demonstrate learning and sharing”*. This is not an OVI but an activity. Learning was not assessed, for example by requiring participants to submit a report to Concern on their return.

Neither Tanzania nor Ethiopia arranged international visits despite the fact that a budget adjustment for Ethiopia specifically made provision for this. This was a missed opportunity. Table 4 shows just some of the topics that representatives would have found interesting by visiting the other countries.

In Tanzania, the emphasis was on district land officers visiting other districts to learn about land registration and land ownership legislation. The project also arranged for District Agriculture Officers, extension officers, and village leaders to visit other parts of Tanzania to learn about improved methods of agriculture (crops and livestock), crop processing and to learn about MKURABITA²⁰, a government programme aimed at fast-tracking recognition of ownership of land and businesses that are based on customary rather than formally recognised laws.

Table 4. Potential topics that each country could benefit from by visiting the others

	Tanzania	Burundi	Ethiopia
Tanzania		Village development plans District level planning Land registration approach Community level processing Role of CSOs in planning	Village development plans District level planning Land registration approach Community level processing Role of CSOs in planning
Burundi	Banana multiplication techniques Introduction of dairy cows and AI Community produce warehousing Rainwater harvesting Greenhouses		Introduction of dairy cows and AI Rainwater harvesting Greenhouses
Ethiopia	Land reclamation Cooperatives Community produce warehousing Government approach to transparency	Land reclamation Cooperatives Government approach to transparency	
The table shows what the countries along the top could learn from the countries down the side			

Burundi was the only country to organise an external visit. Officials from the Ministry of Decentralisation and the Ministry of Communal Development at central and provincial levels visited Tanzania together with staff from Concern to learn about decentralised decision making, government

²⁰ *Mpango wa Kurasimisha Rasilimali na Biashara za Wanyonge Tanzania* (Property and Business Formalising Programme for the Vulnerable of Tanzania)

accountability and the role of CSOs in government planning. In addition to the visit to Tanzania, the project organised visits to other parts of Burundi for provincial, communal, and *colline* officials to learn about decentralised planning, women's rights and conflict resolution. *Commune* staff from DPAE²¹ accompanied Concern staff to Rwanda to learn about rainwater harvesting ponds and greenhouse management.

In **Ethiopia**, the project organised 137 government officers from the *woreda* (Offa) and a few of the *kebeles* to various parts of the country (including Tigre where decentralisation is apparently more advanced) to see examples of natural resources management, GO-NGO forums, decentralised planning.

This OVI has been met only partially because the wording says "*internal and external exchange visits*".

OVI 3: Women's representation

The second OVI was that there would be a "*15% increase in the proportion of women's representation in Community Level structures, in Burundi and Ethiopia*".

In **Burundi**, there has been an increase in the number of women members of *commune* and *colline* councils between 2005 and 2010. There was an increase of 14% for Busoni and 20% for Bugabira of women's representation on the *commune* councils after the 2010 elections. This may have been partly due to the trainings and sensitisation for women's participation by this project (and by earlier EC-funded Concern-implemented projects) that encouraged many women to offer themselves as candidates in the elections. Women are increasingly involved in *colline* level committees, such as those for the warehouses, and the project must have influenced this. However there was no monitoring of increased representation on these informal committees. The ESR reported that only 41% of respondents were satisfied or very satisfied with the level of women's representation.

In **Ethiopia**, the gender make-up of the *kebele* councils (100 men, 100 women) and the *woreda* councils (each *kebele* sends two men and one woman) is regulated by the government. There was no potential for the government to influence women's representation. Women's involvement in community level committees has increased and this may have been a result of the project. Because it was not considered relevant, this OVI was not reported on in the final narrative report from the project.

If "*Community Level Structures*" are to be understood as lower level political structures, the project has had no impact even if, as in Burundi, representation has increased.

OVI 4: Disaster Risk Reduction

The 4th OVI was that "*Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction systems are established and operational within Local Government structures in 60% of target communities in all 3 programme countries*".

In **Tanzania**, DRR systems were established and are operational in all 70 project villages. Twenty dormant village DRR committees were revived by selecting new committee members and training them together with the other 50 village DRR committees and village government leaders over several days. The data being collected varied from village to village and was not done very methodically but DRR committee members are now more prepared to react to a disaster.

In **Burundi**, the project helped to strengthen the provincial platform by facilitating training by staff from the national platform and helped to update the provincial contingency plans. *Colline* and *commune* DRR committees were established with the support of the project. In Bugabira, 8 committee members in each of 12 *collines* were trained and in Busoni, 5 members in each of 41 *collines* were trained (not all were project *collines*). Reporting is not done on a regular basis but only as incidents arise. Committee members are now more confident to meet an emergency. They are also thinking intelligently about what they can do to reduce relatively minor events such as road accidents.

The project in Ethiopia set up DRR committees and *Community Based Early Warning Systems* in all 10 project *kebeles*. The data collected includes information on rain (subjective), livestock and human diseases, events such as landslides, nutritional status of children, harvest assessment for key crops

²¹ Direction Provinciale de l'Agriculture et de l'Elevage - Provincial Directorate of Agriculture and Livestock

and food prices. The *woreda* DRR “Command Post” (based in the Department of Agriculture) was collecting data and sending them to the zonal office. There seemed to be a problem with data overload, as there was no systematic analysis of price data for example. Records were all on paper.

This OVI has been achieved in all three countries

OVI 5: Land tribunals

The 5th OVI (applying to Tanzania only) was that *“all 70 target villages in Tanzania have land tribunals formulated according to the requirements of the Village Land Act No 5 of 1999”*.

In all 70 programme villages, land tribunals were either formed or revived and the project facilitated training (usually by the District Land Officer) on the Village Land Act No. 5 (1999), the Land Dispute Court Act No. 2 (2002), their role in the implementation of the land laws and in developing village land use plans.

It was generally observed that the number of disputes land tribunals deal with is very low (none in some villages visited). The village tribunals still need further training and strengthening. There are no statistics compiled of dispute resolutions at district level. This would have been a useful additional measure of impact.

The OVI has been met in full.

Conclusion regarding Expected Result 1

Although not all OVIs have been met fully in all the three countries, there can be no doubt that the project has made a substantial contribution towards *“strengthened local government structures to manage, regulate and coordinate local development”*.

Expected Result 2: Diversified Livelihoods

OVI 1: Agricultural practices

The 1st OVI for this result was that *“70% of the targeted farmers are applying 1 or more new agricultural practices by the end of the programme in all 3 programme countries”*. The problems with the OVI are discussed in Appendix 3. The surveys made assumptions about the knowledge of the enumerators. For example, did the enumerator know what the correct spacing was when he/she was asking the farmer if they used the correct spacing? Only in Ethiopia was irrigation included as a practice. Neither mulching, nor crop rotation nor soil conservation were included in any country’s list of practices in the questionnaire.

There were some specific queries (see page 93) about the results of the surveys in Tanzania. Judging by the results of the baseline survey and the endline survey, it would appear that the OVI has not been met. However during the evaluation, all the farmers I spoke to said their production had increased since the beginning of the project and the most common reasons given were the use of correct crop spacing and using line planting, though where improved varieties were made available through the QDS scheme or where improved irrigation facilities were made available, my view is that these would have had the greatest impact. My conclusion is that despite the apparent negative results of the baseline and endline surveys, this OVI has in fact been met in Tanzania.

In Burundi, the endline survey report (ESR) records that biggest changes are for the 65% of farmers now using crop protection techniques compared to 11% in the baseline study and 89% now applying fertilisers compared to 17% in the baseline study. Only for fertiliser application was there more than a 70% increase though it should be pointed out that for the first two years, fertilisers were distributed free to group members. The free distribution had stopped by the time of the endline survey.

There are even more questions about the clarity and reliability of the tables in the survey results for Ethiopia (see Annex 3). Table 18 in the Endline Survey Report indicates that all the beneficiaries and 96.7% of non-beneficiaries had adopted two or more practices since 2010 (though the table also shows that 45% of non-beneficiaries had adopted 5 or more improved practices whereas only 42% of beneficiaries had adopted 5 or more). The reliability of this result depends on how the question was asked. During a visit to one non-beneficiary *kebele*, we were told that the farmers had received a considerable amount of training from the government extension agent so this may partly explain the

small differences. The point is that in Ethiopia, it would appear that all beneficiary farmers had adopted at least two new agricultural practices.

The survey data in all three countries are at best questionable. However, based on my interviews with farmers individually and in groups in all three countries, my conclusion is that the OVI has probably been met.

OVI 2: Crop production

The 2nd OVI was that “*targeted farmers have significantly increased ($p < 0.05$) their crop production compared to non-targeted farmers in all 3 programme countries*”. Applying a significance test of $P < 0.05$ to this was a little ambitious but a move in the right direction (of using statistical significance to test whether OVIs had been met).

Production increases can occur not only from increased yield, but also by expanding the planted area. In some processing groups, the extra income meant they could employ more labour. It can also be increased by planting more than once a year as in the case of the irrigation schemes. Introducing fast growing cassava varieties can also increase production not only because it is higher yielding but because they make it possible to have one harvest a year instead of one harvest every two years. Because farmers find it more difficult to estimate areas than production, yields are less reliable than production alone. Only the ESR for Tanzania reported on production (as opposed to yield) and claimed that 85.9% of respondents said they had had an increase in production since 2010 but the ESR did not compare production for beneficiaries with non-beneficiaries. The ESR for Ethiopia reported that 70% (averaged over all crops) of beneficiaries said their “productivity” had increased whereas for non-beneficiaries, there were equal numbers claiming an increase to those claiming a decrease (averaged over all crops).

Table 5 shows the ratio of crop yields for beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries for the three countries as reported in the endline survey reports. The endline surveys are rather more reliable than the baseline surveys. The percentages were obtained by dividing average beneficiary yield by non-beneficiary yield, converting to a percentage and subtracting 100%. The ESR for Tanzania compared yields for respondents in the baseline and the endline surveys and not beneficiary yields with non-beneficiary yields. Apart from cassava and sorghum in Tanzania and sweet potatoes in Burundi, the comparisons are not all that different to answers I received during interviews with farmers during the evaluation. Though the Tanzania cassava yield increase seems unlikely, I was told in Burundi that before the introduction of mosaic resistant varieties, cassava yields were negligible.

Table 5. Crop yields of beneficiaries compared to non-beneficiaries presented in endline survey reports

Crop	Tanzania*	Burundi	Ethiopia
Maize	+ 75%	+ 8%	- 35%
Sorghum	+ 198%	NA	NA
Cassava	+ 1,500%	+ 22%	+ 51%
Banana	NA	+ 35%	NA
Sweet potatoes	NA	+ 400%	+ 71%
Taro	NA	- 3%	+ 66%
Irish potatoes	NA	NA	+ 86%
Pulses	+ 90%	+ 39%	+ 20%
* Tanzania figures compare yields reported at start of project compared to end of project NA = Not applicable or not available			

From interviews during the evaluation and a somewhat sceptical analysis of the endline surveys, my opinion is that in all three countries, at the end of the project, beneficiary production was substantially greater than that of non-beneficiaries if the non-beneficiaries had not benefited from similar interventions from other sources.

OVI 3: Increased income for value-chain groups

The 3rd OVI was that “groups undertaking value-chain activities with links to the private sector, are reporting increased income in all 3 programme countries”.

The ESR for Tanzania reports that 20.4% of respondents who were engaged in crop processing reported a large increase in “net margin” from crop processing. However there are questions about the validity of the question asked (see page 94). For what it is worth, 94.7% of those engaged in processing reported an increased income since the beginning of the project of which 24.3% had had a large or significant increase. The ESR also records that at the time of the baseline, only 6% of respondents had an income in excess of TSh450,000 whereas at the time of the endline survey, 52% (all beneficiaries, not only those involved in value-chain activities) had an income in excess of TSh400,000²².

The endline survey in Burundi analysed the profitability of a sample of cooperatives and found that the most profitable in terms of net profit per member was the Saving and Internal Lending Community sampled (14,472²³ FBu/member) and the least profitable was the Munazi Produce Warehouse (2,784 FBu/member). They were not compared with baseline incomes.

The ESR for Ethiopia discusses only the setting up of honey cooperative and the fruit and vegetable cooperative and not incomes to members. During the evaluation, it was apparent that of these, only the honey cooperative and the produce warehouse were distributing dividends to members but these were quite small in each case. Of all the cooperatives, members of the SACCOs reported most improvements in livelihoods, now being enabled to improve houses, pay for better medical care and buy household goods such as radios.

During the evaluation, most informants who were members of groups involved in savings and credit schemes, crop processing, warehouses, honey production, stove-making (Burundi) said their income was much better than before the project so that they could improve their home, buy goods such as radios, bicycles, clothes, goats, buy land, have better access to health care, pay secondary school fees, buy more beer (man in Burundi) and rely less on money-lenders (in Burundi). Most also said that the number of months of low food availability was much less or zero and they had been enabled to have more meals in a day.

From the limited information in the ESRs and the interviews during the evaluation, my opinion is that this OVI has been met to a large extent in Tanzania and Burundi and to some extent in Ethiopia.

Conclusion regarding Expected Result 2

The emphasis of the project was increasing agricultural productivity and the diversity of crops grown. This strategy has contributed somewhat towards diversified livelihoods. Progress with crop processing was greatest in Tanzania and to a more limited extent in Burundi. In both cases group members had improved incomes. There were no processing groups established in Ethiopia as the project team believed there was no scope. In Burundi and Ethiopia, the warehouse cooperative groups have improved the living standards of members considerably. In all three countries, the savings and credit groups have helped a small number of people start small businesses.

The project has contributed to Expected Result of diversified livelihoods in all three countries but there could have been more emphasis on processing, especially in Ethiopia but also Burundi, and to non-agriculturally based livelihoods in all three countries.

Expected Result 3: Greater involvement of non-state actors in planning

OVI 1: CSO and community members involved in planning

The 1st OVI was that there would be a “documented increase in CSO and community members’ attendance in key planning processes and decision making in all 3 programme countries”. Apart from its partners, Concern has had no influence over other CSOs participation in planning.

²² the baseline and endline surveys used slightly different income classes

²³ only €6.79

The **Tanzania** final report records that attendance 3 or 4 times a year at QVGAMs had increased from 53% at the time of the baseline report to 70% in the 2012 annual survey (women's attendance increased from 27% to 44% at the time of the 2012 annual survey). The report also shows that the level of participation in the QVGAMs had increased. Concern and project partners were invited and (sometimes) attended district Stakeholder Forums where they could explain their own programmes and budgets and contribute towards the development of district level plans (see Appendix 4 for an overview of district level planning in the three countries).

In **Burundi**, CSOs are now routinely invited to take part in *commune* and provincial level stakeholder meetings (Focal Points), normally chaired by the *commune* or provincial administrator. This includes the project partner, APECOS though often they do not attend the meetings. Participants outline the activities that were conducted during that quarter and present the planned activities for the following quarter. COSC set up offices in both project *communes*, attend Focal Point meetings and seeks to liaise between the community and the government. However there is still no strong mechanism whereby community members can influence *commune* development plans through their *colline* councils.

The GO-NGO Forums at *woreda*, zone and state level in **Ethiopia** are the main vehicle by which CSOs interact with the government in development work. The forums do not formulate government development plans but do discuss NGO budgets (and whether they are meeting their targets). The forums also discuss problems and constraints to implementation experienced by the NGOs. As already stated, the decentralised planning opportunities in government policy documents do not yet appear to have materialised.

Taking account of progress in all three countries, it can be concluded that this OVI has been partly met.

OVI 2: Planning reflects need of community and marginalised groups

The 2nd OVI was that "*planning increasingly reflects the needs of community and marginalised groups*". This OVI is similar to the 2nd OVI for the Specific Objective: "*priority issues of women and marginalised groups are increasingly addressed at the community level and within local government structures*". It would really require an analysis of the needs of (a) the community and (b) marginalised groups (because these may not be the same) and the degree to which the needs of each group had been addressed.

The ESR for Tanzania did not report directly on this OVI (*i.e.* that *planning increasingly reflects the needs of community and marginalised groups*) but only the degree of participation in village planning. It records that 86.9% of respondents had participated in village planning meetings by which they presumably mean Quarterly Village General Assembly Meetings. The strengthening of the QVGAMs, increasingly attended by women and other marginalised groups, has undoubtedly contributed to village plans increasingly reflecting their needs. Unhelpfully, we were told in one Kigoma village that "*women may come but it is usually men because they are the ones who make decisions and implement them*"! Nevertheless, the view of many of the village officials and farmers was that the district planning system now took their views more into account than at the beginning of the project.

In **Burundi**, *Commune* Council members (CCDCs) in collaboration with the *commune* administration have begun to involve communities and the *Colline* Development Committees (CDC) in the creation of PCDCs²⁴. However we were told that the central government did not really take *commune* plans seriously and that *commune* plans had to be implemented mainly from locally generated funds (shop and market taxes, etc.). For small projects in CCDCs, *communes* can apply directly to the national government. The CDCs formulate plans and send them to the *commune* but the CDCs interviewed had little confidence that their plans would be included. If they do not obtain assistance from the *commune*, they often raise money themselves.

In **Ethiopia**, *kebele* council members can comment on *woreda* plans and in theory they could be subsequently amended. The ESR attempted to discover the extent to which *kebele* and *woreda* councils addressed their concerns ("marginalised" groups were not disaggregated). It reported that the

²⁴ Plan Communal de Développement Communautaire

top priorities that people wanted councils to discuss were health, drinking water and agriculture, whereas the respondents thought the councils had actually addressed roads, “public” affairs, and community participation. There was no attempt to analyse what the councils actually addressed.

It can be concluded that significant progress has been made in all three countries towards a situation where *“planning increasingly reflects the needs of community and marginalised groups”* but there still remains a long way to go, particularly in Ethiopia and to a lesser extent Burundi.

OVI 3: CSO exchange visits

The 3rd OVI was that *“CSOs have participated in internal and external exchange visits and can demonstrate learning and sharing”*.

In **Tanzania**, the project arranged several internal exchange visits for the CSO partners that focused on cashew nut marketing; cassava processing; the Land Act; CCROs; rice production, processing and marketing; green gram production; kitchen gardening; poultry and goat keeping and quality declared seed production. No external exchanges were arranged.

In **Burundi**, both internal and external exchange visits were organised. A visit was organised for COSC members to Bujumbura Province to meet with other organisations and coalitions that are more mature, in particular, FORSC, SPPDF and MIPAREC in Gitega Province. Lessons learned were documented and shared with those who were unable to take part in the exchange visit. Representatives from five CSOs took part in the exchange visit to Tanzania (Kigoma and Kibondo) in November, 2011 that focused on their role in the decentralization process within a democratic state and the roles and functions of the non-state actors in government planning.

In **Ethiopia**, four staff of the WDA participated in the visits on which the government went to various parts of Ethiopia to look at decentralisation, natural resource management and the functioning of GO-NGO forums.

This was not a strong OVI but it has obviously been met at least in part. The OVI is that CSOs have participated in internal and external exchange visit but only Burundi organised an international visit. CSO representatives did not always write a report on their return. This could have been one way to *“demonstrate learning and sharing”*.

Conclusions regarding Expected Result 3

The Expected Result that there would be *“increased involvement of non-state actors in key planning processes”* has been achieved to a greater extent in Tanzania and Burundi than in Ethiopia where there is no real mechanism for CSOs to contribute to government plans. The institutional mechanisms are strongest in Tanzania, but even there, NSAs do not always avail themselves of the opportunities to participate in government planning processes.

Specific Objective

The specific objective was *“to improve livelihoods and empowerment of poor farmers in decentralised decision-making processes”*. This is really two objectives: (i) improved livelihoods and (ii) empowerment. The OVIs were not the best ones to assess the Specific Objective for reasons explained in Appendix 3.

OVI 1: Increased Food Stocks

The 1st OVI was that *“at the end of the programme, the number of targeted households that have achieved recommended staple food stock levels has increased by at least 15% when compared to non-intervention areas”*. This was the most problematic of all the OVIs and is discussed in detail in Appendix 3. It is generally agreed that the baseline surveys of food stocks were particularly suspect and so to analyse this OVI, reliance has had to be placed on the endline surveys, which also have some problems. The actual food stocks depends on when the surveys were carried out in relation to the harvests, the use being made of produce warehouses, and the amount of produce that is bought and sold. The separate survey (not part of the baseline survey for OVIs) undertaken by ISABU in Burundi showed that during months of food shortage, the majority of households sourced their food off the farm (so they would not have food stocks). This is probably the same in Ethiopia and Tanzania as well.

For ethical reasons, Concern staff in **Tanzania** decided not to include “*non-intervention areas*” in their surveys. The survey was undertaken in beneficiary villages only. The ESR does not record days of food stocks based on energy requirements, but only on the amount of food which for the four main staples recorded were 111 kg of maize, 104 kg of rice, 73 kg of cassava and 47 kg of sorghum. Between 2011 and 2013 there was a recorded increase in the number of meals per day that people ate. It is therefore difficult to say if the OVI has been met or not. However during Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) during the evaluation, most people reported increases in production and income and a reduction in months when food was scarce.

The ESR for Burundi suggests that 46% of beneficiaries had less than 30 days of food stock at the time of the survey (a reduction of 49.5% from the baseline survey). For non-beneficiaries, the number of households with less than 30 days food stock has dropped from 88% to 79%. FGDs with beneficiaries during the evaluation indicated that the level of food security was much less at the end of the project than at the beginning, typically from reducing from between 4 and 6 months to 0.5 to 2 months with a corresponding impact on coping strategies and livelihoods. Though it is difficult to be confident in the survey data, food security undoubtedly improved greatly because of the project interventions and food shortage months consequently reduced by far more than 15% in number. Essentially the OVI was met in Burundi.

For Ethiopia, the ESR states that the baseline survey found that 67.5% of beneficiaries while 64.5% of non-beneficiaries had less than 30 days of food stocks available at the time of the survey²⁵ and that 16.7% of beneficiaries and 35.0% of non-beneficiaries had less than 30 days of food stocks available at the time of the endline survey. It would thus appear that according to these surveys and from responses from beneficiaries during the evaluation, the OVI has been achieved.

Notwithstanding the problems with the surveys, my opinion is that food security has improved greatly among project beneficiaries compared to people who did not benefit from interventions similar to what the project was supporting (including from government or other NGOs). Essentially the OVI has been achieved.

OVI 2: Priority issues of women and marginalised groups increasingly addressed

The other OVI was that “*priority issues of women and marginalised groups are increasingly addressed at the community level and within local government structures*”.

Except for Burundi, there was no attempt to disaggregate what were the priority issues of women and marginalised groups. The surveys in Tanzania and Ethiopia asked the respondents drawn from the whole community if they were satisfied with the way their local government were addressing issues or to compare their priority issues that they wanted addressed with what they thought had been addressed. In no country were there analyses of what was actually addressed in the government structures, for example by attempting a quantitative analysis of the council minutes. In none of the countries were lists made of marginalised groups and there was no common understanding of “*marginalised*” meant. Often it was taken simply to mean “very poor”. It is noteworthy that from the end of 2013 the (Offa) *woreda* government in Ethiopia will start to register for each *kebele* all people who are very poor, elderly, chronically ill, suffering from HIV/AIDS or are physically or mentally handicapped.

The **Tanzania** ESR claimed those who were either satisfied or very satisfied with their village council had increased from 20.3% at the time of the baseline survey to 40.7% in the endline survey. In several FGDs during the evaluation, I was told by women that their issues were not adequately addressed in the village council. However, in another FGD I was told that women would now often ask female councillors to raise issues affecting women such as domestic violence, in village councils.

In **Burundi**, the baseline survey (as reported in the ESR) suggested that the top three priorities that people wanted discussed by *colline* and *commune* councils were (in order of priority): housing, water and livestock. Respondents were asked what they thought the councils had discussed. The most common answer was that social justice issues were given top priority. The endline survey gave a similar mismatch between people’s top priority (housing) and what people thought was the top priority

²⁵ these are different from the figures in the baseline report I saw

of the councils (social justice). However, two out of the top three items that respondents thought the councils had discussed were the same as what they wanted to be discussed. In both the baseline survey and the endline survey, the answers were similar for all people pooled and for women and very poor disaggregated. Satisfaction with the *colline* and *commune* councils increased between the baseline and endline surveys.

As in Burundi, and following guidance from the Dublin office, the ESR for **Ethiopia** reports on critical issues the community wanted the *kebele* council to address (Table 11 in Endline Report) and the critical issues the *kebele* and *woreda* councils were thought to have addressed in the last six months (Table 12 in Endline Report). In the baseline survey (as reported in the ESR), the priorities respondents wanted the *woreda* council to address were food aid, livestock and agricultural inputs and what they thought had actually addressed were health, food aid and agricultural inputs. Two of the top three priorities thus corresponded with the top three issues that people thought had been discussed. During the endline survey, the top five priorities people wanted discussed were health, water, agriculture, food aid and roads whereas they thought what was actually discussed (in order) were roads, food aid, education, health and agriculture. There was no correspondence between the three top priorities that people wanted discussed and the three topics they thought had been discussed. With regard to satisfaction, 62% of beneficiaries thought the *woreda* council was good or very good (the percentage was a little higher, 65%, among non-beneficiaries). At one FGD, a group of women was asked if any of them had ever asked the *kebele* council to discuss an issue of concern to them. None of them had. Only one person in the group knew anyone who was a member of the council and that was only because he was a neighbour.

My conclusion is that priority issues of women and marginalised groups probably are now more addressed at the community level and within local government structures and that the OVI has been met.

Conclusions regarding the Specific Objective

The OVIs were not the best to measure progress towards the Specific Objective but allowing for the difficulties in assessing particularly OVI 1, the OVIs have been met to a substantial extent in all three countries and we can conclude that the project has made a significant contribution towards the Specific Objective, *“to improve livelihoods and empowerment of poor farmers in decentralised decision-making processes”* though probably more to the improved livelihoods part than the empowerment part of the objective.

Overall Objective

The overall objective was *“to contribute to the achievement of MDG1 and food security²⁶ in Tanzania, Ethiopia and Burundi”*. Considering the three Expected Results have been achieved to a large extent and that the project has made a significant contribution towards the achievement of the Specific Objective, I would conclude that the project has definitely contributed substantially to the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger in the three countries and therefore to the Overall Objective.

²⁶ since the 1st Millennium Development Goal is to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, “and food security” is superfluous

Evaluation according to Development Assistance Committee criteria

Relevance and quality of design

Relevance to policies and strategies

The project was submitted in response to a call for proposals under thematic programme “*Non-State Actors and Local Authorities in Development: Actions in partner countries (Multi-country)*”. The thematic programme focuses on “*strengthening the capacity of civil society organisations and local authorities as a pre-condition for a more equitable, open and democratic society through support to their “own initiatives”.*” The overarching objective of the programme is poverty reduction in the context of sustainable development. The goals are set out more fully in “*Thematic programme: Non-state actors and local authorities in development Strategy paper 2007-2010*”²⁷.

The specific objective of the call in 2008 to which this proposal was a response was “*to support actions presented by Non-State Actors which aim at promoting an inclusive and empowered society in partner countries. Those actions must have a global, multi-country character*”. The action was to adopt a multi-actor approach that aimed to:

- improve the capacity of Non-State Actors²⁸ from partner countries to engage in local, national and international decision making processes;
- improve linkages, partnerships and networking ... between Non-State Actors and Local Authorities from ... the partner countries ...;
- provide innovative service delivery and service delivery in difficult ... environments;
- facilitate interaction and exchanges between State and Non-State Actors in different contexts and
- reinforce the role of Non State Actors and Local Authorities in decentralisation processes.

The proposal also had to be consistent with Concern's strategies for the three countries and to its overall policies and goals. It was decided therefore to focus the project on the following outcomes: (i) strengthened local government, (ii) improved livelihoods through alternative sources of income, improved agriculture, and adding value to agricultural produce through processing, storage and marketing and (iii) encouraging their CSO partners to engage in forums involving government and non-government organisations in which they could contribute to the decision making processes. These outcomes, particularly the second, had a particular focus on the poor, women, the vulnerable, and the marginalised.

The proposal conformed with the national government strategies for eliminating poverty and to the EU's Country Strategies and National Indicative Programmes. These are discussed more fully in the Annexes. It can be concluded that the proposal was a good attempt at combining the aims of the call with Concerns strategies and aims and with the EC's national policies and strategies.

Proposal development

The call for proposals was distributed to regional directors in Asia and Africa and to desk officers in Dublin. I was told in an e-mail from Dublin that “*... there were some countries that had funding gaps and we tried to pick countries to work together where we could find some level of programme coherence*”. The three countries that were selected were Ethiopia, Tanzania and Burundi. No guidance from Dublin was provided about the formulation of the project other than the EC Guidelines. The three separate proposals were merged into one proposal in Dublin. There was a widespread opinion among staff in the three countries that the Tanzanian proposal had the largest influence on the composite proposal.

Although there were annual meetings for senior staff from the three countries, the separate identities continued during project implementation to the extent that they went under different names in the

²⁷ http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/civil-society/documents/nsa_la_strategy_paper_2007_2010_en.pdf

²⁸ NSAs

three countries: “Multi-Country” in Tanzania, “Farming Together” in Burundi and “Offa Livelihoods Project” in Ethiopia.

The agricultural and political context of Ethiopia is so different from the other two countries, that the scope for synergies was limited from the outset. Tanzania and Burundi have much more in common agriculturally. Also Tanzania’s and Burundi’s membership of the East Africa Community presented an opportunity to explore the potential for cross-border trade (though it was not exploited). The large distance between Ethiopia, on the one hand and Burundi and Tanzania on the other, meant that the opportunities for travel between the two countries were much more restrictive (than between Burundi and Tanzania) - and expensive.

Another difference between the three country components was the scale. In Ethiopia, the project was working in 10 *kebeles* with a total of 9,758 households; in Burundi there were 28,837 households in the 26 *collines* and in Tanzania, there were 49,237 households in the 70 project villages. In Tanzania the project operated in three widely separate regions and took several full days to travel from Mtwara in the south-east of the country to Kigoma in the north-west. Even within regions, it took up to three hours to reach some villages in Tanzania while in the other two countries the furthest parts of the project could be reached in less than an hour from the project office.

The following recommendations are offered:

- ❖ *if at all possible, future multi-country projects should work in contiguous countries;*
- ❖ *if possible, the locations worked in should be contiguous also (for example districts of Rwanda, Tanzania and Burundi with common borders);*
- ❖ *if cross-border trade is a component, they should if possible, belong to a common market;*
- ❖ *funding gaps should not be given undue weight;*
- ❖ *the proposed number of beneficiaries in each country should be of the same order of magnitude;*
- ❖ *there should be a single project proposal from the beginning developed by one person (by a staff member at the regional or international office or by a consultant) rather than merge several proposals together;*
- ❖ *clear guidelines on the joint logical framework, scope and budgets for the country components should be given by the proposal writer and then the component countries asked to submit a few paragraphs with some ideas of what the project might look like with a list of activities, budget and staff requirements that would be needed to achieve the Expected Results.*

Relevance to the local situations

The selection of the areas to work in were generally based on rational approaches, though in Ethiopia, there was some lack of clarity about the reasons for Concern’s first entry into the area and decision to stay there (originally because of a drought followed by famine and then later a decision was made to stay and help the area to recover). Even so, Wolaita is still recognised as one of the most food deficient parts of the country and the high population density means that farm areas are exceptionally low. Mtwara and Kigoma regions are among the poorest in Tanzania. The location in Iringa is partly because of Concern having had a presence there for over 30 years but the areas within the region were selected on the basis of poor soils and low rainfall. The difficulties of having the Tanzanian project located in three widely separated regions of the country are discussed in detail in Annex 1.

The two *communes* in northern Burundi selected (Busoni and Bugabira) were particularly identified in the Burundi Government Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper for 2006-2010²⁹ since the areas had had several years of low rainfall that led to particular problems of food insecurity.

Concern has had several projects with similar themes in each of the project areas for a number of years. The evaluations of and lessons learned from these informed the development of this project. In particular, all Concern projects in each of the countries involve all stakeholders (CSOs, government, CBOs and ordinary farmers and their families (including women, elderly, marginalized, and other vulnerable groups) in regular reviews of project progress and take their views into account in revising the approach of current projects and informing the design of forthcoming projects, including this one.

²⁹ *Burundi: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper*, IMF Country Report No. 07/46, February 2007. Since then, a second paper for 2011 to 2015 has been published (IMF Country Report No. 12/224, August 2012)

To avoid duplication the project proposal was discussed with other NGOs, both at stakeholder forums and on a one to one basis. Unfortunately this did not work well in Ethiopia as one NGO began to duplicate what the project had planned for two *kebeles*, and project activities in those two *kebeles* were mostly withdrawn as they were no longer relevant.

Quality of logical framework

Countries were sometimes reporting against country specific logical frameworks. This was not a good idea. It would have been better to have eliminated activities that were considered not to be appropriate (or to have inserted ones that were required) before the proposal was finalised. Each country could then have inserted sub-activities that were specific to each country. In Tanzania, where there were two EC-funded projects with similar components. The two logical frameworks were merged into one for a time and the two projects called the *“Integrated Livelihoods Project”*. Signboards with EC logos were made with that name. No boards for this project were seen in Tanzania.

Some OVIs were difficult to measure, some were too vague, some were Means of Verification (monitoring of government plans) or Activities (Exchange Visits) rather than OVIs. These are discussed more fully in Appendix 3. However there were OVIs that were not entirely relevant to some countries.

The Specific Objective and Expected Results 1 and 2 were not overly ambitious. However Expected Result 3 (*“increased involvement of non-state actors in key planning processes”*) was more relevant to Tanzania and, to a lesser extent, Burundi than to Ethiopia.

In Ethiopia, the 2nd OVI (*“priority issues of women and marginalised groups are increasingly addressed ...”*) for the Specific Objective was considered by project staff to be inappropriate because of the legislation in June 2011 which restricts NGOs becoming involved in democratic or women’s rights.

The 1st OVI for Expected Result 1 (*“strengthened local government ...”*) was that there would be *“regular joint monitoring by Concern and partners of progress against local government development plans in all 3 programme countries”*. This OVI was more appropriate to Tanzania than Ethiopia and Burundi as there is currently no mechanism for Concern or any other CSO to monitor government plans and expenditure even though CSOs do attend regular coordination meetings with the district governments.

The 2nd OVI (*“15% increase in the proportion of women’s representation in Community Level structures ...”*) for the 1st Expected Result was outside the projects control in Ethiopia as these proportions are set by legislation.

The 1st OVI for Expected Result 3 concerning increased attendance of CSOs in government planning was not really appropriate in Ethiopia or Burundi as there is not yet any mechanism whereby NGOs can contribute to government planning, though they do attend stakeholder meetings to coordinate activities.

Relevance of interventions and activities

The 2nd Activity for Expected Result 1 (*“strengthened local government ...”*) was *“training on land rights and registration”*. In **Burundi**, some training for government officials took place at *colline* and zonal levels in **Burundi**, and the project helped to delineate plots of land for landless Batwa households just outside the Murehe Forest Reserve though no certificates had been issued by the time of the evaluation. There was perceived to be a lack of commitment on the part of the government in **Burundi** and there was no further work on land rights. In **Ethiopia**, it was considered by project staff that this activity was not appropriate in the present context.

Presumably because decision making is already supposed to be decentralised, the final report for **Tanzania** simply says that the 4th Activity for Expected Result 1, to organise *“Exchange visits of local government representatives around the issue of decentralisation”* ...*“was not appropriate for Tanzania”* though visits were arranged around other topics.

For Expected Result 2, there was no activity for *“provision of inputs”* to target farmers (for example seeds, small livestock). This was an oversight. ER2 refers to *“diversified livelihoods for farmers through working with local institutions and the private sector”*. It could be argued that the provision of planting materials for crops that are normally grown is not really leading to diversification. However,

the provision of planting materials for new cash crops or improved varieties of existing food crops that could lead to marketable production surpluses may indeed lead to “diversified livelihoods”.

In **Ethiopia**, there was no training of the partners or any other CSOs on “*national laws and policies ... [about] opportunities for participation in key planning processes*”, mainly because opportunities are as yet very limited and so project staff thought this activity was inappropriate for Ethiopia (Activity 1 for Expected Result 3).

There were no specific interventions on the part of the project in Ethiopia to *build the capacity of kebele councils to monitor woreda performance* (Activity 2 of Expected Result 3). The woreda government claim they already have a transparent system in place.

Again in **Ethiopia**, there was little in the way of building “*awareness of the decentralisation process among citizens*”. Though it is government policy that *kebeles* are given more power to influence the plans being made by the woreda government, there were no direct interventions by Concern or WDA (apart from the visit of government staff to Tigre where decentralisation is more advanced). In **Burundi** too, opportunities are as yet limited and although some training did take place, there was little emphasis on it to avoid raising people’s expectations (Activity 3 for Expected Result 3).

The technical interventions and “sub-activities” were generally all very appropriate and relevant to the country generally and the project locations in particular. They helped to address core needs of poverty and hunger as well as contributing to the Specific Objective. The regular visits and mid-term evaluations by a consultant³⁰ helped greatly to ensure the project remained technically sound. In **Burundi**, the introduction of dairy cows, inseminated by AI was a high risk, though potentially high benefit innovation that will depend on further support from the government or another NGO for its continued success. The banana multiplication programme, rainwater-harvesting and greenhouse innovations in Burundi were adventurous but technically sound.

Selection of beneficiaries

The criteria by which specific villages/*collines*/*kebeles* were selected included (i) relative poverty – as assessed by Concern and partners together with the district government departments, (ii) logistics and (iii) receiving a positive response to initial discussions with village leaders. In Iringa (**Tanzania**) there was a requirement that villages had a registered CBO and in **Burundi**, that the *collines* had an established agricultural group. It was also required that there were no other NGOs working in the communities and no targeted projects by the governments.

In **Tanzania**, the selection of actual beneficiaries aimed to select the poorest (at least to start with) using wealth ranking. Each village was left to determine its own criteria and the beneficiaries were selected at village meetings based on these criteria. They were also asked to make provision for vulnerable people. The district government officials naturally say that everyone is poor so everyone should be targeted and this approach has sometimes brought about tensions. In practice, the degree to which this was implemented depended from area to area and on the partner who was guiding the communities. In some cases, beneficiaries were obviously not very poor or vulnerable (such as village chairmen). The beneficiary selection strategy that made provision for the very poor and vulnerable was strongest in Kigoma region.

In **Burundi**, the strategy was to work with pre-existing agricultural groups. These groups were generally people with very small farms or no land at all and were mostly but not entirely poor or very poor. To be able to manage a dairy cow, a farmer had to have more land and resources than average. The project formed new savings and credit groups who also were mostly self-selecting poor people.

In **Ethiopia**, the project asked *kebele* councils to select beneficiaries on the basis of wealth rankings but in one *kebele*, I was told the beneficiaries were selected on the basis of: (1) having land but no seed, (2) being a strong farmer but with no opportunity, (3) generally poor people. Of the 9,758 households in the 10 *kebeles*, 8,222 (84%) were selected as beneficiary households. This is more than one would expect. In Tanzania, 19% of households in project villages and in Burundi, 24% of households in project *collines* were targeted.

³⁰ Christopher Davey

Efficiency of Implementation

Quality of project management

The main comment here is that there was no overall coordinator for the three country components. Possibly one solution would have been for the coordinator to live in each country on a rotational basis with regular visits to the other countries. The absence of an overall coordinator was particularly noticeable when it came to the coordination and management of the baseline and endline studies.

- ❖ *It is recommended that in future multi-country projects, an overall coordinator is appointed and lives in one of the component countries (with frequent visits to the other countries) or lives in each on a rotational basis.*

The Assistant Country Directors responsible for Programmes (ACD-P) were all well qualified and experienced in development work. In Tanzania and Ethiopia, visits to the project were made about 6 times a year (in Tanzania twice to each of the three regions) while in Burundi, partly because of the ease of access to Bujumbura, visits were about 24 times a year.

The Concern project manager for **Tanzania** was based in Dar es Salaam and had an MSc in agriculture from Sokoine University. Because he was based in Dar es Salaam, the manager was able to visit each of the three regions only about five times a year for a few weeks each time. In the three regions, Concern had two or three Partner Support Officers (PSOs) who were mostly qualified to degree level (agriculture or community development related subjects) though some were qualified only to diploma level. In **Burundi** and **Ethiopia** the manager lived in the provincial / zonal administrative centre in which the project was located. All were experienced and well qualified in appropriate subjects.

Partner qualifications and experience varied greatly. Some (such as KIMAS and UPT in Tanzania) were quite weak especially in project management, even if they were sound in field work. Time spent in the field also varied widely. The Community Based Organisations (Irrigation Associations) in Iringa, Tanzania visited during the evaluation were particularly weak in management skills though they had the advantage (over CSOs) of being closer to the grass-roots and being more sustainable. Working with the district government as a formal implementing partner in Tanzania was found to be particularly difficult.

Managers, especially those located near the projects, had a good rapport with their staff and in each country there were regular team meetings both for the regional office staff and partners, and for specific components such as agriculture within the projects. In each country there were annual review meetings for the project with implementing staff and partners, M&E Coordinators (Tanzania and Ethiopia) and the ACD-P (Tanzania and Burundi).

In addition there were annual joint coordination meetings for senior staff from the three countries on a rotational basis. Partners normally attended only when the meeting was in their country. These meetings were used to discuss the logical framework, budgets, and monitoring and evaluation especially for the annual and endline surveys.

The national headquarters senior staff all maintained close links with Concern Worldwide in Dublin, which in turn communicated with the European Commission Delegation in Belgium as required. During the project, there were two visits to Burundi from the desk officer and from the agricultural advisor (Paul Wagstaff) in Dublin.

Concern has an effective internal complaints procedure in all countries though it was rarely used. Concern also has a comprehensive Programme Participant Protection Policy³¹ (P4) which is designed to protect both employees and beneficiaries from abuse. All staff and partners have to sign that they have received and read the policy. This document was finalised in May 2010 soon after the beginning of the project.

Quality of monitoring and evaluation system

The M&E systems in all three countries need to be improved. Specific recommendations are made in the last section of this main part of the report. In brief the issues are:

³¹ discussed in more detail under cross-cutting issues

- the need to have real-time information on all activities in all villages/*collines*/*kebeles* on computer in the Concern office as well as partner offices (including how many inputs were given to how many beneficiaries, how many people were trained on what topics);
- the need to avoid duplicate counting of beneficiaries (for example when the same beneficiary attends training on different occasions or when beneficiaries receive several types of inputs);
- the need to monitor possible multiplier effects such as seeds given to other people by farmers who were given a first allocation of seed, monitoring customers at warehouses, etc.
- more attention to investigating economic benefits of large infrastructure inputs;
- assessment of the impact of training by introducing simple multiple choice questions;

Several partners told me that they did not have copies of the project proposal or the logical framework. This should be rectified in future projects by ensuring all senior partner staff members have copies of these documents, especially when there are changes of staff.

In Kigoma, Tanzania there was a good system for monitoring partner field visits including: key issues, progress since last visit, financial information and action points. This was an excellent system though it was not clear if such a system was in operation in the other regions. A similar system would have been useful in all three countries. Ethiopia set up a good system of quarterly monitoring visits followed by an annual learning review.

The problems with the designs of the baseline and endline surveys are discussed in Appendix 3. Some of the survey reports indicate that there was a lack of understanding of the farming systems and how the household economy was managed and that the questionnaire was not adequately piloted by the person in charge of the analysis (Concern staff or consultant). Some of the data analyses were careless. The main problem was the difficulty of measuring some of the OVIs. Each country also had their own problems with measuring the OVIs and these are discussed in the Annexes.

The annual narrative reports and the six-monthly Results Oriented Monitoring Reports for the EC were submitted on time, were of a reasonably good quality and were sent to the appropriate recipients. The annual reports reported on progress towards Expected Results as well on activities.

Financial efficiency

The project in each country was audited externally annually by Deloitte³² (based in Kenya) though they never go to the field. In addition there are one or two internal audits per year which include site visits to check infrastructure costs such as buildings. Finance Officers also made frequent visits to the field to check on expenditure. Stores controls were subject to systems put in place by the internal auditors. The auditors (in Tanzania also with the Partner Finance Support Officer) undertake risk assessments of partners or potential partners and this was particularly important in Tanzania where mismanagement of funds by three partners (KIMAS, TCRS and the district government in Nanyumbu) was discovered and addressed. These events also had impacts on the amount and timing of project activities. Also in Tanzania, after visits from the internal auditor to undertake financial risk assessment of the irrigation groups in Iringa (partner CBOs), the constitution of one was revised in order to reduce risks.

Concern has strict protocols for tendering for goods and services. Tenders for over €10,000 are advertised. Stakeholders are present when tenders are opened and this group draws up a short list of three applicants based on value for money. The final decision is made by the Concern Purchasing Committee. For smaller purchases, quotations are obtained from suppliers and a decision is made by the Finance Officer together with the General Service Manager and a senior project staff member.

There was a budget revision in 2011. This was because of the evolving need for extra or different staff (e.g. the Value Chain and Markets Specialist in Tanzania), visibility and extra consultancy costs. In Tanzania, the introduction of Value Added Tax also caused some price increases. The budget modification for Ethiopia included an allocation for flights to Tanzania for four government representatives to travel to Tanzania for exchange visit around decentralization but was not used.

Co-financing (25%) was provided from Concern's General Donations fund and from Irish Aid's Multi-Annual Programme Scheme (MAPS) which has provided long-term, predictable and significant funding

³² I met the Deloitte auditor during the evaluation in Burundi

to Concern for some years. There were no problems experienced with co-financing. There were no overspends in budget lines outside the acceptable limits.

The final narrative report for Ethiopia states that the “*programme, in collaboration with the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) of the government has managed to overachieve the target by facilitating the rehabilitation ...*”. This implied that the government had contributed to the costs of land reclamation. Enquiries during the evaluation established that this misunderstanding was caused by the use of the term “*Productive Safety Net Programme*” by the project to apply to modalities and not to financial resources used by the programme.

Assets such as vehicles due to be handed over to national CSO partners either have been or were in the process of being prepared for transfer (Burundi).

In Ethiopia, the 2011 law that required NGOs to limit the administration part of their project budget to 30% has caused some inconvenience as the government classifies expenses (such as drivers) normally considered as implementation costs, as administration. The problem has been overcome by judicious re-categorisation of expenses.

In Ethiopia, two *kebeles* were dropped when an NGO started duplicating project activities. As the budget was for 10 *kebeles*, it would have been better if the two *kebeles* were replaced by another two.

The alpha-value³³ is not straight forward. Inputs and infrastructure made up around 31.5% of the total expenditure. These consisted mainly for agricultural and livestock inputs, processing equipment, buildings (land registries, warehouses, bridge) and equipment for government land offices in Tanzania. If one includes the direct costs of capacity building and training (including books), the proportion rises to 55%.

The total cost³⁴ of the project was €3,840,722 out of a budgeted amount of €4,018,449 (95.6%). My estimate is that there were between 19,000 and 20,000 targeted households that benefited from the project. This would work out at an overall cost of around €200 per targeted beneficiary household. This ignores the benefits to government departments, non-targeted households who also received training, non-targeted households who are members of groups formed by the project and indirect benefits such as the non-targeted customers of cooperatives and other groups involved in value added activities.

Cost efficiency

There was a general lack of cost-benefit analyses and market research for major infrastructure expenditure.

❖ *It is recommended that some training is given to project and M&E staff on cost-benefit analysis.*

In **Tanzania**, the processing equipment and centres were of a suitable standard, size and cost for the task and were an efficient use of funds. In the Annex on Tanzania I have questioned whether it was wise use a surveying system that requires an annual subscription. Travel costs were higher in magnitude and as a percentage of human resource costs compared to the other two countries illustrating the point made earlier about the widely spread regions in which Tanzania was working as well as the size of the country.

The use of agricultural groups in **Burundi** to bulk up seed and lead farmers to multiply bananas was a very cost effective approach to improving production. The sustainability (and therefore cost-effectiveness) of the widespread distribution of mosaic resistant cassava variety will depend to some extent on the degree of crop hygiene practiced. A cheaper alternative to the introduction of Jersey dairy cows that were then artificial inseminated (AI) may have been to upgrade the local cows gradually with Jersey semen. Another concern in Burundi was the cost of the research contract with ICRAF and ISABU (6% of the project cost in Burundi), especially as the final report was produced after the end of the project and of limited applicability.

In both **Burundi** and **Ethiopia**, the produce warehouses had never, so far, been more than about 30% full. The use may increase as knowledge of them grows but it depends on how far farmers are willing

³³ proportion of the project cost spend directly on beneficiaries

³⁴ provisional at time of writing

to transport produce usually by donkey cart. Some market research to determine the best capacity beforehand has been advised. The cost of the warehouses was similar in both Burundi (€19,463) and Ethiopia (€21,901).

Figure 1. Project component costs³⁵




Figure 1 gives a breakdown of project costs. The categories do not correspond exactly to the sub-headings in the budget. Inputs and infrastructure are costs for agricultural inputs and infrastructure (including the bridge in Ethiopia and the land registries in Tanzania) that went directly to the beneficiaries and this was what the project spent most on. The largest proportion (31%) of this item went on agricultural inputs (seeds, planting materials and a small amount on tools, fertilisers and pesticides). No agricultural inputs were provided in Tanzania. Almost 83% of inputs were spent in Burundi. The second largest item (19%) for inputs and infrastructure was for land reclamation (Ethiopia), rain-water harvesting (Ethiopia) and small-scale irrigation (all countries³⁶). The largest expenditure was in Ethiopia (76% of this item) and that was mostly on the land reclamation. Ignoring the four springs that were protected under this item, the cost was around €400 per hectare which seems rather high. Hopefully the produce from the reclaimed land will eventually justify the cost. The 3rd highest component was for livestock and veterinary supplies (18%) nearly all of which was spent in Burundi (mainly the Jersey cow scheme).

Training (23.5%) was the second highest item in the pie chart. Over half of the training budget went on decentralisation, district level planning and disaster risk reduction; the remainder on agriculture and livelihood diversification.


Figure 2 shows a comparison of costs for the three countries. Training was least in Ethiopia and slightly higher in Burundi than Tanzania. Research, inputs and infrastructure were highest in Burundi and least in Tanzania. Overall cost was highest in Burundi and the cost per beneficiary was least in

³⁵ Headings do not correspond exactly with budget headings

³⁶ Canals were improved in Tanzania and treadle pumps were distributed but there is no entry under this sub-heading in the accounts.

Tanzania. Cost per beneficiary was highest in Ethiopia. The costs for each sub-heading for each country were mostly within 15% of those budgeted (equipment costs for Tanzania was 26% less than planned as surveying equipment from a previous project was reused). The reason for the high cost per beneficiary in Ethiopia was that the number of actual beneficiaries was considerably less than the number of targeted beneficiaries.

Figure 2. Comparison of component costs in each country



Timeliness

The project in Tanzania got off to a quick start as all the staff members were already in place working on the Food Facility project. In Burundi, the project started about 3 months late, mainly due to recruitment delays. The last community development worker was not recruited until August 2010. The project in Ethiopia was about 5 months late starting because of partner's recruitment delays and the need to establish an office in Offa.

Staff turnover in Tanzania was high for both Concern project staff and partners for common reasons (better salaries, wanting to be in the capital or nearer family). In Ethiopia, all the WDA community development workers left in their first year after disputes over salaries. Most staff in Burundi stayed for the duration of the project.

Payments from EC to Concern and from Concern to partners were made mostly without undue delays though some partners complained of short delays at the beginning of the project.

Inputs were mostly delivered on time but KIMAS (Tanzania) complained that supplies of seeds were commonly late throughout the project though not all the time. The project in Tanzania was often frustrated by delays in having funds released from district council bank accounts to the land offices and this caused some delays to the construction/improvement of the land registries and in Mtwara, there were particular problems because of the delays in completing the district level offices that would house the district land registry. These delays had a knock-on effect in delaying the construction / improvement of the village level registries. In Burundi, there were delays in the procurement of the Jersey cows to the extent that the number had to be reduced because of price changes and elections

in Tanzania meant the visit from Burundi government and CSOs was delayed until the following year. Support to the cooperatives in Ethiopia was started far too late in the project cycle.

There was a 3½ month no-cost extension to the project as Burundi wanted their endline survey to be done after the main harvest as the baseline was.

Quality of inputs and outputs

Most of the inputs were of high quality: seeds and other planting materials, tools, processing machinery. The quality of training materials seen was generally acceptable. It is noted that most of the training to improve government capacity was provided by more senior government officials (with sufficient inducements). There were few ideas introduced from outside the government system.

One sunflower processor in Kigoma had exhaust fumes coming into the working area but members said they would remedy this. The canals seen in Tanzania were not constructed to a very high standard and there were leaks in the structures seen. Lack of proper supervision by the government district engineer was the main contributing factor. The warehouses in Burundi and Ethiopia were built to very high standards.

Institutions developed such as processing and produce storage groups were of acceptable quality and have been trained in business skills and the management of cooperatives. Some groups in Burundi were charging quite high interest rates (60 to 120%) on loans to members and though profits are shared by the members, the rates may need readjusting. In Ethiopia, the Fruit and Vegetable Marketing Cooperative is very weak owing to the project's late start to capacity building.

Knowledge and skills gained from training are as much an output as physical structures. The outcome of training, for example by setting simple multiple-choice tests, was never tested in any of the countries. This would not be appropriate for most practical training for example of farmers when the impact of training can be seen by how well they implement the practices learned. However for topics like land registration, human rights and similar topics, a test would be more appropriate.

- ❖ *It is recommended that a simple multiple-choice test after training of beneficiaries be used whenever appropriate to test what those attending the training have learned.*

In the main, recommendations made by the technical consultant were acted on.

Methodology

The project has worked with three categories of formal project partners: Civil Society Organisations in all three countries and with Community Based Organisations and district governments in Tanzania. In general, the CSOs were easiest to work with. Working with the government in Tanzania was often frustrating and it was concluded that the best method was to use them on an "as needed" and not to channel project funds through district government bank accounts.

Concern senior management generally were members of forums of NGOs and this helped to avoid duplication. However, the system broke down in Ethiopia where an NGO started duplicating project activities in two of the 10 kebeles.

The EC desk officer responsible for the project (based in Tanzania) visited the project only once - in Tanzania, and to only one region out of the three - Mtwara. There were no visits to the other two countries. No field visit report was written. However in 2012, very short Monitoring Reports were written for Tanzania and Burundi by a consultant under contract to the EC. Recommendations were minimal but those given were acted on. The lack of adequate supervision by the EC is a major criticism. It has been brought about by the fact that the EC do not seem to be geared up to supervising development projects in more than one country. Adequate resources need to be allocated to the EC desk officer responsible to facilitate visits to all the countries each year. There has to be clarity in the host country EC offices as to who is responsible.

- ❖ *It is strongly recommended that the EC examine its procedures for supervising development projects in more than one country.*

The regular technical reports (as well as the mid-term evaluation) provided by Christopher Davey were of excellent quality and of great use to project staff. Most points he raised were adequately acted on.

There is a general lack of the use of maps in all three countries to help with village land use plans, irrigation maintenance, and project logistics.

- ❖ *It is recommended that more use of maps is made for planning and management purposes - for example irrigation groups should have a map of the irrigated area and the plots within it.*

Relationship with local stakeholders

Concern relationships with their CSO, CBO and government partners have been generally good though the financial difficulties with some CSOs and the government in Tanzania are noted. They had no major complaints about the project other than relative minor issues such as short delays in supplies and the effects of budget revisions on their inputs. The project worked closely with village/*kebele*/*colline* governments, district/*commune*/*woreda* governments and in Burundi, with the provincial government and to a lesser extent, national level government officials. All the government officials I met spoke very highly of Concern, of their partners and of the impact of the project on the government capacity and on the livelihoods of the beneficiaries.

One issue that did come up was that government staff members contributing to the project (and attending workshops) were given Concern DSAs in Tanzania, partner DSA rates in Ethiopia, and government DSA rates in Burundi. This issue needs to be resolved, preferably with other NGOs. Not only rates should be considered but also the conditions. For example in Tanzania, government people were given a lunch allowance if they were out of station all day. In Ethiopia, they were given DSAs for visiting a cooperative a few hundred metres from their office. In Burundi, one government official, an expert on artificial insemination at the National AI Centre refused to help without being employed as a consultant. There needs to be a general discussion about the level of assistance government staff should be expected to contribute without inducements.

Access

In **Tanzania**, the main issue with access was the distance between the project regions. Weather affected access to project sites only rarely for a few days in the rainy seasons. On the road between Mwanza and Kibondo there are sometimes armed robberies and this has sometimes meant that staff from central office were asked to cancel travel. Kibondo staff members sometimes were prevented from staying in an area because of security concerns. Staff sometimes avoided visiting some places on market days. Internet access in all the regional offices was good. Senior staff members are provided with mobile phones and junior staff members receive a monthly credit.

In **Burundi**, at the beginning of the project, internet access by landline was slow. Wireless broadband was installed in the Kirundo office in 2011 which was a major improvement. Road access was not a problem.

In **Ethiopia**, four *kebeles* were inaccessible this year (2013) between May and October and in previous years for at least 3 months. Internet access in the Concern and WDA offices was acceptable.

Effectiveness

Achievement of results and objectives

The activities in the logical framework were generally implemented. However:

- for justifiable reasons, training on land rights was not done in either Burundi or Ethiopia (page 5);
- visits around decentralisation were not organised in Tanzania and only in Burundi were external visits arranged (page 6);
- there were no community seed storage facilities developed in Tanzania (page 8);
- market linkages were rather weak in all countries, mainly depending on private businessmen to collect produce;
- there was no group crop processing developed in Ethiopia (page 10);
- there was little awareness building on opportunities for CSOs to participate in planning (as opposed to coordination) (page 11);
- there was no attempt in Ethiopia to build capacity of *kebeles* to monitor *woreda* plan implementation (page 11)

- the awareness building about decentralisation policies was weak in Burundi and not done in Ethiopia (11).

The activities implemented contributed towards the achievement of the results and objectives. A full analysis of these is given in the first section. Below is a summary:

Expected Result 1:

“strengthened local government structures to manage, regulate and coordinate local development”.

Although not all OVIs have been met fully in all the three countries, there can be no doubt the project has made a substantial contribution towards the result. Capacity of local government has been improved in all three countries as village district and to a lesser extent provincial levels. Training and visits were appreciated and there are now working disaster risk reduction systems down to village level in all three countries.

Expected Result 2:

“diversified livelihoods for farmers through working with local institutions and the private sector”.

The emphasis of the project was increasing agricultural productivity and the diversity of crops grown which has contributed somewhat towards diversified livelihoods. Groups established around crop processing (mainly Tanzania but also Burundi), produce storage and marketing (mainly Burundi but also Ethiopia), and smaller enterprises such as honey production and pottery/ stove production have improved the living standards of members considerably. In all three countries, the savings and credit groups have helped a relatively small number of people start small businesses. The project has contributed to diversified livelihoods in all three countries but there could have been more emphasis on processing, especially in Ethiopia and Burundi and to non-agriculturally based livelihoods in all three countries. Market links with private sector were not strong in any of the countries.

Expected Result 3:

“increased involvement of non-state actors in key planning processes”.

CSO partners have increased their involvement in government planning but to a greater extent in Tanzania. Involvement of the CBOs in Iringa and Kilolo (Tanzania) in district planning has been minimal though they are involved at a local level. There were no examples of the private sector becoming involved in government planning.

Specific Objective: *“to improve livelihoods and empowerment of poor farmers in decentralised decision-making processes”.*

The Specific Objective has been achieved in that livelihoods have been improved for poor farmers, women and vulnerable and their concerns are now taken into account more in village/colline/kebele councils and to some extent therefore, at district/commune/woreda/ levels also. The degree to which the poor have been “empowered” varies from country to country, being greatest in Tanzania and weakest in Ethiopia.

Overall objective: *“to contribute to the achievement of MDG1 and food security in Tanzania, Ethiopia and Burundi”.*

The project in all three has contributed to the overall objective to a substantial extent.

Assumptions and Risks

The main mistake was to assume the governments in Burundi and Ethiopia would be committed to the decentralisation of the planning (and thus budgeting) process which was perhaps over-optimistic at this time. The assumptions that the governments would be committed to implementing land registration legislation and that the East African Community would ensure that cross-border trade would be facilitated for ordinary farmers were not stated.

There is also an assumption that *“Local authorities will not block civil society's participation in local governance issues”* which in view of the 2011 legislation in Ethiopia prohibiting most NGOs from becoming involved in governance and democratic rights issues was also over-optimistic.

Coordination with other development actors

Project staff in Tanzania participated in regional networks in Mtwara and Kigoma. The forums ensured NGOs were not duplicating efforts and were a useful means of networking, for example by hearing about other projects that could help this one (page 107).

The main means of coordination in **Burundi** with other NGOs locally was through the regular provincial and *commune* level “Focal Point” (Stakeholder) meetings to which Concern and other NGOs active in the area are invited to meet with relevant government departments.

Coordination with other NGOs in **Ethiopia** was meant to be through the annual GO-NGO forums at *woreda*, zonal and state levels. They are meant to avoid duplication but for this project, the *woreda* forum did not function properly since one NGO that was originally going to implement only irrigation in which this project was working, and then started to expand its activities so that it began to overlap with this project’s activities. As a result, Concern stopped working in the two *kebeles* apart from providing training.

Visibility

Visibility accounted for only 0.6% of the overall budget. In all three countries, the project produced several leaflets on different topics. They had the EC logo but no wording to explain that the logo belonged to the European Community and no explanation that the EC was the main source of funding for this project.

Signage on infrastructure (canals, buildings) in Ethiopia and Tanzania also did not have adequate signage. Boards in Burundi were rather better with an explanation of the source of funds. In Tanzania I was told one problem was the difficulty of obtaining the correct colour paint.

I am not aware of any press or media releases about the project though project staff members were asked. There were no web sites apart from the central one controlled in Dublin which did have a reference to the start of the project with due reference to the EU³⁷.

- ❖ *For permanent structures, use permanent plaques made of stone (such as marble) or concrete with the inscriptions (and logo) carved into surface and painted. Only use rust resistant metal (aluminium) if the asset is of a temporary nature (Farmer Field Schools for example).*
- ❖ *for future projects, a senior Concern officer (Compliance Officer?) ensures that staff members are given copies of the EC Communication and Visibility Manual³⁸ and instructed on how to use it.*

Impact

When similar projects have been implemented in the same area before a project such as this, it is quite difficult to separate out the impacts of one project from another as sometimes projects may have delayed benefits. In Tanzania there were two similar projects going on at the same time in the same place for some months.

Beneficiaries

Table 6 gives estimates of those who have benefited from Expected Result 2 activities (diversified livelihoods). The estimates are mine and do not necessarily agree with those given in final narrative reports. Some households benefited from “increased access to land”. These included:

- 5,212 households issued with land certificates in Tanzania;
- 674 Batwa households settled on land near the Murehe Forest Reserve in Burundi;
- 154 members of Forest Cooperatives using reclaimed land communally in Ethiopia.

The land certificates in Tanzania did not increase the land being cultivated, only the security of tenure. The members of the Forest Cooperatives in Ethiopia were existing farmers. Cultivated land area was increased but not the number of beneficiaries. In Ethiopia, the Woyo bridge benefited an extra 3,690 households of the nearby *kebeles* that were not part of the project and the spring protection benefited around 1,500 households in project *kebeles*.

³⁷ <https://www.concern.net/news-blogs/concern-blog/three-year-grant-agriculture-programme>

³⁸ http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/work/visibility/index_en.htm

The total number of direct beneficiaries is about 20,000. Almost all households in the selected villages/*collines/kebeles* will benefit from some of the awareness building, for example on land registration, decentralization, HIV, women's rights, etc. as well the disaster risk reduction committees, and facilities such as the Woyo bridge and the spring protection in Ethiopia. These secondary beneficiaries were 88,000 households. As the capacity of the district governments have been improved as a result of project activities, the tertiary beneficiaries would amount to just over 450,000 households.

Table 6. Estimates of beneficiaries in each country

Category	Tanzania	Burundi	Ethiopia	Total
Households in project districts/ <i>communes/woreda</i>	369,143	59,518	21,842	450,503
Households in target villages/ <i>collines/kebeles</i>	49,237	28,837	9,758	87,832
Targeted households	9,329	7,867	8,222	25,418
Attending FFS ³⁹ , beneficiaries of irrigation not in FFS, members of agricultural groups ⁴⁰ , or those receiving planting material ⁴¹	7,175 ⁴²	6,900	2,300	9,200
Members of processing, producer, produce storage groups not included in above	100	815	450	1365
Savings and credit groups not included in above	550	540	220	1310
Number settled on new land and not included above	-	674	-	674
Approximate total of direct beneficiary households	7,825	8,930	3,000	19,755

In addition to these beneficiaries there are many groups, government departments, and disaster risk reduction committees that have established or benefited from capacity building. Table 7 summarises these.

Table 7. Groups and governments that have been trained and strengthened

Category	Tanzania	Burundi	Ethiopia	TOTAL
District governments	8	2	1	11
Partner CSOs	4	1	1	6
Collaborator CSOs	1	2 ⁴³	0	3
Partner Community Based Organisations	4	0	0	4
Village/ <i>colline/kebele</i> councils	70	53 ⁴⁴	26	149
Village/ <i>colline/kebele</i> councils DRR committees	70	53	26	149
District/ <i>commune/woreda</i> DRR committees	0	2	0	2
Agricultural groups	0	222	0	222
Processing groups	13	1	0	14
Savings and credit groups	21	23	10	54
Produce warehouse / marketing groups	1	8	2	11
Honey producer groups	0	8	1	9
Forest Conservation Cooperatives	0	0	3	3
Manufacturing groups	0	4	0	4
Seed producer groups	13	0	0	13
Irrigation groups (not processing rice)	2	0	0	2
Vegetable and market garden groups	220	12 ⁴⁵	0	232

³⁹ In Tanzania, I have taken the number of FFS groups and multiplied by 30, the nominal number of members of FFS

⁴⁰ Burundi

⁴¹ Ethiopia, this number was more than the number of farmers trained that WDA supplied me with

⁴² An estimated 6,990 farmers in FFS and 185 famers who benefited from irrigation.

⁴³ Two branches of COSC at *commune* level and one branch at province level were strengthened but I have counted it as one organisation

⁴⁴ Training was carried in more than the project *collines*

⁴⁵ Rain-water harvesting groups

Impact of the project on beneficiaries

The project has contributed substantially towards improved crop production, food security and increased household income. Women feel more empowered and AIDS victims and Batwa pygmies less stigmatised. These impacts are likely to be felt not just by beneficiaries but also by the wider society through example and sharing of information.

The various groups summarised in Table 7 will benefit not only their members but also their customers, the businessmen who buy the produce and the wider public that consume the products. In Burundi, the seed bulking and banana multiplication work has the potential to benefit a much wider population than the initial beneficiaries within a few years.

CSO partners in each of the countries have been considerably strengthened though a lot remains to be done (until they can successfully apply unaided for international funding and successfully manage the resulting project without an international NGO to help). In Tanzania, the CBO partners now have a good management structure with a low risk of financial misconduct. They have had good training in management and marketing though they still need to gain confidence in marketing.

There were no unintended results apart from the unexpected observation that joint registration of land in Tanzania helped to stabilise marriages. A full discussion of the degree of achievement of the Expected Results is given in the first part of this report.

Uniformity of impact

In Burundi and Tanzania, the impact on the government and on farming families was fairly evenly spread across the project areas. In Ethiopia, there were four *kebeles* that were inaccessible for 3 or 4 months of the year and so project impact in those areas would have been substantially less than elsewhere.

Effect on local government and leaders

All the district/*commune/woreda* and village/*colline/kebele* government officials interviewed during the evaluation were very positive about the project and said they had benefited from the training they received. They generally believed their management capacity and leadership skills had been improved and some even said their job prospects had been enhanced.

In **Tanzania**, the project has reinforced the government's policy of decentralisation and in general, district officials appear to be more committed to the policy than they were initially. The training has helped them to better plan according to people's needs and generally they are now more committed to decentralised planning and to taking the views of farmers and their families into account when formulating village development plans. Villagers now have a greater say in village level decision making and the concerns of women and other marginalised groups are taken into consideration to a greater extent. The impact on decentralised decision making was less in the other countries but not insignificant. In all countries, there remain some frustrations at village level that their plans are not taken seriously enough upstream from the village/*colline/kebele*.

According to Concern staff, some individual government officials have changed their attitudes to work and helping the poor, but this is not uniform across the project areas or countries. Government officers generally receive low salaries compared to their counterparts in NGOs or the private sector. Many lack motivation. One issue that might be discussed is how to encourage government officials to be more motivated, committed and pro-active in fulfilling their duties.

❖ *It is recommended that Concern give serious thought to this issue and builds non-financial motivation strategies for government staff into their projects.*

Dissemination

The Burundi experience with rainwater harvesting was presented to the International Technical Natural Resource Management workshop held in India in 2011. The rainwater harvesting methodology and climate analogue software developed by ICRAF, ISABU and Concern is part of a recent proposal submission to DFID UK.

The Quality Declared Seed scheme in Tanzania was a successful way of ensuring improved seed after the end of the project. Concern is planning to replicate the method in Zambia in 2014.

Also in Tanzania, the project attracted many people to visit Iringa district to learn from Concern's experience on the issuance of CCROs and the capacity building of the district land offices.

Sustainability

Continuation after end of project funding

Decentralisation

In **Tanzania**, the decentralisation process, including increased influence of village councils on district level planning, will continue to gain momentum, not least because the central government supports this process. Women and other vulnerable groups are increasingly making their voice heard in local institutions. ANSAF will continue to ensure government transparency in Tanzania improves. The governments in **Burundi** and **Ethiopia** are, in theory, also committed to decentralisation. The project has helped to move the process along, but it will take some years before *colline* and *kebele* councils have a real impact on government planning.

Land registration

In **Tanzania**, the momentum in land registration achieved during the project inevitably will decline as a result of cessation of the extra funding. However, people increasingly are prepared to pay the small amount of money required for the district land offices to undertake land registration, independently of central funding. The land office may need to be content with a lower level of accuracy unless funds can be found to keep up the Omnistar subscriptions. In the other two countries, land registration is possible in theory. Hopefully, the Batwa settlers in **Burundi** will eventually obtain their certificates and this may encourage others, but they will need help to pursue their case. Land certification is possible in **Ethiopia** but the project staff believed it was not feasible in the project area.

Disaster risk reduction

The Disaster Risk Reduction systems are well established in the three countries at village/*colline*/*kebele* levels and have strong links with the district/*commune*/*woreda* focal points. The system in **Burundi** seemed the best organised with dedicated government staff (Civil Protection). More training on how to respond in an emergency is needed for some groups. In **Ethiopia**, there is a danger of collecting so much information that the focal points do not analyse it adequately as they are understaffed.

Crop production methods

Farmers who have adopted improved methods will continue with them as long as they remain convinced that the methods contribute to improved yields. Use of fertiliser is very much linked to government policies on subsidised inputs.

Irrigation groups (**Tanzania** and **Ethiopia**) have had training in group management and business skills but they seemed to be too dependent on the government or NGOs to make improvements or do much maintenance work themselves. The only answer to this is to introduce a system of charging for water which is a very politically sensitive subject.

It is early days to assess the sustainability and replicability of the rainwater harvesting systems, greenhouses and drip irrigation in **Burundi**. One leader farmer replicated the rainwater harvesting system himself in a simplified way. Other farmers expressed interest in collecting money within their associations to purchase materials to replicate the system. The established groups will continue to function if they can occasionally obtain some technical support.

Seed and planting material supply

Increased production as a result of farmers growing improved varieties should be sustainable in the short term. The Quality Declared Seed scheme in Tanzania will go a long way to ensuring a good supply of improved varieties for some important crops. The scheme depends on the continued capacity of the Tanzania Official Seed Certification Institute. Mosaic tolerance in cassava may decline if farmers fail to produce quality clean cuttings. Farmers bulking up seed (**Tanzania** and **Burundi**) and multiplying bananas in Burundi will need to refresh their genetic material after 3 to 5 years depending on the crop, but they are well aware of that and seem capable of obtaining fresh supplies.

Continued growing of crops introduced by the project will depend to a large extent on the market and, as seen in **Ethiopia** with the ginger initiative, on there being no major disease or pest attacks.

Livestock

The genetic advantages of the improved goats and poultry introductions may eventually be lost by uncontrolled mating.

Extension workers

The continuation of the voluntary paraprofessionals in Tanzania will depend to some extent on their being able to earn some income. They already charge for vaccinations (for NCD). Some QDS farmers pay paraprofessionals for visits and a processing group in Mtwara pay the paraprofessional every time he visits the group farm. Even if village governments cannot find funds to pay them, many will continue in their work. Most are highly motivated. The performance related bonus scheme in Burundi is not sustainable without financial support from an outside agency. In **Ethiopia**, the continuation of *kebele* extension agents will depend on the national economic situation. They will definitely continue for the foreseeable future.

Crop processing and warehouse groups

The processing groups in **Tanzania** and **Burundi** and the warehouse groups in **Burundi** and **Ethiopia** have been well trained in business management. There is a good demand for their produce and they stand every chance of continuing. Most have had cash injections from the project for start-up capital. They have had training in financial management including concepts such as depreciation and the need to set aside money for replacements and maintenance. Hopefully there will be sufficient social auditing to avoid mishandling of funds. Most have been building up a healthy reserve of savings to draw on. Most groups interviewed knew the cost of their equipment and were confident that when the time came, they would be able to replace the equipment either from accumulated cash or by obtaining a loan – and that there may not be an NGO to help them. The district/*commune* governments in **Burundi** and **Tanzania** are committed to making the groups successful. The registration of the cooperatives with the governments will contribute to ensuring sustainability.

Savings and Credit schemes

The savings and credit groups in all three countries seem to be strong. They all use rather different models and not all are registered cooperatives, notably the VICOBAs in Tanzania and the SILCs in Burundi. A separate evaluation of the different models in a few years time would be a useful contribution to Concern's strategy development.

Level of participation

The beneficiaries were supportive of and appreciated the project activities. The members of processing, warehouse and savings & credit groups definitely have a sense of ownership and have made financial commitments to them. Village registries in Tanzania will continue to be used for their allocated purpose.

Environmental sustainability

There are no environmental sustainability issues other than the need to properly maintain soil conservation structures such as terraces and check dams in **Ethiopia** and **Burundi**. Both countries need to do more to encourage farmers to adopt more soil conservation on private farms.

Role of private sector

The involvement of the private sector has been rather disappointing in that there have been few links made with large companies. In **Ethiopia**, the Damota Cooperative Union in Sodo will continue to be an important link for the cooperatives in Offa and will contribute to their sustainability. Individual businessmen will continue to come to processing groups and warehouses outside the immediate area as long as they can offer produce at competitive prices.

Exit strategy

The project has not increased dependency on outside intervention. However it did not have a well defined (and written) exit strategy in any of the countries.

Cross cutting issues

General comments

In **Tanzania**, project expertise in mainstreaming of HIV/AIDS and gender equality in agriculture programmes was strengthened by networking with various NGOs. Mainstreaming of gender and equality firstly focused on increasing awareness among staff, CSO partners and local government. Staff were trained in Iringa at the end of 2011 on human rights, gender issues and equality. After training in Iringa, some regional staff were mandated as their area focal point. The existing gender/equality manual was adapted to incorporate the human rights training. The designated staff or partners then held meetings in villages, one by one, usually attended by around 300 people (mostly men). In Kibondo, the HIV infected woman paraprofessional is a good example of what both a woman and an HIV victim can contribute to a project like this. The kitchen gardening component was promoted especially for vulnerable people such as those living with HIV/AIDS and the elderly.

In **Burundi**, COSC has been active in sensitisation in the area of human rights, discrimination and gender equality at zonal levels in the project area and APECOS, the project partner has also done excellent work especially on AIDS, gender issues, family planning and hygiene (especially the use of latrines and sexual health). APECOS also lobbied for vulnerable children and strengthening and improving of Child Protection Committees' knowledge of relevant laws.

WDA in **Ethiopia** led short discussions on topics covering gender, HIV and family planning. The latter was a particular focus because of the high population and therefore small farm size in the area. However, the project staff felt restricted by the government legislation in June 2011 that forbids NGOs working on women's rights, human rights, land rights, governance, or advocacy unless specifically registered for that purpose.

Communities in all three countries have been encouraged to make themselves responsible in helping vulnerable peoples through developing community action plans and community support mechanisms. Though not perfect, some groups established by the project have tried to engage with the question of how the vulnerable could be helped, for example by offering free crop processing or storage services.

Despite the excellent achievements, there seems to be still a need to work out how the all that plus the needs of the very poor and other vulnerable groups such as women, children, the elderly and disabled can be actualised in project activities, such as processing and warehouse groups, savings and credit groups, etc. Groups need more guidance (without being prescriptive) rather than being left to work out models for themselves.

❖ *I suggest that senior project staff and HQ senior management organise a day to discuss how project activities can better integrate Concern's focus on very poor and vulnerable and other issues such as human rights, equality, gender, discrimination (e.g. against Batwa or AIDS sufferers), HIV/AIDS by trying to imagine how the ideal group would work if these issues were part of the groups ethos if not their constitution.*

The project has mainstreamed a wide range of cross-cutting issues and these contributed significantly towards the success of the project. The following is a summary of the impact the project has had in specific cross-cutting areas.

Environmental concerns

The project in **Tanzania** did not specifically address environmental issues except for a small amount of water source protection and tree planting in Masasi and Nanyundu. The village land committees that complement the land tribunals (or in some cases combined with them) have a great potential for addressing environmental issues in future projects.

In **Burundi**, the settlement of the Batwa households outside the Murehe Forest Reserve contributed to the conservation of the forest reserve. The workshop organised by the project on different models of protected area governance resulted in the production of an agreed document for the management of the reserve. On-farm soil conservation work encouraged by the project has contributed to

environmental protection. If multiplied, the work would have an impact on conservation of the lakes also.

In **Ethiopia**, the reclamation of the 329 ha of badly eroded common land and bringing it into productive use under the management of Forest Conservation Committees has made a positive contribution to the environmental.

Empowerment of beneficiaries

The project specifically aimed to increase the empowerment of poor farmers and their families, women and the vulnerable such as the elderly, disabled and AIDS sufferers and this has been achieved to a greater or lesser degree across the three countries. Furthermore, the beneficiaries have been economically empowered as well as politically, because increased incomes have improved access to education and medical services.

Gender equality

One of the indicators of the project purpose is about having the priority issues of women being increasingly addressed at the community level and within local government structures. However, paradoxically there was no single activity in the Logical Framework on the enhancement of gender equality or supporting the empowerment of women. The project management teams in **Tanzania** and **Burundi** realized this early on and included specific community and institutional training on gender.

The project has contributed significantly to increased awareness and attention to the needs of women particularly at the village and *colline* levels in **Tanzania** and **Burundi**. Though women were not singled out for capacity building or skills enhancement, they were not discriminated against and took part in a wide range of training from agriculture to processing group management and are active in group management. The involvement of women contributed greatly to the success of the various groups (for one thing we were told they are more trusted to handle money than men).

In **Tanzania**, project staff reminded Village Councils that the councils were supposed to be 50% women. Gender equality has been discussed at FFS. Issues such as GBV do not seem to have been specifically addressed. Training on gender has made a difference to behaviour. More women now contest village council seats and there are more female Village Executive Officers than previously.

In **Burundi**, the project organised workshops for women on GBV. Women often now go to the police though they sometimes do not take any action because of corruption. Gender committees were set up at *colline* level where issues such as GBV are discussed. With support from APECOS, women organised meetings to discuss women's issues.

The June 2011 legislation in **Ethiopia** that limited the extent to which NGOs could engage in human rights and gender issues meant the project had minimal impact on gender equality in **Ethiopia**, though there were some talks on gender issues led by WDA. Women increasingly have a greater say over their household income. Some water committees have women members. Women's literacy rate is very low in the area and this is something the project might have considered as contributing practically towards empowerment.

Human rights and advocacy

In **Tanzania**, most of the village leaders had training on human rights and was said to have been incorporated into village meetings though some people interviewed could not remember hearing human rights mentioned. In the Mtwara villages (partner UPT) there were lists of the two trained Human Rights Watch members for all the UPT villages. Signs about human rights have been put up in some villages. Human rights advocacy groups and partner CSOs conducted awareness meetings on the right to land, the right to food and the right to participation in development programme processes.

In **Burundi**, COSC, though not a formal project partner, worked in very close collaboration with the project. They organised a monthly forum on human rights between CSOs and government at provincial level. Concern organised training on advocacy, lobbying, democratic principles and organisational management for COSC.

Because of the legislation of June 2011 in **Ethiopia**, there was little impact.

Democracy and governance

Matters related to governance are to some extent addressed under Expected Results one and three on strengthening district level authorities and increased involvement of non-state actors in key planning processes.

The revival and encouragement of the QVGAMs in **Tanzania** has meant that the views of villagers are now taken into account by village councils more than they did. Issues such as informing people how they can contribute towards village development plans have often been covered during FFS. 800 booklets on democratic governance ("*Utawala wa Kidemokrasia*") were distributed to the community and village officials. ANSAF has a specific mandate to improve government transparency and governance.

Because of the legislation of June 2011, there was little impact in **Ethiopia**.

Disaster Risk Reduction

That village and district level DRR systems were created or enhanced was specifically included as an activity and as an indicator for "*... strengthened local government ...*". There is now a system in place in all the project villages/*collines*/*kebeles* though it still needs work on. The project has also strengthened district and *woreda* DRR focal points in Tanzania and Ethiopia and in Burundi *commune* committees that did not exist before were established.

In both **Tanzania** (Iringa, 2010/11) and **Burundi** (2012), Concern helped the local government to cope with severe droughts by contributing to the mobilising of national and international assistance.

HIV

In **Tanzania**, there has been training on HIV in most project villages. Some partners have made specific efforts to integrate those suffering HIV/AIDS into the project. All groups said they would not discriminate against people with HIV/AIDS though attitudes are generally more conservative in the south. In Kibondo, although people with AIDS were formerly stigmatised, attitudes have changed over recent years. In **Burundi**, APECOS did training on HIV and hygiene at *colline* level and established HIV clubs in 10 of the 26 project *collines*. The average membership was 25. The clubs put on youth dramas. In **Ethiopia**, some training on HIV was carried out by WDA at the land reclamation sites.

Discrimination

Racial and sexuality equality have not been directly addressed. Tribalism is not a problem in Tanzania or, within the project area, in **Ethiopia**. Formerly, the Batwa pygmies in **Burundi** were discriminated against but now the situation is improving though there are still no representatives on *colline* or *commune* level councils even though several Batwa had stood for election.

Conflict management

The land tribunals in **Tanzania** that were supported by the project made a direct contribution to the resolution of conflicts. However, there were frequent complaints during the evaluation about conflicts with pastoralists who allowed their animals onto cropped land at inconvenient times. Village governments usually had not addressed the issue and neither had the project though staff had had training on conflict management.

The project in **Burundi** trained government officials and police at *commune* level in conflict management. There was also training on GBV.

In **Ethiopia**, the main is GBV but the project staff felt it could not address it.

Concern Worldwide policies and guidelines

The following comments are limited to questions not already covered in the preceding section.

Complaints response mechanism

Key Concern from various countries were trained in HAP and Concern's Complaints Response Mechanism (CRM) in Ethiopia in 2011. On return to their own countries, they in turn trained project managers, support staff and senior staff from partner organisations.

The CRM in **Tanzania** was piloted in Mtwara. A summary of the mechanism in Swahili including UPT and Concern project managers' telephone numbers and information about the project was seen on prominent boards in several villages. Some beneficiaries have made complaints but mainly about the government! Concern staff members were passing on these complaints but as it was making relationships with the government difficult this practice was stopped.

CRM in Burundi was piloted in January to March 2013 mainly targeting a new project though there had been some training in the project *collines*. There is a board near the government offices in Kirundo with an explanation of the complaints procedure.

CRM is in the process of being introduced in Ethiopia but it was not functioning during the project.

Programme Participant Protection Policy

Concern has a comprehensive Programme Participant Protection Policy (P4) which is designed to protect employees, visitors and beneficiaries from abuse or inappropriate behaviour. All staff and partners have to sign that they have received and read the policy. This document was finalised in May 2010 soon after the beginning of the project. In Ethiopia, a booklet explaining the Programme Participant Protection Policy and standards has been translated into Amharic for sharing with beneficiaries.

At least one partner interviewed also explained it to its sub-contractors as well as the wider community. I have seen no evidence in any of the three countries visited that this policy has been infringed.

Other Concern Policies

Table 8 contains comments on the other Concern Policies not already covered in the preceding sections.

Humanitarian Accountability Partnership standards

Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP) standards are set out in "*The Guide to the HAP Standards*"⁴⁶ and "*The 2010 HAP Standard in Accountability and Quality Management*"⁴⁷.

Concern was first certified in 2010 and the certification was renewed in April 2013. A Mid-Term Progress Audit took place in March 2012 with a field visit to Tanzania, one of this project's component countries. In addition, Concern has a *People in Aid* kite mark, which certifies that it is '*Verified Compliant with the People In Aid Code*'; the next audit is scheduled for 2013.

Each country in which Concern is working, is developing its own HAP commitments and is in the process of phasing them in. During the visit, I was given a copy of and have read the CWB Accountability Implementation Plan and Progress Report 2012 for Burundi. In Ethiopia, HAP standards are now also in place but were not functioning during the project. Key senior staff members from the three countries were trained in HAP standards in Ethiopia in 2011.

This project evaluation cannot encompass a HAP audit for which certified auditors are appointed. However, some comments on how countries visited were implementing the HAP standards as far as the consultant could determine are given in Table 9.

⁴⁶ <http://www.hapinternational.org/resources/category.aspx?catid=662>

⁴⁷ <http://www.hapinternational.org/pool/files/2010-hap-standard-in-accountability.pdf>

Table 8. Degree to which the project complied with other Concern policies

Policy	Comments
Value for money ⁴⁸	The cost effectiveness of the project is discussed on page 28. It was concluded that the project was good value for money with cost per beneficiary of about €200. Costs of interventions were justified when taking into consideration the actual or potential improved livelihoods that result.
Accountability when working with partners Partnership policy Capacity building policy	The project worked with a range of partners: local government, CSOs and CBOs. All have benefited from capacity building but the quality of this varied across the project. Further training is needed for some. Quality of relationships has been good, even with CSOs which were collaborators rather than partners. HAP standards (see below) have not yet been introduced in some cases. Some partners did not have a copy of the project proposal or logical framework which limited their ability to be properly accountable. In Tanzania, some partners were found to be financially unreliable. Otherwise reporting and accountability between Concern and its partners and between the partners and beneficiaries was good. For the CBOs in Tanzania and the local government partners in each country, to some extent the partners were also beneficiaries.
Programme cycle management system	I have not seen the concept notes on which the proposal for this project was based. However it is suggested that Concern develops a section in its PCMS on how to develop a project in more than one country (see page 23 for some suggestions). There is a need to improve the M&E system in all countries but particularly Ethiopia and Tanzania (see page 26).
How Concern understands extreme poverty	The project attempted to address extreme poverty in all six assets (financial, natural, human, physical, social and political). Some project staff members were uncomfortable with the latter, especially in Ethiopia. Not all partners were diligent in prioritising the very poor. Comments have been made in the recommendations section (page 45) on concerning the use of assets as a better indicator of livelihoods than food stocks.
Livelihood security policy	Expected Result 2 specifically addressed the issue of “diversified” livelihoods. Given pressure on land especially in Ethiopia and Burundi contexts, there could have been more attention in the proposal to non-agricultural livelihoods. Improved livelihoods were also addressed through Expected Results 1 and 3 because of the emphasis on improved representation and decentralised decision making.
Social Protection Policy	Concern’s Social Protection Policy which includes reducing the vulnerability of the very poor “by increasing the provision of reliable and predictable social protection by their governments” did not figure very strongly in the project. While government aid was provided in the case of the droughts in Tanzania and Burundi, it was dependent to some extent on initiatives by the NGOs and international agencies.
Anti-fraud policy	The efficiency with which the internal auditor dealt with the various financial mismanagement incidents by the partners has been discussed under Financial Efficiency (page 27).
Security policy	Concern is a signatory to the People in Aid ‘Code of best practice for the management and support of aid personnel’ and has adopted its principles, including those governing safety of its staff. All staff I met were aware for personnel safety and I was personally well looked after on the road from Mwanza to Kibondo (Tanzania) which sometimes has armed robbery attacks.
Health policy	The project was consistent with this policy for example in the education on HIV and hygiene in all 3 countries. In Tanzania and Burundi the work on vegetable growing improved people’s nutrition as well as income. In all 3 countries fruit production has been encouraged. The emphasis on increased crop production as part of Expected Result 2 also contributed to improved food security. In FGDs we were often told during the evaluation that as a result of the incomes the project had brought, people were able to pay for better health facilities.
Education policy	This was not addressed directly by the project. However it was a frequent comment during FGDs that with the improved incomes and livelihoods that the project had enabled, parents were better able to pay for school fees. School children in Kibondo were becoming involved in reading the rain gauge and the data used in their mathematics lessons.
Microfinance policy	This has been addressed mainly through the savings and credit groups supported or established by the project. It has enabled many people (though relatively few in relation to the total number of targeted households) to access short term loans to start up or expand small businesses. Most of the warehouse, processing and produce marketing groups in Burundi and Ethiopia also offered loans to members.

⁴⁸ To reduce cluttering the footnotes, the urls are inserted as hyperlinks

Table 9. Comments on HAP benchmarks

Benchmark	Details of benchmark	Comments
Benchmark 1. Humanitarian quality management system	The agency shall establish a humanitarian quality management system.	This is assessed during the HAP audits and has met requirements
Benchmark 2. Information	The agency shall make the following information publicly available to intended beneficiaries, disaster-affected communities, agency staff, and other specified stakeholders: (a) organisational background; (b) humanitarian accountability framework; (c) humanitarian plan; (d) progress reports; and (e) complaints-handling procedures.	In Burundi, there is a board in the provincial centre with details of each project, including the budget, being implemented in that province. The board includes a contact number in case beneficiaries have complaints. In Tanzania there are boards in project villages in Mtwara where CRM and HAP were being piloted. The HAP framework and progress reports were not displayed but were available to anyone who requested them.
Benchmark 3: Beneficiary participation and informed consent	The agency shall enable beneficiaries and their representatives to participate in programme decisions and seek their informed consent.	Representatives of beneficiaries and other stakeholders are involved in reviewing the implementation of the project and have an opportunity to correct mistakes. These reviews are carried out once or twice a year depending on the country.
Benchmark 4: Competent staff	The agency shall determine the competencies, attitudes, and development needs of staff required to implement its humanitarian quality management system.	Staff members interviewed, from the Country Directors to field staff were of excellent competence. Field staff members were knowledgeable enough to implement the project activities. See page 26.
Benchmark 5: Complaints-handling	The agency shall establish and implement complaints-handling procedures that are effective, accessible, and safe for intended beneficiaries, disaster-affected communities, agency staff, humanitarian partners, and other specified bodies.	See Benchmark 2. See CRM under Concern's Policies above
Benchmark 6: Continual improvement	The agency shall establish a process of continual improvement for its humanitarian accountability framework and humanitarian quality management system.	Assessed during the audit.

Recommendations and Lessons Learned

The paragraphs in this section have been numbered for easy reference.

Project design

1. The development of the proposal based on proposals from each country led to a document that was not entirely “joined-up” and a certain degree of disconnectedness between the components in the three countries. Items that were more relevant to one country (notably Tanzania) were not so relevant in other countries. The target numbers in each country varied substantially. The very different agricultural and political context in Ethiopia meant that the potential for mutual synergies was limited. Indeed there were no exchange visits arranged by Ethiopia or Tanzania, presumably because they believed there was nothing to learn from the other countries. I have included a table in the section on evaluation according to indicators that outlines possible benefits of external visits. The development of a project in more than one country requires a different approach to the one used for a proposal in a single country. Below are a list of suggestions that are offered for consideration when developing future projects in more than one country:
 - ❖ *if at all possible, future multi-country projects should work in contiguous countries;*
 - ❖ *if possible, the locations worked in should be contiguous also (for example districts of Rwanda, Tanzania and Burundi with common borders);*
 - ❖ *if cross-border trade is a component, they should if possible belonging to a common market;*
 - ❖ *funding gaps should not be given undue weight;*
 - ❖ *the proposed number of beneficiaries in each country should be of the same order of magnitude;*
 - ❖ *there should be a single project proposal from the beginning developed by one person (by a staff member at the regional or international office or by a consultant) rather than merge several proposals together;*
 - ❖ *clear guidelines on the joint logical framework, scope and budgets for the country components should be given by the proposal writer and then the component countries asked to submit a few paragraphs with some ideas of what the project might look like with a list of activities, budget and staff requirements that would be needed to achieve the Expected Results.*
2. The Logical Framework and the proposal narrative makes frequent use of the phrase “local government”. The term is too vague and has been used in different project reports to mean government structures at village/colline/kebele or structures at district (wilaya)/commune/woreda level.
 - ❖ *It is recommended that vague terms such as “local” are avoided in project proposals and logical frameworks and that if English translations are used (such as “district”) the term used in the national language is also given in brackets.*
3. The decision to work in three widely spread regions of Tanzania posed considerable logistical problems. For example, it takes two days to get from Mtwara to Kigoma. The main issue from a supervision point of view was that the project manager was based in Dar es Salaam. Given the wide geographical spread this was probably the best solution though it meant that day to day supervision suffered as a result.
 - ❖ *It is suggested that for future projects, Concern works only in one region or two adjacent regions.*
4. During the evaluation, there was some confusion in Tanzania about which villages were supported from the Farming Together⁴⁹ project and which were supported from the Food Facility project that overlapped Farming Together in time and space. The confusion was

⁴⁹ In Tanzania the project was generally called the “Multi-Country project”. I have used the name “Farming Together” which is the title used by the Dublin office and the project name in the evaluation Terms of Reference.

eventually resolved. The following recommendations may help to minimise such confusion in the future.

❖ *Where possible, village (kijiji, colline, kebele) names as well as the larger administrative units should be included in project proposals. If this is not possible (perhaps because a survey must be undertaken first before villages are selected), then the list should be included at the first opportunity in official reports, preferably the first narrative report.*

5. The staff in Ethiopia were constrained by the recent laws that restrict foreign-funded NGO involvement in human rights, land rights, women's rights.

❖ *Action: EC is requested to discuss with the Ethiopian government, the extent to which international NGOs working on EC-funded projects can promote issues such as advocacy, decentralised decision making and land tenure rights.*

Project management

6. Even though there were annual coordination meetings, the absence of an overall coordinator or project manager was detrimental to the project, for example in developing more synergies between the countries, resolving logical framework problems and having a more unified approach to the coordination and management of the baseline and endline studies.

❖ *It is recommended that in future multi-country projects, an overall coordinator is appointed and lives in one of the component countries (with frequent visits to the other countries) or lives in each on a rotational basis.*

7. There was confusion, particularly at UPT in Tanzania, about which village activities were being funded under which project (Concern were using UPT to implement two). This was largely because the projects were combined in their Finance Agreement.

❖ *Where Concern is working with partners, the Finance Agreements should include a list of villages (kijiji, colline, kebele) and a clear list of activities that will take place in them.*

❖ *Finance Agreements with partners should not be for more than one project. If there are two projects being managed by a partner, there should be two Finance Agreements. Partners should be aware of the names of the projects as well as the sources of funding.*

8. The lack of adequate supervision by the EC is a major criticism. It has been brought about by the fact that the EC do not seem to be geared up to supervising development projects in more than one country. Adequate resources need to be allocated to the desk officer responsible so that he/she can visit all the countries each year and there has to be clarity in the host countries' EC offices as to who is responsible.

❖ *Action: the EC examines its procedures for supervising development projects in more than one country.*

Monitoring and Evaluation and logical framework

9. The lessons learned about the indicators for this project are discussed in more detail in Appendix 3.

10. It was not a good idea to have a country specific logical frameworks as it may have led to staff losing sight of the project Expected Results and OVs. A better approach would have been to use sub-activities that were country specific.

11. During the evaluation, I asked in each country for a list of activities in each village/colline/kebele and how many beneficiaries there were for each. A list was not immediately available in any of the countries and took some days (or even weeks) to compile. Information about activities and sub-activities (including training delivered module by module with the number of attendees) in villages should be available in real time. It should not need to be compiled.

12. When compiling lists of beneficiaries against activities, ways need to be found to avoid double counting. Double counting is a particular problem with training on different days unless attendees' names are taken and checked each time there is a training session.

13. In addition to activities and direct beneficiaries, staff need to think laterally about possible multiplier effects, something donors like the EC are very keen to know about. These need to be monitored and measured (or even estimated) by the M&E system.

For example if beneficiaries give neighbours some of their seed after the first year harvest (see below). Note that if this distribution by beneficiaries happens at the end of first year, the original beneficiaries plus the recipients of the first year's seed can both pass on some seed so quadrupling the effect by the end of year 2 and multiplying the effect by 8 by the end of year 3. It would be useful to know, not only that so many Quality Declared Seed farmer groups had been established but also how much seed they had produced and how many farmers they had distributed it to, at what cost.

When warehouses, honey (or any other producer) or processing groups are established, their capacity should be stated in project reports and the throughput of produce, the number of sellers and buyers, turnover and profits recorded.

14. I was informed by some project staff members that they had not had any training in Results Oriented Management and more than one staff member interviewed did not know what the specific objective had been. All staff, including partners, should have regular workshops at which not only project progress is reviewed, but also staff are reminded about what the project objectives and expected results are.

❖ *Action: Concern HQ ensure that all field staff (Concern and partner) have extra training in monitoring of project activities bearing in mind the above points.*

15. Because of the amount of work if the task is to be done adequately,

❖ *if at all possible, each project should have a dedicated M&E specialist who reports to the project manager and the national M&E Coordinator / Advisor.*

The TORs for the M&E officer should include the following:

- monitoring progress against OVLs in project logical framework;
- monitoring progress against other statements of intent in the project proposal narrative (the narrative is part of the contract and not just the logical framework); this is especially important if there are numerical commitments in the narrative but not in the logical framework (before submitting a proposal, the narrative should be scanned for commitments that are not in the logical framework – then either put them or make them more vague);
- monitoring numerical progress of project activities village by village (*colline by colline*);
- monitoring the number of secondary beneficiaries – not as easy as it seems – for example when non-members receive seeds from group plots or when non-members bring produce to sell to processing group;
- designing (with assistance) baseline and endline surveys – making sure household economies and farming systems are properly taken into account (care needs to be taken with OVLs at proposal stage to ensure OVLs are feasible in the light of household economies and farming systems).

16. More than one partner manager said they did not have a copy of the project proposal or logical framework.

❖ *Action: Concern senior management ensures that all partners have a copy of the project proposal and logical framework and have read them (and if a new manager takes over, that he/she confirms that he/she has a copy and has read them).*

17. The way the baseline survey was carried out (and the endline survey which was contracted out in Tanzania and Ethiopia) indicates that there was a lack of understanding of the farming systems and how the household economy was managed. The baseline questionnaire was not adequately tested / piloted.

❖ *Before baseline surveys that are to include agricultural production questions are designed, the project manager should ensure that the M&E officer (or consultant) has spent time talking to farmers and visiting farms to understand the farming system and household*

economy (and preferably have some agricultural background) and that questionnaires are adequately piloted.

18. If crop production must be assessed as part of an OVI, crop-cutting or preferably whole field harvesting are much more accurate ways of determining crop production than relying on farmer estimates.
19. Asset based indicators or coping mechanism indicators are more reliable than food stocks.
20. Training in a development projects are often not assessed. Those attending are often simply given attendance certificates. Having discussed the problem with government officers and Concern staff, I recommend that
 - ❖ *Concern project staff consider encouraging trainers to set simple multiple-choice tests at the end of training sessions (especially if certificates are awarded) and the results should become part of the monitoring system.*

This would not apply to practical training such as crop management techniques where uptake is an assessment of the training. Nor would it apply to artisan training such as tailoring or pottery since sales would be an indicator.

21. The demonstration of “learning” from educational visits is difficult to assess during an evaluation. One approach would be to require participants to write a brief report on their return from exchange visits. An incentive could be to withhold reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses until a report had been submitted.

Cost-benefit analyses and design of infrastructure

22. More attention should be given to cost-benefit analysis of infrastructure components in project reports to compare costs with economic benefits. For example, where a bridge is built some subsequent monitoring of traffic would help (or not) to justify the cost. Some attempt should also be made to calculate and report the internal rate of return (there is a function in Excel to do this) or the payback period.
23. When designing buildings such as warehouses, more research should be done beforehand to gauge the potential use (how many customers would there be, how far would people come from, how much produce would they bring) and therefore the size. In other words, designs should be based on prior market research. After construction, records should be kept of the number of customers and where they have come from, etc..

Purchasing

24. There is a tendency for government, or even NGO, staff to insist that only top of the range equipment or software will suffice to do a particular task. As a general rule,
 - ❖ *when purchasing expensive software or technical equipment for government departments, it is strongly advised that a third party is consulted first for an opinion and consideration given to sustainability as well as cost.*
25. When planning technical innovations such as drip irrigation, it is essential to ensure that there are sufficient skilled staff available to implement and maintain the new system. If necessary, special training should be arranged.

Processing & Marketing

26. Concern still needs to build access to processing and marketing expertise in the three countries (preferably, in-house in my opinion) with practical entrepreneurial business experience to advise projects with processing and marketing components. Market chain analysis skills are not sufficient.
27. The use of mobile phones has been very successful in improving marketing for farmers in various parts of the world⁵⁰.
 - ❖ *It is recommended that future projects with a marketing component develop more systematic ways of using mobile phones to assist with marketing.*

⁵⁰ see for example

<http://www.ictinagriculture.org/sourcebook/module-9-strengthening-agricultural-marketing#mobilemarketing>

Visibility

28. EC visibility instructions have not been well followed.

- ❖ *Action: for future EC funded projects, a senior Concern officer (Compliance Officer?) in the country headquarters ensures that project staff are given copies of the EC Communication and Visibility Manual⁵¹ and instructed on how to use it.*
- ❖ *For permanent structures, use permanent plaques made of stone (such as marble) or concrete with the inscriptions (and logo) carved into surface and painted. Use metal (rust resistant such as aluminium) only if the asset is of a temporary nature (Farmer Field Schools for example).*

Concern procurement officers should ensure that the correct paint is available to project staff.

CSO Partners

29. As stated in the Guidelines for Grant Applicants, the programme under which this project is financed *“is an “actor-oriented” programme aimed at strengthening the capacity of civil society organisations and local authorities as a pre-condition for a more equitable, open and democratic society through support to their “own initiatives”*”. Whilst the project has contributed significantly to building the capacity of district governments, more could have been done to improve the capacity of its CSO partners. There are widespread weaknesses in some them, partly because of the level of education and partly because of their lack of skills.

- ❖ *Action: Concern desk officers ensure that future projects with similar partner CSOs include rigorous training and capacity building programmes including:*
 - *looking for sources of funds;*
 - *project cycle management;*
 - *project formulation;*
 - *proposal writing;*
 - *logical frameworks;*
 - *monitoring, especially the use of spreadsheets to record activities, training, input provision;*
 - *monitoring of secondary impacts such as seed actually grown and sold by seed-growers, dividends paid by processing groups;*
 - *design of baseline and endline surveys;*
 - *project management, human resource management, team building;*
 - *HAP, SPHERE, CRM standards.*

Motivation of government officials

30. This project was very dependent on the inputs (mostly to provide training) from government staff. It has been necessary to pay government officials daily allowances and often to provide fuel or transport. In Burundi, a government staff member had to be employed at consultancy rates before he would help as he was essential to the success of a particular activity (artificial insemination). It is recognised that government offices are generally on low salaries compared to their counterparts in NGOs or the private sector but many lack personal motivation and commitment. One issue I discussed with Concern staff was how to encourage government officials to be more motivated, committed and pro-active in their fulfilling their duties.

- ❖ *Action: Concern HQ obtains the services of a management consultant with experience of working with governments in developing countries to lead a workshop and develop a consultation document that addresses this issue.*
- ❖ *Action: Concern HQ builds non-financial motivation strategies for government staff into their projects⁵².*

31. There is inconsistency between the countries as to whether government partners are paid Concern DSA rates or government DSA rates. This should be resolved if possible in collaboration with the national NGO forums. There should also be clarity about the terms on

⁵¹ see http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/work/visibility/index_en.htm

⁵² see for example “Drive” by Daniel Pink <http://www.danpink.com/books/drive>

which DSA rates are paid. For example, governments usually only pay staff DSAs when they are away from station but in this project DSAs have been paid to government staff when all they have to do is walk a few hundred meters from their office.

- ❖ *Action: Concern Worldwide HQ agree with country offices whether government staff will be paid national government DSAs or national Concern DSAs and apply the decision in all countries.*

Disaster Risk Reduction

32. Data collection in Ethiopia was possibly more systematic than the other countries and (in theory) included:

- weekly information on the spatial and temporal distribution of rain and the effect on crops;
- likely level of crop production, taking into account rain and crop pests;
- occurrence of landslides;
- natural disasters such as flooding;
- extent of contagious livestock and human diseases (not just epidemics) – presumably obtained from health clinics;
- market prices of commonly consumed crops and consumer goods;
- nutritional status of children as an indicator for the food security of the population – obtained from health clinics.

There was evidence in Ethiopia that collected data, notably on food prices were not being analysed for a connection between prices and serious food shortages and that the *woreda* government DRR staff were suffering from “data overload”. If there are future projects involving DRR as a project component (rather than a cross-cutting issue), it would be good if the DRR focal points could be given guidance about, and possibly assistance with data analysis.

33. Concern (and partners) should use the term “climate change” with extreme caution and certainly not without the support of the national or preferably international meteorological agencies. Climate change happens over long time periods and cannot be deduced from a series of low rainfall years. Even if rainfall does decline, it is not necessarily a “disaster” if farmers can adapt such as by using more drought tolerant crops. A balanced review is to be found in the new book “*East African Agriculture and Climate Change*” published by IFPRI⁵³. In it different models are presented for increases or decreases of rainfall over the next 50 years.

34. Rainfall data are being collected in most areas of Tanzania (probably at division level) and in each *commune* in Burundi. In Tanzania, rain gauges were donated to the Tanzania Meteorological Agency. It is easier to obtain data from the collectors or village/*commune* government officials (who have copies) than from national agencies.

- ❖ *It is recommended that for projects containing a DRR, water or agriculture component, rainfall records are obtained from the stations that exist in or close to the project area.*

As DRR is supposed to be main-streamed, this should be done in all projects. The data can be used by project agricultural staff to help explain variations in production (especially important if increased production is an OVI and the final year of the project had a substantially below average rainfall), water resource staff to help with estimates of surface run-off in specific months and DRR committee members to provide specific data in the case of disasters resulting from lack or excess of rain, for example to support requests for emergency aid.

35. The attention of district (district, *commune*, *woreda*) DRR committees (and Concern and partner staff) should be drawn to the regular food security assessments made by:

- the USAID-funded Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) Network⁵⁴;
- the World Food Programme’s “*Comprehensive Food Security & Vulnerability Analysis*” for various countries, e.g. Tanzania⁵⁵;

⁵³ August 2013, by Michael Waithaka, Gerald C. Nelson, Timothy S. Thomas, and Miriam Kyotalimye

⁵⁴ downloadable from <http://www.fews.net/Pages/remote-monitoring-country.aspx?qb=tz&l=en>

- the FAO's *Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS)*⁵⁶;
- IFPRI's *Food Security Portal*⁵⁷ (data mostly presented on a national basis).

36. The interests of women and vulnerable groups have often not been addressed specifically by Disaster Risk Reduction Committees or through the partner NGOs. Greatest progress was made in Burundi where the project organised workshops for women on Gender Based Violence and gender committees were set up at *colline* level where issues such as GBV are discussed.

Maps

37. There is a general lack of use of maps in the project. Examples have been given for specific countries but generically more use of maps should be encouraged for showing locations of project intervention sites (to make logistical planning easier, to improve security for example by considering alternative routes); to help villages plan changes in land use more effectively; to assist in management and maintenance of irrigation schemes.

Backing up electronic data

38. In Masasi (Tanzania), riots led the burning of government buildings and vehicles. As a result computers provided by the project and used for the land registration record were destroyed including some electronic records.

- ❖ *Action: for future projects that involve government electronic records, a strict procedure for backing up data is put in place with the backup copies being kept at a different site.*

This recommendation also equally applies to Concern (and partner) offices in general.

Documentation of lessons learned

39. There has been inadequate documentation and sharing of lessons learned (for example on bean and maize conservation agriculture in Tanzania) in the project. I would suggest that projects build in capacity for a consultant to do this and distribute the results outside of Concern if appropriate.

Cross-cutting issues

40. There has been generally been good sensitisation in all three countries to issues such as human rights, equality, gender, discrimination and HIV/AIDS. However there seems to be a need to work out how all that plus the needs of the very poor and other vulnerable groups such as women, children, the elderly and disabled can be actualised in project activities, especially processing, savings, farmer, groups. Groups have more or less been left to work out models for themselves.

- ❖ *Action: Concern senior management including project managers and partners in each country organise a day to discuss how project activities could better integrate Concern's focus on very poor and vulnerable and other issues such as human rights, equality, gender, discrimination, HIV/AIDS.*

It would not be a good idea to be too prescriptive, but at least if staff have discussed these things they may be able to make definite suggestions to management committees – even to the extent of including something in their constitutions.

⁵⁵ downloadable from <http://www.wfp.org/content/tanzania-comprehensive-food-security-vulnerability-analysis-2012-august-2013>

⁵⁶ <http://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/index.jsp>

⁵⁷ <http://www.foodsecurityportal.org/tanzania>

Appendix 1. Management Response

The following comments (in normal font) were made by Mr Paul Wagstaff, the Agriculture Advisor to Concern Worldwide. My replies are written in italics below each comment.

Burundi

Cows v AI v bulls

I was worried about the importation and distribution of **pedigree Jersey cows**, as was Peter Rugu⁵⁸, (despite their apparent lower fodder requirements) during the design stage, in Burundi as a previous herd improvement program had failed due to insufficient fodder and there was no reason to believe that the situation had improved. At the time the proposal was developed, there were many recently graduated livestock technicians, with basic training in AI, that the government could not absorb. Semen was available from Rwanda so one option was to improve the existing herds by focusing on an AI project to create self-employment for the **livestock technicians**. A 25% mortality rate represents a huge waste of resources, but this needs to be broken down into mortality and off-take. Would Concern's new **Livestock Distribution Guidelines** have avoided this? Regarding bulls, having failed once, has anything changed to make bulls viable now?

*I was not told about the unemployed **livestock technicians**; only that it was extremely difficult to obtain the services of the government AI specialist in Bujumbura. I was informed that the provincial livestock specialist had had training in AI and that he had helped with inseminating some of the project cows. The impression I had was that there was a shortage of AI expertise in Burundi. This seems to have been mistaken. I have subsequently been informed that after testing the semen at the National AI Centre, the AI was carried out by some of the technicians referred to under the supervision of the provincial livestock specialist in DPAE Kirundo. However, training of technicians in AI at a college would not make them proficient. They would need to be apprenticed for a year or so. To be effective, an AI practitioner needs to be inseminating at least 10 cows a day. A private AI service may be the best way forward.*

*When I discussed AI with a colleague who is a livestock specialist, he said that if AI expertise was lacking, maybe the alternative option of **importing bulls** should be considered. He pointed out that a major problem with bulls has been the way they are managed by the community.*

*If AI expertise is available, the least risk option would be to provide semen plus the necessary equipment for the inseminators to work with **upgrading local cattle**, not using pure-bred cows. AI using Jersey semen should then be used on the calves of the hybrids and so gradually increase the percentage of Jersey genes with each generation. He recommended Concern Burundi contact Dr James Nguhiu-Mwangi⁵⁹ at the University of Nairobi, Kenya for advice on AI strategies and also to make contact with Send a Cow that is in the process of setting up operations in Burundi.*

*Regarding the initial high **mortality rates**, my specialist colleague thought they were more likely to be due to diseases as a result of poor nutrition rather than the poor nutrition per se. It seems that now the cows are given adequate nutritional supplements, the survival rates are good. The potential sustainability risks of farmers not being able to or not being bothered to obtain supplements after the end of the project has been discussed under Sustainability in Annex 2.*

*The **Livestock Distribution Guidelines** were not mentioned in any of the three countries during my visit. I was told that village committees decided who received livestock based on wealth ranking and (in Burundi) ability to look after pure breeds (Jerseys). I am not a livestock specialist, but I have now had a look at the Guidelines and it seems that maybe a workshop to go over the guidelines with technical field staff and project managers is needed. I was aware*

⁵⁸ Former Assistant Country Director (Programmes) for Burundi

⁵⁹ nguhiuja@yahoo.com

of shortcomings in what was happening with livestock distribution and the “solidarity chain”, and these have been mentioned in the Annexes for Tanzania and Burundi.

Food stocks

All the countries struggled with the food stocks indicator, despite this being a national indicator for the Tanzanian government. More discussion on this indicator would be useful. Can it be adapted for future projects or should we quietly forget about it?

I have discussed this problem in Appendix 3. My advice is to forget about it. I have given alternatives.

ICRAF

No mention of the **Climate Analogue** work. This is a very interesting approach to climate smart agriculture – is this a tool we should be using in our contextual analysis and strategic plans?

I believe that **rainwater harvesting** is a critical part of climate smart agriculture, so more comment on the viability of the approaches used and the potential for scale-up/out would be useful.

*The **climate analogues** tool connects sites with statistically similar climates across space (i.e. between locations) or time (i.e. with past or future climates) or both. The analyses provide a useful way of examining possible trends in crop production as a result of climate change. The analyses done by ICRAF indicate that up to the 2050s there are relatively favourable prospects for both Busoni and Bugabira. This underlines my own statement in Appendix 2 that a run of low rainfall years cannot be taken as evidence of climate change in the direction of reduced rainfall. The term “climate change” should be used with caution. A 30 year horizon is about right for planning purposes. The technique should be used by Concern to help develop agricultural strategies. The forthcoming book “East African agriculture and climate change” published by IFPRI should also be consulted.*

*Regarding the **rainwater harvesting** intervention, the sites seen in Burundi seem to have been working very well, both from a technical and socio-economic point of view. For vegetable production, I would keep the design more or less as it is (with due regard to fencing for safety and ensuring that the surplussing arrangements are working properly and not causing erosion downstream). The ponds will need to be de-silted from time to time and this process may damage the lining if care is not taken). As with other interventions like this, staff should get into the habit of doing simple cost-benefit analyses. The main advantage of the current system is in the production of out of season vegetables. The costs should be compared with alternatives such as simple irrigation methods. I was told by the current project manager that he had been shown by ICRAF how to go about designing water harvesting systems. Using GIS may be a more sophisticated way of designing systems but it should be depended on if the method is to be reproduced on a wide scale. In-field systems of rainwater conservation such as contour terraces and tied ridges should also be promoted.*

Beekeeping

The approach to beekeeping involved promoting improved hives. Many beekeeping experts (including our Dochas⁶⁰ colleagues) question the economic viability of the NGO (and government) fixation with distributing improved hives. Farmers almost never buy improved hives for themselves as they are unable to recover the costs and field experience shows that improving traditional hives is more cost-effective. A benefit cost analysis of the hives would be useful.

If there was good management, fairly cheap construction costs and abundant local bee flora Langstroth hives might be economic, but they are not advisable for most conditions in central Africa. Langstroth hives need a lot of expertise and good quality workmanship. The yields of between 100 and 170 kg reported from a mixture of local and improved hives would not justify the cost of improved hives.

⁶⁰ Irish Association of Irish Non-Governmental Development Organisations

The Kenya top bar hive was developed in the 1960s but it is now known that vertical sided hives are fine for Africa as the African bee tends not to attach their brood comb to the side walls.

Generally, traditional hives are very good, cheap and effective. There is not much to be improved. The problem with log and bark hives is finding suitable trees. However, some beekeepers in Burundi use hives woven from locally available material such as bamboo. Beekeepers may find it helpful to put a piece of coffee wire in the centre to act as a queen excluder but African bees do not like crossing queen excluders. There are many ideas for cheap improved hives in "Beekeeping"⁶¹ by P.D. Paterson. For example, he suggests using multi-chamber, fixed comb hives (old fashioned skeps) that had a super on them. They could be made using plastic buckets or clay pots.

Cost-benefit analyses have not been done but Paterson believes that both the Langstroth hives (with protective clothing, smoker, honey extractor, labour) and traditional hives (including labour to make it) would give a return after one year under favourable conditions.

The economic distance a bee will forage is about 1 km so groups of apiaries should ideally be at least 2 km apart. This guideline was not always followed in Burundi⁶².

Mutwenzi Agro-Pastoral Centre

Having worked within a Catholic Diocese, and visited the Mutwenzi centre, I feel that the evaluator makes a big assumption over the diocese and the sustainability of Mutwenzi. The priest who runs the centre is enthusiastic but is an engineer not a businessman. He loves his machines, which he runs very professionally, but there was little evidence of a business plan. Centres like this tend to be financially opaque and rely on endless free gifts from donors to keep going rather than internal investment or commercial financing.

I had the same discussion with the Assistant Country Director (Programmes). I also commented on the lack of financial transparency in the Mutwenzi Agro-Pastoral Centre. I do not believe that the Centre should be financially supported by Concern. However, the Centre will continue to operate for some years. Hopefully, Abbe Gerard will find a successor before he retires or leaves. The Centre should be seen as an opportunistic way of marketing sunflower and other crops rather than an enterprise to be assisted. If a similar project is funded, alternative or complementary markets should be found.

Workload of government staff

Another issue I questioned during the design of the project was the commitments of the government staff. With their commitments to a range of NGOs (CRS, WFP, WV, etc.) they did not appear to have much time left to work with Concern. I am therefore interested in what changed and how much time they devoted to Concern.

I saw no evidence that the government staff were not doing what they had agreed to do for the Farming Together project. I have more fundamental concerns. Much of the training on agriculture and also issues such as land rights, role of women, HIV, decentralisation, village level planning was delivered by government officials. Much of the work was their responsibility anyway. I see two difficulties: firstly that the increasing commitment to working for NGOs is detracting government staff from their normal duties and secondly, too great a reliance on government staff means that there is a limited amount of new ideas coming in. There is a danger, on the one hand, of Concern (and other NGOs) using government staff as a cheap source of professionals (keeping human resource costs down) and on the other, government staff becoming so reliant on NGOs to supplement their incomes, that without the extra money, they are reluctant to work. I have made some suggestions about using non-financial ways of motivating government staff in the Recommendations section.

⁶¹ Macmillan Education (19 Oct 2006)

⁶² This reply is based on an e-mail from Peter Paterson

Goats' milk

During my initial interviews in Burundi, there appeared to be major cultural barriers to consuming goats' milk, so the project should document how they convinced people to consume goats' milk as this is relevant to many of our "Agriculture to Nutrition" interventions.

The current project manager said that the Farming Together project was able to show that goats can produce milk and after tasting it, children started to drink it regularly. The problem is that the produced quantity is still low. In Tanzania, some villages that were used to drinking goats' milk were given local breeds with low milk yields. This was a missed opportunity though dairy goats have not always been successful in Tanzania, especially in warmer areas.

Tanzania

On-farm storage

In the 1980s, farmers in Tanzania were reluctant to adopt improved storage structures due to perceptions of insecurity. This has obviously not changed. Did we repeat the mistakes of the past due to poor analysis or did the project staff feel that security was no longer an issue?

Although there were demonstrations and training for improved grain storage structures at household level by the DAOs, the uptake was very low as people preferred the traditional types or wanted to start storing food in their homes because of security. Discussions with farmers about their perceptions about communal storage are required.

Crop processing machines

Internally we have a long-running debate on whether crop processing machines should be run by groups of beneficiaries or by local entrepreneurs. Tanzania staff were going to try leasing one machine to an entrepreneur to compare the performance. How did the trial go?

The machine given to Caritas is not working. It has been concluded that using partners to run processing operations. The ACD-P intends to give the machine to a private entrepreneur. Two other machines which were given to a private entrepreneur and a group of farmers seem to be working well though it needs more time to investigate the efficiency of operation of these two⁶³.

Ethiopia

Jatropha group

We should link this with the new Jatropha project in Malawi to share learning.

Yes but the first priority is to increase the production so that the factory will come to collect the seed.

Taro

I was shown multiplication plots for drought tolerant taro (*Colocasia esculenta*) variety *Bereket* which seemed to be doing well (very impressive size, more than 8 suckers per corm and drought tolerant). Has *Bereket* been replaced by *Boloso*, and if so, why? *Bereket* was apparently a GM variety but I have been unable to get any technical details from breeders or our own team (this may be due to Ministerial in-fighting in Ethiopia). Despite apparent initial success *Bereket* does not appear in this project or any of the Resilience/ Early Recovery proposals prepared by our Ethiopia teams.

I had not heard of Bereket while in the field and there has been no reply at the time of writing from an e-mail enquiry.

Irrigation Scheme

Paul may want to compare the Dakaya irrigation scheme with my report on the Bilate and Shalfuha river irrigation scheme (*Damot Weyde and Duguna Fango Livelihoods Programme Evaluation Report, v8*).

⁶³ Based on an e-mail reply from ACD-P for Tanzania

I have not seen the report and I did not spend a long time at the Dakaya irrigation scheme. It consisted of a visit to the intake structure and lined canal plus a discussion with some of the beneficiaries.

Drip kits

Yet again our drip irrigation projects failed. We have a depressing list of failed drip irrigation projects. Our only clear success has been in Kenya. We have documented some of the roadblocks to adoption but clearly the information is not getting through to field staff. How can we change this? The Kenyan success seems to be due to contracting-out the irrigation component to a commercial company on a design-install-train-maintain contract. Another option is to employ an irrigation professional on our staff, as Pakistan has done.

A range of actions is required:

- a) I would recommend – in each country – that there is at least one experienced soil and water engineer on the Concern staff;*
- b) Agricultural staff from Concern and district governments should be given one week theoretical and practical workshops on drip irrigation.*
- c) Farmer groups using the system must be given adequate training in maintenance.*
- d) If Concern staff have not had experience or specific training, the only option is to use a contractor – an expensive and unsustainable option.*

Dissemination and learning

The Farming Together project has worked on many interesting agricultural interventions. I would value a table that gives the relative success of each intervention and the potential for scaling up by Concern and for advocating the methods to donors and governments.

Internally, what are we going to do next before Farming Together is forgotten? One option would be to make Farming Together the focus for the next agricultural technical workshop (currently suspended due to budget restrictions)⁶⁴. Funds permitting I'd like to get Christopher, Paul and the country teams to present to Concern's technical FIM staff. A second option (cheaper) would be to develop a series of webinars on key topics. At the very least we need to present the results of the interventions to international staff (DOs, RDs and ACDPs) to ensure that everyone is aware of the options for future projects and so avoid re-inventing the wheel.

A summary of the success of the various interventions and the potential for scaling up is given in Table 10 overleaf. The potential for scaling up and dissemination uses a star system, one star being slight potential, 5 stars meaning very high potential.

⁶⁴ Note: the Burundi Rainwater harvesting project was presented to the International Technical NRM workshop held in India in 2011. The Rainwater harvesting and climate analogue software is part of the current DFID BRACED proposal submission. These should be mentioned in the report as examples of how learning is being disseminated and used.

Table 10. Success of agricultural interventions and potential for scaling up

Intervention	Potential for scaling up and dissemination	Comment / question from Concern management	Response from consultant
Climate Analogues:	***	Should we integrate the software into program planning?	The approach is very useful for future planning but I recommend that the analysis is contracted out. More reflection on how project planning has been affected in Burundi. It may require counter-intuitive decisions for example when there has been a run of low rainfall years but the analysis predicts increased average yields – or <i>vice versa</i> .
Rainwater harvesting:	****	What should we scale-up?	The lined ponds using water from roadside ditches as demonstrated in Burundi is a reasonable method to scale up. It should be complemented by in-field approaches such as terracing, tied ridges and conservation agriculture (which increase infiltration as well as reducing erosion).
	*	How do we build internal capacity to carry out the technical GIS feasibility studies?	I am not convinced that using GIS is necessary as this will make it less reproducible by farmers without outside support. A list of criteria for site selection and training for some lead farmers in how to identify sites are needed.
AI:	***	Is this more cost-effective than livestock distributions?	Yes as long as skilled practitioners are available. If not use bulls (one bull per 25 cows). Use either approach to upgrade successive generations of local cattle rather than attempting to develop pedigree herds.
	***	Is it a viable business for unemployed livestock graduates?	Yes, but bear in mind that a practitioner should be inseminating at least 10 cows a day to be proficient.
Jersey cows:	-	Benefits for highland farmers in high milk yields with low feed requirements?	The main drawback is that sufficient land for growing fodder is required and sufficient money for building a shed is needed. It may not be the best solution for poor farmers. The more gradual approach outlined above is more suited to poor farmers.
Dairy goats:	*	How to overcome cultural barriers to the consumption of goats' milk?	The Burundi staff simply asked people to taste it. Use field days to introduce this and other new food prepared from any crops not widely grown before. Dairy goats need extra care in housing, nutrition and disease control and there were some failures in Tanzania. I recommend persevering with dairy goats. They cannot be just given to farmers. Regular close supervision is required for the first year.
Results-based payments for extension staff:	*	Lessons and best practice as this may be the way most of our programs would like to go to get off the "government allowance" treadmill.	This was an attractive approach and worked well for the duration of the project. I do not believe it is sustainable as some source of outside funding would be always required. I do not recommend that this model is scaled up. See below.

Intervention	Potential for scaling up and dissemination	Comment / question from Concern management	Response from consultant
Para-professionals:	*****	This was one of the key outputs. What is the best practice in community-based agriculture and livestock services? Can providing community-based agricultural extension services be a sustainable business?	I believe that the Tanzanian model is the most sustainable. Income was received from vaccinating poultry and some paraprofessionals were paid by Quality Declared Seed groups and by processing groups. The latter should be pursued using the argument that if farmers have increased production, the throughput, and therefore the profit of the processing group will be increased. Other sources of income need to be found if extension is to be a business. Could the para-professionals be used to market QDS or other inputs such as fertilisers, pesticides, tools, ploughs, <i>etc.</i>
		What kind of income did the para-professionals get during the Farming Together project?	In Nanyumbu, they had been vaccinating chickens for NCD at TSh 50 per chicken. A vial that vaccinates 400 chickens costs TSh 2,000 so making profit of TSh 45 per chicken. In Mtwara, the charge is TSh 30 per chicken, TSh 10 of which goes to the village funds, TSh 10 goes to the cost of vaccine and TSh 10 goes to the paraprofessional. The minimum wage in the agricultural sector in Tanzania is TSh 100,000 so paraprofessionals would need to vaccinate 5,000 chickens a month to have an adequate income if the work was full time. Numbers were in practice a lot less than this. Have there been any experiments with using radio for extension work using advertising as a source of revenue? Farmer Voice Radio ⁶⁵ operating in Kenya and Malawi plans to expand into Tanzania, Uganda, Mali and Ghana. How could Concern contribute?
Stoves:	****	The Burundi stoves project seems to have been one of our most successful stoves projects – based on good research and with market focus, rather than just wishful thinking on reducing firewood consumption.	Agreed, the Batwa stoves were a successful intervention. The stamps to give them a brand identify was a very good idea. I would think that there are still improvements that can be made to wood burning stove design <u>that are affordable</u> so I would not rule out investigating newer designs. If non-Batwa are interested, why not take a few Batwa on temporarily as trainers?
Food stocks:	-	This indicator was adopted as it was part of the Tanzanian national food security monitoring framework and theoretically used by every village in Tanzania. It turned out to be a nightmare and raises questions over Tanzania's food security monitoring.	I have not yet seen any documentation regarding this requirement by the Tanzanian government. I am sure that without project presence, the monitoring would not have been done. Food stocks are more appropriate for provincial or national strategic reserves rather than household food security.
Quality Declared seeds:	*****	This seems to have been very successful and we plan to replicate it in Zambia this year.	The QDS scheme was an excellent way of making improved seed sustainably available to farmers. The method should be rolled out in any country where the government seed specialists are prepared to work with relatively small scale farmers.

⁶⁵ <http://www.comminet.com/community-radio-africa/content/farmer-voice-radio-fvr>

Intervention	Potential for scaling up and dissemination	Comment / question from Concern management	Response from consultant
Land reform:	*****	Lots of ideas have been discussed over the years (including a PhD) to do an impact evaluation of the land reform activity, especially in light of the international interest in “land grabbing”. Is such a study still worth pursuing?	Yes. In particular it would be interesting to know (a) the ease with which CCROs can be used as collateral for bank or other loans, (b) the level of public awareness of their land rights (c) the impact of certification on the land market. Using emotive terms such as “land grabbing” is unhelpful but it would be useful to know for example what are going to be the impacts of the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania. What is also urgently needed is an investigation into the extent that NGOs such as Concern could support zonal or <i>woreda</i> governments in Ethiopia to address land certification issues. A similar study is needed in Burundi as in theory usufruct certificates can be issued but the government progress is rather slow.
Intervention stores:	***	The stores were intended to act as village-level intervention stores: smoothing prices by buying at harvest and releasing food during the pre-harvest hunger season. Is there any evidence that these village level stores can smooth prices? ⁶⁶	The warehouses seen in Burundi and Ethiopia were well built and have a potential for fulfilling a felt need as well as improving farmer incomes. More background research is needed to investigate potential use. The stores should not be seen as grain banks alone but also a way of marketing surplus produce. The Ethiopian model of giving group members first refusal for buying back stored produce before it is sold on seems like a good model as is the formation of a registered cooperative from the group members. I am unsure of the wisdom of produce warehouses being used as a source of financial credit.

⁶⁶ Concern uses a wide range of crop-storage models, and the names: cereal / seed/ crop/ banks/ stores are used interchangeably (and confusingly). See Concern Worldwide overview paper on the various approaches.

Appendix 2. Logical Framework

Table 11. Overall objective and Specific Objective

	Intervention logic	Objectively verifiable indicators of achievement	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions and risks
Overall Objectives	<i>To contribute to the achievement of MDG1 and food security in Tanzania, Ethiopia and Burundi.</i>			
Specific objective	<i>To improve livelihoods and empowerment of poor farmers in decentralised decision-making processes.</i>	<i>1. At the end of the programme, the number of targeted households that have achieved recommended staple food stock levels has increased by at least 15% when compared to non-intervention areas</i>	<i>(i) Monthly food stock survey reports from respective districts' agriculture departments and project teams, (iii) Baseline and endline surveys/mid and end of programme evaluations.</i>	<i>(i) The weather conditions permit for successful cropping seasons over the programme implementation period, (ii) The respective Agriculture departments are cooperative in providing agricultural extension support to poor farmers and they collect and maintain accurate food stock level information, (iv) The decentralised system is maintained and supported.</i>
		<i>2. Priority issues of women and marginalised groups are increasingly addressed at the community level and within local government structures.</i>	<i>(i) Physical attendance at sampled planning meetings, Village Land use planning sessions, and QVGAMs by implementing partners, (ii) Twice-annual HH surveys monitoring satisfaction and tracking of follow-up action by village and district councils regarding issues and concerns raised by women and marginalised groups.</i>	<i>(i) Women's and marginalised groups such as poor farmers' views are heard in the planning processes, (ii) Village Council meetings are scheduled and views and opinions sought from all citizens, especially poor farmers, (iv) (i) That Village Council leaders will recognise the equal rights of all to participate in decision making processes and pay attention to the views expressed by marginalised groups</i>

Table 12. Expected Result 1: Strengthened local government structures to manage, regulate and coordinate local development

Objectively verifiable indicators of achievement	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions and risks
1. Regular joint monitoring by Concern and partners of progress against local government development plans in all 3 programme countries	(i) Meeting minutes (ii) Interviews with local government and council members (iii) Peer reviews (iv) Workshop records	A considerable number of trained staff are retained in local government positions, sustained support for decentralisation,
2. Local authorities in all 3 programme countries have participated in internal and external exchange visits and can demonstrate learning and sharing	(i) Visit reports (ii) interviews with staff who participated in exchange visits (iii) Peer reviews	
3. 15% increase in the proportion of women's representation in Community Level structures, in Burundi and Ethiopia	(i) Meeting minutes/records	
4. Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction systems are established and operational within Local Government structures in 60% of target communities in all 3 programme countries	(i) Training reports (ii) Action plans (iii) Peer reviews	
5. All 70 target villages in Tanzania have land tribunals formulated according to the requirements of the Village Land Act No 5 of 1999	(i) Technical reports (ii) Peer reviews	

Table 13. Expected Results 2 and 3

	Objectively verifiable indicators of achievement	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions and risks
Expected result 2: diversified livelihoods for farmers through working with local institutions and the private sector	1. 70% of the targeted farmers are applying 1 or more new agricultural practices by the end of the programme in all 3 programme countries	(i) Stratified Random HH Survey (baseline/midline/endline)	Enthusiastic up-take by lead farmers and farmers associations of innovative ideas and progressive farming practices; assume no problem with procurement of the various agro-sylvo-pastoral, horticultural inputs; assume that research institutes implicated in action are not constrained from giving full technical back-stopping; good collaboration with Ministry of Agriculture, the already perceptible signs of climate change do not change remarkably and that seasonal variations, which are noted do not swing drastically (e.g. severe drought or unusual heavy rainfall); (i) Conducive environment for off-farm income generating schemes, including friendly policy environment to small business and regional cross-trade mechanisms not an obstacle to trade (ii) Friendly policy environment to small business and regional cross-trade mechanisms not an obstacle to trade, (iii) Friendly policy environment to small business and regional cross-trade mechanisms not an obstacle to trade
	2. Targeted farmers have significantly increased ($p < 0.05$) their crop production compared to non-targeted farmers in all 3 programme countries	(i) Stratified Random HH Survey (baseline/midline/endline)	
	3. Groups undertaking value-chain activities with links to the private sector, are reporting increased income in all 3 programme countries	(i) Stratified Random HH Survey (baseline/midline/endline)	
Expected result 3: increased involvement of non-state actors in key planning processes	1. Documented increase in CSO and community members attendance in key planning processes and decision making in all 3 programme countries	(i) Meeting minutes/records	All CSOs will participate in the trainings, local authorities especially in the sensitive area of overseeing budgetary allocation and spending will not menace and thwart civil society's role therein
	2. Planning increasingly reflects the needs of community and marginalised groups	(i) Physical attendance at sampled planning meetings, Village Land use planning sessions, and QVGAMs by implementing partners, (ii) Twice-annual HH surveys monitoring satisfaction and tracking of follow-up action by village and district councils regarding issues and concerns raised by women and marginalised groups.	Local authorities will not block civil society's participation in local governance issues
	3. CSOs have participated in internal and external exchange visits and can demonstrate learning and sharing	(i) Exchange visit reports (ii) Interviews with CSO partner staff (iii) Peer reviews	(i) Civil society organisations form active networks and promote sharing, (ii) Sustained support by government of decentralisation

Table 14. Activities

	What are the key activities to be carried out	What pre-conditions are required
Activities for Expected Result 1	1.1 Build capacity of relevant government personnel on decision-making, financial allocations and effective planning	<p>Political stability at national, provincial and communal levels prevails</p> <p>Conducive policy environment/commitment of government to poverty reduction</p> <p>Donors' commitment to support livelihoods continues</p> <p>Local authorities will not block Civil Societies participations in local governance issues</p>
	1.2 Training on land rights and registration	
	1.3 Train local councils on Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) initiatives	
	1.4 Exchange visits of local government representatives around the issue of decentralisation.	
Activities expected result 2	2.1 Training for farmers in appropriate farming techniques, for example crop diversification, including new short-cycle drought-resistant crop varieties, animal health and irrigation, through the use of farmer Field Schools (FFS).	<p>Farmers have access to resources and means of agricultural production</p> <p>Farmers willing to be trained, participate on "on-farm" research/adopt appropriate technologies</p> <p>Beneficiaries have access to resources and means of engaging in income generating activities</p> <p>Fruitful linkages between micro-finance institutions and beneficiaries as well as private sector</p>
	2.2 Strengthen agricultural extension services through government and community-based models	
	2.3 Development of community seed and produce storage facilities	
	2.4 Watershed management, including rain-water harvesting and small-scale irrigation	
	2.5 Training and support on alternative income generating techniques	
	2.6 Facilitate linkages between beneficiaries and markets including cross-border trade	
	2.7 Support farmers to add value to their crops by engaging in processing and marketing	
	2.8 Increase access to land, including community gardens and land registration	
Activities expected result 3	3.1 Awareness raising for civil society organisations on national laws and policies, with an emphasis on the opportunities for participation in key planning processes;	
	3.2 Build the capacity of village committees, village councils and other local representative bodies to monitor district council performance where appropriate.	
	3.3 Facilitate increased awareness of the decentralisation process among citizens so they may take full advantage of the available opportunities to participate in decision-making processes and access public services	
	3.4 Collaborate with national and local NGO platforms	
	3.5 Exchanges and learning between NSAs	

Table 15. Sources of Information about activities and Means

Sources of information	Monthly and annual progress reports Project staff/Site visit reports CSO partner reports Training attendance registers Training feedback forms Minutes of meetings		
Means	3 x Country Director 3 x Assistant Country Director (Programmes) 1 x Regional Accountant 2 x Programme Coordinator 3 x Country accountants 4 x Programme Manager 8 x Project Officers 7 x Community Development Workers 4 x Drivers 4 x Finance officer 3 x <i>Logistics Assistant</i>	Training inputs (financial, agricultural, managerial, technical) 3 x Vehicles 4 x Motorbikes 6 x Desk top computers 5 x Lap top computers 2 x Printers 2 x Scanners Transport costs Venue rental/meeting space Office and stationary equipment Food processing equipment Construction materials and labour Agricultural inputs (seeds, tools, pesticides, fertilizer) Published material: guidelines, research Drip irrigation lines/pipes, water container, training manual, consultants, nursery inputs (forest seeds, polythene tube, watering can, wheel barrow, plastic tray...),	Costs: Human Resources: 543,826.30 EUR Travel: 46,150 EUR Equipment: 1,535,660.951 EUR Local office costs: 225,664.48 EUR Services: 249,916.43 EUR Training: 908,749.90 EUR Total: 3,943,449 EUR

Appendix 3. Comments on Logical Framework and Surveys

Specific objective

The **Specific Object** was: *“to improve livelihoods and empowerment of poor farmers in decentralised decision-making processes”*.

This is actually two objectives rolled into one: (1) improved livelihoods and (2) empowerment Quite rightly, two Objectively Verifiable Indicators were designed to address each part though whether they were the most appropriate OVIs is questionable.

OVI 1: Food Stocks

The first OVI was that *“at the end of the programme, the number of targeted households that have achieved recommended staple food stock levels has increased by at least 15% when compared to non-intervention areas”*.

This OVI attempts to measure food security rather than “improved livelihoods”. The consultant was told by an international food security expert at the University of Reading (UK) Department of Agricultural Statistics that they had never heard of the term *“minimum recommended food stocks”* and pointed out the (now well recognised) difficulties with trying to establish a reliable answer⁶⁷.

An assets based OVI (television, radio, bicycle, type of house, school fees paid, type of medical facilities used, etc.) would have been easier to measure and more appropriate. Alternative (and perhaps more reliable) proxy indicators for food security commonly used include the number of different types of food consumed in a week, the number of meals per day, and clinical measures of nutritional status of children. The Tanzania endline survey gave results for the latter two though there were no baseline data with which to compare them. Another approach would have been to monitor coping strategies such as migration; selling livestock; doing casual labour or eating wild plants (Ethiopia). (We were told at one FGD in Tanzania that coping strategies included stealing livestock, poaching wild animals, and fishing (in Mtera dam about 100 km away)).

The reason for adopting food stocks as an OVI was that Concern Worldwide Tanzania had been using food stocks as one of the FIM⁶⁸ program indicators because this was a standard indicator for the Tanzanian Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives that all NGOs are expected to use. The Tanzania team explained at the initial planning workshop that the food stocks had been determined by the community leaders so in theory, this made it an attractive indicator. On reflection the indicator is more appropriate to national strategic food reserves in silos and warehouses than in farmers’ houses.

The plan was for the baseline to take the first measurements, with the communities then recording their own food stocks at pre-determined (monthly was suggested) intervals during the project. After agreeing the indicator at the planning workshop, Ethiopia and Burundi became sceptical though they made valiant attempts to measure it.

It is pointed out also that the OVI says *“... staple food stock”*. *“Staple”* is used to describe essential food in the household diet, usually some form of carbohydrate. However some surveys (baseline and endline) unnecessarily included crops such as onions and sunflowers.

The baseline and endline surveys mainly calculated days of food stocks by converting weights to kilocalories and then dividing this by the recommended daily calorie requirement (the Tanzania endline survey records only weights).

The reasons for the difficulties in assessing this OVI were as follows.

⁶⁷ Pers. comm. by e-mail from Andrew J. Pinney, Senior Statistician, Statistical Services Centre, University of Reading. 13th August 2013

⁶⁸ Food, Income and Markets

(i) Crops not harvested at one time

Some crops such as cassava, taro and bananas are not harvested at one time but left in the field for some months until required. Different countries adopted different approaches to this problem.

(ii) Timing of the surveys

The timing of the various surveys was unfortunate. The optimum time for a food security indicator to be measured is just before the main harvest. The diagram (Figure 3) below indicates when surveys were carried out in each country compared to the main harvest periods (bearing in mind that because the bimodal nature of rainfall in East Africa, there are at least two harvest periods).

It can be seen that in Tanzania, the baseline survey for Kigoma and Iringa were at the right time. However for Mtwara, a large part of the survey took place after the start of the main harvest. The endline survey was done at a different time (following advice from Dublin) and took place well after the start of the harvest in Mtwara and coinciding with most of the harvest period in the other two regions.

In Burundi both surveys took place after the harvests resulting from the (minor) season A harvest whereas it would have been better to delay their starts by six weeks to correspond with the period before the harvest from the (major) season B rains.

country	Activity	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov
Tanzania	Surveys					Baseline							
							Endline						
	Mtwara harvest							Sorg.					
							Main		Cassava				
	Kigoma harvest			Short				Main					
	Iringa harvest			Short				Main					
Burundi	Surveys			Baseline									
				Endline									
	Harvests		Short					Main					
Ethiopia	Surveys				End-line		Base-line						
	Harvests								Short (belg)			Main	
Notes: Short and main refer to the <u>harvest</u> from the main and short rains respectively, not the rain periods.													
Sorg = sorghum													

Figure 3. Timing of harvests and surveys

(iii) Incorrect answers

Poor farmers may be inclined to understate the food they have in stock if they think there is a possibility that this will result in further assistance with food or agricultural inputs. Incorrect answers could also be obtained by misunderstandings, for example, if the harvest is kept at another location. This is particularly the case in areas such as Mtwara in Tanzania and Kirundo where some beneficiaries are Muslims with more than one wife living in different houses and

sometimes having their own land from which produce may be shared. Answers that were obviously wrong were generally not checked by going back to the farmer.

(iv) Data entry and calculation errors

Some Excel files sent to me had obvious calculation errors in the formulas used. In another file, many cells had been left blank. It was not clear if this was because there was no answer from the farmer (because he /she did not know) or because the answer was zero. However Excel treats blanks and zeroes in exactly the same way. For “no answer”, data entry assistants should enter a “NA” as text so that the cell is ignored (or produces an error message) by Excel.

(v) Units

Food stocks were based on “bags” or “sacks”. It is not clear if a sample of bags & sacks were weighed to determine the average weight (and standard deviation) for each food type. Some crops such as bananas and cassava are not kept in sacks at all. Farmers were not asked for “bunches” for bananas for example. Even if they had been, the size of bunches on traditional and improved lines were very different.

(vi) Cash economy

Few of the farmers interviewed were subsistence farmers in the strict sense of the word. Most farmers were selling some produce and buying other produce as needed even before the project started. Many informants supplemented their income, especially in the dry seasons from activities such as running small businesses (shop-keeping, tea-shops, trading). The project further increased cash income of beneficiaries through increased production (improved varieties, irrigation facilities, better agricultural techniques - see below) and profits from activities such as processing and crop storage groups and savings and credit groups.

OVI 2: Issues addressed by local government

The second OVI was that *“priority issues of women and marginalised groups are increasingly addressed at the community level and within local government structures”*.

This OVI is not “SMART”. There are no targets given and it was not adequately backed by activities. The OVI also illustrates a general problem in the Logical Framework and the proposal narrative and that is the use of the word “local”. The term is too vague and has been taken to mean government structures at village / colline / kebele or those representing larger areas (such as district (*wilaya*) in Tanzania).

❖ *It is recommended that vague terms such as “local” are avoided in project proposals and logical frameworks and that if English translations are used (such as “district”) the term used in the national language (“wilaya” in this case) is also given in brackets.*

Recording of attendance at the various meetings mentioned in the Means of Verification (MOV) is of variable quality depending on the country and the implementing partner and was not analysed quantitatively.

Questions were asked about what issues respondents wanted their village and district councils to address and what they thought had been addressed by the councils. Ideally, quantitative analyses of minutes of the government councils would have been carried out but this may have been impractical and probably not allowed in some situations. What issues women and marginalised groups wanted addressed was usually not disaggregated.

The twice-annual household surveys for satisfaction with village and district that were included as a Means of Verification in the logical framework were not carried out in all countries.

Expected Result 1: Strengthened Local Government

The first Expected Result was: *“strengthened local government structures to manage, regulate and coordinate local development”*. See comments above about use of the word “local”.

ER1 was not specific enough as the emphasis of the project was on agriculture-based livelihoods whereas ER1 refers to local government structures in general.

OVI 1: Monitoring of implementation of government plans

The first OVI was that there would be *“regular joint monitoring by Concern and partners of progress against local government development plans in all 3 programme countries”*.

This is not an OVI but a means of verification (or possibly a result). What the monitoring is intended to measure is the extent to which government plans were actually implemented and the level of transparency. In Tanzania, the monitoring at district level is done under the auspices of ANSAF. ANSAF has no numerical data as yet but did suggest there had been some qualitative results of the monitoring process (see page 84). There is no equivalent to ANSAF in Ethiopia or Burundi.

In Ethiopia, the meetings between government and NGOs are mainly for coordination and also so that the government can monitor NGO performance, not the other way round. The *“score cards and service charters”* that the proposal narrative said would be used in Tanzania by villagers to measure government performance were not in fact developed.

OVI 2: Exchange visits

The second OVI was that *“local authorities in all 3 programme countries have participated in internal and external exchange visits and can demonstrate learning and sharing”*

Participation in exchange visits is an activity rather than an OVI. Ethiopia and Tanzania did not organise external exchange visits. One way of assessing learning would be to require participants to write a report on their return (and possibly before final out-of-pocket expenses are paid).

OVI 3: Women's representation (Burundi and Ethiopia only)

The second OVI was that there would be a *“15% increase in the proportion of women's representation in Community Level structures, in Burundi and Ethiopia”*.

An increase of membership of women (and other vulnerable groups) in government bodies from village/ colline / kebele level upwards would be one proxy indicator that issues of importance to women were being discussed. Because of the timing, the project had little impact on election results in (Tanzania and) Burundi though previous projects may well have. In Ethiopia, the government lays down what the level of representation by women should be (100 men and 100 women in kebele councils and these send two men and one woman to the woreda council). It was an inappropriate OVI for Ethiopia.

OVI 4: Disaster Risk Reduction

The fourth OVI was that *“Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction systems are established and operational within Local Government structures in 60% of target communities in all 3 programme countries”*.

This is fine.

OVI 5: Land tribunals (Tanzania only)

The fifth OVI (applying to Tanzania only) was that *“all 70 target villages in Tanzania have land tribunals formulated according to the requirements of the Village Land Act No 5 of 1999”*.

This is fine.

Expected Result 2: Diversified Livelihoods

The second Expected Result was that there would be *“diversified livelihoods for farmers through working with local institutions and the private sector”*.

Under Activities for this result, there was no mention of distribution of improved planting material to targeted households and it was an activity in all three countries. This was an oversight.

The OVIs do not really measure the quantity or quality of diversification. There were three OVIs.

OVI 1: Adoption of new agricultural practices

The first OVI was that: *“70% of the targeted farmers are applying one or more new agricultural practices by the end of the programme in all 3 programme countries”*.

This seems fine as an OVI. However the reliability of the answers in the surveys depends on how the enumerator and how the farmer understood the questions. The tables in the endline reports just have one word for each practice such as “spacing”, “variety”. In one survey both “correct” spacing and “seed rate” as two practices with different answers. Some knowledge of agriculture would have been needed by the enumerator to ensure the farmer understood the question correctly. One survey reported that farmers had had training in traditional agriculture which seems unlikely. Practices such as crop rotation, applying manure, soil conservation, irrigation were often not included in the list farmers had to choose from.

OVI 2: Increased crop production

The second OVI was that *“targeted farmers have significantly increased ($p < 0.05$) their crop production compared to non-targeted farmers in all 3 programme countries”*.

The difficulties with this OVI are similar to those of food stocks (see above). The specification that the increase should satisfy a $p < 0.05$ level of statistical significance was a move in the right direction though over-ambitious given the inherent uncertainties. Surveys paid too much attention to determining yield (production per unit area) rather than production *per se* which was the OVI.

Production can be increased by planting larger areas (which happened in some villages) as well as through increased yields. In FGDs in Tanzania, it was reported that farmers with insufficient land often rented land from others, sometimes in neighbouring villages. In Iringa villages, it is not uncommon for a farmer to have an irrigated field and an unirrigated farm. Polygamy is another reason for farmers having more than one plot. Reported production may be from one of the wives' farms or all the farms. Some people said that as a result of higher incomes, from processing groups for example, they were now able to hire labour to cultivate more of their available land.

There were some additional complications:

- (a) Traditional cassava varieties are harvested after 18 or 24 months over a 12 month period so farmers would not remember how much they had harvested. Varieties introduced by the project that were short duration would be harvested after 6 to 9 months over a 4 month period.
- (b) The period over which production was to be reported seems to have differed from country to country. The normal period for reporting production is 12 months, rather than 3 months for example as in Burundi.
- (c) Naturally, there have been considerable rainfall variations over the project lifetime. For example in Kibondo, the third year had lower rainfall in some areas than in the first two years. Because of such variations, it may have been better to omit the word “increased” in the OVI and to simply compare beneficiary production with non-beneficiary production.

OVI 3: Value chain

The third OVI was that *“groups undertaking value-chain activities with links to the private sector, are reporting increased income in all 3 programme countries”*.

This was fine though it could have been more “SMART” (percentage of groups, percentage of increased income). Not all endline surveys reported on “increased income” under this heading.

Expected Result 3: Non-state actor involvement in planning

The third Expected Result was that there would be *“increased involvement of non-state actors in key planning processes”*. There were three OVIs.

OVI 1: Increased attendance of CSOs and community members in government planning

The first OVI was that there would be a “*documented increase in CSO and community members attendance in key planning processes and decision making in all 3 programme countries*”.

Whilst there are stakeholder forums in Ethiopia, the CSOs attending do not participate in government planning or decision making. It was considered inappropriate in Ethiopia.

OVI 2: Plans include needs of community and marginalized groups

The second OVI was that “*planning increasingly reflects the needs of community and marginalised groups*”.

This was similar to OVI 2 for the Specific Objective: “*priority issues of women and marginalised groups are increasingly addressed ...*”.

OVI 3: Exchange visits for CSOs

The third OVI was that “*CSOs have participated in internal and external exchange visits and can demonstrate learning and sharing*”. This is not an OVI but an activity. It is not clear in the OVI what the purpose of the visits were to be. As with OVI 2 for Expected Result 1, a final report should have been a requirement and assessed.

Appendix 4. Overview of administrative units and planning

Tanzania

President: Jakaya Kikwete

Vice President: Mohamed Gharib Bilal

Prime Minister: Mizengo Pinda

Population: 44,928,923⁶⁹

Administrative Units

Tanzania is divided into:

- 30 regions (*mkoa*) [25 on the mainland, 5 in Zanzibar];
- 169 districts (*wilaya*) [also known as local government authorities] – of which 34 are urban units (further classified as 3 city councils (Arusha, Mbeya, and Mwanza), 19 municipal councils, and 12 town councils);
- urban units have an autonomous city, municipal, or town council and are subdivided into wards (*shehia*) and *mtaa*;
- rural districts have an autonomous district council;
- rural districts are subdivided into:
 - divisions (seem not to be very functional);
 - wards (*shehia*);
 - villages (*vijiji*) that have elected village councils and these are divided into
 - hamlets (*vitongoji*) having a hamlet leader.

The average number of households in the project villages was about 700.



Figure 4. Regions (*mkoa*) of Tanzania

⁶⁹ 2012 Census

Planning at village and district levels

The following is an idealised outline of the process for producing the District Development Plan and specifically the District Agricultural Development Plan. The process does not necessarily happen in this way in every district.

Villages do not receive a budget from the ward or district directly but villages do participate in the creation of district plans that may include provision for activities in a specific village. However we were told that 20% of money raised at village level (from market fees etc) is retained by the village council. However villages generally have very few sources of income. One village in Masasi used to put a tariff on cashews⁷⁰ harvested but this was stopped by the district government after cashew prices fell. Another village in Masasi received income from a village owned cashew farm.

Ward Development Plan

Some months before decisions are made at district level, staff from the District Planning Office visit the wards in order to explain to (or remind) the Ward Executive Officer (WEO) of the need to develop a Ward Development Plan and how to go about this.

The WEO, the Village Executive Officer and sometimes district staff visit the hamlets (*vitongoji*) to encourage the hamlet chairperson to develop a hamlet plan together with the hamlet household members.

The hamlet plans are then submitted to the village council who discuss them and then explain a revised consolidated plan to the general village assembly. At the village assembly the Village Development Plan is finalised.

The Village Development Plan is then submitted to the Ward Development Committee. Members of the Ward Development Committee include the councillor, village chairpersons and VEOs, and hamlet leaders. The Ward Development Committee then considers the village plans, may reject some components and finally submits a consolidated written Ward Development Plan to the District Planning Office. The Ward Development Committee is therefore key in passing on the village plans to the district government.

- More attention to building capacity of the Ward Development Committees to sift and make decisions (prioritise) about village plans and how best to present them to the district government may be a good future strategy.

Once the central government have decided on how much each district will receive, the districts receive tranches on a quarterly basis. However it is not easy to disaggregate expenditure on specific villages unless there is a special project.

District Development Plan and District Agricultural Development Plan

The Planning Office then passes the various components of the Ward Development Plans to the respective specialist departments (such as agriculture, education, health, roads, etc.) for their consideration.

These specialist departments prioritise the various submissions and once a year; pass them with estimated costs to the District Finance Committee, a sub-committee of the (elected) District Council.

One of the specialist departments is Agriculture & Livestock. This department (like others) calls Sector Stakeholder Meetings to which CSOs and other stakeholders are invited. It is at these Sector Stakeholder Meetings that the District Agricultural Development Plan is initiated. Sector Stakeholder Meetings are supposed to be held every quarter.

The District Planning Office hosts the Stakeholder Meetings with heads of sector departments though the meetings are actually organised by the District Community Development Officer. NGO plans would then be included but NGOs do not always inform the government of what they are

⁷⁰ Cashews have to be sold in Tanzania through the government controlled cooperative system that pays very low prices.

planning to do. Also local NGOs who are invited to such meetings have to bear the cost themselves and may not be able to afford the cost of coming very long distances (over 200 km each way for example in the case of some Iringa districts).

These plans are then considered by the District Council sitting with the heads of technical departments (and the DC is also invited) to consider what the Finance Committee have recommended.

The final decision is made by the District Advisory Committee chaired by the DC to which heads of departments and stakeholders are also invited. The final plans are then sent to the Regional offices for consideration before passing on to the central government. Districts are subsequently given a budget ceiling with allocations for each sector.

Burundi

President: Pierre Nkurunziza

Vice-Presidents: Terence Sinunguruza & Gervais Rufyikiri

Population: 10,557,259⁷¹

Administrative Units

Burundi is divided into:

- provinces (17),
- communes (117)
- zones (headed by chef de zones)
- collines (hills) [2,638 in total] (3 to 7 per zone)
- sub-collines (3 to 5 per colline)

The *collines* in the project communes of Busoni and Bugabira each have about 1,100 households.




Figure 5. Provinces of Burundi

⁷¹ July 2012 estimate

Planning at *colline* and *commune* level

Collines are administered by *Colline* Councils with five members (typically including only one woman). *Colline* Development Committees (CDCs) consist of the council plus seven others selected from the community. Typically women make up 25% of the CDCs. CDCs are not given a budget by the government. The *colline* simply send its plans to the *commune*. If they do not obtain assistance from the *commune*, they may decide to raise money themselves.

At *commune* level there are *Commune* Committees for Community Development (CCDCs). However it seems that the central government do not really take *commune* plans into account so *commune* plans can be implemented only from locally generated funds (shop and market taxes, etc.). For small projects developed by CCDCs, *communes* can apply directly to the national government. Though there is decentralisation policy in Burundi it has not yet penetrated to *colline* level to any great extent.

Ethiopia

President: Girma Wolde-Giorgis

Prime Minister: Hailemariam Desalegn

Population: 86,613,986⁷²

Administrative Units

Ethiopia is divided into:

- 9 ethnically based and politically autonomous regional states (*kililoch*, singular *kilil*) plus 2 chartered cities (*astedader akababiwoch*, singular *astedader akababi*) [Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa]
- the *kililoch* (states) are subdivided into 68 zones;
- zones are divided into 550 *woredas* and several “special” *woredas*;
- *woredas* are divided into neighbourhoods (*kebele* or in some areas, *tabia*).

The *kebeles* in the Offa *woreda* of Wolaita zone area each have about 1,000 households.

Planning at local level

In theory, before the *woreda* budget is developed, (some of) the sector specialists visit each *kebele* and discuss the draft budget for the *kebele* with the *kebele* leaders (cabinet) and council members. The *kebele* leaders can ask for other items to be included or for some to be excluded. The adjusted allocations for each sector are discussed by the *woreda* cabinet (government employees). The total budget is based on previous years plus an allowed percentage increase. The budget is therefore a decision by the *woreda* on how to divide up the more or less fixed budget between the various sectors. The project facilitated training (by zonal specialists) on budgeting and planning.

Then the *woreda* Office of Finance and Economic Development combines the sector submissions and coordinates a stakeholder meeting with NGOs at which a *Woreda Development Plan* is agreed⁷³. The final decision is taken by the elected *woreda* council⁷⁴. The *Woreda Development Plan* is then sent first to the zone and then up to the regional (state) government.

Woredas are able to raise their own money from taxes also and this is under their own control.

⁷² 2013 estimate - [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Statistical_Agency_\(Ethiopia\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Statistical_Agency_(Ethiopia))

⁷³ I was told that the Office of Finance and Economic Development also warns NGOs if they are falling behind in the activities they had agreed to do.

⁷⁴ *Woredas* are the lowest administration with an elected government. The last elections were at the end of 2012.




Figure 6. Administrative areas of Ethiopia

Appendix 5. Itinerary and work schedule

Work Day	Date	Activity	Location
1	Mon. 12 th Aug.	Reading project proposal & reports, preparing questions for interviews, making notes on reports and proposal; discussions on Skype with staff in Dublin	Anglesey, UK
2	Tue. 13 th Aug.		
3	Wed. 14 th Aug.		
4	Thu. 15 th Aug.		
5	Fri. 16 th Aug.		
	Sun. 18 th Aug.	Travel Anglesey to Manchester; fly Manchester to London. Fly London Heathrow to Dar es Salaam via Addis Ababa	
6	Mon. 19 th Aug.	Arrive Dar es Salaam, TANZANIA at 13:30. Arrive hotel at 18:00	
7	Tue. 20 th Aug.	Meetings with DCD(P) ⁷⁵ Concern (Burton Twisa), Exec. Sec. of ANSAF ⁷⁶ (Audax Rukonge), former EC Desk officer for project in Tanzania (Paddy Knudsen)	Dar es Salaam
8	Wed. 21 st Aug.	Travel Dar es Salaam to Iringa by road. Discussions with DCD(P)	
9	Thu. 22 nd Aug.	Meeting with District Planning Officer, Iringa	Iringa town
		Meeting with staff of Department of Land and natural Resources and Department of Agriculture and Livestock Development.	Itunundu, Iringa District
		Meeting with officials of ITUNUNDU Association of Irrigators & UKULUPA ⁷⁷ Association of Irrigators	
		Visit to Itunundu canal	
10	Fri. 23 rd Aug.	Meeting with beneficiaries in Kimande village, Iringa Dist. Meeting with village leaders and interviews with beneficiaries at homes	Kimande village, Iringa Dist. Magozi village, Iringa Dist.
11	Sat. 24 th Aug.	Meeting with members of UWAKAMA ⁷⁸ Visit stream diversion structure Meeting with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries	Mtandika village, Kilolo Dist. Ikula village, Kilolo Dist. Ikula village, Kilolo Dist.
12	Sun. 25 th Aug.	Travel Iringa to Dar es Salaam by road (10 hours)	
13	Mon. 26 th Aug.	Travel by plane from DSM to Mtwara, then by road to Masasi	
		Meetings with staff of Land Office, Masasi Meeting with staff of KIMAS, Masasi	Masasi town, Masasi District, Mtwara Region
14	Tue. 27 th Aug.	Meeting with village officials, paraprofessional & beneficiaries in Miungo village, Masasi Meetings with village officials and beneficiaries, Holola vill.	Miungo village, Masasi District Holola village, Masasi District
15	Wed. 28 th Aug.	Discussions with Peres Magiri Meeting with District Agricultural and Livestock officers Meeting with Land Valuer, Mtwara District Council – Lands Department Meeting with UPT staff	Mtwara town

⁷⁵ Deputy Country Director, Programmes)

⁷⁶ Agricultural Non-State Actors' Forum

⁷⁷ Umoja wa Kilimo cha Umwagiliaji Luganga Pawaga

⁷⁸ Umoja wa Wamwagiliaji Kata ya Mahenge = Association of Irrigators – Ward of Mahenge

Work Day	Date	Activity	Location
16	Thu. 29 th Aug.	Meetings with members of cashew processing group, Mtiniko vill.	Mtiniko village, Mtwara
		Meetings with beneficiaries of land registration and cassava processing group	Mchanje village, Mtwara
		Meeting with beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries & village officials, Mpanyani vill.	Mpanyani village, Mtwara
17	Fri. 30 th Aug.	Travel Mtwara to Mwanza by plane via Dar es Salaam	
18	Sat. 31 st Aug.	Travel Mtwara to Kibondo by car (7 hours)	
19	Sun. 1 st Sept.	Discussions with DCD(P). Start compiling points for report. Revise list of questions for Burundi	Kibondo town
20	Mon. 2 nd Sept.	Meeting with REDESO staff (Concern partner)	Kibondo town
		Meet village officials & FGD with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in Gwanumpu, village, Kibondo	Gwanumpu, village, Kibondo
21	Tue. 3 rd Sept.	Visit with DEO and District Land Officer	Kibondo town
		Visit to Busunzu village – crop storage warehouse group	Busunzu village, Kibondo district
		Village officials and paraprofessionals, Nyankwi village,	Nyankwi village, Kibondo district
		Travel on to Kigoma by car	
22	Wed. 4 th Sept.	Meet with Planning Officer and Agricultural Officer, Kigoma	Kigoma town
		Visit to village officials and FGD with sunflower processing group, Katuramimba	Katuramimba village, Kigoma
23	Thu. 5 th Sept.	Discussions with Concern and Caritas staff	Kigoma town
		Discussions with officials and FGD with beneficiaries in Mkongoro village	Mkongoro village, Kigoma
		FGD with VICOBA members, Mkongoro village	Mkongoro village, Kigoma
24	Fri. 6 th Sept.	Travel by road via Kobero to Bujumbura, BURUNDI. Security briefing by Country Director	
25	Sat. 7 th Sept.	Discussions with CD	Bujumbura
26	Sun. 8 th Sept.	Report writing, documentation research, revising interviews	
27	Mon. 9 th Sept.	Discussions with ACD-P	
		Travel to Kirundo. Meet with Kirundo team	
28	Tue. 10 th Sept.	Meeting with Provincial Governor, Kirundo	Kirundo town, Kirundo Province
		Meeting with DPAE (Prov. Agriculture & Livestock Dept.)	
		Meeting with APECOS	
		Meeting with Provincial DRR platform	
		Visit to Mutwenzi processing centre (Catholic Diocese of Muyinga)	
		Meeting with COSC	
29	Wed. 11 th Sept.	Meeting with Busoni administrator and Development advisor	Busoni town
		Visit Murore Co-op & meet with management committee	Murore, Busoni <i>Commune</i>
		Visit to lead farmer and zero grazing unit	Busoni <i>Commune</i>
		Visit to Munazi Hangar & meeting with committee	Munazi, Busoni <i>Commune</i>
30	Thu. 12 th Sept.	Visit to bee keeping group at Kigoma / Ntwago	Kigoma / Ntwago, Bugabira <i>Commune</i>
		Visit to a zero grazing unit at Kigoma	Kigoma, Bugabira <i>Commune</i>
		Meeting with RWH activity and green house group in Nyabikenke	Nyabikenke, Bugabira <i>Commune</i>
		Visit to Nyakarama Hangar & meeting with committee	Nyakarama, Bugabira <i>Commune</i>

Work Day	Date	Activity	Location
31	Fri. 13 th Sept.	Meeting with Renga DRR committee Visit to cassava multiplication group Meeting with Improved stoves' group at Vunga Meeting with representatives of SILC groups at Kigoma	Renga, Busoni <i>Commune</i> Kagege, Busoni <i>Commune</i> Vunga, Bugabira <i>Commune</i> Kigoma, Bugabira <i>Commune</i>
32	Sat. 14 th Sept.	Discussions with Claver Kabuhungu	Kirundo town
33	Sun. 15 th Sept.	Report writing and meeting with Bujambura team	Bujambura
34	Mon. 16 th Sept.	Meeting with soil and water management group, ISABU Meeting with bean specialist, ISABU Meeting with Financial Controller, CWB Meeting with Coordinator, CIALCA	
35	Tue. 17 th Sept.	Meeting with DRR national platform Meeting with head of seed multiplication unit, ISABU Debriefing with CD & ACD-P	
36	Wed. 18 th Sept.	Report writing	
		Travel Bujumbura, BURUNDI to Addis Ababa, ETHIOPIA	
37	Thu. 19 th Sept.	Briefing with CD, ACD-P, Livelihoods Advisor and M&E Coordinator	Addis Ababa
		Travel to Sodo, Wolaita Zone main town	
38	Fri. 20 th Sept.	Meeting with WDA staff	Sodo
		Meeting with former Coordinator of government Finance & Economic Development Department, Offa	Gasuba
		Meeting with Head of Agricultural Office, Offa	
		Meeting with staff of Marketing & Cooperatives Department	
39	Sat. 21 st Sept.	Report writing & discussions with Concern Livelihoods Programme Manager and Livelihoods Advisor	Sodo
40	Sun. 22 nd Sept.	Report writing	
41	Mon. 23 rd Sept.	Meeting with vice-head of <i>woreda</i> Finance and Economic Development Department Visit to Wachika Esho Forest Conservation Cooperative and meet with members Meet with head of <i>woreda</i> Water Office	Gasuba
42	Tue. 24 th Sept.	Visit to grain bank and meet with members Visit honey cooperative and meet with members Visit fruit and vegetable cooperative and meet with members	
43	Wed. 25 th Sept.	Visit to SACCO, Kodo <i>kebele</i> Meeting with members of Kodo <i>kebele</i> Forest Conservation Cooperative Visit to (broken) Milke bridge - could not reach Woyo Meeting with Anti-Corruption Officer about transparency Meeting with Head of Zonal Cooperative Promotion and Market Development Office	Offa

Work Day	Date	Activity	Location
43.5	Thu. 26 th Sept.	Travel to Awassa. Report writing	Awassa
44	Fri. 27 th Sept.	Report writing ⁷⁹	
44.5	Sat. 28 th Sept.		
45	Sun. 29 th Sept.		
46	Mon. 30 th Sept.	Meeting with Women’s Affairs Officer Meeting with <i>kebele</i> officials, Woshe Woche Dakaya and visit to irrigation scheme Visit to Anti-Corruption Officer	Offa
47	Tue. 1 st Oct.	Meeting with <i>kebele</i> council, Woshe Woche Dakaya Meeting with members of Mancha Forest Conservation Cooperative members	
48	Wed. 2 nd Oct.	Meeting with community in Galako, a non-target <i>kebele</i> . Debriefing with <i>woreda</i> government officials Meeting with project beneficiaries in Zamo Meeting with officer in charge of DRR, Gasuba	
49	Thu. 3 rd Oct.	Travel to Addis Ababa	
50	Fri. 4 th Oct.	Debriefing meeting with senior Addis staff	
51	Sat. 5 th Oct.	Return to UK	
52	Sun. 6 th Oct.	Report writing	Anglesey, UK
53	Mon. 7 th Oct.		
54	Tue. 8 th Oct.		
55	Wed. 9 th Oct.	Report writing	Anglesey, UK
56	Thu. 10 th Oct.		
57	Fri. 11 th Oct.		
58	Mon. 14 th Oct.	Report writing	Anglesey, UK
59	Tue. 15 th Oct.		
60	Wed. 16 th Oct.		

⁷⁹ This period was a holiday for the Celebration of the True Cross. On the advice of the desk officer, it was not considered wise to stay in Sodo when all staff were away. so by agreement with the ACD-P, I went to Awassa where I was met by some of my family. I spent only half these days on project work.

Maximising rural communities' livelihood options through engagement between non-state actors, government and the private sector

(Farming Together)

Final Evaluation

Paul D. Smith

November 2013

Annex 1. Tanzania



Annex 1: Tanzania

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Front cover: farmer in Ikula village, Kilolo District shows off his crop of lettuce made possible by the irrigation canal and stream diversion improvement by the project.

Evaluation according to logical framework indicators - Tanzania

This section considers the extent to which the project in Tanzania has met the objectively verifiable indicators (OVI) in the logical framework. To put the indicators into context and to clarify that some project activities were not relevant to every country, I have given a brief overview of the activities associated in the logical framework with each OVI.

A discussion of the logical framework and the difficulties associated with the various OVIs is given in Appendix 3. The following is a brief summary of the extent to which the objective and expected results have been met.

Overall objective

The Overall Objective was *“to contribute to the achievement of MDG1⁸⁰ and food security in Tanzania, Ethiopia and Burundi”*. Taking into account the indicators for the three expected results and for the Specific Objective, the project in Tanzania has contributed to the overall objective to a substantial extent.

Specific objective

The **Specific Objective** was: *“to improve livelihoods and empowerment of poor farmers in decentralised decision-making processes”*.

Despite problems with the Logical Framework and the baseline and endline surveys, my opinion is that the project in Tanzania has achieved a substantial improvement in *“... livelihoods and empowerment of poor farmers in decentralised decision-making processes”*.

There were two Objectively Verifiable Indicators for the Specific Objective:

OVI 1: Food Stocks

The first OVI was that *“at the end of the programme, the number of targeted households that have achieved recommended staple food stock levels has increased by at least 15% when compared to non-intervention areas”*.

The problems with assessing this OVI are discussed in Appendix 3. The baseline surveys were particularly suspect. The Endline Survey Report (ESR) states that at the time of the survey, the average food stocks per household indicated to be: maize - 111 kg; paddy - 104 kg, cassava - 73 kg and sorghum - 47 kg. The endline survey for Tanzania did not analyse days of food stocks based on calorie requirements. No attempt was made to analyse the total days available by adding the energy available from all the surveyed crops and no attempt was made to compare target households with non-target households. It is therefore difficult to say if the OVI has been met or not. However during Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), most people reported increases in production and income and a reduction in months when food was scarce.

The ESR also reports the following food security data:

- 8.3% of children had moderate malnutrition at the time of the survey - mainly Mtwara;
- from 2011 to 2013, the percentage of people eating only one meal a day had reduced from 4.4% to 2.0%;
- from 2011 to 2013, the percentage of people eating 2 or 3 meals a day had increased from 95.1% to 97.7%.

OVI 2: Issues addressed by local government

The second OVI was that *“priority issues of women and marginalised groups are increasingly addressed at the community level and within local government structures”*.

⁸⁰ Since MDG 1 is to “Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger”, “food security” in the Overall objective is superfluous.

Annex 1: Tanzania

The ESR did not address the issues of “women and marginalised” but simply asked all the respondents the degree to which they were satisfied that the district and village councils had addressed their priorities. The report claimed those who were either satisfied or very satisfied had increased from 20.3% at the time of the baseline survey to 40.7% in the endline survey. We were told by women in several FGDs that women’s issues were not adequately addressed in the village council and in another FGD that women would now often ask female councillors to raise issues affecting women such as domestic violence.

The OVI is not SMART and in any case not easily measured. However my view is that there has been a gradual though slow improvement in local government addressing priority issues of women and marginalised so that the OVI has been achieved.

Expected Result 1: Strengthened Local Government

The first Expected Result was: “*strengthened local government structures to manage, regulate and coordinate local development*”. My opinion is that the project has contributed greatly to achieving this result despite problems with the OVIs and surveys. However the result is too general. Though the project has helped to strengthen village councils and village level planning, at a district level, the project strengthened mainly the district Land Offices and the District Agricultural and Livestock Development departments. Brief comments on the Activities in the Logical Framework for this Expected Result are given below.

Activities for Result 1

Government capacity building

The 1st activity was to “*build capacity of relevant government personnel on decision-making, financial allocations and effective planning*”.

The proposal stated that the project would train “*Village Council members in 70 Tanzanian programme villages on their role in DADPs⁸¹ planning process as per the DADPs Guidelines and the ASDP⁸², and the convening and facilitation of QVGAMs⁸³ as per the Local Authorities Act of 1982 (Amended in 1999)*”.

The project facilitated the training of Village Councils in making village development plans, on the importance of citizen participation in the planning process, to develop plans which address community priorities including those of marginal groups and on the DADP development process. The final report records that a total of 630 village committee members (9 per village) were trained.

The training on Village Council planning and other responsibilities was delivered by the partners or the District Council staff (usually by the District Community Development Officer). Guidelines for developing village development plans that had been produced at national level were provided by the District Council officials. A number of Village Councils interviewed said they needed more training in making village plans.

In addition, the project facilitated the training of district officials and village leaders on topics (depending on the region) such as land registration (see page 92), land use planning and (in some villages) environmental conservation and food budgeting. The project also raised awareness among villagers on topics such as human rights and land registration Table 16⁸⁴.

Table 16. Training of government and village populations

Topic	Women	Men	TOTAL
Decision-making, financial allocations & effective planning	3,206	3,374	6,580
Human rights and land rights	13,734	13,908	27,642
Disaster Risk Reduction	1,889	2,161	4,050
Local institutions (members of village councils, land councils & tribunals)	663	1,206	1,869

⁸¹ District Agricultural Development Plans

⁸² Agricultural Sector Development Programme

⁸³ Quarterly Village General Assembly Meetings

⁸⁴ Taken from the final narrative report

Training on land rights

The final report (Table 16) states that approximately 27,642 people benefited directly through awareness raising on land rights. The training to villagers was provided by District Land Officers after the Southern Zonal Commissioner and specialists from the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlements Development in Dar es Salaam trained district officers in Iringa. See also the above paragraph and page 92 on land registration.

Training on DRR

The 3rd Activity was to train “*local councils on Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) initiatives*”.

Nine committee members were selected in each village by the community. A total of 490 DRR committee members and 210 village leaders (chairperson, secretary and treasurer) participated in the training that was provided usually by the person in the District Agriculture and Livestock Office responsible for DRR. Training included how to respond in a disaster such as a severe storm or a bush fire. Villagers were also included in the list of those trained (Table 16).

See also OVI 4 below on the establishment of a DRR system.

Exchange visits

The 4th Activity was to facilitate “*Exchange visits of local government representatives around the issue of decentralisation*”. The final report states bluntly that “*This is not applicable for Tanzania*”. See OVI 2 for Expected Result 1 below but note that OVI 2 is simply that “*local authorities in all 3 programme countries have participated in internal and external exchange visits and can demonstrate learning and sharing*”. OVI 2 does not specifically refer to “*decentralisation*”.

OVI 1: Monitoring of implementation of government plans

The first OVI was that there would be “*regular joint monitoring by Concern and partners of progress against local government development plans in all 3 programme countries*”.

As pointed out in Appendix 3, this OVI is really a Means of Verification. The OVI would have been better expressed as something like “*proportion of government plans in agriculture sector actually implemented has increased*”. In Tanzania, this is exactly what ANSAF are attempting to do and so this OVI was more feasible in Tanzania than the other two countries. Through their partners, ANSAF monitors agricultural sector budgets and expenditure at national and district levels. While good progress has been made at national level with an impressive degree of government cooperation, implementing their Social Accountability programme at district level has been more difficult.

ANSAF HQ staff trained Concern staff, councillors and representatives from villages on their approach to monitoring district level plans. During the project, Concern and partner staff members of this project were asked by ANSAF⁸⁵ to visit government departments in Iringa and Kilolo and Masasi districts, annually to collect agricultural budget and expenditure details. ANSAF subsequently analysed the data. ANSAF also trained some CSOs and public officials in Iringa and Kilolo districts on Social Accountability Monitoring as a way of bridging the gap between duty bearers and rights holders. For Iringa a full report was produced, whereas in Kilolo and Masasi the reports were still being prepared.

ANSAF said it was not yet possible to assess the impact of the monitoring at district level. However, they did say that based on the findings from Iringa and preliminary analyses from Masasi and other districts where ANSAF members are located, the ANSAF Secretariat shared recommendations with national level government officials. One of the decisions that ANSAF contributed to, was to give DADP guidelines to LGAs to allocate at least TZS 56 million for investment projects in the agricultural sector. This directive was given not to Iringa alone, but to all the districts in Tanzania when developing DADPs.

ANSAF has also noted that there is a significant increase in the number of people demanding information (no figures were given) - especially at local level due to the Social Accountability Monitoring. In Lindi for example, a review of the documents indicated “*a cut and paste culture*” where the public officials would just shift figures from previous years and paste them in the current year’s budget. A discussion which followed, challenged the councillors that they were endorsing a document without properly reviewing them. ANSAF believes that this situation may have improved during the 2012/13 planning period (the ANSAF Secretariat did not conduct budget analyses for 2012-13).

⁸⁵ This and the following paragraphs relating to monitoring of government budgets and expenditure by ANSAF are based on an e-mail answer from ANSAF to questions posed by the consultant.

Annex 1: Tanzania

In terms of timely disbursement of funds, ANSAF said there was evidence (not specified) that for 2009-10 and 2010-11 there was a significant improvement in the timely transfer of funds for agriculture from the treasury to LGAs and community levels though this improvement was not maintained over the last two years (2011-12, 2012-2013).

ANSAF observes that it is difficult to keep the momentum and government commitment unless a good monitoring mechanism is put in place to ensure the set standards are not compromised. While the central government and donors are committed to deliver funds in a timely manner, this cannot be guaranteed when the LGAs budgets are given a “*qualified audit opinion*” (or disclaimer) or adverse opinions. Normally when such opinions are given, they contribute to delays in the transfer of funds.

Councillors are expected to review and approve documents before they are submitted to central government. ANSAF believes that many of the councillors do not have a good education and so at times they hardly discuss the plans or consult with their constituents before endorsing them. ANSAF believed that this may be one of the reasons why some LGAs are consistently obtaining “*qualified audit opinions*”, or produce poor plans. ANSAF also suggested that too often politicians interfere with planning and resource allocation and development work suffers as a result.

Whilst it may not be a direct result of this monitoring (and is unsubstantiated), we were told by some planning officers (e.g. in Iringa) that the percentage of government funding allocated to agriculture has been increasing.

OVI 2: Exchange visits

The second OVI was that “*local authorities in all 3 programme countries have participated in internal and external exchange visits and can demonstrate learning and sharing*”.

Tanzania did not arrange external exchange visits though there was a visit from a delegation from Burundi. Within Tanzania, the project facilitated a 5-day visit for Land Office staff from project districts to Iringa District Council Land Department⁸⁶. There, they learned about Guidelines for the implementation of Land Act no 5 of 1999, the use of GPS equipment for land surveying, and the processing and issuing of CCROs to villagers.

In addition, the ESR states that District Agriculture Officers, extension officers, and village leaders (VC and VEO) were among those going on exchange visits to different districts. The field trips focused at cashew nut marketing, cassava processing, rice production, green gram production, home gardening, poultry keeping, seed growing, oxen farming, and familiarization with MKURABITA (*Mpango wa Kurasimisha Rasilimali na Biashara za Wanyonge Tanzania* (Property and Business Formalising Programme for the Vulnerable of Tanzania)). No numbers are given.

OVI 3: Women's representation

The second OVI was that there would be a “*15% increase in the proportion of women's representation in Community Level structures, in Burundi and Ethiopia*”.

Although this OVI did not apply to Tanzania, partners reminded VCs from time to time that there should be 50% representation (by law). However in the villages visited, the number of women on village councils ranged from 6 to 8 out of 25. Some women are appointed to district councils by political parties according to the number of seats to increase the ratio of women to men.

The number of women leaders in project districts is shown in Table 17. The contribution made by the project to actual leadership numbers during its relatively short duration was very small. The elections for local government including the village chairmen had already been held in 2009 though there have since been some by-elections. The councillor elections in 2010 were not influenced by this project either but staff members believe that the previous Rights Based Livelihoods Project did have an impact. Councillors are elected for 4 years but this project was for only 3 years and so had minimal influence over the council membership.

⁸⁶ This may explain why I was told by district planning staff that they did not go on exchange to other districts.

Annex 1: Tanzania

Table 17. Women in leadership roles in project districts

District	Village chairperson	Village executive officers	Ward councillors
Masasi	0	2	3
Nanyumbu	0	1	1
Mtwara	1	4	2
Kigoma	NA	NA	NA
Kibondo	NA	NA	NA
Iringa	0	1	2
Kilolo	0	1	1
TOTAL	1	9	8

OVI 4: Disaster Risk Reduction

The fourth OVI was that *“Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction systems are established and operational within Local Government structures in 60% of target communities in all 3 programme countries”*.

The final report states that DRR systems were established and are operational within all 70 project villages. Twenty dormant village DRR committees were revived by selecting new committee members and training them together with the other 50 village DRR committees and village government leaders over several days.

The village DRR committees were informed about how to report to the district DRR committees. Though the project focused only on village level DRR committees, we were informed that districts generally have an emergency (contingency) fund to help them cope with disasters. Environmental impact assessments were not commonly undertaken though we were told in Iringa that the district government undertook environmental assessments before any new road construction.

The project responded to a series of low rainfall years (frequently interpreted as “climate change”) by introducing the more drought tolerant sorghum and encouraged farmers to plant it instead of maize and to replace local cassava varieties with a more drought tolerant (and bitter) variety. Farmers and government officials widely appreciated this introduction.

Concern (and partners) should use the term “climate change” with extreme caution and certainly not without the support of the Tanzania Meteorological Agency (in this case). Climate change happens over long time periods and cannot be deduced from a series of low rainfall years. Even if rainfall declines, it is not necessarily a disaster if farmers can adapt such as by using more drought tolerant crops.

In collaboration with Tanzania Meteorological Agency (TMA), the project provided 12 rain gauges under the DRR activity as the TMA were keen to increase their coverage. The village leaders selected individuals to be trained by the TMA in how to read the equipment, fill in the report forms and send them to the TMA. The monitors (the village paraprofessionals) at one site visited gave one copy of the records to the village chairman and kept copy themselves. Village officials and the recorders interviewed during the evaluation had no difficulty with giving copies of the data to project (or partner) staff.

❖ *It is strongly recommended that for projects containing a DRR, water or agriculture component, rainfall records are obtained from the stations that exist in the project area.*

As DRR is supposed to be main-streamed, this should be done in all projects. The data can be used by agricultural staff to help explain variations in production, water resource staff to have an idea of surface run-off in specific months and DRR committee members to provide specific data in the case of disasters resulting in a particular year from lack or excess of rain.

Annex 1: Tanzania

The ACD-P asked TMA if they could give an interpretation of weather records for the project areas but they were (not surprisingly) unwilling to interpret their models for a very small part of the country.

However during the evaluation it became evident that there was no systematic collection of Early Warning data put in place in Tanzania though there is some price monitoring on an *ad hoc* basis. The general impression was that the DRR system in Tanzania at both village and district level was still rather weak.

We were told in Kibondo that the REDESO manager had been invited onto the district DRR committee though it had met only once⁸⁷.

- ❖ *The attention of District DRR committees (and Concern and partner staff) should be drawn to the regular assessments made by the USAID-funded Famine Early Warning System Network⁸⁸ and to the World Food Programme's "Comprehensive Food Security & Vulnerability Analysis" for Tanzania⁸⁹.*

OVI 5: Land tribunals (Tanzania only)

The fifth OVI (applying to Tanzania only) was that *"all 70 target villages in Tanzania have land tribunals formulated according to the requirements of the Village Land Act No 5 of 1999"*.

In theory, all villages already had land tribunals (some selected after the 2009 elections) but they were generally inactive (in one village they knew they had a tribunal but did not know who the members were). Tribunal also exist at ward (as well as district) level.

In all 70 programme villages, land tribunals were either formed or revived and the project facilitated training of the 490 members (7 per village) on the Village Land Act No. 5 (1999), the Land Dispute Court Act No. 2 (2002), on their role in the implementation of the land laws and in developing village land use plans. Training was usually undertaken by the District Land Officer.

It was generally observed that the number of disputes land tribunals deal with is very low (none in some villages visited). We were told by a Land Officer that tribunals are helping to some extent but there is still a lot to do in building capacity. There are no statistics compiled of dispute resolutions at district level. This would have been a useful additional measure of impact.

In Masasi, village land committees were formed as well as land tribunals (in most villages, the two functions are addressed by a single committee). The land committees are responsible for land use planning and management. In these villages, KIMAS also gave the committees training in environmental awareness, promoted tree planting on a very small scale, the protection of water sources and discouraged the practice of burning bush to hunt game. The village land divided into (i) occupied, (ii) village land, (iii) forest reserve. Village land in one village had been sub-divided into grazing areas, forest areas, general land and potential building land. Some villages have developed a two year land use plan.

- ❖ *It is recommended that future projects with a natural resource management component pay particular attention to the Village Land Committees as they are responsible for the village land use plan.*
- ❖ *It is recommended that in future projects, Village Land Committees are encouraged to develop maps of their villages⁹⁰ showing the different land classifications and village land which could be given up for cultivation if the need arose.*

Expected Result 2: Diversified Livelihoods

The second Expected Result was that there would be *"diversified livelihoods for farmers through working with local institutions and the private sector"*. This result has been achieved mainly for those targeted farmers who were able to participate in activities such as processing and savings groups. Some of the poor people given goats and poultry have also increased their range of livelihood sources.

⁸⁷ However the Acting DEO said that there were only government people on the district DRR committee.

⁸⁸ downloadable from <http://www.fews.net/Pages/remote-monitoring-country.aspx?gb=tz&l=en>

⁸⁹ downloadable from <http://www.wfp.org/content/tanzania-comprehensive-food-security-vulnerability-analysis-2012-august-2013>

⁹⁰ outline maps already exist as they are required by the Land Act 5 before land registration within a village can take place

Annex 1: Tanzania

Most beneficiaries have had existing sources of livelihood (growing crops) enhanced through training and improved varieties rather than diversified. Comments on the activities associated with this Result in the Logical Framework are given below.

Activities for Expected Result 2

Training for farmers

The 1st activity was “*training for farmers in appropriate farming techniques, for example crop diversification, including new short-cycle drought-resistant crop varieties, animal health and irrigation, through the use of farmer Field Schools (FFS)*”.

The project identified approximately 9,300 target households (poor, very poor, vulnerable) in the project villages. The figure for farmers trained through FFS in Table 18 taken from the final report is therefore too high. The estimated number of farmers attending FFS was 6,990 though not all of these were targeted farmers as some FFS were open to anyone who wanted to join. A further 185 were trained in water use.

The techniques most often mentioned in FGDs during the evaluation were line planting and crop spacing. In Iringa and Kilolo, members of irrigation groups were trained in rice processing, household food budgeting, food storage, financial management, group management & governance (officials, elections, minutes, agenda, etc.) but training in improved agricultural techniques was done by the government extension workers.

Table 18. Training related to Expected Result 2⁹¹

Topic	Men	Women	Total
FFS training on crop production and livestock husbandry	3,356	3,364	6,990
Paraprofessionals	110	110	220
Quality Declared Seeds farmers	55	64	119
Water use			185
Alternative income generating techniques	483	457	940
Processing and marketing	613	1,045	1,658

Strengthen agricultural extension services

The 2nd activity was to “*strengthen agricultural extension services through government and community-based models*”.

Paraprofessionals

The model used in Tanzania was to train volunteers called “paraprofessionals”. Training was done by the partners if they had qualified staff, by District Agricultural Officers (facilitated⁹² by the project) and by government Ward Extension Agents. In Mtwara, the Naliendele Agriculture Institute helped with training paraprofessionals. The project trained 220 paraprofessionals trained (Table 18) on agronomy and animal health including vaccination methods. The paraprofessionals were to complement the few government agricultural extension workers at ward level. Two people (one male, one female) selected by the village council or at a general meeting were trained. However in Kibondo, REDESO trained ten paraprofessionals in each village because of demand. No paraprofessionals were trained in Iringa where the government District Agricultural Department provided training to farmers. In Kibondo, the paraprofessionals were provided with bicycles.

The paraprofessionals were able to earn some money from vaccinations of chickens for which they received training from the DVO. For example in Nanyumbu, they had been vaccinating chickens for NCD at TSh 50 per chicken (a vial that vaccinates 400 chickens costs TSh 2,000 so making profit of TSh 45 per chicken). In Mtwara, the charge is TSh 30 per chicken, TSh 10 of which goes to the village funds, TSh 10 goes to the cost of vaccine and TSh 10 goes to the paraprofessional.

A processing group in Mtwara pay the paraprofessional every time he visits the group farm. Some QDS farmers also pay paraprofessionals for visits.

In one FGD we were told that the paraprofessional should also be trained in treatment for worms and prevention of fowl pox.

⁹¹ based in data from final project report but farmers, water users, and paraprofessionals trained are estimates based on revised data provided by the ACD-P after submission of final report

⁹² “facilitated” in this report means the project paid subsistence allowances and provided transport

Annex 1: Tanzania

Farmer Field Schools

The paraprofessionals organised a total of 233 Farmer Field Schools (FFS) on a dedicated plot of land about twice a week during the growing season (planting to harvest). The selection process of those who were invited to attend FFS was very variable across the project villages in Tanzania. In one village in Masasi, we were told that those invited should be “*hardworking, influential farmers, opinion leaders, and have land*”. When questioned further, the informants added that the beneficiaries should also include representatives of some poor and vulnerable people. In many cases anyone who wanted to join the FFS was allowed to do so. During the evaluation, it was not unusual to find that village officials had been members of the FFS. In one village, the FFS morphed into a processing group and the FFS plot was taken over by the group to grow cassava.

The FFS seemed to be more targeted on the poor and vulnerable in Kibondo and Kigoma. In Kibondo, FFS are required to help AIDS victims or other vulnerable people such as giving them a job cooking for the FFS participants or by giving them the harvest from the FFS plot. AIDS victims and other vulnerable people joined the FFS because they were unable to work on their own. In Kigoma we were told that the vulnerable either joined the FFS or sent a family member or received produce from the FFS plot.

The FFS are organised regularly on dedicated plots during the growing period for two to three years. After that, the paraprofessionals continue with on-farm extension only. Often Ward Extension Agents came to the FFS to provide training. In Kibondo, many of the FFS also had demonstration conservation agriculture plots.

Often farmers who had not been invited attended FFS. Not only had those attending FFS applied the techniques being taught, but farmers were copied by their neighbours. This makes disaggregating beneficiaries from non-beneficiaries very difficult in Tanzania.

Develop community seed & produce storage facilities

Processing groups

The only large-scale storage facilities that were developed or improved were for the sunflower and cassava processor groups and these were quite small as products were sold soon after being produced. Seed produced under the QDS scheme in Tanzania irrigation groups was stored also in small stores at farm level.

On-farm storage

Although there were demonstrations and training for improved grain storage structures at household level by the DAOs, the uptake was very low as people preferred the traditional types or wanted to start storing food in their homes because of security.

Community Based Warehouses

In Kibondo, REDESO helped to revive an existing village warehouse and linked it with savings & credit groups (SACCO and VICOBA). The group had 43 members. Crops are stored for around 3 months until the prices are higher. In the meantime the farmer obtains a loan from savings and credit group. REDESO helped to link warehouses with buyers. Nothing was done to encourage bulk marketing though some farmers joined together privately to sell in bulk. There was an arrangement whereby storage fees for the poor were waived.

Watershed management including rain-water harvesting & small-scale irrigation

Canals

In Tanzania, the project was not involved in watershed management or the construction of rainwater harvesting systems. However, the project arranged for the lining of 1,765 m of canals in Iringa district and 1,004 m of canals in Kilolo district to improve water supply. The schemes irrigate about 3,800 ha. The project trained 185 water users in equitable water management. The quality of the canals seen during the evaluation was not high and this is discussed further on page 104. The irrigation groups in Iringa were growing rice throughout the irrigated area and this is discussed on page 91.

Treadle pumps

In Kibondo, about 480 treadle pumps were distributed to vegetable growing groups (of about 7) who also received seeds - a total of 3,375 direct beneficiaries. Water was pumped from shallow wells.

Support development of alternative income generating sources

The main means that the project helped to develop alternative income generating sources was through the establishment of processing groups for rice (Iringa), sunflower (Kigoma and Kibondo) and cassava (Mtwara and Masasi) - see page 93. Other ways the project helped to develop alternative income generating sources included the following.

VICOBAs and SACCOs

21 Village Community Banks (VICOBAs) were formed with a total of 522 members. These were trained on management of their banks focussing on saving and credit procedures. There is no restriction on membership. In theory, the VICOBAs support villagers to save and receive small loans to invest in income generating activities.

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The programme injected capital to functioning groups to increase number of beneficiaries able to access loans. Every member has to take a loan on a cyclical basis. Interest rates hardly cover inflation. Loans were usually used to start or expand small businesses such as shops, trading, or, in one case, setting up a solar-powered mobile phone charging service. However some people took loans to pay school fees or other domestic purposes. One SACCO was set up in Kibondo and registered as a Cooperative.

Vegetable growing

A total of 202 kitchen garden groups were established in Iringa, Kilolo and Kibondo. In Kibondo, 18 FFS with 476 vegetable growing groups were trained on vegetable grading, packaging and advertising. After the training, the groups started to penetrate the vegetable markets in urban areas such Kigoma town.

Provision of inputs

Note that under Activities for this result in the Logical Framework, there was no mention of the provision of inputs. This was an oversight. It can be argued that the provision of inputs helped poor farmers to produce a marketable surplus and therefore contributed to their having another source of income.

Goats: In Tanzania, the main inputs provided to very poor households identified by the community were chickens and goats. A total of 232 goats were provided to about 160 beneficiaries. In Kilolo, two goats, one male and one female, were given to each targeted household. This is not the correct ratio (1:10). Though villagers liked goat milk, they were not given the opportunity of having a dairy goat. No one had passed on offspring to other poor people in the community as requested. In Mtwara, beneficiaries received only female goats and here the offspring were passed on to other needy families. The initial overly extravagant design of the goat houses were changed after comments made in one of the Technical Reports from the consultant⁹³.

Poultry: A total of 2,360 chickens were distributed to around 470 beneficiaries. The final report records that the number of poultry given to families was increased from 2 in 2010 to about 9 at the end of the project. During the evaluation, I was told in one village in Kilolo that early in the project 21 poultry including six cocks had been given to groups of 10 people. Later in the project 6 poultry including one cock had been given to each targeted household. The ratio of males to females is not correct (1:10). In Kibondo the partner gave 2 females and one male chicken. As they were hybrid chicks, egg production increased significantly,

Cassava cuttings: Before the start of this project (as part of the Food Facility project), mosaic- resistant cassava cuttings were distributed widely in Mtwara region. Through the FFS, 70 farmers were trained how to store cassava cuttings for the next season. UPT in Mtwara helped to multiply cassava. In Kigoma, the government provided mosaic-resistant cassava cuttings to farmers including those in project villages.

Seed: In addition to cassava cuttings, REDESO in Kibondo provided FFS demonstration plots with seeds of improved varieties of groundnuts, sunflower and beans.

Drugs and vaccine: In Kibondo, vaccine for NCD was provided free of charge. The community now appear to be reluctant to pay for vaccinations so the paraprofessionals will no longer provide this service though they will continue to organise FFS and do their agricultural extension work.

Quality Declared Seed

In Tanzania, the project supported the establishment of Quality Declared Seed (QDS) producers for sunflower in Kigoma and Kibondo, and for sorghum (mainly, but also sunflower, cowpeas, groundnut, onion and sesame) in Iringa and Kilolo. A total of 119 farmers in 13 groups were trained and produced certified seed (Table 18). The produced seed increased access to quality seeds for farmers as well as providing a lucrative source of additional income for producers.

Facilitate linkages between beneficiaries and markets including cross-border trade

As with the other two countries, nothing was done to explore the potential for cross-border trade (to Mozambique in Mtwara and to Burundi in Kigoma?). However farmers were trained on how to look for markets. In Mtwara, farmers were put in touch with CAVA Africa that is involved in promoting the marketing of cassava. In most cases though, businessmen came to buy processed products in the village. As stated above, in Kigoma, vegetable producers seem to have been more proactive.

Support farmers to add value ... through processing & marketing

Approximately 1,172⁹⁴ (850F: 322M) farmers were involved in processing and marketing sunflower and cassava products and about 476 farmers are involved in rice processing. According to Table 18 taken from the final report, 1,658 had specific training.

⁹³ Christopher Davey

⁹⁴ Figures are taken from the final report which included Lindi

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Cassava processing

Around 511 farmers in the south region (Mtwara, Nanyumbu and Masasi districts) are members of 9 cassava processing groups. Anyone was able to join and village officials were not uncommon. The programme provided seven processing machines for cassava and trained the groups. The groups generally produce cassava grit rather than flour as the grit is preferred by traders (they do the final grinding into flour themselves). Grit sells for about 10 times the price per kg of dried cassava (though 1 kg of cassava does not produce 1 kg of grit). In some villages we were told there was a list of vulnerable people in the village and these could have their cassava processed free. Groups generally sold to buyers from as far away as Dar es Salaam. Occasionally farmers organise themselves to transport their products to big markets in towns. In either case, most cassava flour is sold outside the community. Farmers have attended different exhibitions in trade fairs such as Cassava Week and National Agriculture Day (Nane Nane), which enabled them to advertise their products and have contacts with buyers. Support for the year following the end of this project is being provided to the cassava processing groups from Concern's General Donations fund.

The project provided mobile phones to two cassava processing groups in Mtwara to ensure they were able to communicate with buyers whenever they needed to. The experiment should be evaluated. The use of mobile phones has been very successful in improving marketing for farmers⁹⁵.

- ❖ *It is recommended that future projects with a marketing component develop more systematic ways of using mobile phones to assist with marketing.*

Sunflower

Two sunflower producer associations in Kigoma were established. One of these has been provided with a motorised oil expeller machine. Membership is about 50. The group buys sunflower seed from producers in eight surrounding villages. The oil is mostly sold within the community. The residue is very popular as an animal feed. In one processing group visited a person with no use in one arm sows his farm on his own but the processing group help him to cultivate and harvest. The group was helping five people in this way including four elderly people with no one in the village to help them. This is another example that groups in Kigoma and Kibondo were addressing the needs of the vulnerable more than other districts visited.

Irrigation groups

The project assisted four existing irrigation groups to build up their management, marketing and in two cases, rice processing skills. The groups were UKULUPA, ITUNUNDU and UKIUMA in Iringa and UWAKAMA in Kilolo. These CBOs were also project partners. Training on financial management, improved agricultural methods, human rights, food budgeting and land registration was delivered and the project helped the groups with formulating their constitutions.

Though the group in Iringa formerly grew mostly vegetables, the whole irrigated area is now planted to rice. Most seed planted is an old variety (*Supa Zambia?*) bought from the market but they also plant a so-called improved variety (*Salo*) which gave higher yields but has a lower market price because of the poor flavour. This mono-cropping may have been at least partly due to the influence of a local NGO (Rudi) working in the area and which is promoting rice production. Greater crop diversity that included legumes would be better and would also mean the water could be distributed to more people (as the paddy rice requires more water). In Kilolo, there was a more balanced distribution of crops.

A rice processing machine was provided to the UKULUPA farmers association. The machine provides processing facilities to around 360 rice farmers. Processing the rice enables the farmers to sell their rice at almost twice the unprocessed rice price. Harvested rice is stored in farmers' homes and processed as required. Most of the produce is sold. The cost of processing is paid for by the farmers and the processed product sold privately, often in December when prices are higher unless the farmer has a cash flow problem when he/she sells earlier.

Thus there is no market link as such. Traders (apparently from as far afield as Dar es Salaam) come to the village to purchase processed rice. This seems to have been a missed opportunity as the farmers association could have been set up as a wholesaling operation.

Other opportunities

We were told in Nanyumbu during the evaluation that it would have helped farmers if the project had facilitated the setting up of a group to store and market green grams as business people often came to village at harvest to buy when prices were low. In Kibondo, we were told that there was a (missed) potential for marketing sunflower, maize and cassava.

See also OVI 3 below (page 93).

⁹⁵ see for example <http://www.ictinagriculture.org/sourcebook/module-9-strengthening-agricultural-marketing#mobilemarketing>

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Increase access to land ...

The 8th activity was to “*increase access to land, including community gardens and land registration*”.

Land registration

The project facilitated the issuing of 5,212 CCROs, 48% of which were in Iringa and Kilolo districts.

Before the project there were budget constraints so the District Land Offices were making slow progress with the land registration process. Concern's “*Rights-Based Livelihood Programme*” (2006-09) had trained people in some villages on land registration and we were told in some villages that training on registration had been going on since 2005.

The project put a lot of effort into establishing or strengthening land registries at village level and district levels, facilitating the training of district land staff in surveying, land registration and producing “*Certificates of Customary Right of Occupancy*” (and village certificates also in some cases) and by providing GPS equipment and software. “*Para-technicians*” were also trained in the use of the GPS equipment (supplied by the project).

The assistance provided by the project enabled the government officers to greatly expand their activities. See also above “*Training [of local government] on land rights*” under “*Activities for Expected Result 1*”.

Although the certification process increased security of usufruct, it did not actually increase access to land. The benefits of land registration were perceived by farmers to be the assurance that their land was secure, that it helped to avoid conflict and enabled the obtaining of loans (though several who had tried to obtain loans had failed – partly because of the remote locations) though obtaining microfinance is difficult to obtain in Tanzania. In one Mtwara village we were told that it could also provide surety for bail in a court case and that if the registration was in joint names, it helped to strengthen marriage. We were told by a District Land Officer that it had reduced the risk of land speculation. In one Mtwara village it was apparent the benefits originally had not been properly explained as some poor people thought their land was going to be taken after it was surveyed.

In theory, the project started with registration of the poorest people in the villages (as identified by the village council) and registration for these was free. However in one village the councillor and the village chairman were also beneficiaries. In Iringa, some beneficiaries had to pay the VEO around TSh 5,000. Reasons given included the cost of the form, a fee to the adjudication committee, and for transport for the VEO to take the form to the district town (Iringa).

In Masasi, riots led to the burning of government buildings and vehicles. As a result, equipment used for the land registration was destroyed including some electronic records.

❖ *It is recommended that for future projects that involve government electronic records, a strict procedure for backing up data is put in place with the backup copies being kept at a different site.*

This recommendation could also equally be applied to Concern (and partner) offices in general.

We were told by Land Officers in Iringa that growing numbers of people were prepared to pay for land registration (about TSh 30,000/acre in Iringa) though during FGDs the maximum that farmers said they were prepared to pay was TSh 10,000 (and many said TSh 1,000).

Unfortunately, since the end of the project, land registration activities have reduced significantly even though the land registration budget is increasing. There is also a problem with continuity as staff members often are transferred. It was apparent in Kibondo that the new Land Officer would not become involved with registration without some perks such as extra training. The Mapinfo software had stopped working after the operating system had been changed to install some new software.

Tribunals

The project also facilitated the creation or strengthening of village land tribunals (and in Masasi, village land use committees) (see OVI 5 for Expected Result 1).

Kitchen gardens

The final report records that the project helped to set up 202 kitchen gardens, 110 of them in Iringa. The farmers were supplied with sprayers, seeds (eggplant, carrot, okra, tomato, watermelon and cucumber) and pesticides. The gardens targeted vulnerable people such as those with HIV/AIDS and the elderly. No kitchen gardens were seen during the evaluation but there were meetings with beneficiaries.

OVI 1: Adoption of new agricultural practices

The first OVI was that: “70% of the targeted farmers are applying one or more new agricultural practices by the end of the programme in all 3 programme countries”.

The ESR concluded that the main change in agricultural practice was from 28% in 2011 to 67.6% in 2013 of farmers practicing row planting (in the text) or correct spacing (in the table) but that

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percentage of farmers using the correct seed rate, the practice closely associated with correct spacing had changed from 16% in 2011 to only 18% in 2013. There were apparently 72.7% of farmers not using random planting (the opposite of row planting or intercropping) in the baseline survey. If the endline survey means row planting where it says correct spacing, there has been a slight decrease between 2010 and 2013. If that is true, the OVI has not been met.

For “*management of soil fertility*”, “*use of improved varieties (or breeds!)*”, and “*planting time*” the percentage would seem to have declined between 2010 and 2013. It would be a mistake to take these results too seriously.

Mulching and crop rotation were not included in the list of questions.

During the evaluation, the techniques mentioned that had had greatest impact on production was using the correct crop spacing and using line planting. All farmers interviewed claimed their production had increased since the beginning of the project because of adopting these methods though the actual increases seem to be exaggerated (see page 93). Where they were available, improved varieties (made available through the QDS scheme) and improved irrigation facilities would have a greater impact than improved planting methods.

The introduction of sack cultivation for vegetable production by about 500 housebound people was a good innovation in Kibondo that also improved incomes for poor, vulnerable families.

My conclusion is that although the endline data is suspect, this OVI has been achieved.

OVI 2: Increased crop production

The second OVI was that “*targeted farmers have significantly increased ($p < 0.05$) their crop production compared to non-targeted farmers in all 3 programme countries*”.

The ESR claimed that 85.9% of respondents said they had had an increase in yields since 2010. It did not compare production with non-beneficiaries. The ESR also gives figures for total production of various crops but they are not compared to the baseline because the baseline data gives yield (production per unit area). Yields are compared with baseline but it is generally agreed in Concern that the baseline data are not reliable. Neither the baseline nor the endline survey included non-beneficiary villages.

The introduction of drought tolerant crops such as sorghum and cowpeas (through the QDS scheme and FFS) has had a significant impact on production.

Anecdotal evidence is even more suspect than the ESR. For example, the DAO in Iringa claimed that rice yields went from 1.6 to 5 t ha⁻¹ as a result of the introduction of improved varieties, applying fertiliser at planting (DAP) and proper timing of subsequent fertiliser applications. Similarly the introduction of improved maize brought changes from 1.4 to 1.7 t ha⁻¹. Both these examples were on the government research farm. One farmer told us that production of simsim had more than trebled. Other farmers claimed cassava production had increased by factors ranging from 3 (from 480 kg/acre to 1,500 kg/acre) to 7 (120 kg to 840 kg /acre) as a result of the improved cassava variety introduction (in an earlier project). In another village we were told that green grams had doubled in yield 80 to 160 kg/acre as a result of improved practices.

In Iringa and Kilolo especially, irrigation expansion has been a major contributor to increased production in project villages. In one FGD, beneficiaries said the irrigated area had doubled and yield has also increased dramatically (by 5 or 6-fold according to another FGD). If they obtain the permit they are requesting that will allow them to irrigate throughout the year, production will increase even further.

In my opinion, this OVI has been met in essence though it would be difficult to claim that increases were statistically significant at $p < 0.05$.

OVI 3: Value chain

The third OVI was that “*groups undertaking value-chain activities with links to the private sector are reporting increased income in all 3 programme countries*”.

The ESR reports briefly on this OVI and suggests that 20.4% of respondents reported a large increase in “net margin” from crop processing. Although the majority of the respondents (68.3%) were apparently involved in cassava processing, they also recorded mango, cashew and sweet potato processing which the project was not involved with. There were only 511 farmers involved with cassava processing groups supported by the project so it is puzzling as to how the survey found that 68.3% of the population were involved. The figure is clearly unreliable.

For what it is worth, 94.7% of those engaged in the above processing reported an increased income since the beginning of the project of which 24.3% had had a large or significant increase. The ESR also records that at the time of the baseline, only 6% of respondents had an income in excess of TSh450,000 whereas at the time of the endline survey, 52% had an income in excess of TSh400,000⁹⁶.

All processing group members spoken to in the evaluation said they were now better off as a result of the project. Many said they had been able to improve their homes and in some cases build new ones by taking out loans based on their secured income. From both the ESR and anecdotal evidence during the evaluation, my opinion is that this OVI has been met.

Expected Result 3: Non-state actor involvement

The third Expected Result was that there would be *“increased involvement of non-state actors in key planning processes”*.

From an assessment of the OVIs and from the visits made it is apparent that CSOs, particularly partners, have increased their involvement in government planning. The project had no influence on CSOs who were not partners. The CBOs in Iringa and Kilolo have had minimal involvement in government planning apart from their contribution to the normal process of village-based planning and their participation in the Ward Water Resources Committee.

Activities for Expected Result 3

Awareness raising for CSOs

The 1st activity was *“awareness raising for civil society organisations on national laws and policies, with an emphasis on the opportunities for participation in key planning processes”*.

The government “National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty” (p.56) states that *“CSOs will work closely with the government ministries and local authorities to ensure that cross-cutting issues are included and implemented in the sectoral and district plans”*. In the annex of the same document, it states that one of the government goals (2.2.7.) is to *“increase engagement of civil society (including FBOs) at all levels in policy processes including planning and monitoring.”* There has not been much in the way of awareness raising of such policies. However CSO partners have been encouraged to attend the regular district Stakeholder Forums through which these policies are being worked out.

Build capacity of villages to monitor district performance

The 2nd activity mentioned in the logical framework was to *“build the capacity of [village councils] and other local representative bodies to monitor [district council] performance where appropriate”*.

The main actor in this activity was ANSAF. ANSAF HQ staff trained Concern staff on their approach to monitoring district level plans. ANSAF also trained public officials and CSOs in Iringa and Kilolo districts on the rights-based approach to Social Accountability Monitoring as a way of bridging the gap between duty bearers and rights holders.

Although not mentioned specifically in the LF, the proposal narrative says that (as part of government monitoring):

“Citizens in all 70 Tanzania programme villages will be supported to negotiate Service Charters and Score Cards with their respective district councils in the areas of DADPs planning process, village land survey and demarcation and village land use planning, and with their respective Village Councils on the convening and conduct of QVGAMs. This is an important accountability tool that will enable citizens to hold their leaders to account for their actions.”

None of the staff or partners who were asked about these knew anything about them. They were not used. However, there was a question about this in the endline survey which found that *“4.5% of the respondents*

⁹⁶ the baseline and endline surveys used slightly different income classes

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indicated to know how to use score cards to hold the government to account". This may have been due to other NGOs using the system in some project villages.

Facilitate increased awareness of the decentralisation process among citizens

The 3rd activity was intended to be to *"facilitate increased awareness of the decentralisation process among citizens so they may take full advantage of the available opportunities to participate in decision-making processes and access public services"*

The project trained village councils on the need for village development plans (see page 83) to reflect the needs of the community. Village leaders (840 participants) from all 70 project villages were trained at different locations close to their villages on topics that included their roles as village leaders, conducting quarterly village meetings, accountability, transparency and ways to support the village land tribunal in resolving land disputes. Concern, in collaboration with District Community Development department sensitised 125 village council members in Iringa villages on the right of citizens to participate in the development of DADPs and in Mtwara district, UPT conducted sensitisation meetings on community participation in DADPs in all project villages.

The final report records that the project facilitated increased awareness among 1,258 community members and members of CBO partners of the decentralisation process, their right to participate in planning and on implementing and evaluating their development plans. Human rights advocacy groups and partner CSOs conducted awareness meetings on right to land, right to food and right to participation in development programme processes. 800 booklets on democratic governance (*"Utawala wa Kidemokrasia"*) were distributed to the community and LGAs.

Community members in project villages have demonstrated increased awareness by demanding information on village land use, social services and the right to be heard in the quarterly village meetings.

Collaborate with national and local NGO platforms

Concern Tanzania is a member of the national Policy Forum and the Agriculture Non-State Actors' Forum (ANSAF), works with the Development Partner Group (DPG) and the Tanzania Water and Sanitation Network (TAWASANET).

Project staff participated in regional networks such as the Mtwara Development Forum (MDF) and the Participatory Ecological Land Use Association (PELUS) in Kigoma. These forums ensured NGOs were not duplicating efforts and were a useful means of networking. For example, at the MDF, it was discovered that CAVA Africa were involved in marketing cassava.

Concern Tanzania is a member of Kigoma Agricultural Stakeholder Platform (KASP) and Caritas Kigoma and REDESO Kibondo are both members in the Regional Kilimo Kwanza committee.

Exchanges and learning between NSAs

See OVI 3 for this result.

OVI 1: Increased attendance of CSOs and community in government planning

The first OVI was that there would be a *"documented increase in CSO and community members' attendance in key planning processes and decision making in all 3 programme countries"*.

Based on the final report, it appears that the attendance 3 or 4 times a year at QVGAMs had increased from 53% at the time of the baseline report to 70% in the 2012 annual survey. Attendance by women had increased from 27% during the baseline survey to 44% at the time of the 2012 annual survey. The report also shows that the level of participation in the QVGAMs had increased.

Concern and project partners were invited and (sometimes) attended district Stakeholder Forums. They are expected to explain their own programmes and budgets but can call for specific issues to be discussed and may ultimately influence the district Finance Committee decision making. UPT in Mtwara said they attended only one such meeting (in 2011) though Mtwara Concern staff attended twice a year. Some CSOs said they had discussed issues with villagers before they attended. Often notices about planning meetings arrived at CSOs too late for them to attend. In Mtwara, we were told that councillors had advocated that CSOs and the private sector be invited to attend Finance Committee meetings.

See Appendix 4 for an overview of the district planning process.

OVI 2: Plans include needs of community and marginalised groups

The second OVI was that *“planning increasingly reflects the needs of community and marginalised groups”*.

This OVI is very similar to OVI 2 for the Specific Objective (see above). For an overview of the planning processes in the three countries see Appendix 4.

The ESR did not report directly on this OVI (i.e. that *planning increasingly reflects the needs of community and marginalised groups*) but only the degree of participation in village planning. The ESR reports that 86.9% of respondents had participated in village planning meetings. At village level, the main planning is undertaken by the Village Council so it must be assumed the report refers to the Quarterly Village General Assembly Meetings (QVGAMs). The report claims that 28.6% of those who participated, participated to a great extent and that 19.5% said they had fully participated. The ESR also found that 20.2% of youths, 18.8% of elderly and 16.6% of the disabled attended or were represented in village and district meetings.

In addition to training of village councils on the need for village development plans (see page 83) to reflect the needs of the community, partners and project staff generally tried to encourage the participation of villagers in the creation of Village Plans. Specifically, the project helped to revive some QVGAMs as not all were functioning when the project started. Project villages can have up to 1,800 households. If only one person from half the households attended, there would be a meeting of 900. Without a public address system (which we saw in a few villages) conducting such a meeting would be impossible. To stand up and use a microphone to address such a crowd would not be for the timid. Because of the size of the QVGAM, meetings were sometimes organised on a hamlet basis. We were told at one Kigoma village that *“women may come but it is usually men because they are the ones who make decisions and implement them”*.

Issues discussed at the QVGAMs get passed to VC and then up to the ward council if it cannot be dealt with locally. We were told in one village that the ward councillor never visited the village and villagers were unsure as to whether their needs were being represented adequately at the district. In one FGD, people felt they did not get enough feedback about how their requests were being dealt with. Also they felt they were not properly consulted during the planning of infrastructure for example. In many cases the government employed contractors who did poor work but felt they could not complain. In another we were rather surprisingly told the QVGAMs were an opportunity to obtain information about the village income and expenditure account. In another FGD were told that progress with village plans was not adequately monitored.

In FGDs, estimates of increases in attendance at QVGAMs over the project lifetime ranged from zero to 60%. Some villages tried to keep records of attendance but many people refused to or were unable to sign the register. The final report states that 60% of possible QVGAMs actually took place in 2012, a rise of 20% from the frequency of meetings earlier in the project.

Village councils generally meet once a month and discuss the village development plans and issues raised at the QVGAMs. However, often people are not informed about the date of the council meeting in good time.

The view of many of the village officials and farmers was that the district planning system now took their views more into account than at the beginning of the project.

OVI 3: Exchange visits for CSOs

The third OVI was that *“CSOs have participated in internal and external exchange visits and can demonstrate learning and sharing”*.

No external exchanges were arranged. The final report records that the project arranged several internal exchange visits for the CSO partners. The visits were focused on cashew nut marketing; cassava processing; the Land Act, CCROs; rice production, processing and marketing; green gram production; kitchen gardening; poultry and goat keeping and quality declared seed production. Two area facilitators from TCRS in Kigoma and four paraprofessionals of Kigoma District conducted an exchange visit to REDESO Kibondo to learn about organic farming.

Evaluation according to Development Assistance Committee criteria - Tanzania

Relevance and quality of project design

Consistency with policies and strategies

Both the Overall Objective and Project Purpose are closely aligned with Tanzania Government policies as defined within the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (MKUKUTA 2005-2010). They also resonate with identified issues of poverty reduction, improved agriculture, food security, decentralisation and land rights, as described in more recent government policy documents.

The project is supportive of EC development approaches as stated in the Country Strategy Paper (2008-2013) and National Indicative Programme. Project design is entirely consistent with relevant components of the Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania. The project showed respect for and adherence to the guidelines and regulations of EC. The project also was consistent with Concern's country policies and strategies for Tanzania.

Relevance of location

Concern has been working in the regions of Mtwara, Iringa, and Kigoma for some years. Mtwara and Kigoma are among the poorest regions in Tanzania. Iringa region is near the middle of the national ranking according to wealth. Though Iringa was selected largely because Concern had a history of working there⁹⁷, the areas selected within Iringa region were those with particularly low rainfall (and therefore of low agricultural potential) as were the areas in the other two regions. This selection, on the basis of agro-ecological zones, was carried out in consultation with district governments.

However, the decision to work in three widely spread regions of Tanzania posed considerable logistical problems. For example, it takes two days to get from Mtwara to Kigoma. The main issue from a supervision point of view was that the project manager was based in Dar es Salaam. Given the wide geographical spread this was probably the best solution though it meant that day to day supervision suffered as a result (visiting each project region for one or two weeks four or five times a year).

❖ *It is suggested that for future projects, Concern works only in one region or two adjacent regions.*

Concern has had several projects with similar themes in each of the project areas. In particular, lessons were learned from the "Food Facility"⁹⁸ project and these helped in the formulation of the Tanzanian component of this project. All Concern projects in Tanzania involve all stakeholders (CSOs, government, CBOs and ordinary farmers and their families) in regular reviews of project progress and take their views into account in revising the approach of current projects and informing the design of forthcoming projects.

Quality of logical framework

The quality of the logical framework is discussed in Appendix 3. However, Tanzania had some specific issues. The logical framework for this project was used for the first five months. By July 2010, a combined logical framework based on the Food Facility project and the Farming Together project was developed and used for management purposes until the end of October 2011 when the Food Facility project ended. The combined "project" was called the *Integrated Livelihoods Programme* which even had its own sign boards. CWT went back to using the MC LF around November 2011.

The Specific Objective, Expected Results and the respective OVIs were all relevant to Tanzania.

⁹⁷ Concern Tanzania has worked in Iringa District for over 30 years.

⁹⁸ an EC funded project in response to the call "Food Facility – Facility for rapid response to soaring food prices in developing countries". The actual project title submitted by Concern was "Mitigating the negative impacts of volatile food prices on vulnerable households in Tanzania"

Relevance of interventions and activities

Presumably because decision making is already supposed to be decentralised, the final report for Tanzania simply says that the activity to organise “*Exchange visits of local government representatives around the issue of decentralisation*” ...“*was not appropriate for Tanzania*” though visits were arranged around other topics.

The technical interventions and sub-activities included farmer and extension agent training; provision of inputs such as seeds, other planting materials, small livestock (goats and poultry); crop processing and small scale irrigation. I have seen examples of these interventions and all are very appropriate and relevant to the country generally and the project locations in particular. The regular visits by a consultant⁹⁹ helped greatly to ensure the project remained technically sound.

Selection of beneficiaries

Specific villages generally were selected based on an assessment of poverty by partners together with the District Agriculture and Land Departments, on the basis of logistics and receiving a positive response to initial discussions with village leaders. In Iringa, another criterion was that the villages should have a registered CBO. In Kigoma, we were informed that villages were selected on the basis that there were good soils and high rainfall but that people did not have high skill levels.

During the evaluation, there was some confusion about which villages were supported from the Farming Together¹⁰⁰ project and which were supported from the Food Facility project that overlapped with it in time and space. The confusion was eventually resolved. However, the following recommendations may help to minimise such confusion in the future.

- ❖ *Where possible, village (kijiji, colline, kebele) names as well as the larger administrative units should be included in project proposals. If this is not possible (perhaps because a survey must be undertaken first before villages are selected), then the list should be included at the first opportunity in official reports, preferably the first narrative report.*
- ❖ *Where Concern is working with partners, the finance agreements should include a list of villages (kijiji, colline, kebele) and a clear list of activities that will take place in them.*
- ❖ *Finance agreements with partners should not be for more than one project. If there are two projects, there should be two finance agreements and not merged into one.*

With regard to selection of actual beneficiaries, the overall aim was to select the poorest (at least to start with) using wealth ranking (each village was left to determine its own criteria and the target groups selected at a village meeting) and to make provision for vulnerable people such as old people with no family living close by, older widows who had no family, those suffering from physical (or mental?) disabilities and those suffering with AIDS. The implication was that the non-beneficiaries would be the better off households. The district government officials naturally say that everyone is poor so everyone should be targeted and this approach has sometimes brought about tensions.

The degree to which the poor have been actually targeted has varied according to the approach (or understanding?) of the implementing partner. For example the distribution of animals (chickens, goats, pigs) in some villages and those invited to Farmer Field Schools were supposed to target the poor, especially if they were also considered to be progressive farmers. However interviews indicated that some partners had not specifically targeted the poor. For example, in one village visited, the list of criteria for those able to join the FFS included those who were “influential” and opinion leaders in addition to some representation from the poor and vulnerable. In other villages, anyone who wanted to attend could attend FFSs. Even with this open invitation, the FFSs were not over-subscribed – the target number being 20 to 30 participants.

Poorer farmers generally are averse to taking risks and so often reluctant to adopt new practices until they have seen them working in neighbours’ fields. However, even if the poor and vulnerable farmers did not want to participate in FFSs, they should have been visited by the paraprofessional extension agents on a one to one basis.

⁹⁹ Christopher Davey

¹⁰⁰ In Tanzania the project was generally called the “Multi-Country project”. I will use the name “Farming Together” which is the title used by the Dublin office and the project name in my Terms of Reference.

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The issue of training on land rights was not specifically targeted at the poor. Sensitisation meetings were held with the whole village. However, those selected for (free) land registration were supposed to be the poorest in the village. This seems not always to have been the case - again depending on the implementing partner. In one village the councillor and the village chairman were also beneficiaries.

Efficiency of implementation

Quality of project management

In Tanzania the general oversight of projects is provided by the Deputy Country Director (Programmes) who is well qualified and very experienced in development work. He visited each project region for the Farming Together¹⁰¹ project about two to three times a year and has an excellent grasp of all aspects of the project.

The Concern project manager for Tanzania was based in Dar es Salaam and had an MSc in agriculture from Sokoine University. As explained earlier, because he was based in Dar es Salaam, the manager was able to visit each of the three regions only about five times a year for a few weeks each time.

In the regions¹⁰², there were two or three Partner Support Officers (PSOs) who were mostly qualified to degree level (agriculture or community development related subjects) though some were qualified only to diploma level.

Partner qualifications and experience varied greatly. The Community Based Organisations (Irrigation Associations) visited in Iringa were particularly weak though they had the advantage (over CSOs) of being closer to the grass-roots and being more sustainable.

Qualifications and time spent in the field varied among the CSO partners. Most senior staff members were degree holders and junior staff members were diploma or certificate holders. Time spent in the field varied but was generally satisfactory. The manager of REDESO was by far the best qualified with an MBA from Oslo. She spent the majority of her time in the field (not all on this project).

There is a good rapport between the former Partner Support Officers and the DCD(P). I did not have an opportunity to meet the project manager as he had left Concern. The whole project teams, senior staff from Concern and partners came together for annual coordination meetings once a year and at occasional workshops or training sessions in Dar es Salaam.

The Annual review meetings for the project took place on a regional basis and involved the DCD(P), Project Manager, PSOs and senior staff from partners working in each region.

Concern has an effective internal complaints mechanism and there is a staff manual with grievance procedures. Concern has also produced a Programme Participant Protection Policy (called 4P) that was finalised in May 2010 shortly after the start of the project. All staff are aware of this document. This is discussed in the main part of this document.

Quality of M&E system

Concern Worldwide in Tanzania has an M&E officer based in Dar es Salaam. The M&E officer in post at the time of the project has since left. That M&E officer was a statistician by training which obviously has advantages – though also dangers.

Though the M&E Officer visited the project regions fairly regularly, the project itself did not have a dedicated M&E officer. PSOs and partner staff were responsible for keeping M&E. Some may have allocated the task to juniors. The level of guidance and training was not as detailed as it should have been, particularly for partners. I was informed by some project staff that they had not had any training in Results Oriented Management and more than one staff member interviewed did not know what the specific objective had been.

¹⁰¹ In Tanzania, the project was also known as the Multi-Country project but for the sake of consistency I will use the title "Farming Together" as it was called in the consultant's terms of reference.

¹⁰² I use the term "regions" to refer to the three project areas in Mtwara, Iringa and Kigoma regions. It does not imply the project was working in the whole of the three regions. References to districts include the word "district" such as "Mtwara district".

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- ❖ *If at all possible, each project should have a dedicated M&E specialist who reports to the project manager and the national M&E advisor.*

A list of which activities took place in which village with the number of beneficiaries took some time to compile. This was partly because of the complication of having another project (discussed above) from which to disentangle data. However the point is that information about activities and sub-activities (including training delivered module by module with the number of attendees) in villages should be available in real time. It should not need to be compiled.

Some CSO partners did not keep computerised records of activities on a village by village and month by month basis. Some of the paper records I saw were rather disorganised. KIMAS, presumably with other partners, had had some training on M&E, report writing, analysing community problems, ranking priorities and financial management. However my conclusion was that

- ❖ *all field staff (Concern and partner) need extra training in monitoring of project activities.*

One CSO partner (KIMAS) informed me that it did not have a copy of the project proposal or logical framework though this may be because it had been given to the previous manager and the new manager was not told about it. Most activities KIMAS were responsible for were already taking place when the new manager took over in September 2011 and he said he had learned about new activities in the project meetings.

- ❖ *Concern senior management should ensure that all partners have a copy of the project proposal and logical framework (and if a new manager takes over, that he/she has a copy).*

In Kigoma, there was a good system for monitoring of partner field visits including: key issues, progress since last visit, financial information and action points was an excellent system but it was not clear if such a system was in operation in the other regions.

The annual narrative reports and the six-monthly Results Oriented Monitoring Reports for the EC were submitted on time, were of a reasonably good quality and were sent to the appropriate recipients. The annual reports reported against Expected Results as well as Activities.

The design of the baseline survey (and the endline survey which was contracted out) indicates that there was a lack of understanding of the farming systems and how the household economy was managed. The baseline questionnaire was not adequately tested / piloted.

- ❖ *Before baseline surveys that are to include agricultural production questions are designed, the project manager should ensure that the M&E officer has spent time talking to farmers and visiting farms (and preferably have some agricultural background).*

Detailed comments on the logical framework and the associated problems of the baseline and endline survey reports (ESR) are given in Appendix 3 but the following are examples of specific shortcomings in the Tanzania surveys:

- No attempt was made to analyse the total days of food stocks available by adding the energy available from all the surveyed crops and no attempt was made to compare target households with non-target households.
- For the 2nd Specific Objective OVI, the ESR did not address the specific issues of “*women and marginalised*” but simply asked all the respondents the degree to which they were satisfied that the district and village councils had addressed the respondent priorities.
- For agricultural practices, two questions were asked, one about seed rate and the other about crop spacing, figures which are closely related. However the ESR noted there has been a change in percentage of farmers using the correct spacing from 28% in 2011 to 67.6% in 2013 but a change in farmers using the correct seed rate from 16% in 2011 to 18% in 2013.
- The ESR reports briefly on improved incomes for processing groups. Although the majority of the respondents (68.3%) were apparently involved in cassava processing, they also recorded mango, cashew and sweet potato processing which the project was not involved with. There were only 511 farmers involved with cassava processing groups supported by the project so it is puzzling as to how the survey found that 68.3% of the population were involved. The figure is clearly unreliable.

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- For Expected Result 3, the ESR did not report directly on the 2nd OVI (i.e. that *planning increasingly reflects the needs of community and marginalised groups*) but only the degree of participation in village planning.

Financial efficiency

The existence of two EC-funded projects with similar components (this one and the “Food Facility” project referred to above), that overlapped both in time and geographically caused some confusion at the start of the project. Until the EC raised a question about possible double-funding, some staff and most partners were not clear which villages were being funded from which project. Even during the evaluation, there was confusion and the final list of villages in this report is different from those in the project reports. As a result of the identified double-funding, activities, and therefore the budget, for this project were reduced in Iringa for the remaining duration of the Food Facility project and reinstated when it ended.

There was a budget revision in 2011 for the project (in Tanzania this was for a Value Chain and Markets Specialist, visibility and extra consultancy costs). After the start of the project, imported items of hardware (vehicles, motorcycles, IT equipment, etc.) became subject to Government imposed Value Added tax (VAT) causing the costs of some items to become higher than planned and this also contributed to the need for the budget revision. One staff member said the revision was done without sufficient consultation with implementing field staff.

Co-financing (25%) was provided from Concern’s General Donations fund and from Irish Aid’s Multi-Annual Programme Scheme (MAPS) which has provided long-term, predictable and significant funding to Concern for some years. There were no problems experienced with co-financing. There were no overspends in budget lines outside the acceptable limits.

At Concern’s head office in Dar es Salaam, the Partner Finance Support Officer (PFSO) and the internal auditor kept close scrutiny of spending by CSO and district government partners and partner’s accounts were audited each year. The financial risks with CSO partners are considered to be low compared to district government partners.

Some financial problems were experienced with CSO partners. For example, in Masasi, the first KIMAS manager was apparently not fulfilling his agreements with Concern and the internal auditor found that some payments were difficult to reconcile (as much as TSh 1,000,000). One issue was when he claimed to be doing land tribunal training instead of the government. He was eventually removed from his post by the organisation and replaced and was asked to repay the money from his salary. Concern decided to bear the cost of this loss from their General Donations fund. Another issue raised by KIMAS was that motorcycles provided by Concern were beyond repair – allegedly because they had been brought from the Food Facility project. However the Food Facility project started only in 2008. The write off seems more likely to have been due to lack of proper maintenance. In Kigoma, a CSO partner, the Tanganyika Christian Refugee Society had to be dropped from the programme, partly because of mismanagement of the project vehicle (and eventually crashing it). In Nanyumbu district, Concern’s internal auditors found that the district government of the newly formed district could not account for around TSh 5,800,000 given for land registration. This had to be written off and the cost met out of Concern General Donations. As a result of this, land registration was halted in Nanyumbu.

The constitutions for the irrigation groups in Iringa were initially of poor quality but this seems to have been addressed after visits from Concern’s internal auditor to undertake a financial risk assessment. Extra training was provided for example in the use of payment vouchers, and record keeping. In at least one case, Concern paid for a lawyer to redraft the constitution (which now has to be approved by the ministry of Home Affairs in Dar es Salaam).

Another example of the success of Concern’s inclusion of financial risk assessment in the responsibilities of the internal auditors is seen in the case of the Cheetah Development Company in Iringa. An MoU was signed between Concern and Cheetah to help with marketing maize and potatoes. Some Concern staff members were seconded for four weeks. Subsequently, after a risk assessment by Concern’s internal auditor, the arrangement was halted.

Taking account of a few delays mentioned above, the rate of spending was acceptable.

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The alpha-value is not straight forward. Inputs and infrastructure made up around 12% of the total expenditure. These consisted mainly of agricultural inputs, processing equipment, livestock supplied to very poor target farmers, land registry construction or improvement and surveying equipment, computers and software for government land offices. However, if one includes the direct costs of capacity building and training (including booklets and other published material), the ratio rises to 52%.

The total cost¹⁰³ of the project in Tanzania was €1,014,052 (26% of the cost across all three countries). The cost per beneficiary household was around €127.

Cost-effectiveness and use of funds

The processing equipment and centres were of a suitable standard, size and cost for the task and were an efficient use of funds. One specific question about cost-effectiveness concerns the surveying equipment supplied to the government. Mapinfo is expensive and not likely to be bought by districts not supported by a project. An example of free GIS software is QGIS¹⁰⁴.

❖ *When purchasing expensive software or equipment for government departments, it is strongly advised that a third party is consulted first for an opinion.*

A pie chart showing the breakdown of the project costs is shown in Figure 7. The cost of capacity building, training and training materials was rather high compared to other items (Tanzania had the largest training cost of all three countries). Nearly 70% of the cost was for training on land rights. The total training breakdown was 69% for training on decentralisation, land rights and district level planning processes, 5% on DRR training, 8% on agricultural training and 18% on training in diversified livelihoods. If we include DRR, over 74% of the training budget therefore went on strengthening local government. Whilst this may seem disproportionate, it may not have been possible to achieve the level of success in achieving Expected Result 1 without this investment. A considerable part of the cost of training for strengthening local government is for travel and per diems paid to government officials to do the training as well as to those attending. The large distances in Tanzania must also be borne in mind.

Staff air travel and per diem costs were higher in magnitude €46,722 and a higher percentage of human resources (31%) than the other two countries, again reflecting the size of the country and the fact the project was located in three widely separated regions of the country.

Of the attributable costs (€ 533,502 or 53% of the total), the first expected result (strengthened local government) cost 69% and the second expected result (improved livelihoods) cost 31%. There were no attributable costs for expected result 3 (increased involvement of NSAs in planning).

Timeliness

The official project start date was signed on 15th February 2010. The official start date was 16th February 2010. The actual start date was soon after this. This was because there was little delay in appointing key project staff (including the project manager) because they were already in place, being employed on the Food Facility project. As the activities were fairly similar, this does not appear to have been a problem.

Staff turnover was high for both Concern project staff and partners. Reasons were quite common: finding a better paid position with a UN or other large international organisations or moving to Dar es Salaam or another large town to look for better opportunities, to be nearer families, to be nearer better health facilities or because of children's education. However, the rate at which the project was implemented does not appear to have suffered unduly as a result of the turnover.

MoUs with partners were signed in February and March of 2010 and detailed Funding Agreements prepared soon after. These were renewed each year. Partners generally were happy with the timeliness of funding tranches though at the beginning there were some short delays in transfers which some partners complained about during the evaluation. KIMAS said there had been delays with


¹⁰³ provisional at time of writing

¹⁰⁴ <http://www.qgis.org/en/site/forusers/download.html>

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services and sharing of information (though they had not used the CRM procedure). They also complained that supplies of seeds were commonly late throughout the project though not all the time.

Figure 7. Make up of project costs in Tanzania¹⁰⁵



About half the planned land registries were implemented by rehabilitating existing rooms in village offices. However the others had to be constructed. District governments were asked if funds for construction of land registries could be paid into the Village Council's bank account. Some districts agreed but others insisted the funds were paid first into the district council bank accounts. In these cases, construction of the land registries was delayed considerably.

In Mtwara, there were particular problems because of the delays in completing the district level offices that would house the district land registry. These delays had a knock-on effect in delaying the construction or improvement of the village level registries.

There was no no-cost extension requested for Tanzania but Burundi did apply and this affected the timing of the end of the project in Tanzania also.

Quality of inputs and outputs

The quality of inputs such as seeds, and tools were of appropriate quality. The quality of training materials seen were generally acceptable but the level of knowledge after training was never tested in order to monitor the impact of training. This applied more to non-practical topics, such as Land Law training provided by senior government staff to village leaders. The results of whether farmers have taken on board practical training, such as that provided in Farmer Field Schools, can be seen by the extent to which they apply the acquired knowledge. However paraprofessionals could also be tested after their training.

¹⁰⁵ This cost breakdown does not follow EC budget headings exactly. "Other costs and services" exclude visibility (shown separately), the grant to ANSAF (shown separately) and booklets on district planning and the land act which have been included in training costs. The cost of livestock has been transferred from training to "inputs and infrastructure" to be comparable with the other countries.

- ❖ *Concern project staff should consider encouraging trainers to set simple tests¹⁰⁶ at the end of training sessions (especially if certificates are awarded).*

In general, physical outputs observed were implemented to a reasonable standard especially the processing units (though in one group in Kigoma, there was an exhaust from a diesel engine putting fumes out to where people were working – the group has been warned about the dangers and a simple remedy suggested, but so far the recommendations have been ignored).

The masonry canal work in Iringa district, while obviously reducing seepage into bare soil, was not of good quality and the canal was clearly leaking. The diversion weir seen at Ikula in Kilolo District was also leaking underneath the structure (so that eventually the wall itself could be undermined). In case of flood, the disposal of surplus has to be done by opening a valve under the water on the upstream side – a very cumbersome system that requires someone to go to the site. Simpler automatic systems are known to any good civil or agricultural water engineer. The problem with the construction seems to be a result of poor supervision provided by the government district engineer.

As stated in the Guidelines for Grant Applicants, the programme under which this project is financed “is an “actor-oriented” programme aimed at strengthening the capacity of civil society organisations and local authorities as a pre-condition for a more equitable, open and democratic society through support to their “own initiatives””. Whilst the project has contributed significantly to building the capacity of district governments, more could have been done to improve the capacity of its CSO partners. There are widespread weaknesses in some them, partly because of the level of education and partly because of their lack of skills.

- ❖ *It is therefore recommended that future projects with similar partner CSOs include a rigorous training programme including:*
 - *looking for sources of funds;*
 - *project cycle management;*
 - *project formulation;*
 - *proposal writing;*
 - *logical frameworks;*
 - *monitoring, especially the use of spreadsheets to record activities, training, input provision;*
 - *monitoring of secondary impacts such as seed actually grown and sold by seed-growers, dividends paid by processing groups;*
 - *design of baseline and endline surveys;*
 - *project management, human resource management, team building;*
 - *HAP, SPHERE, CRM standards.*

Methodology

The project in Tanzania worked with three categories of partners: Civil Society Organisations (such as REDESO, KIMAS, and CARITAS Kigoma), Community Based Organisations (such as the irrigation groups in Iringa and Kilolo) and district governments. In general the CSOs were easiest to work with (though not without problems as seen above). Working with the government as a partner was more difficult. The view of the ACD-P, with which I concur, was that giving grants to government delays implementation. Later in the project the government officers were used on an “as needed” basis and this was more efficient.

In several situations, it was noticeable that there were very few maps of project interventions, for example irrigation canals, or even the location of project villages.

- ❖ *It is recommended that more use of maps is made for planning and management purposes - for example irrigation groups should have a map of the irrigated area and the plots within it.*

The EC visited the project only once in Tanzania and only one region out of the three – Mtwara. No field visit report was written. However, a (very short) Monitoring Report was produced by a consultant under contract to the EC. Recommendations were minimal but those given were acted on.

¹⁰⁶ multiple choice questions would be fine

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On the other hand, the regular technical reports (as well as the mid-term evaluation) provided by Christopher Davey were of excellent quality and of great use to project staff. A few points he raised have still not been adequately dealt with (and are also discussed elsewhere in this report):

- ❖ *processing and marketing - Concern still needs to build access to processing and marketing expertise (preferably in-house in my opinion) with practical business experience to advise projects with processing and marketing components;*
- ❖ *documentation of experience (for example on bean and maize conservation agriculture) - maybe staff are too busy to do this but someone should do it and perhaps put material on a dedicated Concern Worldwide - Tanzania web page;*
- ❖ *the conflict between pastoralists and cultivators (discussed later under conflict resolution) has not been adequately dealt with (Davey advises by developing mutually beneficial relationships between the two communities around livestock products, crops, crop residues and dry season feeds, and the manuring of fields);*
- ❖ *the quality of training materials is still patchy - though REDESO were using good material obtained from Concern, partners especially (including government extension agents) need more assistance with training materials and with organising their training agenda;*
- ❖ *M&E is still lacking sufficient attention to activities and milestones - regional staff and partners need more guidance on using computerised spreadsheets for this task.*

One interesting issue when planning improvements to irrigation schemes is the decision of whether to increase land and water available to existing irrigators as in Iringa or to try to increase the number of people with access to irrigation as in Kilolo. In Kilolo, newly irrigated land increased by about 50% and this was used by an extra 790 new farmers. The issue does not seem to have been given sufficient attention at the planning stage.

Relationship with local stakeholders

Relationships with village and district level governments were generally excellent. One issue that did come up was that government staff were given Concern DSAs which are less than government rates and this was a frequent cause of complaint. Some staff in the Mtwara Lands Office complained about the impact of a budget revision on the extent of their registration work.

In Masasi, KIMAS said there were delays in releasing funds though after start up the delays were apparently only two or three weeks. The latter budget revision led to a reduction in the amount allocated to activities being implemented by KIMAS.

All government officials met at village and district level had a very high opinion of the project, especially its contribution to land registration and the establishment of land tribunals, the establishment of the processing groups and the training on decentralised decision making.

Access

The main issue with access was the distance between the project regions. Weather affected access to project sites only rarely for a few days in the rainy seasons.

On the road between Mwanza and Kigoma there are sometimes armed robberies and this has sometimes meant that staff from central office were asked to cancel travel. Local staff sometimes were prevented from staying in an area because of security concerns. Staff sometimes avoided some places on market days and sometimes programme plans were changed so as not to coincide with market days.

Internet access in all the regional offices was good. Senior staff are provided with mobile phones and junior staff receive a monthly credit.

Effectiveness

Achievement of results and objectives

The activities in the logical framework were generally implemented. However:

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- there were no external exchanges arranged either for government or CSO partners. This was a missed opportunity. An analysis of the potential benefits is given in the main part of this report;
- not all that surprisingly, there was no attempt to explore the possibilities of cross-border trade;
- the marketing component has been rather weak and has relied too much on businessmen coming to villages rather than processing groups being more proactive;

The activities implemented contributed towards the achievement of the results and objectives. A full analysis of these is given in the first section of this Annex. Below is a summary:

Expected Result 1:

“strengthened local government structures to manage, regulate and coordinate local development”.

The project has contributed substantially to achieving this result.

However the expected result was too general. Though the project has helped to strengthen village councils and village level planning, at a district level, the project strengthened mainly the district Land Offices and to a lesser extent, the District Agricultural & Livestock Development departments.

Expected Result 2:

“diversified livelihoods for farmers through working with local institutions and the private sector”.

This result has been achieved mainly for those targeted farmers who were able to participate in activities such as processing and savings groups. Some of the poor people given goats and poultry have also increased their range of livelihood sources. Most beneficiaries have had existing sources of livelihood (growing crops) enhanced through training and improved varieties rather than diversified.

Expected Result 3:

“increased involvement of non-state actors in key planning processes”.

CSO partners have increased their involvement in government planning at district level but the project had no influence on CSOs who were not partners. The CBOs in Iringa and Kilolo have had minimal involvement in government planning apart from their contribution to the normal process of village-based planning and their participation in the Ward Water Resources Committee. There were no examples of the private sector becoming involved in government planning.

Specific Objective:

“to improve livelihoods and empowerment of poor farmers in decentralised decision-making processes”.

The Specific Objective has been achieved in that livelihoods have been approved for beneficiaries and the issues of poor farmers, women and vulnerable are now taken into account more in village level planning and to some extent therefore at district level also.

Overall objective:

“to contribute to the achievement of MDG1 and food security in Tanzania, Ethiopia and Burundi”.

The project has contributed to the overall objective to a substantial extent.

The assumptions and assessment of risks in the logical framework were realistic. There were no effects of unforeseen risks on the project outcome.

Coordination with other development actors

Coordination with other development actors was one of the activities in the Logical Framework. Concern Tanzania is a member of the national Policy Forum and the Agriculture Non-State Actors' Forum (ANSAF) which aims to improve social accountability of government in agricultural planning. ANSAF was an integral part of the project. Nationally, Concern also works with the Development Partner Group (DPG) and the Tanzania Water and Sanitation Network (TAWASANET).

Project staff participated in regional networks such as the Mtwara Development Forum (MDF) and the Participatory Ecological Land Use Association (PELUS) in Kigoma. These forums ensured NGOS were not duplicating efforts and were a useful means of networking. For example, at the MDF, it was

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discovered that CAVA Africa were involved in marketing cassava. Concern Tanzania is a member of Kigoma Agricultural Stakeholder Platform (KASP) and Caritas Kigoma and REDESO Kibondo are both members in the Regional *Kilimo Kwanza*¹⁰⁷ committee.

The relationships with the other actors through these forums was effective and contributed to the achievements of the project and helped to avoid duplications.

Visibility

EC visibility instructions¹⁰⁸ have not been well followed, particularly where structures and machinery are concerned. It is not sufficient merely to put an EC logo on an item. The fact that it was donated by the EC should also be stated with the name of the project and date. Plaques should be made of stone (such as marble) or at least metal. Inscriptions in concrete and use of paper stick-on logos that subsequently wash off in the rain are not appropriate. One reason given for the lack of signs was that it was difficult to obtain the correct colour paint. According to their web site, Pantone paints (stipulated by the EC) are sold by Dulux-Tanzania.

❖ *It is recommended that for future EC funded projects, a senior Concern officer (Compliance Officer?) from Dar es Salaam ensures that staff are given copies of the EC Communication and Visibility Manual and instructed on how to use it.*

The project produced several leaflets on different topics. They had the EC logo but no reference to the EC funding this project. There have been no press or media releases about the project in Tanzania.

News items from the project have been included on the Concern main web site¹⁰⁹.

Impact

Beneficiaries

It is very difficult to differentiate beneficiaries from non-beneficiaries in Tanzania. Also, because at the beginning in some places there was an overlapping project, already referred to above, it is difficult to be precise about the extent of the impact of this project.

The project identified approximately 9,300 target households (poor, very poor, vulnerable) in Tanzania. The estimated number of farmers attending the 233 FFS is 6,990 and there were in addition, 185 water users trained in irrigation management. There were about 700 members of processing groups and the community warehouse in Kibondo. Most group members (perhaps 600) were also members of FFS. These groups were often a mixture of target households and non-target households. Savings and credit groups had around 550 members. Thus, the number of households benefiting from activities that led directly to improved livelihoods was around 7,725. CCROs were issued to 5,212 households of which perhaps 500 were not also members of FFS. Establishment of risk reduction committees together with training on land rights and other issues benefited all households in the project villages.

In addition, the project built the capacity of

- 8 district governments and 70 village councils (plus 70 village DRR committees and 70 village land tribunals);
- 4 Civil Society Organisations (United Peasants of Tanzania (UPT), Masasi People's Umbrella Organization (KIMAS), Relief to Development Society (REDESO), Caritas - Kigoma)¹¹⁰;
- 4 Community Based Organisations (Umoja wa Kilimo cha Umwagiliaji Luganga Pawaga (UKULUPA), Itunundu Irrigation Association (ITUNUNDU), Umoja wa Kilimo cha Umwagiliaji Makifu (UKIUMA), Umoja wa Wamwagiliaji Kata ya Mahenge (UWAKAMA))¹¹¹.

¹⁰⁷ "Kilimo Kwanza is a catalyst for the implementation of Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP) and accelerates implementation and achievement of MDGs targets and objectives with a stronger emphasis for pro-poor growth". See <http://jikikwete.com/initiatives.php?cat=3&subcat=111>

¹⁰⁸ see http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/work/visibility/index_en.htm

¹⁰⁹ e.g. <https://www.concern.net/en/news-blog/building-better-future-farmers>

¹¹⁰ Another CSO, Tanganyika Christian Refugee Society (TCRS) was dropped early in the project due to their weak implementation capacity and management problems.

¹¹¹ Another two CBOs, Kilimo Hai na Asili (KIHASI) and Umoja wa Kilimo cha Umwagiliaji Makifu (UKIUMA) were dropped

Impact of the project on beneficiaries

The project has contributed substantially towards improved crop, food security and increased family income so they could now improve their homes, have better access to medical services and education and buy life enhancing assets such as radios. Women feel more empowered and AIDS victims less stigmatised. These impacts are likely to be felt not just by beneficiaries but also by the wider society through example and sharing of information.

The project has reinforced the government's policy of decentralisation and in general, district officials appear to be more committed to the policy than they were initially. Villagers now have a greater say in village level decision making and the concerns of women and other marginalised groups are taken into consideration to a greater extent.

The CBO partners in Iringa and Kilolo now have a good management structure with a low risk of financial misconduct. They have had good training in management and marketing though they still need to gain confidence in marketing. CSO partners have been considerably strengthened though a lot remains to be done (until they can successfully apply unaided for international funding and successfully manage the resulting project without an international NGO to help).

There were no unintended results apart from the unexpected observation that joint registration of land helped to stabilise marriages. A full discussion of the degree of achievement of the Expected Results is given the first part of this Annex.

Uniformity of impact

The project activities were more or less equally spread over the six districts. However, the response of district government officers (to capacity building, training) differs quite widely. This is exacerbated by the frequent moves that the government require of their district staff.

Effect on local government and leaders

All the district and village government staff interviewed during the evaluation were very positive about the project. They generally believed their management capacity and leadership skills had been improved and some even said their job prospects had been enhanced. Some said the training had helped them to better plan according to people's needs. According to Concern staff, some individual government officials have changed their attitudes but this is not uniform across the project area.

Government officers are generally on low salaries compared to their counterparts in NGOs or the private sector. Many lack motivation. One issue the ACD-P and I discussed often was how to encourage government officials to be more motivated, committed and pro-active in fulfilling their duties.

❖ *It is recommended that Concern give serious thought to this issue and build non-financial motivation strategies for government staff into their projects.*

Village councils, chairmen and executive officers all said they benefited from the training they received. Generally they are now more committed to decentralised planning and to taking the views of farmers and their families into account when formulating village development plans. However there remain some frustrations at village level that their plans are not taken seriously enough at ward and district level.

Sustainability

Continuation after end of project funding

The process by which the views of women and other vulnerable groups become increasingly taken into account in decision making will continue to gain momentum, not least because the central government supports this process. Similarly thanks to organisations like ANSAF, government transparency will continue to improve. The bottom-up planning process is not perfect but has gained a momentum that will be difficult to stop.

because of weak implementation capacity.

Annex 1: Tanzania

Though the project built up the capacity of district government to accelerate the land registration process, the momentum has inevitably declined after the end of the project. However, non-beneficiaries were reported increasingly to be prepared to pay the small amount of money required for the district land offices to undertake land registration, independently of central funding. One issue already alluded to is the surveying equipment. A subscription was included for the Omnistar satellite system which transmits signals to hand held GPS equipment in order to enhance accuracy. District offices are unlikely to be able to afford the future annual subscriptions.

Farmers who have adopted improved methods will continue as long as they remain convinced that the methods contribute to improved yields.

The processing groups have been well trained in business management (from the district Marketing Officer), there is a good demand for their products and they stand every chance of continuing. They have had training in financial management including concepts such as depreciation and the need to set aside money for replacements and maintenance. Most have been building up a healthy reserve of savings to draw on.

Groups interviewed knew the cost of the equipment they had been given and were confident that when the time came, they would be able to replace the equipment either from accumulated cash or by obtaining a loan. Though the project donated most processing equipment to village groups, one processing machine had been given to an individual who was trusted by the community and another one (sunflower processor) had been handed over to Caritas, the project partner in Kigoma. It remains to be seen which the most sustainable model is.

One possible weak point is the voluntary paraprofessionals (though some were provided with motorcycles or bicycles). However if they can earn some income from poultry vaccinations (for NCD), it will go some way to their continuing work. It may have been better to investigate other ways by which they could earn income, for example by channelling improved seeds from the farmers producing Quality Declared Seed (QDS) or selling other inputs. Some QDS farmers pay paraprofessionals for visits and a processing group in Mtwara pay the paraprofessional every time he visits the group farm. Though some paraprofessionals will not continue unless village governments find funds to pay them, many will continue in their work.

The Quality Declared Seed scheme the project set up will go a long way to ensuring a good supply of improved varieties for some important crops. It is a pity the scheme was not implemented in Mtwara region. The scheme depends on the continued capacity of the Tanzania Official Seed Certification Institute.

As pointed out by Davey, mosaic tolerance in cassava may decline if farmers fail to produce quality clean cuttings. Also the genetic advantages of the improved goats and poultry introductions may eventually be lost by uncontrolled mating.

However, Concern has a continued presence in the three project areas and will continue to provide support to at least some of the beneficiaries of this project, albeit possibly in different ways.

Environmental sustainability

None of the activities seriously threaten environmental sustainability.

Government influence on sustainability

Factors that make the outputs from the project sustainable include the government support for many of the project components such as land registration, land tribunals, decentralised decision making, DRR systems and increased food security. However, the cessation of project funding will lead to a reduced rate at which land registration will happen.

One issue of concern was the reliance on paying government officers subsistence allowances and sometimes providing transport for them to do what was essentially their job. This issue is not confined to this project or even the three countries. Until national wealth is improved and tax income increased, government officers will continue to need some financial incentives. The possibility of investigating other ways of improving motivation is discussed above.

Level of participation

The beneficiaries were supportive of and appreciated the project activities. The members of processing and savings & credit groups definitely have a sense of ownership and have made financial commitments to them. Village registries will continue to be used for their allocated purpose.

Role of private sector

The project had a specific focus on improving livelihoods through the private sector (Expected Result 2). The project has facilitated links with business people though as already stated, the marketing has been quite a weak component. The private sector though have not been altruistically contributing towards development goals, only to making profits. Perhaps more could have been done to attract large companies to become involved in altruistic efforts which could also have an element of self-interest through good public relations and an enhanced supply base.

Contribution to cross-cutting issues

Attention to cross-cutting issues contributed significantly towards the success of the project. Though not perfect, groups were in the main trying to engage with the question of how the vulnerable could be helped, for example by offering free crop processing services. The HIV infected woman paraprofessional in Kibondo is good example of what both a woman and an HIV victim can contribute to a project like this. The project has mainstreamed a wide range of cross-cutting issues and these are summarised below.

Environmental concerns

The project has not specifically addressed environmental concerns except for a small amount of water source protection and tree planting in Masasi, Nanyundu and Iringa. The village land committees that complement the land tribunals (or in some cases combined with them) have a great potential for addressing environmental issues in future projects.

Empowerment of beneficiaries

The project specifically aimed to increase the influence of poor farmers and their families, women and vulnerable such as the elderly, disabled and AIDS sufferers on village level decision making and this has been achieved to a considerable degree. Furthermore, the beneficiaries have been economically empowered as well as politically because increased incomes have improved access to education and medical services.

Gender equity

The project has contributed significantly to increased awareness and attention to the needs of women particularly at a village level. Increased involvement of women contributed greatly to the success of processing groups and they were a key part of the savings groups.

Project staff reminded Village Councils that the councils were supposed to be 50% (though is rarely achieved in practice). Gender equity has been discussed at FFS. Women were not singled out for capacity building or skills enhancement. However they have taken part in a wide range of training from agriculture to processing group management and are active in the management of processing groups and the VICOBA's. Issues such as GBV do not seem to have been specifically addressed.

Training on gender has made a difference to behaviour. More women now contest village council seats and there are more female Village Executive Officers than previously.

Human rights

Most of the village leaders had training on human rights from the partners, Concern staff (including at FFS) or consultants. In one village only a few remembered human rights being discussed in village meetings but it was explained that this was because it was included in normal meetings rather than specific village meetings on rights. In the Mtwara villages (partner UPT) there were lists of the two trained Human Rights Watch members for all the UPT villages (i.e. 64 names in each village). Signs about rights have been put up in some villages.

Democracy

The revival and encouragement of the QVGAMs has meant that the views of villagers are now taken into account by village councils more than they did. Issues such as informing people how they can contribute towards village development plans have often been covered during FFS.

Disaster Risk Reduction

That village and district level DRR systems were created or enhanced was specifically included as an activity and as an indicator for “... *strengthened local government* ...”. There is now a system in place though it still needs work on. Villages and districts have DRR committees - with a major focus on reducing the impact of droughts (through the introduction of drought resistant crops and varieties).

After the drought of 2010/11 resulting in a very poor harvest in some parts of Iringa, the project contributed 40.84 tonnes of sorghum seed (enough for about 4,000 ha), a new drought resistant crop for the area, to complement the assistance being provided by the national and district government as well as FAO.

Equality

Staff were trained in Iringa at the end of 2011 on human rights, gender issues and equality. Staff or partners then held meetings in villages, one by one, usually attended by around 300 people (mostly men). Response was generally positive though there were sometimes negative remarks.

Racial and sexuality equality have not been directly addressed. In Tanzania, tribalism is not a big issue. There has been training on HIV in most project villages. Some partners have made specific efforts to integrate those suffering HIV/AIDS into the project. For example in Kibondo, vegetable gardens included those suffering from HIV/AIDS and the elderly. Also in Kibondo, one of the paraprofessionals is an HIV/AIDS sufferer. All groups said they would not discriminate against people with HIV/AIDS though attitudes are generally more conservative in the south. In Kibondo, though people with AIDS were formerly stigmatised, attitudes have changed over recent years.

Conflict management

The land tribunals supported by the project have made a direct contribution to the resolution of conflicts. However, there were frequent complaints during the evaluation about conflicts with pastoralists who allowed their animals onto cropped land at inconvenient times. Village governments often were not addressing the issue and neither had the project. Project staff had training on conflict management in the context of the land tribunals.

Complaints response mechanism

The CRM in Tanzania has been piloted in Mtwara. Telephone numbers for UPT and Concern have been placed on a board in the village together with information about the project. Some beneficiaries have made complaints, mainly about the government. Concern staff were passing on these complaints but as it was making relationships with the government difficult this practice was halted.

**Maximising rural communities' livelihood options
through engagement between non-state actors,
government and the private sector
(Farming Together)**

Final Evaluation

Paul D. Smith

Annex 2. Burundi



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Cover photograph: lead farmer on his terraced farm with improved bananas given by the project

Evaluation according to logical framework indicators - Burundi

Overall objective

The overall objective was *“to contribute to the achievement of MDG1 and food security in Tanzania, Ethiopia and Burundi”*. Taking into account the indicators for the Specific Objective and the three expected results, the project in Burundi has made a substantial contribution to the achievement of overall objective.

Specific objective

The **Specific Object** was: *“to improve livelihoods and empowerment of poor farmers in decentralised decision-making processes”*. Whilst livelihoods of beneficiaries have undoubtedly been improved, the degree to which farmers have been empowered *“in decentralised decision-making processes”* has been more limited in the case of Burundi than in Tanzania. This limitation was outside the control of the project.

OVI 1: Food Stocks

The first OVI was that *“at the end of the programme, the number of targeted households that have achieved recommended staple food stock levels has increased by at least 15% when compared to non-intervention areas”*.

The endline survey suggested that 46% of beneficiaries had less than 30 days of food stock at the time of the survey (a reduction of 49.5%). For non-beneficiaries, the number of households with less than 30 days food stock has dropped from 88% to 79% (a variation of just 9%). The difficulties in the reliability of these measurements are discussed in Appendix 3.

Focus group discussions with beneficiaries during the evaluation indicated that the level of food security was much better at the end of the project than at the beginning. The picture that emerged was that for beneficiaries, the number of months of scarcity had reduced typically from between 4 and 6 months to 0.5 to 2 months with a corresponding impact on coping strategies and livelihoods. Though it is difficult to be confident in the survey data, food security undoubtedly improved greatly because of the project interventions and food shortage months consequently reduced by far more than 15% in number. Essentially the OVI has been met.

OVI 2: Issues addressed by local government

The 2nd OVI was that *“priority issues of women and marginalised groups are increasingly addressed at the community level and within local government structures”*.

Every year, two surveys of beneficiaries were carried out to assess the progress of the programme (usually in March and July/August). In the questionnaire, some questions focused on the level of satisfaction with local government. No attempt to find out what councils actually discussed (rather than people's opinion of what was discussed) was made. Analysis of what was actually discussed would have been time consuming (and possibly not allowed) but perhaps could have been done for a small sample of the *collines*.

In Burundi, the baseline survey (as reported in the ESR) suggested that the top three priorities that people wanted discussed were (in order of priority): housing, water and livestock. What respondents thought had actually been addressed were social justice issues (mostly), food aid, and housing only third. At the endline survey, the priorities that people wanted discussed were housing (as in the baseline), health and water while what people thought had been discussed were social justice issues (mainly, as in baseline), water and health. While there was still a mismatch between what people wanted discussed and what they thought was discussed, at the time of the endline, two out of the top three items that people thought had been discussed were the same as what people actually wanted to be discussed whereas in the baseline, only one of the top three topics people thought had been

discussed were in the top three topics that people wanted to be discussed. In both the baseline survey and the endline survey the answers were similar for all people pooled and for women and very poor disaggregated.

Both baseline and endline results showed that people thought that the government tends to place more emphasis on issues such as social justice, which do not require large amounts of capital.

In recording level of satisfaction, at the time of the baseline report, 13% of respondents thought that the *colline* council was good or very good and 14% that the *commune* council was good or very good. At the endline, 61% of respondents thought the councils were good or very good though among the very poor, only 38% thought they were good or very good. Satisfaction appears to have increased even among the very poor.

My conclusion is that councils are now discussing priority issues more than they were and that the level of satisfaction has increased and that therefore this OVI has been met.

Expected Result 1: Strengthened Local Government

The first Expected Result was: “*strengthened local government structures to manage, regulate and coordinate local development*”. This has been difficult to achieve in the Burundi context as the central government still shows poor commitment to their declared decentralisation policies. Nevertheless some progress has been made at *colline* and *commune* level to develop planning skills and the project initiated a quarterly meeting in the two *communes* so that local structures and councils can review the PCDC (Plan Communal de Developpement Communautaire) and to discuss other development issues.

Activities

Government capacity building

The 1st activity was to “*build capacity of relevant government personnel on decision-making, financial allocations and effective planning*”.

Capacity building of government personnel, in addition to the training on land rights and DRR and in addition to the Exchange visits, are summarised in Table 22. Topics covered decentralisation, participatory planning, budgeting at *commune* level, monitoring and evaluation for *commune* small projects, role and responsibilities of CDC, setting up gender commissions and training on GBV, decision making on youth rights, human and family code, code of criminal procedure, conflict resolution¹¹², and communities’ infrastructures maintenance. Participants included (not for all topics): *Commune* Committees for Community Development (CCDCs), CSO partners, political parties, *Colline* Development Committees (CDCs), *commune* accountant, technical advisor of the administrator in charge of development, Chefs de zones, *Commune* Administrator, gender commission members, *Colline* council members, Officier de Police Judiciaire, and School Management Committees.

Training on land rights

The 2nd Activity was “*training on land rights and registration*”.

It has been estimated that 3 to 5% of adult men are landless because of subdivision of land as once plot sizes become less than around 0.5 ha, younger brothers tend to sell their land to their elder brothers.

In 2012, the project organised training for 120 CCDCs, chefs du zone, and CDC members (Table 22) in the *commune* towns. However there was no expenditure on this item (*Training on land rights*) recorded in the final accounts.

Despite the fact that the new (2011) legislation on Land Tenure Reform was supposed to simplify registration, this is not happening, partly because the *commune* requires a land registry before certificates can be issued and partly because of widespread corruption. Farmers have to pay a fee and the registration falls short of full land title. Rightly, the project management saw no point in pursuing land registration in other areas apart from the resettlement of the 674 Batwa households (see under Activities for Expected Result 2 - increased access to land).

¹¹² I was told in one *colline* that major conflicts, apart from Gender Based Violence (GBV) were arguments over land and arguments between the wives of polygamous men

Annex 2: Burundi

Table 19. Training on land registration and DRR

Topic	Category of participants	No. of participants	Location	Date
Training on land registration code	CCDC, chef de zone, CDC	120	Busoni & Bugabira	2012
Training on DRR contingency plan development	Provincial platform members	45	Kirundo centre	2011
Refresh DRR contingency plan elaboration		45		Jun. 2012
Training on DRR		45		Nov. 2012
Training on Early Warning Systems	Communal platform members	80	Busoni & Bugabira	2012

Training on DRR

The 3rd Activity was to “train local councils on Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) initiatives”.

Training on DRR was provided to government staff at communal and provincial (45 participants) levels (Table 19). At *colline* level, there were 8 members of the DRR committees in Bugabira and 5 members in Busoni. There were 301 *colline* DRR committee members trained in the two project *communes* but not only in project *collines*. See also OVI 4 below.

Exchange visits

The 3rd Activity was to facilitate “Exchange visits of local government representatives around the issue of decentralisation”. See OVI 2 below.

OVI 1: Monitoring of implementation of government plans

The first OVI was that there would be “regular joint monitoring by Concern and partners of progress against local government development plans in all 3 programme countries”.

The Burundi “Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper” (p. 3) states that CSO’s role will include

“(iii) keeping a critical eye on the monitoring and evaluation of the PRSP through information actions, communication, and training of beneficiaries; and (iv) functioning as a counterweight by monitoring and conducting regular social audits of government action and decentralized government agencies”.

Decentralised planning is still weak in Burundi but the project was able to initiate a quarterly meeting in the two *communes* so that local structures and councils can review the PCDC (Plan Communal de Developpement Communautaire) and to discuss other development issues. Thus this OVI has been met.

OVI 2: Exchange visits

The second OVI was that “local authorities in all 3 programme countries have participated in internal and external exchange visits and can demonstrate learning and sharing”

Burundi was the only country to organise an external exchange visit for government staff. An exchange visit to Tanzania (Kigoma and Kibondo districts) was organised in 2011. The team comprised representatives of the Ministry of Decentralisation and the Ministry of Communal Development representatives as well as Concern staff from both Burundi and Tanzania. The team also saw how Tanzania’s decentralised financial management system works, how budgetary allocations are processed from central government, how local taxes are collected and utilised and the ways in which local governments are accountable to both central government and communities. Sending central government representatives to Tanzania was a good idea as there is a small possibility that exposure may stimulate the government to be more motivated in implementing its decentralisation policy.

Internal visits (Table 20) covered topics such as decentralisation, empowerment in community development and women’s rights.

Annex 2: Burundi

- ❖ *The demonstration of “learning” is difficult to assess. One approach would be to ask participants to write a brief report on their return from exchange visits.*

Table 20. Visits arranged for local government

Topic	Personnel	Location	Date
Exchange visit on decentralisation processes	Government structures representatives and 2 representatives from the Ministry for Planning and Local Development	Tanzania	May 2011
Interprovincial visits	Bugabira & Busoni CDC and CCDC members	Ngozi	Dec. 2011
Improving local administrative structures & participation in coordinating local development	CDC members from Bugabira	Busoni	Sep. 2012
Interprovincial visits of COSC, FORSC, SPPDF (Synergy for Women's Rights Promotion) with MIPAREC (Minister for Peace and Reconciliation)	COSC	Bujumbura, Gitega	Oct. 2012
Local administrative structures, coordination of local development	54 CDC/CCDC reps + prov. admin.	Bugabira & Busoni	Oct. 2012
Decentralisation, ownership and empowerment in community development	29 from Bugabira & Busoni CDC, CCDCs and <i>commune</i> councils	<i>Communes</i> in Mwaro Province	Dec. 2012
Decentralisation processes	44 from province, <i>commune</i> & zone levels	Cankuzo, Ruyigi, Rutana, Makamba and Bururi Provinces	Feb. 2013

In addition to the visit to Tanzania, the project organised visits to other parts of Burundi for provincial, communal, and *colline* officials to learn about decentralised planning, women's rights and conflict resolution.

It will be seen also in Table 25 that two representatives (at *commune* level) from DPAE (Direction Provinciale de l'Agriculture et de l'Elevage) accompanied three Concern staff, one person from the private sector and one person from the research sector on a visit to Rwanda in December 2011 to learn about rainwater harvesting ponds, greenhouse management and to look at the possibility of importing Jersey cows and semen.

OVI 3: Women's representation (Burundi and Ethiopia only)

The second OVI was that there would be a “15% increase in the proportion of women's representation in Community Level structures, in Burundi and Ethiopia”.

Women's representation on the *commune* councils after the 2005 and 2010 (September / October) elections are shown in Table 21. They show an increase of 14% for Busoni and 20% for Bugabira. The project may have influence on these results after trainings and sensitization for women participation encouraged many women to offer themselves as candidates in the elections. The next elections are due in 2015.

Table 21. Women's representation in *commune* councils in 2005 and 2010

<i>Commune</i>	Number of women elected in 2005	%	Number of women elected in 2010	%	Increase
Busoni	8/205	3%	35/205	17%	14%
Bugabira	4/60	6%	16/60	26%	20%

The ESR reported that only 41% of respondents were satisfied or very satisfied with the level of women's representation. However, during the evaluation we were told that women were now more prepared to stand for elections. Also that they were trusted more than men to manage money for savings groups and for community projects such as school building.

OVI 4: Disaster Risk Reduction

The 4th OVI was that *“Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction systems are established and operational within Local Government structures in 60% of target communities in all 3 programme countries”*

There was no DRR system at the *commune* or *colline* level before the project though there had been a national platform (supported by Concern) for some years and meets monthly. The DRR system in Burundi comes under the police department for Civil Protection.

After initial meetings, the provincial governor asked Concern to support the provincial DRR platform and to help set up *commune* and *colline* level platforms.

The provincial platform now has three sub-committees:

- resource mobilisation, training and research;
- programme planning, emergency operations;
- legal matters, communication, information, and community sensitisation.

The project helped to strengthen the provincial platform by facilitating training by staff from the national platform and helped to update the provincial contingency plans. Concern is a member of the provincial platform¹¹³.

The project subsequently facilitated training (by the provincial DRR Executive Secretary, the Red Cross and staff from the national platform) at *commune* level (see Table 19) and at *colline* level (see Table 27 and Table 28). The project provided one motorbike to the Provincial DRR Platform. Thus, DRR “platforms” were set up in both project *communes* and in all 26 project *collines* and in 27 *collines* that were not project *collines*. There are 8 people selected by the community on the *colline* DRR committees and were trained by *commune* DRR officials (Table 27 and Table 28).

Data being collected include: pest attacks on crops, epidemics of livestock, human epidemics such as cholera (presumably obtained from health clinics), social unrest, gender based violence and level of road accidents on certain routes. We were told at one *colline* they also report on road accidents and accidental deaths (such as drowning). The reporting is not regular but only as incidents arise. The *colline* DRR committee are also keen to learn about first aid. They give safety advice also such as warning people not to stand under trees in an electrical storm.

Issues discussed include crop storage, soil erosion, fuelwood collection and tree-planting (because of the high incidents of landslides), and gender based violence¹¹⁴ (seen as a DRR issue since DRR is managed by the police department for Civil Protection).

In Ethiopia the data collection is more systematic (possibly to the extent of information overload).

❖ *Consider encouraging colline / commune platforms to collect some of following (collected in Ethiopia component):*

- *weekly information on the spatial and temporal distribution of rain and the effect on crops;*
- *likely level of crop production, taking into account rain and crop pests;*
- *occurrence of landslides;*
- *natural disasters such as flooding;*
- *extent of contagious livestock and human diseases (not just epidemics) – presumably obtained from health clinics;*

¹¹³ We were told in Kirundo about a recent fire in the market (not like the recent large one in Bujumbura market). There is apparently no volunteer fire brigade and one wonders if this is something future projects with a DRR component should look at.

¹¹⁴ Formerly GBV often was not reported by victims. Increasingly it is, though sometimes (not always) police do not take action because of corruption (bribery).

Annex 2: Burundi

- *market prices of commonly consumed crops¹¹⁵ and consumer goods;*
- *nutritional status of children as an indicator for the food security of the population – presumably from health clinics.*

There is much discussion about droughts and climate change in the DRR platforms. Solutions offered include water-harvesting, the introduction of drought tolerant varieties and increased crop storage facilities¹¹⁶ - all useful technologies. However climate change is a gradual process that takes place over decades and centuries – not years. A balanced review is to be found in the new book “*East African Agriculture and Climate Change*” published by IFPRI¹¹⁷. In it two different models predict either an increase in rainfall or a decrease over the next 50 years. The following further recommendations are made:

- ❖ *that Concern invites someone from Institut Geographique du Burundi, Departement de Meteorologie to talk to staff and DRR platform at Provincial about weather forecasting, DRR and climate change evidence;*
- ❖ *that someone responsible for DRR in Concern read the report on the WMO Severe Weather Forecasting Demonstration Project (SWFDP) Mission to the Burundi Hydrometeorological Department, Institut Géographique du Burundi (BHMD / IGEBU) Bujumbura, Burundi, 4-5, June 2012;*
- ❖ *Concern staff, on projects with an agricultural or DRR component, ask for copies (at least monthly) of rainfall data from those collecting rain-gauge data in or near their project areas¹¹⁸. Summaries of these data may be included as appendices to project reports;*
- ❖ *Concern assist provincial DRR platforms by providing food security alerts on the on the USAID supported Famine Early Warning System Network¹¹⁹ (FEWSNET) web site (includes market analysis), the WFP Burundi web site¹²⁰ and FAO's¹²¹ Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS) web site¹²².*

A practical example of the impact of the DRR system was seen in 2012 when Concern supported the Provincial Governor as chair of the DRR platform in quickly declaring an emergency after the settlement of the Batwa with project assistance, coincided with the drought that particularly affected that area between March and April 2012. The poor growing conditions, exacerbated by the Batwa's lack of agricultural skills, led to severe hunger and the deaths of around 30 people. Concern helped to convene a forum of the provincial government and NGOs to coordinate the call for assistance from the international agencies.

Expected Result 2: Diversified Livelihoods

The second Expected Result was that there would be “*diversified livelihoods for farmers through working with local institutions and the private sector*”.

Activities for Expected Result 2

Training for farmers

The 1st activity was “*training for farmers in appropriate farming techniques, for example crop diversification, including new short-cycle drought-resistant crop varieties, animal health and irrigation, through the use of farmer Field Schools (FFS)*”.

In Burundi, agricultural groups, most of which existed before the beginning of the project were the focus of much of the agricultural activity. Groups generally consist of “*poor to average*” farmers though I was told there were also some better off members. Groups often buy, rent or are lent one or two fields to cultivate as a group. Some offer themselves out for hire, as group labour, for better off farms. Others work on each other's farms at critical times. Most had had some training from the *colline* government extension agent even before the project. After

¹¹⁵ Prices were collected at *colline* level during the project but this has since stopped

¹¹⁶ Apparently there is no national grain silo - surely a priority though not for an NGO like Concern

¹¹⁷ August 2013, by Michael Waithaka, Gerald C. Nelson, Timothy S. Thomas, and Miriam Kyotalimye

¹¹⁸ There is at least one rain gauge in each *commune*

¹¹⁹ <http://www.fews.net/Pages/remote-monitoring-country.aspx?gb=bi&l=en>

¹²⁰ <http://www.wfp.org/countries/burundi/publications>

¹²¹ FAO already provide their alerts and harvest assessments to the national DRR platform

¹²² <http://www.fao.org/gIEWS/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=BDI>

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being encouraged by the project, some groups have organised themselves into “collectives” on a *colline* basis. Seeds and other planting materials were given to the groups to bulk up and distribute to other group members.

There is at least one “lead farmer”, chosen from one of the groups in each *colline* who acts as a focal point for extension and on-farm demonstrations of improved practices. There were 75 “lead farmers” - about 3 per *colline*. Lead farmers received special training from DPAE and Concern staff.

There were about 6,889 farmers in 222 groups trained. A summary of training given to farmers with support from the Provincial Agriculture and Livestock Directorate (DPAE) is given in Table 25. Topics covered included: plant density, seed selection, fertiliser use, seed conservation, macro-propagation techniques for banana, management of mother gardens for banana propagation, multiplication of sorghum seed and cassava cuttings, soil conservation, agroforestry practices, efficient land use, rainwater harvesting ponds, greenhouse management, animal health and pest control. ICRAF helped with training on water-harvesting and greenhouse construction and management.

Strengthen agricultural extension services

The 2nd activity was to “*strengthen agricultural extension services through government and community-based models*”.

The project facilitated the training of 26 government *colline* extension staff by DPAE officers. They were also provided with tools for use on demonstration plots. Following an earlier precedent set by a Belgian government funded project, in 2011, a performance-based contracting system for *colline* extension workers was introduced by the project. The scheme was fully operational with 25 extension workers from 2012, about one per *colline*. The system was to supplement their government salary by 50% if they achieved at least 80% of their targets (terraces constructed by farmers, technologies adopted). Their DPAE supervisors in the *commune* were also paid a supplement (and provided with fuel if there was a shortage of supply in the government). Achievements were planned and assessed quarterly by the DPAE officers together with project staff.

The scheme helped to create a good relationship between government extension workers and farmers. Before the project, visits from extension workers were very few. During the project the system facilitated intensive training and the dissemination of new techniques. However, it is not a long-term solution to extension work even if other NGOs have expressed interest in taking over the initiative. To some extent, it also undervalues the prerogative of the farmer to reject technologies as being inappropriate or unaffordable.

Develop community seed & produce storage facilities

Eight warehouses were constructed and equipped by the project (Table 23). The capacity is around 150 tonnes but the largest amount stored in one warehouse visited had been around 50 tonnes. The ones seen had roof rainwater harvesting systems built in. Following the Season B 2012 harvest, a total of 209 tonnes (beans, sorghum, maize and rice) were deposited in all eight warehouses. Produce was protected with pesticides provided by the project.

The warehouses were registered as cooperatives and the average number of members is 335 (2,685 in total). The warehouses management is selected by the members. They have two main functions, storage¹²³ of crops for farmers and purchase and sale (when prices are higher) of produce. Charges for storage are about 4% (supposedly for security and running costs) in kind regardless of the time period. The warehouses also generally offer loans to members if the management committee agrees. The interest rate at one visited was 60% p.a. though the maximum period was 5 months.

Shops to sell farm inputs were set up in 5 of the 8 warehouses and were given start-up stocks of mineral fertilizers, vegetable seeds, pesticides, agrochemicals, and implements such as watering cans and spray cans.

We asked about welfare arrangements and one group told us:

- the group pays towards burial costs of members;
- the group pays towards medical costs of a member or his/her close relative is ill;
- waive the interest on those parts of loans that have been repaid if a woman becomes a widow and inherits her husband's debt.

The impact of warehouses on income is discussed under OVI 3 of Expected Result 2.

Watershed management including rain-water harvesting & small-scale irrigation

In Burundi, this activity consisted of harvesting surface runoff into small ponds lined with heavy duty plastic. The system was copied from Rwanda after an exposure visit for farmer representatives and government staff (Table 25). Twelve systems were installed (Table 23), 10 in 2011 and 2 in 2012. Water is generally pumped out using a hand pump but at two sites, drip irrigation and a mechanical pump have been installed. The introduction of this

¹²³ One woman told us that she likes to store her farm produce because it means her husband cannot take it and sell it to obtain money for beer.

technology has enabled farmers to cultivate vegetables (on rented land or land belonging to the lead farmer) outside the normal growing season and so sell when prices are high.

Support development of alternative income generating sources

Planting material distribution

Though not specifically mentioned as an activity, the project distributed relative small quantities of seed and other planting material to the agricultural groups for growing on their plots. As all the varieties were improved varieties, farmers could produce larger crops and so increase income. Thus the planting material distribution is justified under this activity. Because groups distributed the produce from their plots to group members for planting in following years, there was a good multiplier impact from this. The following planting material was distributed.

Bananas: Bananas are the main starch crop in the project area. The project bought 22,000 plants (FHIA 17, 21, 23 and 25) grown *in vitro* (obtained from an independent banana specialist in Bujumbura) for multiplication through mother gardens¹²⁴ (such as those at Nyabikenke and Mukerwa visited during the evaluation). The new varieties produce bunches that are four times (70 kg) those of local varieties (17 kg) after just one year. Because they produce 2 or 3 bunches the production per plant from year 2 is around 240 kg.

The project grew also 127 suckers in macro-propagation chambers. Assuming that one produced 6 suckers (low), the total suckers propagated through this technique is 762 suckers. Bananas for multiplying were given to lead farmers (as they could not be planted on rented land) - typically 20 suckers each. It has been estimated that the distribution of suckers has met around 40% of demand among group members.

Making connection with CIALCA was very useful to the project and should be continued if the opportunity arises. As in the other countries, especially Mtwara Region in Tanzania, the project missed an opportunity to develop banana products such as beer, jam and chips (as was seen at CIALCA in Bujumbura).

Cassava: After bananas, cassava is the most important source of energy. There was a large outbreak of mosaic virus around 2001, yields declined dramatically and farmers were told to burn their crops. Between 2009 and 2011 there was a massive distribution of mosaic resistant cassava by the government though apparently not in the project *collines*. The project distributed a mosaic resistant, short duration (10 months as opposed to 18 to 24 months) variety. The project distributed 800,000 cuttings in 2010, 1,200,000 cuttings in 2011 and 1,310,000 in 2012, a total of 3,310,000. At 10,000 plants per hectare, this is sufficient for around 300 ha. It is thought that all group members now have improved cassava and are passing on cuttings (10 per plant) to others.

Sweet potatoes and taro: The sweet potato variety distributed was a variety enriched with beta-carotene. There was not a great amount of interest in sweet potato even though it is a drought tolerant crop. Even so 3 million cuttings were distributed. 149,000 cuttings of taro were distributed also.

Seeds: Seeds distributed (see Table 26) included:

- beans - farmers did on-farm trials with 5 varieties and selected one for wider dissemination, a total of 35 tonnes of bean seed were distributed;
- maize - short growing season - 2.8 tonnes;
- sorghum (Gambella for beer making¹²⁵) - 8.4 tonnes;
- soya bean - 9½ tonnes;
- groundnuts - 14 tonnes;
- pigeon peas - 0.8 tonnes;
- chickpeas - 0.5 tonnes;
- vegetables - 99 kg.

As a result of the bulking up and redistribution of seed, it is estimated that maize seed now meets around 50 to 60% of demand, bean seed meets over 80% of demand, and soya seed meets 30 to 40% of demand. Seed will have to be replaced after 3 to 5 years but growers all knew where to obtain replacement seed.

Fruit, fodder, and soil amelioration plants: These include (Table 26):

- 24,000 saplings of mango, avocado, papaya and tree tomatoes;
- 14,000 pineapple cuttings;
- 1 million seedlings of *Calliandra*, *Grevillea* and *Leucaena*.

Fertiliser distribution

Fertilisers were distributed free to group members for the first two years because farmers found it difficult to obtain. Fertilisers are now used by about 45% of group members.

¹²⁴ survival rate was 60%

¹²⁵ after two years without success, the promotion of this sorghum variety was stopped

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Livestock Improvement

Jersey dairy cows: Jersey cows and semen were brought from Rwanda. Semen is kept at the national AI centre in Bujumbura. It was a struggle to obtain the assistance of the government national expert (for testing the semen through the National Artificial Insemination Centre) without employing him as a consultant. The actual insemination was done by trained technicians under the supervision of the provincial veterinary officer. AI has taken place twice. Cows were distributed to 118 group members. A further 55 are estimated to have benefited from the Solidarity Chain scheme.

The recipients are selected by the *colline* livestock committee based on the farmer having enough land to grow fodder, enough money to have built cow-shed and no other cows. However many of the recipients were still quite poor. A quarter of the original batch (118) died apparently from diseases because they were weak as a result of not being fed supplements. Survival was good after this issue was addressed. The Jerseys are said to be giving 15 litres per day as opposed to 3 litres per day from local cows.

Goats: Goats were distributed to 322 group members. Another 276 are estimated to have benefited under the Solidarity Chain scheme. Recipients are decided by the *colline* livestock committee on the grounds of poverty. Goats were either (mostly) Boer (for meat) or Alpine (for milk). Families that had received Alpines were giving extra milk to their children. The goats were brought from Rwanda. Families were given three female goats each and one billy between three families. Recipients promised to pass on kids to other poor people (this is called the "Solidarity Chain" in Burundi).

Animal health: Vaccinations are organized nationally by the government. Farmers who acted as private animal health workers were given drugs for common diseases. The provincial DPAE officers believed that *colline* extension workers or farmers were not skilled enough to administer vaccines, apparently even for NCD¹²⁶.

Greenhouses

The greenhouses use water pumped from rainwater harvesting ponds. There are two, each managed by an agricultural group (one of 50 the other of 33 members). Until now, only tomatoes have been produced but they plan to grow other vegetables out of season later.

Bee-keeping

Nine groups were supported, one of which (with 31 members) was also an agricultural group. The other 8 had a total of 242 members. The project identified pre-existing bee-keeping groups which had a constitution and a management committee. Group members were trained on the use of modern beehives and honey harvesting methods. They were given new hives and equipment (but members interviewed did not know where to obtain new equipment). The honey is not bottled. Instead, they sell 25% of the honey locally to people who bring their own containers. The remainder is sold in towns largely through Kirundo Beekeeping Collective (who the project put them in touch with). Income from honey sales at one group visited was used to rent land and it was the produce from this that was shared.

There was a missed potential to develop some of these groups into a honey marketing cooperative. There is a lack of expertise on bee-keeping and some practices (such as using buildings to house the bee-hives) seem questionable. I would recommend that some expert advice is sought to improve the bee-keeping activity¹²⁷.

Saving and Internal Lending Communities (SILCs)

Twenty-three groups were established with a total of 539 members (Table 24). Groups have been given training (by a national NGO in Bujumbura, facilitated by the project) and start-up materials, such as stationery. Savings meetings are held weekly and each member contributes usually between 500 BIF (€0.25) and 700 BIF (€0.40) per week though one group visited was saving 1200 BIF. Members also have access to a social fund to ensure they will be better prepared to cope with any disasters and economic shocks in the future. However one group visited was charging 120% p.a. This was justified on the grounds that the profits were distributed to members as a dividend. The fact that it may be the poorest taking loans was not taken into account. In another group money was being kept in someone's house because they were unable to pay the high bank charges. Groups are not agricultural groups though some individual members may also belong to an agricultural group. Some SILCs have formed themselves into "collectives" to provide a source of advice on management and transparency and to share knowledge.

Processing groups

The support to the flour and sunflower processing groups and their impact is discussed below and under OVI 3 of Expected Result 2.

Tailoring

Twenty individuals in two *collines* were trained in tailoring skills.

¹²⁶ Volunteer paraprofessionals were trained in Tanzania to administer NCD vaccine which is given through the eye.

¹²⁷ I have sent a French copy of P D Paterson's book "L'apiculture" Quae éditions (8 Feb 2008) to the project staff.

Fuel efficient stoves

The Batwa pygmies are a very vulnerable group. Four Batwa groups with a total of 167 members have been trained in the manufacture and marketing of fuel-efficient stoves that burn wood and grass. One group visited had rented land for agriculture and later bought land with the group proceeds. They supplement their income by hiring themselves as a group for casual labour and by making cooking pots. In 2012, the stove associations each received 20 copies of individual stamps with which to brand their stoves.

Facilitate linkages between beneficiaries and markets including cross-border trade

As with the other two countries, there was no attempt to undertake cross-border trade. However a market analysis was undertaken that included an analysis of cross-border trade opportunities to Rwanda and Tanzania. In practice there are still considerable hurdles for small businesses to engage in cross-border trade despite the rhetoric of the East African Community.

Little has been done to facilitate bulk marketing. Most marketing has been local or has relied on businessmen coming to the *colline*.

Examples of the strategies adopted include:

- distribution of information leaflets about the fuel-efficient stoves to *commune* markets;
- encouraging the community storage hangars in Munazi and Kagege to market sunflower to the (Catholic Diocese) Mutwenzi Agro-Pastoral Centre.

It was a pity the potential link between sorghum farmers with BRARUDI (Burundi Breweries) did not work out because of problems with growing the required sorghum variety.

Support farmers to add value ... through processing & marketing

The 7th Activity was to “*support farmers to add value to their crops by engaging in processing and marketing*”. Marketing has already been discussed in the preceding paragraph. There are two processing groups that the project has supported.

Murore Cooperative

Murore cooperative has 406 members. They produce flour for gruel purposes (called *Busonifac*) made from cassava, sorghum and soya (and milk powder when it is available) and sell it to local markets, primarily as a children's food¹²⁸. The mixture was originally developed to feed to AIDS patients. The mixture apparently costs FBu 1,700 to make and is sold for FBu 2,000. It would seem the margin is too small. Four tonnes were sold in the year preceding the evaluation. The cooperative management was trained in management and technical aspects by staff from the National Food Processing Centre so the quality is considered to be high. However their accounts are not audited (because of the cost). They (and other groups) should add a realistic amount to cover marketing, auditing and transport. It is estimated (Table 23) that 233 members and 487 non-members brought produce to the cooperative in the year to May 2013.

The cooperative also have a shop that sells soap and salt. The group also buys produce such as beans, sorghum and soya and sell them to business people. Produce is bought from anyone but only the members receive dividends (in kind).

Asked about any welfare arrangements, the management said any member who became unable to work would continue to receive dividend payments.

Mutwenzi Agro-Pastoral Centre

In collaboration with Caritas Belgium, the project supported the improvement of the electricity supply (15% of the cost) of the Mutwenzi Agro-Processing Unit to increase its processing capacity and of the building. The Unit is part of a large complex of different enterprises owned and managed by the Catholic Diocese. It produces sunflower oil, jams, sparkling pineapple wine and spaghetti made from maize. The Unit also trains people to assemble solar panels and provides training to farmers. In Table 23, it will be seen that 154 farmers from Munazi *colline* took sunflower seeds to the Processing Unit in the 12 months prior to May 2013.

The enterprises at the Mutwenzi Unit are not very transparent. Finances for the enterprises are not kept separate but go into the Diocese account. It would be difficult to analyse the cost-efficiency of any one of them. However, given the lack of market outlets for farmers growing sunflowers, linking farmers to the processing unit as a market was definitely justified. The Unit arranges annual contracts with growers so giving them a guaranteed market. The oil is sold locally and in Bujumbura.

See also OVI 3 below

¹²⁸ If it is to be used for children, they add sugar.

Increase access to land ...

The 8th activity was to “*increase access to land, including community gardens and land registration*”.

The land situation in Burundi is very different from Tanzania. The land bill clarifying certain aspects of land tenure was passed during the course of the project, but effectively the setting up of the land offices at communal level started only in 2013. The main intervention under this activity was for Batwa communities who had settled illegally within the Murehe Forest Natural Reserve, causing extensive damage to the forest ecosystem. After making representations to the government, in 2011, Concern, in collaboration with the Ministry of Environment and Local Administration, supported the delimitation, surveying and distribution of 674 plots of 0.5 ha of land to Batwa families just outside the Murehe Forest Reserve. The settlers were given seeds by the project and others were helped to set up small income-generating activities. At the time of the evaluation, no certificates of ownership or title deeds had been issued.

In October 2012 a three-day-training session on different models of protected area governance was conducted in Busoni Commune for participants from the administration, the population in the surrounding area of the Murehe Reserve and the INECN (Conservation Agency). Over the course of the session a management committee composed of 10 members (local administration, INECN and community) was set up.

See also above “*Training on land rights*” under “*Activities for Expected Result 1*”.

OVI 1: Adoption of new agricultural practices

The first OVI was that: “*70% of the targeted farmers are applying one or more new agricultural practices by the end of the programme in all 3 programme countries*”.

According to the ESR, 65% of farmers are now using crop protection techniques compared to 11.44% in the baseline study and 88.6% are applying fertilisers¹²⁹ compared to 16.7% to the baseline study. As pointed out in Appendix 3, the answers to the about what practices have been adopted depends to some extent on the knowledge of the enumerator. As the survey was done “in-house”, the answers are probably more reliable than those for Tanzania or Ethiopia where the endline survey was contracted out. Terracing, which may have helped to increase production (through extra moisture availability) was not mentioned as an option in the list of questions.

Interestingly for 5 of the 11 methods listed, more non-beneficiaries practiced the methods without training than those who practiced them that had had training, which seems to indicate some degree of learning by osmosis.

According to the ESR, the range of crops grown by beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries is almost identical except that non-beneficiaries did not record growing cabbage or amaranth.

Based on FGDs during the evaluation and on the information in the ESR, this OVI has been achieved.

OVI 2: Increased crop production

The second OVI was that “*targeted farmers have significantly increased ($p < 0.05$) their crop production compared to non-targeted farmers in all 3 programme countries*”.

Most surveys have tried to determine yield (production per unit area) when the OVI asks only that production has increased. This can be obtained by increasing cropped area as well as increasing yields. Estimates of production by farmers are more reliable than estimates of area so converting data to yields decreases accuracy unnecessarily. Unfortunately the ESR gives only yields. It looks as if Column 1 in Table 4 is the sum of the area planted by all the respondents. Half of the crops listed have very small areas which indicate small numbers of farmers growing those crops. For the crops with larger numbers of farmers, all the crops (maize, sorghum, cassava, sweet potato/yam, banana, sunflower, pulses) have higher yields than the non-beneficiaries. No statistical analysis (two tailed t-test) is given.

Farmers’ interviews during the evaluation invariably said their yields had increased quite dramatically over the project. This is more likely to be due to use of improved varieties, particularly banana and cassava, than to crop husbandry.

¹²⁹ It should be noted that fertilisers were distributed free to group members for the first two years.

OVI 3: Value chain

The third OVI was that “groups undertaking value-chain activities with links to the private sector, are reporting increased income in all 3 programme countries”.

The ESR gives financial data for the first 3 months of 2013 obtained from interviewing officials of a sample of groups formed under the project:

- Dukore Ibirama (production & sale of honey and by-products);
- Turwanyubunewe (Saving and Internal Lending Community);
- Abatwa Ntidusigare Inyuma Mwiterambere (production and sale of Fuel Efficient Stoves);
- Murore Cooperative (Flour processing unit);
- Munazi Hangar (collection and storage of member's production).

The most profitable in terms of net profit per member was (surprisingly) the Saving and Internal Lending Community (14,472 FBu/member) and the least profitable was Munazi Hangar (2,784 FBu/member). Murore Cooperative made the largest net profit in absolute terms (2,923,670 FBu).

During the evaluation, most informants said their income was better than before the project, that the months of low food availability was almost zero and they had been enabled to have more meals in a day, improve their home, buy bicycles, buy clothes, buy land, buy goats, enabled better access to health care, pay secondary school fees, buy more beer (!), etc. There was also less use of money-lenders. One group had paid for medical cards for some of their members. It was said in one group that some formerly poor people were becoming better off.

Expected Result 3: Non-state actor involvement

The third Expected Result was that there would be *“increased involvement of non-state actors in key planning processes”*.

Activities for Expected Result 3

Awareness raising for CSOs

The 1st activity was *“awareness raising for civil society organisations on national laws and policies, with an emphasis on the opportunities for participation in key planning processes”*.

The Burundi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2007, § 233, p. 38) states that the government is *“preparing a decentralization policy that reflects the communities’ will to participate, in particular by transferring the responsibilities of planning, financing, and managing development plans that are initiated at the local level”*. However I have found no evidence that there has been any *“awareness raising ... on...national ... policies ... on ... opportunities for participation”* for the CSO partner, APECOS or of any other CSOs. However, CSOs are now routinely invited to take part in commune-level stakeholder meetings (see page 18).

Build capacity of villages to monitor district performance

The 2nd activity mentioned in the logical framework was to *“build the capacity of [colline councils] and other local representative bodies to monitor [commune council] performance where appropriate”*.

In order to increase monitoring and evaluation of decentralisation and local governance, the project facilitated a 2-day workshop for commune officials focused on locally adapted M&E techniques, tools and approaches (see Table 22). The project also supported CDCs in implementing monitoring report templates used to monitor progress in PCDC implementation.

Facilitate increased awareness of the decentralisation process

The 3rd activity was intended to be to *“facilitate increased awareness of the decentralisation process among citizens so they may take full advantage of the available opportunities to participate in decision-making processes and access public services”*

As summarised in Table 22, government capacity building included: the national decentralisation policy, participatory planning and budgeting at commune level. The extent to which the ideas of decentralisation has penetrated to colline level officials and “citizens” seemed quite low during the evaluation.

Collaborate with national and local NGO platforms

The NGO platforms which are currently working in Kirundo province in Burundi are CANE, FORSC, and the Kirundo Coalition of Civil Society Organisations (COSC). Neither Concern nor its partner APECOS are members of COSC.

Exchanges and learning between NSAs

In order to create links between COSC Kirundo and other national forums, an exchange visit was organised to FORSC and SPPDF. See also OVI 3 for Expected Result 3

OVI 1: Increased attendance of CSOs and community in government planning

The first OVI was that there would be a *“documented increase in CSO and community members’ attendance in key planning processes and decision making in all 3 programme countries”*.

CSOs such as COSC are now routinely invited to take part in *commune* and provincial level stakeholder meetings, normally chaired by the *commune* or provincial administrator. This includes the project partner, APECOS. On their own admission, often they do not attend the meetings. Participants outline the activities that were conducted during that quarter and present the planned activities for the next quarter.

COSC offices are set up in both project *communes*. COSC act as a focal point for the community and now attend all planning and coordination meetings which helps to ensure that planning now reflects the needs of the community and poor. COSC representatives are invited to take part in all activities organised by province and *commune* governments at which COSC mediates between the administration and the community. COSC has helped also to create *commune* development plans.

This OVI has therefore been met.

OVI 2: Plans include needs of community and marginalised groups

The second OVI was that *“planning increasingly reflects the needs of community and marginalised groups”*.

Communal Council members (CCDCs) in collaboration with local *commune* administration have begun to involve communities and the *Colline* Development Committees (CDC) in the regular review of PCDC¹³⁰ activities. In 2012, 6 joint meetings took place and updated the PCDC activity matrix in the new five year PCDC plans which started in October 2012. The meetings helped to prioritise development activities in the two target *Communes* of Bugabira and Busoni. Project staff later helped to evaluate the PCDCs for the two *communes*.

However, we were told that the central government did not really take *commune* plans into account and plans have to be implemented mainly from locally generated funds (shop and market taxes, etc.). For small projects in CCDCs, *communes* can apply directly to the national government.

The *colline* council deals with administrative matters. CDCs deal with development issues and have 12 members. The CDC consists of the council plus seven others selected from the community. One CDC visited had 4 women members but two of the women found it difficult to attend. CDCs visited have an agenda and keep minutes. CDCs are not given a budget by the government. The CDC sends its plans to the *commune*. If they do not obtain assistance from the *commune*, they may decide to raise money themselves.

Note that this OVI is similar to the 2nd OVI for the Specific Objective: *“priority issues of women and marginalised groups are increasingly addressed at the community level and within local government structures”*. See page 114.

It can be concluded that *“planning increasingly reflects the needs of community and marginalised groups”* and so this OVI has been met.

OVI 3: Exchange visits for CSOs

The 3rd OVI was that *“CSOs have participated in internal and external exchange visits and can demonstrate learning and sharing”*.

Following the capacity building and strengthening of skills of members of the COSC¹³¹, both internal and external exchange visits were organised. The first visit was organised in Bujumbura Province to

¹³⁰ Plan Communal de Développement Communautaire

¹³¹ COSC: Coalition des Organisations de la Société Civil de Kirundo/ Civil Society Organisations Coalition

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meet with other organisations and coalitions that are more mature, in particular, FORSC, SPPDF and Miparec in Gitega Province. Lessons learned were documented and shared with those who were unable to take part in the exchange visit.

Representatives (6 male, 5 female) from five CSOs took part in the exchange visit to Tanzania (Kigoma and Kibondo) in November 2011 that focused on their role in the decentralization process within a democratic state and the roles and functions of the non-state actors in government planning.

This was not a strong OVI but it has obviously been met.

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Table 22. Government capacity building

Topic	No. of participants	Category of participants	Location	Date
Decentralisation National policy	50	CCDC, CSO, political parties	Kirundo	Sep. 2010
Participatory planning (PCDC elaboration process)	120	CCDC, CDC and CSO representatives	Busoni and Bugabira	Mar. 2011
Budgeting at <i>commune</i> level	80 - 120	CCDC, communal accountant, technical advisor of the administrator in charge of development, responsable de l'état civil, chefs of zones, CSO		May 2011
Democratic principles to prepare for decentralization process	80	Political parties representatives and administration structures		2011
Monitoring and evaluation for <i>commune</i> 's small projects	80 - 100	Technical advisor to the administrator in charge of development, CCDC, Communal Administrator,		2012
Role and responsibilities of CDC	467	CDC members		2011
Role and responsibilities, reporting on activities.	456	CDC members	Zone head quarters	2012
Gender commission set up	480	CDC members		2011
Gender commission members on GBV and how to prevent it	480	Gender commission members		2012
Decision making on youth rights	468	CDC, <i>Colline</i> council, chief of zones and local leaders		May 2012
Human and family code, code of criminal procedure	470	CDC, <i>Colline</i> council, chief of zones and local leaders		Apr. 2011, Mar. 2012 Nov. 2012
Conflict management	60	Communal administration CSO, OPJ and local leaders	Busoni & Bugabira headquarters	2012
Communities' infrastructure maintenance	57	CCDC, SMC, micro-projects management committees		2012

Annex 2: Burundi

Table 23. Activities of agricultural groups and benefits to non-members

Commune	Colline	House holds	Agricultural Groups		Activities undertaken by one or more of the agricultural groups in a <i>colline</i>					Non-members who received bananas ¹³²	Non-members who had crops in hangar ¹³³
			No. of groups	Total members	Rainwater Harvesting	Banana propagation	Greenhouse	Hangar	Bee group		
BUGABIRA	Kigina	927	14	349						35	
	Gitwe	1828	20	656				All groups		66	245
	Gaturanda	834	13	356	1 group of 23					36	
	Nyabikenke	866	10	381	2 groups of 50 & 31			All groups		38	321
	Rugasa	2364	13	537	3 groups			All groups		54	159
	Rubuga	2032	20	504						50	
	Kigoma	2479	18	569						57	
	Nyakarama	1631	5	147				All groups		15	352
	Ruhehe	1098	6	179						18	
BUSONI	Burara	1039	7	231						23	148
	Munazi	1234	3	176	1 group of 33						
					2 groups			All groups		18	227
	Nyakizu	244	3	25						3	
	Gisenyi	1218	3	101					31 members	10	
	Gatemere	567	6	81						8	
	Ruyaga	550	3	106						11	
	Rutabo	716	4	164	3 groups: 33, 27, 45			All groups		16	123
	Munyinya	765	12	311						31	
	Mukerwa	781	6	264						26	
	Kiravumba	470	11	365		1 group of 28		All groups		37	231
	Runyinya	443	12	321						32	
	Kagege	892	6	147						15	
	Mugobe	266	1	25						3	
	Nyagisozi	1250	11	259				All groups		26	322
	Gatare	1530	5	310						31	
	Gatete	1763	5	179						18	
	Kididiri	1050	5	146						15	
TOTAL		28,837	222	6,889	12	7	2	8 hangars	31	689	2,128

¹³² Estimate

¹³³ Estimate for end of May 2013

Annex 2: Burundi

Table 24. Other groups started or supported by the project

Commune	Colline	Number of hh	SILC		Bee-keeping groups		Tailoring	Stove groups		Flour processing			Sunflower processing
			No. of groups	SILC (no. of members)	No. of groups	No. of members	Individuals	No. of groups	No. of members	No. of members	No. of group members who sold produce in 12 months to May 2013	No. of non-group members who sold produce in 12 months to May 2013	No. of people from <i>colline</i> that brought produce in 12 months to May 2013
BUGABIRA	Kigoma	2479	6	200	3	84							
	Ruhehe	1098			1	22		1	42				
	Kiyonza	1992						1	45				
	Rugasa	2364					10						
BUSONI	Runyinya	443	1	22	1	33							
	Gatemere	567								85	38	45	
	Ruyaga	550								123	53	91	
	Murore	562								198	142	182	
	Munyinya	765	7	133									
	Gatemere	567	4	95									
	Mukerwa	781	5	89									
	Gisenyi	1218			1	31							
	Gatete	1763			1	32		1	50				
	Munazi	1234			1	40							154
	Marembo	1296					10						
	Burara	1039						1	30			45	
	Rutabo	716										57	
	Rurende ¹³⁴											67	
TOTAL			23	539	8	242	20	4	167	406	233	487	154

¹³⁴ not a project *colline*

Annex 2: Burundi

Table 25. Farmer and extension worker training

Topic	No. of participants	Trainees	Location	Dates
Planting density	1,230	Farmers	Collines	2010, 2011 & 2012
Seeds selection	845			2011 & 2012
Fertilizers application	853			2010 & 2011
Seeds conservation	543			2011
Macro propagation techniques (banana)	160	Farmers	Munazi, Kiravumba, Rugasa, Kigoma	Sep. 2010
Soil protection (construction of terraces), agroforestry practices and efficiency land use.	400	Farmers + extension workers at <i>colline</i> level	All targeted <i>collines</i>	2011 & 2012
Sorghum, cassava & banana propagation	75	Lead farmers	Headquarters in target <i>communes</i>	2011
	26	Extension workers at <i>colline</i> level		
RWH ponds and Green house management	120	Farmers + DPAE representatives (at <i>commune</i> level)	Rwanda	Dec. 2011
Animal health, sanitation and pest control (goats/cows)	430	Farmers and extension workers at <i>colline</i> level	<i>Collines</i> & <i>Communes</i>	2010, 2011 & 2012
Improved stove making	72	Farmers	Kigoma, Gatete, Burara	2011
SILC	269		Kigoma, Mukerwa	Jul. 2010

Annex 3: Burundi

Table 26. Planting material distributed

Seeds	Units	Quantity			
		2010	2011	2012	TOTAL
Bean, local variety	kg	1,000	1,000	3,100	5,100
Bean (Moore variety)	kg	1,800	7,465	17,165	26,430
Bean Kat B1 ¹	kg	150		1,500	1,650
Bean Kat X56 ¹	kg	150		1,000	1,150
Bean Kat X69 ¹	kg	100		1,000	1,100
Peanut - Red Beauty	kg	3,500	6,500	4,500	14,500
Soya bean	kg	2,500	4,000	3,000	9,500
Maize	kg	2,800	8,950	6,000	17,750
Sorghum (Gambella)	kg	7,500	932		8,432
Pigeon pea	kg	800			800
Chick pea	kg	500			500
Tomato (Roma)	kg	3	13.6	6	23
Onion (Red Creole)	kg	6	15	3	24
Onion (Holland)	kg	3		4.5	8
Cabbage	kg	3.5	16	3.5	23
Egg plant	kg	1		1	2
Carrot	kg		15		15
Spinach	kg		5		5
Sweet potato	Cuttings (30 cm)			2,962,500	2,962,500
Taro	Pieces			149,000	149,000
Cassava	Cuttings		1,310,000		1,310,000
Pineapple	Pieces		19,756	19,756	39,512
Avocado trees	Plants		6,457	3,500	9,957
Mango trees	Plants		4,500	4,500	9,000
Tree tomatoes	Plants			3,000	3,000
Papaya	Plants			1,750	1,750
Calliandra	seedlings			27,4194	274,194
Grevillea	seedlings			530,625	530,625
Leucaena	seedlings			274,194	274,194
<i>Notes: ¹ Trials with legumes programme of ISABU in 2010 and bought in 2012</i>					

Annex 3: Burundi

Table 27. Colline level training - Busoni

Colline	Maximum number that attended any of the sensitisation events			No. in colline DRR committee
	DRR	Human rights, gender, equality	AIDS / HIV	
Buhimba	5	9		8
Burara	5	9	22	8
Buringa	5	9		8
Gatare	5	9	21	8
Gatemere	5	9	19	8
Gatete	5	9	23	8
Gisenyi	5	9	21	8
Gitete	5	9		8
Higiro	5	9		8
Kabanga	5	9		8
Kagege	5	9	25	8
Karambo	5	9		8
Kibonde	5	9		8
Kididiri	5	9	21	8
Kigoma	5	9		8
Kiravumba	5	9	21	8
Kivo	5	9		8
Kumana	5	9		8
Marembo	5	9		8
Mugobe	5	9	22	8
Mukerwa	5	9	24	8
Munazi	5	9	19	8
Munyinya	5	9	23	8
Murambi	5	9		8
Murore	5	9		8
Muvyuko	5	9		8
Muyange	5	9		8
Nyabisindu	5	9		8
Nyabugeni	5	9		8
Nyagisozi	5	9	26	8
Nyakizu	5	9	13	8
Renga	5	9		8
Rugarama	5	9		8
Ruheha	5	9		8
Runyinya	5	9	25	8
Rurende	5	9		8
Rurira	5	9		8
Rutabo	5	9	25	8
Ruyaga	5	9	22	8
Rwibikara	5	9		8
Sigu	5	9		8
TOTAL (41 collines)	205	369	372	328
Note: not all were project collines				

Annex 3: Burundi

Table 28. Colline level training - Bugabira

<i>Colline</i>	Maximum number that attended any of the sensitisation events			DRR
	DRR	Human rights, gender, equality	AIDS / HIV	No. in <i>colline</i> committee
Kiri	8	12		8
Kiyonza	8	12		8
Kigoma	8	12	21	8
Gaturanda	8	12	23	8
Rugasa	8	12	29	8
Gitwe	8	12	27	8
Kigina	8	12	17	8
Nyamabuye	8	12		8
Nyakarama	8	12	25	8
Rubuga	8	12	19	8
Nyabikenke	8	12	27	8
Ruhehe	8	12		8
TOTAL (12 <i>collines</i>)	96	144	188	96
Note: not all were project <i>collines</i>				

Evaluation according to Development Assistance Committee criteria – Burundi

Relevance & quality of design

Relevance to strategies and policies

The background to the project formulation is discussed in the main part of the evaluation.

The action was compatible with the Burundi national agricultural policy and national agricultural strategy (SAN), the national policy on decentralization and community development, as well as the strategic framework of growth and elimination of poverty. Burundi's agricultural sector policy is laid down in the national agricultural strategy document adopted in 2008, which takes into account and follows the guidelines and priorities of the country's basic strategic documents, particularly Outlook 2025 and the Strategic Framework for Poverty Alleviation (SFPA).

The action conformed to the EU development objective on the eradication of poverty. It was consistent with the Monterrey consensus of 2002 on harmonization of development approaches, as well as the Rome and Paris declarations of 2003 and 2005 respectively on harmonization of aid effectiveness on leadership and managing for results. In particular the project was in harmony with the EC Country Strategy for Burundi¹³⁵ especially "*soutien à la décentralisation*" (support for decentralisation), "*l'installation d'outils qui garantissent la sécurité alimentaire*" (improved food security) and "*transformation et mise en valeur des produits agro-alimentaires*" (processing and added value to food products). The project adhered to the guidelines and regulations of EC.

Relevance to local situation

After contextual analysis, Kirundo was identified as a priority province in the inter-agency Burundi Government Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper for 2006-2010¹³⁶. This was reinforced when a consultant developed a strategic plan for Concern Worldwide in Burundi, which also identified Kirundo province and also the *communes* of Bugabira and Busoni in Bugesera region on the border with Rwanda. The two *communes* were identified by the provincial government and others as being the *communes* most in need. In particular, several years of low rainfall had led to particular problems of food insecurity.

Concern has had a presence for some years in the two target *communes* (Busoni and Bugabira) and there was another livelihoods focused project in same 13 *collines* selected for this project. Beneficiaries have regularly been involved in twice yearly meetings at *commune* and provincial level with all stakeholders, including representatives of lead farmers and pygmy groups. The meetings have reviewed project progress, corrected mistakes and contributed to forward planning and the formulation of new projects - including this one.

To avoid duplication the project was discussed with other NGOs such as GAA and CRS before submission¹³⁷.

Quality of logical framework

A complete analysis of the logical framework is given in Appendix 3. All the Expected Results and OVIs were relevant to Burundi.

¹³⁵ *Republique du Burundi - Communauté Européenne: Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013*

¹³⁶ *Burundi: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper*, IMF Country Report No. 07/46, February 2007. Since then, a second paper for 2011 to 2015 has been published (IMF Country Report No. 12/224, August 2012)

¹³⁷ The process of how the whole multi-country project was put together is discussed in the main part of the report.

Relevance of activities and technical designs

The 2nd Activity for Expected Result 1 (*“strengthened local government ...”*) was *“training on land rights and registration”*. Some training for government officials took place at *colline* and zonal levels. Although the project helped to delineate plots of land for landless Batwa households just outside the Murehe Forest Reserve, no certificates had been issued up to the time of the evaluation. This was indicative of a general lethargy on the part of the government in implementing their new legislation on Land Tenure Reform (2011). There was therefore not a lot of enthusiasm for this activity within the project.

One of the activities for Expected Result 2 (*“diversified livelihoods ...”*) was to *“facilitate linkages between beneficiaries and markets including cross-border trade”*. As with the other countries, there was no attempt to explore the possibility of cross-border trade. This was partly due to the fact that although the East African Community is supposed to be a free market, in practice moving goods (legally) across the border is not as easy as it is supposed to be.

One of the activities for the third Expected Result, *“increased involvement of non-state actors in key planning processes”* was to *“facilitate increased awareness of the decentralisation process among citizens so they may take full advantage of the available opportunities to participate in decision-making processes and access public services”*. As already stated, the government’s commitment to decentralised decision making (and planning) is very weak and too much emphasis on the activity was in danger of raising people’s expectations (or frustrations).

The technical approach of the project was sound and even adventurous for example with the dairy cow component, the banana multiplication programme, the water-harvesting and the greenhouses. In fact the level of technical innovation generally in the Burundi component was much stronger than in the other two countries. The technical components helped to address core needs of poverty and hunger. The “political components” such as localised decision making and more emphasis on taking account of issues of importance to women and other vulnerable groups were more difficult to achieve.

Selection of beneficiaries

There are 53 *collines* in the two *communes* of Bugabira and Busoni. Workshops at *commune* level were held to select the 26 project *collines* on the basis of poverty, an absence of other NGOs and an absence of targeted government projects.

The project’s strategy was to target existing groups (agricultural, bees, savings, and stoves) which was a wise decision. Although the agricultural groups are open to anyone who wants to join, they tend to attract those who are among the poorer people in the *colline* who have no or very small plots of land. Similarly the SILC, bee and stove groups consisted mostly of poor or otherwise vulnerable people (women, Batwa).

Activities such as Jersey cows tend to go to the better off members of the groups, as there are certain minimum requirements, such as the construction of the cowshed and availability of spare land to grow fodder, that were possibly beyond the means of some people. This is not to say the initiative is a bad one; just that getting the right balance is difficult.

Efficiency of implementation

Quality of project management

The project manager and the five community development workers (many with five years of university education) were very well qualified, knowledgeable and motivated. The project was adequately staffed. The project manager visited the field between once a week and once a month. Community development workers spent most of their time in the field.

The team reported they had received good support from Bujumbura. The Country Director visited one project (out of four) each month and the Assistant Country Director for Programmes visited each project at least twice a month.

The Concern team in Kirundo held team meetings with their office staff and partners once a month and there were more frequent meetings with relevant staff to discuss particular activities. The

Directors and other senior staff in Bujumbura had a good rapport with the implementing team. The quality of communication between Kirundo and Bujumbura was excellent.

Concern has an effective internal complaints procedure though it was rarely used. Concern also has a Programme Participant Protection Policy (P4) which is designed to protect both employees and beneficiaries from abuse. All staff and partners have to sign that they have received and read the policy.

The Bujumbura office maintained close links with Concern Worldwide in Dublin which in turn communicated with the European Commission Delegation in Belgium as required.

During the project, there were two visits from the desk officer and from the agricultural advisor (Paul Wagstaff) in Dublin.

Communication at all levels therefore was good and enabled the efficient implementation of the project.

There were annual joint coordination meetings in each of the three countries on rotational basis.

Quality of M&E system

There was no M&E officer for the project and no national M&E officer to advise the project. An M&E officer for another project helped, mostly with preparing for the endline survey from January 2013. An expatriate Project Support Officer supported the project partly for two years especially in the surveys.

Activities (training, meetings, and seed distributions) were mostly recorded on paper except for livestock distribution data. Having asked at the end of the evaluation for a list of activities and beneficiaries by *colline* (plus an estimate of farmers benefiting from seeds distributed by members of agricultural groups, number of beneficiaries (not just members) of warehouses and the two processing activities), it took several weeks to compile. This was the same situation as in the other two countries. The recording system was inadequate.

APECOS, Concern's partner did not have a copy of the logical framework or the narrative proposal, only a list of activities and the budget.

Project narrative reports have generally tried to assess the progress towards the project results using the indicators in the logical framework. The reports were mostly submitted on time as were the completed Results Oriented Monitoring forms.

Detailed comments on the logical framework and the associated problems of the baseline and endline survey reports (ESR) are given in Appendix 3. The final and endline surveys were based on the logical framework but were of questionable quality. The following are examples of specific shortcomings in the Burundi surveys:

- For the 2nd OVI of the Specific Objective, though the final survey asked for people's opinions about what councils had discussed, no attempt was made to analyse quantitatively what councils had actually discussed (rather than people's opinion of what was discussed).
- Terracing, which may have helped to increase production (through extra moisture availability) was not mentioned as an option in the list of questions for increased number of agricultural techniques.
- Estimates of crop production by farmers are more reliable than estimates of area so converting data to yields decreases accuracy. Unfortunately the ESR gives only yields.

Financial efficiency

The project in each country was audited externally annually by Deloitte¹³⁸ (based in Kenya) though they never go to the field. In addition there are one or two internal audits per year which include site visits to check infrastructure costs such as buildings. Also the Finance Officer in Kirundo made frequent visits to the field to check on expenditure.

Tenders for over €10,000 are advertised. Stakeholders are present when tenders are opened and this group draws up a short list of three applicants based on value for money. The final decision is made by

¹³⁸ I met the Deloitte auditor during the evaluation

the Concern Purchasing Committee. For smaller purchases, quotations are obtained from suppliers and a decision is made by the Finance Officer together with the General Service Manager and one programme staff member.

During the evaluation, the project vehicle was in Bujumbura being prepared for handing over to APECOS.

Co-financing (25%) was provided from Concern's General Donations fund and from Irish Aid's Multi-Annual Programme Scheme (MAPS) which has provided long-term, predictable and significant funding to Concern for some years.

The final cost¹³⁹ of the Burundi component was €1,820,512, 95% of the amount budgeted and 47% of the total project cost across all three countries. The cost per targeted beneficiary household was about €219. None of the sub-heads were overspent by more than the permitted margin, human resources being the largest overspend at 115% of the cost budgeted. Apart from the delays mentioned below, the budget was spent at an acceptable rate.

The alpha value (percentage of budget spent on beneficiaries) is never a simple calculation. Of the more direct spending, 39% was spent on inputs and infrastructure, 6% on research (ICRAF and ISABU) and 19% on capacity building and training, a total of 63% which is a very high figure.

Cost-effectiveness and use of funds

Generally, the project in Burundi was good value for money. The largest cost category (€712,966) was for inputs and infrastructure (Figure 8). This was mainly for agricultural inputs, mostly seeds (43% of inputs cost), the dairy cow scheme (25%) and the produce warehouses (22%). There was also an amount of €17,475 under DRR training for the support to landless and child-headed households including agricultural and livestock inputs but the actual inputs component is not given in the final expenditure summary. Training, the next biggest cost (€338,600) was more or less equally spread between decentralisation and district level planning (18.2%), agriculture (22.5%), livelihood diversification (37.2%) and disaster risk reduction (22.2%).

For those items (mainly inputs, infrastructure, and training) that were attributable to an Expected Result, €1,018,311 was spent on achieving Expected Result 2 (improved livelihoods) and €136,614 on achieving Expected Result 2 (strengthened government).

The use of agricultural groups to bulk up seed and lead farmers to multiply bananas was a very cost effective approach to improving production. The sustainability (and therefore cost-effectiveness) of the widespread distribution of mosaic resistant cassava variety will depend to some extent on the degree of crop hygiene practiced. The main concerns are the warehouses, the contract with ICRAF, and the Jersey cow scheme as an alternative, cheaper and possibly more effective approach may have been to use semen from Jersey bulls to upgrade local herds over several generations.

From the observed dimensions, the warehouses have a capacity of around 150 tonnes (the managers of the warehouses did not know!) but the largest amount stored in one warehouse visited had been around 50 tonnes. The design was one developed by GIZ. It remains to be seen if the warehouse is ever used to its full capacity


- ❖ *More thought should be given to the design of warehouses taking into account the distances travelled by potential customers, the expected number and the expected amount of crops to be sold.*

In other words, the design should be based on prior market research.

¹³⁹ unaudited

Annex 3: Burundi

Figure 8. Breakdown of project costs in Burundi¹⁴⁰



The International Centre for Research in Agroforestry (ICRAF), based in Kenya, provided training in the construction of rainwater-harvesting ponds and greenhouses. The organisation also provided a draft template for a survey of farmer problems. The template was amended by ISABU who also undertook the survey and wrote it up. In addition, in collaboration with ISABU, ICRAF undertook two research trials. One compared the performance of maize with different fertiliser / manure treatment combinations and the other demonstrated / researched different types of terracing and trees planted along the contour. The fertiliser trial was done on one site (in Busoni) and for one season only. It would have been more useful to undertake the trial on multiple sites throughout the Bugesera agro-ecological zone (project area) and over a longer period (which would have increased the cost considerably). Similarly with the trials with terraces and contour planting of different tree species were carried out one plot and the duration was insufficient to obtain very useful results (since biomass increase takes over 2 years). Furthermore, farmers could not afford the amounts of chemical fertilisers used in the trials. Even if the results were widely applicable, the final report from ICRAF, for the “On-Farm Applied Research” (May, 2013) was produced too late for the dissemination of the on-farm research results during the implementation of this programme.

The Jersey cow scheme was high risk with potentially high rewards. Given prevailing milk prices, the initial outlay could be recovered in a year or two. However the success depends on the AI centre in Bujumbura and the provincial veterinary officer being willing to continue the AI work without support from the project. For an AI practitioner to be proficient he/she needs to be inseminating at least 10 cows a day, not a few per month so there is also a problem with the present scale of the scheme. An alternative, cheaper, approach may have been to use Jersey semen to upgrade local herds over several generations.

❖ *It is recommended that Concern contacts “Send a Cow” that is in the process of starting work in Burundi¹⁴¹ for advice.*

¹⁴⁰ This cost breakdown does not follow EC budget headings exactly. “Other costs and services” exclude visibility (shown separately).

Timeliness

The project was supposed to start on 16th February 2010 but according to an EC Project Synopsis¹⁴², the project in Burundi started around 15th May 2010, 3 months late. This was mainly due to recruitment delays. The last community development worker was recruited in August 2010. However no key staff left the project until its end.

There were generally few problems with supply of inputs though Kirundo staff said they often had to “push” the Bujumbura procurement staff to complete the purchases in a timely manner. The major problem was the procurement of the Jersey cows from Rwanda as they were delivered 6 to 8 months late. In the meantime, the unit cost had increased from 1,200,000 FBu to 1,800,000 FBu - a 50% increase. This meant that instead of 150, only 118 cows were purchased and distributed.

A delay to the planned exchange visit to Tanzania occurred in year 1 owing to elections. Instead it took place in year 2.

Burundi asked for a no cost extension so that the endline survey could be after the main harvest to be the same as the baseline. Both were at the wrong time as the correct time for food security surveys is before the harvest, not after it.

Quality of inputs and outputs

All the inputs observed were of good or high quality. Planting materials were for appropriate varieties. Staff were educated and skilled sufficiently to deliver the training inputs and training materials were generally acceptable.

The quality of the outputs was generally good. The warehouses were built to a high standard but had ventilation spaces in the walls through which it is possible for rats to get in, and they do. Warehouse managers should be encouraged to put wire mesh over the ventilation holes. There have been no trials with organic methods of pest control such as the use of neem leaves and seeds. The capacity of the CSO partner, APECOS was improved considerably during the project as a result of training on project management.

The technical reports made recommendations on improving the rainwater harvesting ponds, soil conservation (terracing), drip irrigation, the Murore Cooperative, goat houses, Disaster Risk Reduction and fuel efficient stoves. Most have been acted on to improve quality.

The bee-keeping groups are weak and need specialist expertise. Though senior programme staff visited the National Beekeeping station in Kenya, as far as I am aware, no consultant was brought in as advised¹⁴³.

Some of the groups offering loans, such as the warehouses and SILC groups, charge interest rates from 60% to 120% per year. Even if the proceeds are shared through annual dividends, these rates do not seem equitable as most needy will be more likely to take the loans.

As with the other countries, outputs from training was not assessed. This is discussed in the Lessons Learned section of the main report.

Methodology

Concern senior management in Burundi held regular meetings with NGOs such as GAA throughout the project to avoid duplication.

The EC desk officer charged with responsibility for this project and based in Tanzania never went to visit the project in Burundi and it was not on the list of projects of the EC in Burundi as one they were responsible for supervising.

However, the technical support to the project through the technical visits and mid-term review by Christopher Davey was of excellent quality and recommendations were mostly implemented.

¹⁴¹ <http://www.sendacow.org.uk/worldfoodday2013>

¹⁴² authored by Frans Geilfus, filename PS BUR ROM.pdf

¹⁴³ I can suggest someone if needed

The project team responded positively to the recommendations made in the technical reports (see above) and amended their work programmes to put them into practice.

Relationship with local stakeholders

Concern worked with a local NGO called APECOS that has focused on helping AIDS sufferers and latterly to helping in preventing infections. The project worked closely with *colline*, *commune*, provincial, and to a lesser extent, national level government officials. The opinion of the project by the government officials met during the evaluation was extremely favourable.

When used for training, DSAs were paid to government personnel using government rates which were higher than those of Concern's (Tanzania used Concern rates which were higher than the government rates). One government official, an expert on artificial insemination at the National AI Centre refused to help without being employed as a consultant. These issues are discussed in the main part of the report and in the Lessons Learned section.

The project collaborated with similar interventions by other organizations including the World Agroforestry Centre, the National Food Processing and Marketing Agency (CNTA), and work on human rights championed by Women Lawyers Association, among others.

Access

At the beginning of the project, internet access by landline was slow. Wireless broadband was installed in the Kirundo office in 2011 which was a major improvement. Road access was not a problem.

Effectiveness

Achievement of results and objectives

A summary of the achievements of the results and objectives in Burundi is given below.

Expected Result 1: "strengthened local government structures to manage, regulate and coordinate local development".	This result has been achieved to a substantial extent. The visit to Tanzania was appreciated and government officials learned about the decentralisation process there but at <i>commune</i> and <i>colline</i> level, the government's implementation of its decentralisation policy is weak. The DRR system set up is particularly strong in Burundi.
Expected Result 2: "diversified livelihoods for farmers through working with local institutions and the private sector".	It would appear that many beneficiaries have adopted new agricultural techniques and increased food production (in no small part due to the improved varieties introduced). While there was some support for marketing and crop processing activities, there was not a lot of non-agricultural livelihoods developed other than the fuel efficient stove manufacturing groups and some training in tailoring. The main emphasis was on diversifying and increasing production from agriculture.
Expected Result 3: "increased involvement of non-state actors in key planning processes".	Whilst NSAs are involved increasingly in planning at <i>commune</i> and provincial level, the problem remains that, as for Expected result 1, the central government does not seem very committed to the decentralisation process.

Specific Objective: *“to improve livelihoods and empowerment of poor farmers in decentralised decision-making processes”.*

Whilst livelihoods of beneficiaries have undoubtedly been improved, the degree to which farmers have been empowered “*in decentralised decision-making processes*” has been more limited in the case of Burundi than in Tanzania. This limitation was outside the control of the project.

Overall objective: *“to contribute to the achievement of MDG1 and food security in Tanzania, Ethiopia and Burundi”.*

The project in Burundi has made a substantial contribution to the achievement of MDG 1 (Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger) in Burundi.

Assumptions and Risks

The main mistake was to assume the government would be committed to the decentralisation of planning (and thus budgeting) process which was perhaps over-optimistic at this time. There was no assumption stated that the government would be committed to implementing land registration legislation nor that the East African Community would ensure that cross-border trade would be facilitated for ordinary farmers.

Coordination with other development actors

Concern is a member of various forums nationally. Senior management met on an individual basis with the senior management of other NGOs active in the area to ensure there was no duplication. The main means of coordination with other NGOs locally was through the regular provincial and *commune* level “Focal Point” or Stakeholder meetings to which Concern and other NGOs active in the area are invited to meet with relevant government departments.

Visibility

Visibility costs in Burundi were very low, only 0.4% of the overall costs for Burundi and 77% of the agreed visibility budget for Burundi. There was no web site and there were no press releases. Extension leaflets were of good quality but there was only an EC logo, no explanation that the EC had funded this particular project. Otherwise, visibility on infrastructure (buildings) was acceptable and included reference to the source of funds.

Impact

The main impact on the targeted beneficiaries was by

- improving livelihoods of:
 - 6,889 members of agricultural groups;
 - 406 members of the Murore Flour Cooperative;
 - 242 members of honey producing groups¹⁴⁴;
 - 167 members of Batwa improved stove producing groups;
 - 539 members of the savings and credit groups;
 - 20 tailors.

Though not monitored, it was estimated there were about 150 farmers from target *collines* who benefited from the sunflower processing unit at Mutwenzi and almost 500 farmers from target *collines* (other than cooperative members) that benefited from the Murore Flour Cooperative. There is no estimate of the number of non-target families who benefited from the warehouses. Some of these farmers, perhaps most, would have been members of agricultural groups. The total number of directly targeted beneficiaries is probably about 8,300.

In addition the project contributed to building the capacity of:

¹⁴⁴ who were not also members of an agricultural group

Annex 3: Burundi

- 3 Civil Society Organisations (APECOS (the project partner), two branches of COSC at communal level, one branch at provincial level and FOSC (Forum for Strengthening Civil Society));
- 111 government institutions (53 CDCs, 53 *Colline* DRR Platforms, 2 Communal DRR Platforms, 1 Provincial DRR Platform);
- 222 agricultural groups;
- 23 SILC groups;
- 8 bee-keeping groups;
- 4 improved stove manufacturing groups;
- 8 crop warehouse cooperatives;
- the Murore Flour Cooperative.

The project contributed substantially to increased crop production and therefore reduced food insecurity. The project has also increased incomes not only through generating surplus production but also through the warehouses, the savings groups, the processing groups and activities such as honey production and tailoring. Many beneficiaries interviewed said they now had better livelihoods and were able to access better health facilities and education, as well as improving their homes and purchasing life enhancing assets for their home such as radios.

The seed bulking and banana multiplication work has the potential to benefit a much wider population than the initial beneficiaries within a few years. The warehouses and flour processing will benefit not only the beneficiary *collines* but areas outside these as well.

The government at all levels have appreciated the training given and they believe their capacity has improved as a result. Though still sluggish, the government's commitment to decentralised decision making could well be improved through the exchange visit to Tanzania.

The impact on the government and on farming families had been fairly evenly spread across the project area.

It was implicit in the project design that there would be a substantial effort to improve the capacity of CSO partners (APECOS in this case). APECOS have benefited from participating in training and workshops, and received training on financial management, logistics, project cycle management (mainly M&E and logical frameworks). APECOS said they were able to expand their activities as a result of the capacity improvement under the project. However, there was no specific expenditure on "*Capacity building of Partner (technical, organisational, policies, assessment, training and development)*" in the final accounts. In addition, ISABU capacity was improved through workshops and on-job training (by ICRAF and project staff).

Sustainability

Continuation after end of project funding

The warehouse groups, flour processing unit and the savings groups have had a substantial amount of business training and stand every chance of continuing after the end of the project. *Commune* and provincial government will continue to be committed to these interventions. The groups seem aware that they will sooner or later have to replace equipment and there may not be an NGO to go to. That is a weakness (and possibly a strength) of the sunflower processing unit (that the project supported) at Mutwenzi Agro-Pastoral Centre, as the Catholic Diocese which owns the centre presumably will never lack sources of funds to improve, replace or repair equipment.

Farmers bulking up seed and multiplying bananas will need to refresh their genetic material after 3 to 5 years depending on the crop but they are well aware of that and seem capable of obtaining fresh supplies.

The Disaster Risk Reduction system is now well established with links from *colline* to *commune* to province stream-lined. It stands every chance of surviving and the government is committed.

It remains to be seen if the government commitment to decentralisation and land registration improves after the end of the project.

The project has not increased dependency on outside intervention. However it did not have a well defined exit strategy.

Environmental sustainability

There were no issues affecting wider environmental sustainability. On a local scale, farmers will need to ensure that terraces are properly maintained and that inflows into and outflows from the rainfall-harvesting systems do not cause localised erosion.

Role of private sector

There has been no involvement of the private sector other than through private businessmen coming to the warehouses and flour processing unit to make purchases. There were no strong links made with large companies. It was a pity that the proposed link with the BRARUDI brewing company did not materialise because of the problems with growing the required sorghum varieties.

Even so there will be a continued market for the produce being sold through the warehouses, the sunflower oil being produced at Mutwenzi and the flour product being made at Murore Cooperative.

Cross-cutting issues

COSC has been active in sensitisation in the area of human rights and gender equality at zonal levels in the project area and APECOS, the project partner has also done excellent work especially on AIDS, gender issues, family planning and hygiene (especially the use of latrines and sexual health). APECOS also lobbied for vulnerable children and strengthening and improving of Child Protection Committees knowledge of relevant laws. These have added value to the project. However, see the comments on page 39 about the need to create stronger linkages between the cross-cutting issues and the project activities.

There has been good sensitisation to issues such as human rights, equality, gender, discrimination and HIV/AIDS. However there seems to be a need to work out how all that plus the needs of the very poor and other vulnerable groups such as women, children, the elderly and disabled can be actualised in project activities (such as processing groups, SILCS, agriculture). Groups have more or less been left to work out models for themselves.

❖ *I suggest that senior project staff and Bujumbura senior management organise a day (or part of day) to discuss how project activities could better integrate Concern's focus on very poor and vulnerable people and other issues such as human rights, equality, gender, discrimination (e.g. against Batwa), HIV/AIDS. Try to imagine how the ideal group (agriculture, SILC, warehouse, processing, etc) would work if these issues were part of the groups ethos, if not their constitution.*

It would not be a good idea to be too prescriptive, but at least if staff have discussed these things they may be able to make definite suggestions to management committees – even to the extent of including something in their constitutions. For example, one warehouse group said there were provisions for women who became widows while there was an outstanding loan. It is not clear if this is an *ad hoc* arrangement or if it was written down somewhere.

The following gives a summary of the impact the project has had in specific cross-cutting areas.

Environmental issues

The resettlement of the 674 Batwa households outside the Murehe Forest Reserve contributed to the conservation of the forest reserve. The 2012 workshop organised by the project resulted in a document governing the management of the reserve.

Empowerment of the beneficiaries

Empowerment of beneficiaries was a key part of the project, especially with regard to decentralised decision making. Indeed it was part of the Specific Objective and its 2nd OVI, that “*priority issues of women and marginalised groups are increasingly addressed...*”. It was inherent also in the 3rd activity for Expected Result 3, “*facilitate increased awareness of the decentralisation process ...*”.

Gender equality

One of the indicators of the project purpose is around having the priority issues of women being increasingly addressed at the community level and within local government structures. Paradoxically, there is no activity in the logical framework supporting the empowerment of women. The project management team realized this gap and in August 2010 training on gender equality was conducted followed by awareness sessions for women participation in associations.

The project organised workshops for women on GBV. Women often now go to the police but they may sometimes (not always) not act because of corruption. With support from APECOS, women organised meetings to discuss women's issues. Gender committees were set up at *colline* level where issues such as GBV are discussed.

Human rights and advocacy

COSC members attended a seminar on human rights in Kirundo in 2011 and this led to the formation of COSC. Though not a project partner, there was very close collaboration throughout the project. There was a monthly forum on human rights between CSOs and government at provincial level. Concern organised training on advocacy, lobbying, democratic principles and organisational management for COSC.

Democracy & governance

Matters related to governance are to some extent addressed under expected results one and three on strengthening district level authorities and increased involvement of non-state actors in key planning processes.

Disaster Risk Reduction

Setting up Disaster Risk Reduction systems at *colline* and *commune* level were integral parts of the project.

HIV and discrimination

Though APECOS had previously been active in providing support to HIV orphans, the project gave them the opportunity to become more involved in prevention.

APECOS did training on HIV and hygiene at *colline* level and established HIV clubs in 10 of the 26 project *collines*. The average membership was 25. The clubs put on youth dramas.

Formerly, the Batwa were discriminated against but now the situation is changing, though there are still no representatives on *colline* or *commune* level councils even though several Batwa had stood for election.

Conflict management

The project trained government officials at *commune* level and police in conflict management. There was also training on GBV. I was told in one *colline* that other major conflicts arose from arguments over land and between the wives of polygamous men.

Complaints response mechanism

The CRM was piloted in January to March 2013 mainly targeting a new project though there had been some training in the project *collines*. There is a board near the government offices in Kirundo with an explanation of the complaints procedure (Photograph 1). Before the CRM procedure was set up, some informal complaints were received about the quality of seed, the lateness of inputs in the first year and the delays in finding a good variety of sunflower.

Annex 3: Burundi



Photograph 1. Board with explanation of complaints procedure, Kirundo

**Maximising rural communities' livelihood options
through engagement between non-state actors,
government and the private sector
(Farming Together)**

Final Evaluation

Paul D. Smith

Annex 3. Ethiopia



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Front cover: Produce Warehouse Cooperative, Gesuba, Offa

Evaluation according to logical framework - Ethiopia

A discussion of the logical framework and the difficulties associated with the various OVIs is given in Appendix 3. This evaluation should be read in conjunction with those comments. A summary of the interventions is given in Table 34. The following is a brief summary of the extent to which the objective and expected results have been met.

Specific objective

The **Specific Object** was: *“to improve livelihoods and empowerment of poor farmers in decentralised decision-making processes”*.

From the indicators, the livelihoods have been improved for some of the targeted beneficiaries but the degree to which farmers have been empowered in decentralised decision-making was rather limited.

OVI 1: Food Stocks

The first OVI was that *“at the end of the programme, the number of targeted households that have achieved recommended staple food stock levels has increased by at least 15% when compared to non-intervention areas”*.

The Endline Survey Report states that the baseline survey found that 67.5% of beneficiaries and 64.5% of non-beneficiaries had less than 30 days of food stocks available at the time of the survey¹⁴⁵. The Endline Report states that 16.7% of beneficiaries and 35.0% of non-beneficiaries had less than 30 days of food stocks available at the time of the survey. It would thus appear that according to these surveys and responses from beneficiaries, the OVI has been achieved.

I was informed during the evaluation that ensete, sweet potatoes and taro were the most important starch crops in some *kebeles* (and maize in others). Ensete is a particularly difficult crop to assess for its contribution to food stocks (and to assess increased in production), as like cassava, it is collected as needed. It was not included in the endline survey.

Even if the FSR was reliable, Figure 2a in the Endline Report actually shows that the greatest monthly food stocks for the months August to November were in 2010 and that 2012 only shows highest food stocks for May to July plus December.

During the evaluation, I was told that during harvest periods, estimations of production had been carried out on farms of the same 20 farmers in each of the project *kebeles* from October 2010 (Table 2a in the Endline Report implies measurements started in August 2010). The method was to sample three replicates of 1m² marked plots in the farmers' fields. WDA fieldworkers were trained on how to take the samples. When the fieldworker visited the farm, if the crop was near harvest, the farmer was asked to inform the fieldworker when he was about to harvest but that in any case he should not harvest the three marked plots. Production was apparently estimated by measuring the size of the field using a tape and averaging the yields from the 3 1m² plots. This was the most scientific method of estimating production of the three countries. The data was used to estimate food stocks from:

Food Stocks = Production + Food obtained from other sources (bought, donated)

This calculation is clearly erroneous because it does not take account of food stocks left over from the previous month. Measuring monthly production could have been used, not only to monitor changes in production but also food stocks by more detailed questioning using the equation:

$$S_{t+1} = S_t + H_t - D_t - C_t + B_t + R_t$$

where S_{t+1} is the food stock at the start of month $t+1$, S_t is the food stock at the start of month t , H_t is the crop harvested in between t and $t+1$, D_t is the production disposed of (sold or given to relatives etc.) between t and $t+1$, C_t is the food consumed between t and $t+1$, B_t is the food bought between t and $t+1$, and R_t is the amount of food relief received between t and $t+1$.

Unfortunately, the crop cutting data was kept by the field assistants who have now left WDA. Effectively the data has been lost.

¹⁴⁵ these are different from the figures in the baseline report I saw

Crop production data was obtained also from the *woreda* Food Security Department. We checked this during the evaluation and the figures we were given seemed exceptionally high.

In *Dakaya kebele*, we were told that 5 children had been registered as malnourished in 2012 but that this was more to do with mismanagement by the parents than to food shortages.

The view of the *woreda* Agricultural Officer was that poorer people buy 75% of their food or receive it as aid. As discussed under OVI 3 of Expected Result 2, beneficiaries whose income had increased were able to purchase more food. Sales of crops such as haricot beans and for members of Forest Conservation Cooperatives, sales of commodities such as grass were also important.

What was clear during the evaluation was that most beneficiaries interviewed said that their food security situation was a lot better now than it had been at the beginning of the project. Typically at the start of the project, food was short for 3 or 4 months and now there were no food shortage months. In only one FGD did farmers say the food security had not noticeably improved. That may have been due to the fact that 2013 had been a very wet year in that highland *kebele* and production was down as a result.

OVI 2: Issues addressed by local government & community

The second OVI was that *“priority issues of women and marginalised groups are increasingly addressed at the community level and within local government structures”*.

The endline survey did not attempt to discover what were the priority issues of women and marginalised groups specifically but instead reported on *“Critical issues the community expects the kebele council to address”* (Table 11 in Endline Report) and the critical issues the *kebele* and *woreda* councils were thought to have addressed in the last six months (Table 12 in Endline Report)¹⁴⁶. Nor was there an attempt to discover what the councils actually discussed, for example by analysis of council minutes.

The *woreda* government will start to register all people who are very poor, elderly, chronically ill, suffering from HIV/AIDS or are physically or mentally handicapped from the end of 2013. This will provide an ideal opportunity for future projects in the *woreda* to think through how the vulnerable can be catered for in project interventions in practice.

In the baseline survey (as reported in the ESR), the priorities respondents wanted the *woreda* council to address were food aid, livestock and agricultural inputs and what they thought had actually addressed were health, food aid and agricultural inputs. Two of the top three priorities thus corresponded with the top three issues that people thought had been discussed. During the endline survey, the top five priorities people wanted discussed were health, water, agriculture, food aid and roads whereas they thought what was actually discussed (in order) were: roads, food aid, education, health and agriculture. There was no correspondence between the three top priorities that people wanted discussed and the three topics they thought had been discussed but four of the top five priorities people wanted to be discussed they thought had been discussed.

With regard to satisfaction, 62% of beneficiaries thought the *woreda* council was good or very good (the percentage was a little higher, 65%, among non-beneficiaries).

At one FGD, a group of women was asked if any of them had ever asked the *kebele* council to discuss an issue of concern to them. None of them had. Furthermore, only one of the group members knew anyone who was a member of the council and that was only because he was a neighbour.

To summarise, *priority issues of women and marginalised groups* may or may not be more addressed now than at the beginning of the project. If they are, the impact of the project was negligible.

The OVI refers not only to local government, but also to the issues addressed by the community. It is noted that gender equality, HIV and family planning were among issues addressed by WDA staff at the short discussions at the beginning of watershed reclamation work days. It is also noted that there are women on the water committees set up in some villages so they have had some influence over the siting of water points.

¹⁴⁶ following guidance from the Dublin office

Clearly, there is a lot that remains to be done.

Expected Result 1: Strengthened Local Government

The first Expected Result was: “*strengthened local government structures to manage, regulate and coordinate local development*”. Brief comments on the Activities in the Logical Framework for this Expected Result are given below.

Activities for Expected Result 1

Government capacity building

According to the final narrative report, training (by zonal government, facilitated by WDA) of government staff was delivered to 180 *woreda* staff (21 women) in development planning, execution and budget allocation; community mobilisation; resource allocation (natural, human, financial) and sustainability.

Other training given to government staff is summarised in Table 29. It covered participatory, planning, M&E, budgeting and setting priorities. However I was informed by the Concern manager that there had been no training on decentralisation of planning at *kebele* level and this was confirmed when council members were interviewed. The participatory planning in Table 29 refers to land reclamation.

Table 29. Government training and capacity building¹⁴⁷

Participants	Topics	Number of participants		
		Male	Female	Total
Local council and CBO members	Participatory planning, monitoring and evaluation	35	8	43
Government personnel	Effective planning, financial allocation and decision making	47	8	55
Local councils and CBOs	Participatory community based watershed planning & monitoring	65	35	100
<i>Woreda</i> Council & key government personnel	Results of baseline survey	28	7	35
Government personnel	Effective planning, financial allocation and decision making	85	1	86
Relevant government personnel	Fair decision-making and financial allocation	15	1	16
Relevant government personnel	Decision making, financial allocation and effective planning	44	12	56

Before the *woreda* budget is developed, the sector specialists visit each *kebele* and discuss with the *kebele* leaders (cabinet) and council members what their priorities are (Appendix 4). During the evaluation, it was evident that the potential to build the capacity of *kebele* leaders to prioritise development requirements and to make realistic requests to the *woreda* sector specialists was not well explored.

Training on land rights

There was no training on land rights as it was considered by project staff that this would have been politically unacceptable in the Ethiopian context. All land in Ethiopia belongs to the state. Users can rent out and inherit their land but not sell it. Land ownership would require a change in the constitution. However about 7 or 8 years ago the government started issuing certificates of usufruct including a map of the area. Watershed cooperatives in the project have been granted such certificates. If land is subdivided or merged, the certificate would need to be changed. It may have been possible to investigate if this would have been possible for farmers who do not have certificates (possibly because of subdividing land after a father's death). Apparently it is possible to negotiate with *kebele* leaders and on agreement, a certificate can be issued. In fact, zonal government staff have been involved in Land Registration and Certification in Wolaita quite recently. See for example Qoricho, 2011¹⁴⁸. In my opinion, insufficient research was carried out to determine if there were any people (including widows) who would benefit from land certificates.

¹⁴⁷ No dates were provided

¹⁴⁸ **Qoricho, Yonas Tafesse.** 2011. *Women and Land Rights in Rural Ethiopia: The Case of Wolaita*. M.Phil. thesis. University of Tromsø, Norway

Annex 3: Ethiopia

Training on DRR

The final report records that the project facilitated the training of 169 *kebele* and *woreda* government staff and council members in DRR. In addition, 30 government staff in land reclamation and 109 community members in disaster response. Figures for training on DRR provided by WDA are summarised in Table 30.

See also OVI 4 below.

Exchange visits

See OVI 2 below.

Table 30. Training on DRR

Participants	Topics	Number of participants		
		Male	Female	Total
Woreda Council & key government personnel	Disaster Risk Management and Emergency Preparedness	130	122	252
Kebele Councils	Disaster risk reduction	32	6	38
Kebele Councils	Disaster risk reduction	23	12	35
Communities	Disaster prevention and management	32	18	50
Woreda government	Community based early warning system workshop	32	8	40

OVI 1: Monitoring of implementation of government plans

The first OVI was that there would be “*regular joint monitoring by Concern and partners of progress against local government development plans in all 3 programme countries*”.

This is not really an OVI but a Means of Verification (that the *woreda* government implemented its plans). An outline of the planning system is given in Appendix 4.

The OVI is not reported on in the final report and during the evaluation I was told that monitoring by WDA or Concern did not happen. The nearest thing to monitoring took place during the GO-NGO forums. They were held annually at *woreda*, zonal and regional levels.

It was the view of the project staff that *woreda* government could not be held to account by NGOs. Discussions with *woreda* Anti-Corruption Officer indicated that the *woreda* was trying to be transparent about their budget.

The district governments in Ethiopia monitor the work of the NGOs. NGOs cannot monitor the work of the district government. The district governments know the NGO budgets because at the start of a project, an NGO must explain their budget to the *woreda* council. *Woreda* governments may then reallocate *kebele* budgets according to what NGO activity there is in each *kebele*.

This OVI was not appropriate for Ethiopia and was not met.

OVI 2: Exchange visits

The second OVI was that “*local authorities in all 3 programme countries have participated in internal and external exchange visits and can demonstrate learning and sharing*”.

This is not really an OVI but an Activity (see above). Visits within Ethiopia were arranged for 137 government staff from the *woreda* and from some *kebeles* to see natural resources management activity, examples of how GO-NGO forums were working, and how other local governments were practicing decentralised decision making. All the government officers interviewed during the evaluation said they had found the visits informative. However it is a pity that the exposure to “*decentralised decision making*” was not developed further.

The proposal states that the project will “*arrange and support sharing and learning of local government authorities through exchange visits to neighbouring East African countries*”. This did not happen. I was told it was because there was insufficient budget even though in the budget revision of 2011, Concern Ethiopia added an allocation for four government representatives to travel to Tanzania for an exchange visit around decentralisation.

This OVI was met only partially.

OVI 3: Women's representation (Burundi and Ethiopia only)

The second OVI was that there would be a “15% increase in the proportion of women's representation in Community Level structures, in Burundi and Ethiopia”.

The *kebele* council are selected at a general *kebele* meeting. People are nominated and if they are willing to stand they are selected by a show of hands. The last *kebele* and *woreda* elections took place at the beginning of 2013.

Women's representation on the *kebele* council (for 2013) is stipulated by the federal government as being 50% (100 men and 100 women). However in the 2008 elections the *kebele* councils were to consist of 100 women and 50 men. Representation of women at *kebele* level has therefore gone down but it does now seem fairer. However at the *woreda* council, each *kebele* council must send two men and one woman representatives. The project, of course, has had no influence at all on these changes.

The change of the law in June 2011 (see OVI2 of the Specific Objective) meant that project staff believed they could not address this issue (women's rights) and I was told that this OVI was not relevant to Ethiopia. However, the project did organise two workshops on women's participation (in development), economic empowerment, and equality (inclusiveness). The workshops were delivered by the Women's Empowerment Officer in the *woreda* Office of Women's Affairs.

Because it was not considered relevant, this OVI was not reported on in the final narrative report from the project. However, the Endline Survey Report pointed out that there was a growing number of national institutions catering for women with branches at *kebele* level. These include the Women's League and the Women's Federation (both national political organisations). No figures were given. These are not “Community Level structures”. The report has a general discussion about increased women's representation but no comparative figures for the start and end of the project.

OVI 4: Disaster Risk Reduction

The fourth OVI was that “Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction systems are established and operational within Local Government structures in 60% of target communities in all 3 programme countries”

DRR committees and “Community Based Early Warning Systems” have been established in all 10 project *kebeles*. The data collected includes:

- weekly information on the spatial and temporal distribution of rain and the effect on crops;
- location and seriousness of landslides¹⁴⁹ and other natural disasters such as flooding;
- potential harvest assessment for key crops;
- occurrence of contagious livestock and human diseases;
- market prices of commonly consumed crops and consumer goods;
- nutritional status of children as an indicator for the food security of the population.

This information is collected from all project *kebeles* on weekly basis to the *woreda* DRR Command Post (based in the Department of Agriculture) that in turn reports to the Zone Command Post. Nutritional and health data are simply obtained from the *kebele* health clinics (so now there is double-reporting). In theory the *woreda* staff are supposed to compare food prices with the average over the last three years but in practice most data is simply forwarded to the zone HQ. No collected data are computerised at the *woreda* level because of the lack of sufficient staff (only one full-time equivalent) and of computers. It seemed there was a severe case of “information overload” and data was possibly being collected for its own sake and not to enable decisions to be made at a local level. There was no clear link between food prices and severe food shortages. There is a case for an MSc student from a local university to study the DRR system especially to examine the correlation between food prices and critical food shortages (rather than simple seasonal fluctuations).

¹⁴⁹ 13 people were killed in one *kebele* alone during September 2013

Expected Result 2: Diversified Livelihoods

The second Expected Result was that there would be “*diversified livelihoods for farmers through working with local institutions and the private sector*”. Comments on the activities associated with this Result in the Logical Framework are given below.

Activities for Expected Result 2

Training for farmers

The 1st activity was “*training for farmers in appropriate farming techniques, for example crop diversification, including new short-cycle drought-resistant crop varieties, animal health and irrigation, through the use of Farmer Field Schools (FFS)*”.

In Ethiopia, “*Farmer Field Schools*” were not used. Though there were Farmer Training Centres (FTCs)¹⁵⁰ in each *kebele*, they were not used by the project. Groups of about 20 farmers interested in growing a particular crop were gathered together at one of their farms. Training was usually carried out by the *woreda* government agricultural staff using training material provided by the zone. No handouts were provided to farmers. The final report records the project facilitated training of:

- 541 farmers in integrated pest management;
- 485 farmers on basic crop agronomy (spacing, line planting, etc.);
- 120 farmers in horticulture;
- 380 farmers on coffee and ginger production;
- 115 farmers on cultivated pasture management;
- 93 farmers and *kebele* leaders in land reclamation;
- 107 farmers in animal health care.

Not all training was delivered in all *kebeles*. The total number of farmers trained is not known because some farmers were trained in more than one topic on more than one occasion and this was not monitored. The total is about 2,300. A list of training compiled by WDA is given in Table 31.

Strengthen agricultural extension services

Government extension staff includes one agronomist, one animal production specialist and one natural resource management specialist (all diploma holders) in each *kebele*. There is one assistant veterinarian for every three *kebeles*. All were provided training and some went on exchange visits.

The project facilitated the training of:

- 67 agricultural extension workers;
- 50 government paravets;
- 20 animal health extension workers.

A list of topics covered is given Table 32. The project also supplied the *woreda* animal health service with veterinary drugs and vaccinations against commonly occurring diseases. The amount was unavailable to the evaluator.

Develop community seed & produce storage facilities

Only one Produce Warehouse Cooperative¹⁵¹ located at the *woreda* centre in Gesuba, was supported by the project. The cooperative had been registered in 2004. At the time of the evaluation, it had 350 members (of which 20 were women) from 13 *kebeles*, only 5 of which are project *kebeles* (Kodo, Wachiga Esho, Galida¹⁵², Offa Heramo and Omo Bolola).

The project facilitated training (Table 33) by the *woreda* cooperative and marketing officer. Membership is open to anyone on payment of a registration fee and purchase of shares. Though the warehouse is used to distribute seed, its main purpose is for buying and selling produce and therefore could be seen as a contribution to value-chain activities (OVI 3 – see below). The warehouse accepts any crop but it must have been dried and be in good condition.

The warehouse purchases crops from farmers at a better price than the traders pay at harvest. The produce may be sold back to farmers after 3 or 4 months at a higher but relatively low price compared to the market. Remaining stocks are sold by auction in store when prices have risen. Members are given first refusal on the sale.

¹⁵⁰ Government extension agents delivered training through the FTCs and some beneficiaries also attended this training

¹⁵¹ The final report refers to it as a “grain bank” but generally grain is not stored. Even though storage is offered free to members, no one has accepted.

¹⁵² This was one of the two project *kebeles* that were dropped because another NGO was working there

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The Cooperative is a member of the Damota Cooperative Union in Sodo (from whom it obtained a loan) but is free to sell produce directly. The coffee and haricot beans were marketed through the Damota Cooperative Union.

The new warehouse built with project support has a capacity of 800 to 1,000¹⁵³ tonnes but the maximum stored so far has been 100 tonnes. When asked how the size was determined, I was told the project built the largest warehouse it could with the available budget. There was no survey of possible demand beforehand.

❖ *It is recommended that future projects involving warehouses do some background research to determine potential use and that records are kept of customers home kebele and the crops deposited (and amount) in order to assist future warehouse designs.*

The cooperative did not start functioning until supported by the project through training and a capital grant. It started buying only in February 2012 with a collection of coffee¹⁵⁴ (12 tonnes). In March 2013, the warehouse collected about 12 tonnes of teff. Members have started receiving dividends but the warehouse is still expanding its purchase-storage-marketing cycle. The management seemed to have a fairly good business approach.

At the debriefing with the *woreda* government, we mentioned the possible use of mobile phones to obtain market information. This has been very successful for a range of commodities in different countries in Africa. We were told that the government had recently (about 4 months ago) installed wireless telephones in each *kebele* and these were linked to the regional information centre at Awassa from which up to date market information could be obtained.

Watershed management including rain-water harvesting & small-scale irrigation

Land reclamation

The project supported the reclamation of 329.5 ha of degraded land on 4 sites in 4 *kebeles*. Fodder grasses, fruit trees and soil amelioration trees were planted. One cooperative included bee hives.

The project paid the equivalent of 60% of the WFP cash for work rates to anyone who wanted to work on the reclamation. (One informant said he was paid 56 birr per week compared to 150 birr per week for local labour though those on the reclamation work worked only from 7 am to 12 pm). A total of 1,050 benefited from the cash payments, people walking from as far as 4 km away to obtain the “employment”. Only the poorest would do this work. In one *kebele* (Mancha) I was told that this employment was the only real benefit they had had from the project.

It was unfortunate that the activity was referred to in project reports as the Safety Net Programme as this was used to refer to the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) being implemented by the government but apparently not in the project *kebeles* owing to resource limitations. The term was used because WDA used the government guidelines (work rates, times of working, etc.) that applied to the land reclamation work. The communal degraded lands targeted by WDA were previously identified, delineated and handed over by the *woreda* government to WDA for the project's implementation.

Three of the four sites (a total area of 93.9 ha) were registered as “Forest Conservation Cooperatives”¹⁵⁵ (Table 34) and were issued with usufruct certificates that include a map of the areas. One cooperative visited was not registered until after the end of the project. The cooperatives are open to anyone but most members are farmers on adjacent land. There are a total of 154 members in the three cooperatives. The project facilitated training in group management and cooperative regulations (Table 33) and helped to set up management structures,

The land reclamation work was well executed. Initially it could appear that the cost per hectare (around €400) was high but when the potential benefits are taken into account, the costs should be recouped from produce (by the cooperative) within about 5 years. This ignores the other benefits such as land protected from gully encroachment and improved water flow.

The cooperative at Mancha have planted many *Jatropha curcas* trees in addition to fruit trees. *Jatropha* can be used to make biodiesel and has wound healing properties. The group became keen to plant this after WDA took three group members and the *kebele* extension agent to visit a biodiesel factory in Bati, Wollo. If the group can produce 20 tonnes of seed, the factory would collect it. It is a pity that the project ended before this idea came to fruition.

In some of the *kebeles* in which Forest Conservation Cooperatives were established, by-laws have been developed, enforceable by fines, to stop people using common land in an unsustainable way.

The rehabilitation of Dakaya Irrigation scheme

The rehabilitation of the scheme on the Dakaya river in Dakaya *kebele* consisted of lining of a short stretch of an existing canal with concrete. The work was done by a contractor. The inlet structure had been built by the

¹⁵³ two estimates from two members of staff

¹⁵⁴ and possibly haricot beans

¹⁵⁵ There was no cooperative formed at Woshi Aldada.

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government some years before. The extra water enabled 89 households to have improved irrigation over an area of 94 ha and to enable farmers to grow two crops a year instead of one. There is a management committee but no water users group. There has been no training in maintenance which is expected to be done by the government.

Spring protection

The project facilitated the protection of 4 springs in 4 *kebeles* for domestic and animal use (a 5,000 litre cattle trough is incorporated). One does not work (it did before it was protected!) and this was the one installed under supervision of zonal “expert” by a contractor in the rainy season (not the time for spring protection). The other 3 were supervised by the *woreda* staff.

There is a precedent for NGOs to work through government departments in the construction of spring protection and

❖ *it is recommended that this model is adopted in future as far as possible.*

Woreda staff are used to obtaining labour contributions from the community though it can be consuming. Contractors want to finish the job as soon as possible and not have to rely on uncertain voluntary labour.

Each spring produces around 0.22 litres per second in the dry season. Assuming 14¹⁵⁶ hours of water collection and 20 litres per person usage, each spring would be sufficient for around 500 people (a total of 1,500). Water use committees were set up for each spring and a total of 78 (39 men, 39 women) water care technicians trained (Table 33).

Drip irrigation

It was planned to provide 490 farmers in 70 groups with drip irrigation equipment but owing to lack of knowledge on drip irrigation in Concern and the partner, this component did not happen. The one system installed with support from the zonal expert using water from a shallow well is not working.

Support development of alternative income generating sources

In addition to produce and forest conservation cooperatives, the project supported the following.

Saving and Credit Cooperatives

The project helped to establish one¹⁵⁷ Saving and Credit Cooperative in Zamo *kebele* (20 members) and supported another 9 through capacity building and training (Table 34). The model used by the *woreda* government is based on recommendations by the International Cooperative Alliance¹⁵⁸. The total number of members is 217. Though some were initially targeted at women and youth, under Cooperative rules, there can be no discrimination so SACCOs are now open to anyone who wishes to join. Interest rates on loans are between 10 and 12.5% (compared to 18% from microfinance institutions). There is a minimum monthly saving of around 5 Birr and voluntary additional savings can be up to 100 Birr per month. No interest is paid on savings but members receive dividends depending on their savings, shares and loans. Members who want a loan must come with a business plan and this is appraised by the management committee. During the evaluation we heard of a wide range of enterprises that had been started with loans from the SACCOs, mostly trading in various commodities, typically butter and maize but also buying and fattening calves.

❖ *More training on preparation of business plans is needed and to cater for illiterate members, perhaps the management committee could be helped to develop a list of questions to ask applicants for loans*

Distribution of planting material

Under Activities for this result in the Logical Framework, there was no mention of distribution of improved planting material to targeted households (or any other inputs). This was an oversight. The distribution of planting materials has therefore been included under this activity as a way of increasing the cash income of farmers. The following planting materials were supplied to targeted poor farmers:

- 40,876 seedlings of different types of improved varieties of mango, avocado and apple to 977¹⁵⁹ targeted households;
- 40,250 coffee seedlings (from selected plants) grown on community plots to 605 targeted hh;
- 287 q of ginger (“Volvo” variety) rhizomes to 196 farmers after testing 4 varieties on 20 farms under supervision of Areka Research Center¹⁶⁰;

¹⁵⁶ I was told at one of the *kebeles* that water was collected for only 6 hours a day.

¹⁵⁷ according to WDA but the *woreda* cooperative officer told me the project had helped to establish three

¹⁵⁸ <http://ica.coop/>

¹⁵⁹ The final narrative report gives 2,500 but I was told by the WDA M&E officer that this was because of double counting of people who had received more than one type of tree.

¹⁶⁰ Sadly, an unknown virus has recently infected ginger on a wide scale in Ethiopia and farmers have lost their entire crop. The government has issued instructions to all ginger growers to uproot and destroy their crops.

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- 5,733 seedlings (from selected plants) of ensete to 143 targeted hh.
- 2,170 kg of seeds of haricot (Red Wolaita) to 75 beneficiaries (about 21 ha);
- 13,780 suckers of banana (Dwarf Cavendish cultivar) to 436 beneficiaries,
- 118,750 cuttings of short duration, dwarf, mosaic resistant cassava (Kello and Nigerian Red) to 140 beneficiaries;
- 239 q [18 ha] of corms from improved taro (Boloso 1) to 224 farmers;
- a small amount of cabbage and onion seed to 224 farmers;
- 37 q of grass seed to 248 farmers.

According to WDA, 2,276 farmers received at least one kind of planting material. While 793 farmers received only one type of crop (excluding fruit trees), there were 62 that received as many as 5 different types of crop (see Table 35).

Because many farmers had lost their sweet potato crops due to disease and drought, the government distributed sweet potatoes in many *kebeles* including the project *kebeles*. Apparently taro was much appreciated by the farmers and several said it had had a big impact on improving food security.

WDA distributed seed according to their “Seed Distribution as Revolving System”. All the haricot bean, ginger and taro tubers were distributed to beneficiaries on condition they paid back an equal amount to the project after their harvest. The collection of this planting material from the first lot of targeted households was done in the presence of project staff together with committees established for the purpose and the material was distributed to an equal number of targeted households. Haricot bean seed were revolved twice, and ginger revolved once.

Pottery

A list of training from WDA (Table 33) included an item on pottery groups who were taught pottery practical skills, materials and design (3 men, 12 women) but I did not meet any during the evaluation.

Facilitate linkages between beneficiaries and markets including cross-border trade

The Gesuba market is one of the largest markets for agricultural products in Wolaita zone. The *woreda* government asked the project for assistance in constructing the Woyo bridge to improve market access to 6 Offa *kebeles* (including 1,336 households in one project *kebele*, Ofa Heramo) in the vicinity of the bridge and also communities in neighbouring *woredas*. WDA estimates that 3,690 households that are in the vicinity of the bridge and not in project *kebeles* benefit from the improved access. In addition to having poor access to markets when the river was flowing, the communities were experiencing difficulties accessing facilities such as the primary school, health centre and a water scheme. The project agreed to finance the building of the bridge using a contractor. Currently, the bridge cannot be used because a neighbouring bridge at Milke 6 km away on Gesuba side has partly collapsed and is impassable to traffic. We were assured that the regional road department had committed funds to repair the bridge in this financial year. It would have been helpful to have had more information about the difference to trade that the Woyo bridge would make. No research was carried out before or after the construction to assess the possible or actual usage.

- ❖ *It is recommended that in future projects with a road or bridge construction component, a survey to determine likely usage is undertaken and that volume (and preferably type of traffic) is monitored after construction and these data to develop a cost-benefit analysis.*

Support farmers to add value ... through processing & marketing

Honey cooperative

Two other marketing cooperatives have been formed and are based in Gesuba. The honey cooperative has 67 members and was formed in 2011 but only started collecting honey in June 2013 when they started renting their current premises. They collected 261 kg. Another 23 farmers who are not members also bring honey to the cooperative. They are selling the honey in 1 litre (unlabeled¹⁶¹) plastic containers. The containers leak.

The members were given hives¹⁶², equipment and very good training in both honey production and marketing and cooperative management by staff from the Bee Research and Training Centre, Holeta and by *woreda* staff (Table 33). The cooperative was provided with start-up capital. Because of the late start, the management structure was not properly in place until near the ends of the project. Committee members met did not know the cost of replacing any of their equipment. Members do not have any training on food standards requirements. There is a good potential for the members to earn a good dividend but at this stage sales are going mainly to building up capital.

¹⁶¹ by now they should have had their own labels

¹⁶² The beekeepers use mostly their traditional design but were given German, Top Bar and Modified Top Bar hives. The German design is preferred.

Fruit & Vegetable Cooperative

The Fruit and Vegetable Cooperative was not registered until after the end of the project (June, 2013). There are 75 members (5 female) but it is not known which *kebeles* they are from. According to WDA, there are a total of 977 farmers who received fruit trees¹⁶³ who will also benefit from the cooperative, but those growing fruit will not necessarily market their produce through the cooperative, and in any case, not for a few years. Members have been trained on cooperative management (Table 33) but their level of knowledge seemed very weak. They have had no training on produce storage or transport methods – very skilled tasks for fruit and vegetables. Fruit storage and transport is a very complex affair and the project has failed them in not providing technical support during the project lifetime. This is because the formation of the cooperative was left until the last months of the project.

Because of the late start, other opportunities such as juice extraction, jam making and drying, have been missed, some of which are done in neighbouring *woredas*. The *woreda* government has promised to follow up on this but it would have been better if the activity had been started earlier in the project timeframe.

Cassava crushers

The project distributed some hand-held cassava crushers.

Increase access to land ...

Increased access to land has been through the reclamation of 329.5 ha of degraded common land on 4 sites in 4 *kebeles* (see above). All of the cooperative members interviewed had land before the land reclamation. They were not landless but their farms were too small to support their families on. The subdivision of small farms means that inheritance customs are changing and there will be increasing numbers of people without access to land in the future.

See also “*Training on land rights*” under “Activities for Expected Result 1”.

OVI 1: Adoption of new agricultural practices

The first OVI was that: *“70% of the targeted farmers are applying one or more new agricultural practices by the end of the programme in all 3 programme countries”*.

The way the data in Table 14 and Table 15 are presented is unhelpful. When the data are reanalysed, they show that there were considerable increases in the percentage of beneficiaries practicing improved planting methods, fertiliser application, tree planting, improved crop production methods and compost preparation. There were moderate increases in the percentage of farmers using improved varieties and crop protection. There were (as expected) large reductions in the percentage of farmers using traditional practices and (surprisingly) intercropping. At the time of the endline survey, the percentage of non-beneficiaries using the correct planting time, timely weeding, intercropping, crop protection, animal production and compost preparation was greater than the percentage of beneficiaries. However the data also indicate that only 2.2% of beneficiaries had not adopted at least one new practice whereas 21.7% of non-beneficiaries had not adopted at least one new practice. The percentage of non-beneficiaries using an improved practice is greater than the beneficiaries for 7 of the 13 practices (excluding traditional methods). Two of the practices for which the percentage of beneficiaries was greater than the percentage of non-beneficiaries related to land reclamation and irrigation, both of which were paid for by the project.

The unreliability of the data is illustrated by the fact that in Table 16 of the Endline Survey Report, beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries had had training in traditional methods which clearly did not happen.

Table 18 in the Endline Survey Report indicates that all the beneficiaries and 96.7% of non-beneficiaries had adopted two or more practices since 2010 (the table also implies that 45% of non-beneficiaries had adopted 5 or more improved practices whereas only 42% of beneficiaries had adopted 5 or more improved practices).

All farmers interviewed during the evaluation were using at least one improved practice. One group of non-beneficiaries were visited during the evaluation. Some of the farmers had been taught some of the improved practices by the *kebele* extension agent but they said they did not think line planting for example had made any difference to haricot bean yields. They were convinced that only fertilisers improved yields (one farmer said yields had increased four-fold as a result of improved varieties and the use of fertilisers supplied by the project).

¹⁶³ The final narrative report says 2,500

Despite the unreliability of some of the data in the Endline Survey Report, my opinion is that this OVI has been met.

OVI 2: Increased crop production

The second OVI was that “*targeted farmers have significantly increased ($p < 0.05$) their crop production compared to non-targeted farmers in all 3 programme countries*”. The problems with this OVI are discussed in Appendix 3.

The Endline Survey Report states that 69.5% of beneficiaries and 52.5% of non-beneficiaries reported a production increase between the beginning of 2010 and the beginning of 2013. Table 25 shows that beneficiary yields are reported to be greater than non-beneficiary yields for all crops except maize (no units are given but it assumed to be kg ha⁻¹). Table 26 presumably lumps all the crops together before performing a t-test which shows that beneficiary yields were significantly higher than those of non-beneficiaries. The Report concludes that the OVI has been met but without seeing the calculations, it is impossible to say if the analysis is valid.

My conclusion is that farmers who have adopted improved cultivation techniques and/or been given seed or planting material of improved varieties and/or have improved access to irrigation will have had statistically significant higher yields than non-beneficiaries in neighbouring kebeles if they did not adopt these innovations.

However members of some of the Forest Conservation Cooperatives where the fruit-tree planting work was not finished until 2013 and those who were given improved cassava only in 2013 will not see increased production (and so income) until many months after the project ended.

OVI 3: Value chain

The third OVI was that “*groups undertaking value-chain activities with links to the private sector, are reporting increased income in all 3 programme countries*”.

There is a heading related to this OVI in the ESR but it discusses only the setting up of honey cooperative and the fruit and vegetable cooperative. During the evaluation, it was apparent that of these, only the honey cooperative and the produce warehouse were distributing dividends to members but these were quite small in each case.

Of all the cooperatives, members of the SACCOs reported most improvements in livelihoods, by being enabled to improve houses, pay for better medical care and buy household goods such as radios.

Expected Result 3: Non-state actor involvement

The third Expected Result was that there would be “*increased involvement of non-state actors in key planning processes*”.

Activities for Expected Result 3

Awareness raising for CSOs

The 1st activity was “*awareness raising for civil society organisations on national laws and policies, with an emphasis on the opportunities for participation in key planning processes*”.

The Ethiopia Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (Growth and Transformation Plan 2010/11–2014/15) states that

“... strategic direction will involve initiatives that ensure citizens' participation in local governance and development decision making. In addition, the Woreda and local administrations will be strengthened to ensure better public participation and thereby to facilitate the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. ... and ensure full public participation in the formulation and evaluation of government policies, strategies and development plans, support professional and public associations and organizations in their efforts to build inter-organizational initiatives that promoting principles contributing to democratisation” (pp. 96-97).

However, there was no specific training given to the CSO partner on “*national laws and policies, with an emphasis on the opportunities for participation in key planning processes*”. In practice, the mechanism for active participation in planning has not developed. The nearest thing is the GO-NGO forums at woreda, zone and state level. WDA attended the woreda level forum meetings which were more for coordination than planning.

Build capacity of kebele to monitor woreda performance

The second activity mentioned in the logical framework was to “build the capacity of [kebele cabinet and councils] and other local representative bodies to monitor [woreda cabinet] performance where appropriate”.

According to woreda officials, there is already a system in place that makes woreda budgets and expenditure transparent. At quarterly meetings the sector heads report to the woreda council the progress being made in implementing the woreda plans and how expenditure is conforming to the budget. Since the woreda has representatives from the kebeles (2 women and 1 man), this information is filtered down to the kebeles and the kebele can then call a public meeting if it so wishes. Each year the expenditure is compared to the budget by the sector heads at a woreda council meeting. However there was no specific activity on the part of the project to “build the capacity of [kebele cabinet and councils] ... to monitor [woreda cabinet] performance ...”

Facilitate increased awareness of the decentralisation process

The 3rd activity was intended to “facilitate increased awareness of the decentralisation process among citizens so they may take full advantage of the available opportunities to participate in decision-making processes and access public services”

It is government policy that kebeles are given more power to influence the plans being made at by the woreda government. However no direct interventions were made to increase awareness of the possibility of increased decentralisation by Concern or WDA as project staff thought this was the role of the government. There was no expenditure for Ethiopia under the budget item “Train communities on laws and legislation, their interpretation and application”.

Representatives of some kebeles (and the woreda administrator) were taken on the exchange visits described under OVI 2 of Expected Result 1. In particular, the visit to Tigre exposed them to decentralised decision making which is more advanced in Tigre than in Wolaita. On their return, the woreda administrator explained to the kebele cabinets what was happening in Tigre.

Increased decentralisation is therefore beginning to happen and the project has played a part in this by organising the exchange visits.

Collaborate with national and local NGO platforms

There has been no collaboration of the project staff themselves with national or local NGO platforms though Concern is a member of several national forums and regularly meets with other NGOs for coordination. Project staff from Concern and its partner the WDA only participated in the GO-NGO forum at woreda level.

Exchanges and learning between NSAs

Four staff of the WDA participated in the exchanges described under OVI 2 of Expected Result 1 (see also under OVI 3 for Expected Result 3). However, there were no exchanges or learning between CSOs (apart from mutual learning between Concern and WDA).

OVI 1: Increased attendance of CSOs and community in government planning

The first OVI was that there would be a “documented increase in CSO and community members attendance in key planning processes and decision making in all 3 programme countries”.

The GO-NGO Forum at woreda and zonal level is the main vehicle by which CSOs interact with the government in development work. The forums do not discuss government budgets or plans but do discuss NGO budgets (and whether they are meeting their targets). The forums also discuss problems and constraints to implementation experienced by the NGOs. The project has had no influence over other CSOs’ attendance at the forums.

There has been only one GO-NGO Forum at woreda level per year. It was attended by a total of 13 NGOs (including WDA) but this number did not change over the three years of the project.

OVI 2: Plans include needs of community and marginalised groups

The second OVI was that “planning increasingly reflects the needs of community and marginalised groups”. This OVI is not SMART and is virtually the same as OVI 2 for the Specific Objective (see above).

OVI 3: Exchange visits for CSOs

The third OVI was that “CSOs have participated in internal and external exchange visits and can demonstrate learning and sharing”.

Annex 3: Ethiopia

Four staff of the WDA participated in the exchanges described under OVI 2 of Expected Result 1. There was no report written on their return which might have been used to assess what they had learned.

Annex 3: Ethiopia

Table 31. Farmer training

Topics	Number of participants		
	Male	Female	Total
Community Managed Watershed-based NR Conservation Techniques	97	11	108
Integrated pest Management (IPM)	253	48	301
Agronomy and organic farming	78	42	120
Horticulture	191	8	199
Community managed watershed based NR conservation: biological & physical SWC	26	14	40
Community managed watershed based NR conservation: soil & water conservation activities	14	11	25
Participatory animal disease management	91	16	107
Cassava processing: handling, processing and consumption	51	9	60
Agronomic aspects on ginger production	33	5	38
Participatory community-based watershed planning	30	15	45
Animal feed production	109	11	120
Animal feed production management and preservation	13	6	19
Agronomy, IPM & ginger cultivation	69	21	90
Agronomic & organic farming training	82	43	125
Horticulture	27	13	40
Spice	46	29	75
Integrated pest management	73	47	120
Cassava processing, agro-pastoral	48	46	94
Gender	24	28	52
Beekeeping, bee management, honey production and management, wax printing, marketing of honey and wax.	113	12	125

Table 32. Training of extension workers

Participants	Topics	Number of participants		
		Male	Female	Total
Extension agents	Extension and communication	24	8	32
Para-vets, animal health extension agents & members of farmers groups	Animal health and feed	30	-	30
Extension agents	Communication, facilitation & networking	22	12	34
Para-vets & animal health extension workers	Participatory livestock disease management, livestock production, animal husbandry	102	4	106

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Table 33. Training on cooperatives and income generation

Participants	Topics	Number of participants		
		Male	Female	Total
Farmers	Income generating techniques	15	17	32
IGA committee members	Income generating activities	17	15	32
Pottery groups	Pottery: practical skills, materials and design	3	12	15
Bee-keepers	Beekeeping	20	-	20
Community Grain Bank members	Awareness Creation: concepts, procedures and organization of marketing cooperative	56	34	90
Grain bank committee members and beneficiaries	Marketing, revolving loan management, recording, how to purchase & sell grain, market assessment, handling and profit sharing	25	7	32
Community grain bank management committees members	Marketing & grain bank management	19	3	22
SACCOs' committees	SACCO's organization, responsibilities and duties	26	12	38
Bee-keepers and groups	Quality honey production, wax production, queen and colony multiplication, wax printing (provided by APINIC)	17	-	17
IGA groups management committee	IGA concepts, principles and procedures	15	17	32
Cooperative management	Basic business skills, business management	10	19	29
Cooperative clerks	Concepts and procedures of bookkeeping, financial management, record keeping and documentation	2	2	4
Cooperative clerks	Bookkeeping, financial management, keeping records and financial documents	23	1	24
Cooperative officials	Concepts, principles and procedures of business management & business service development	8	2	10
Cooperative members	Business plan management, saving and credit	17	98	115
Cooperative members	Value chain: concepts & production	27	128	155
Honey cooperative members	Honey value chain	82	2	84
Fruit cooperative members	Fruit value chain concepts & production	45	22	67
Natural resource management cooperative	Natural resource management, user groups duties and responsibilities	96	24	120
Community workers	Basic business skills, business management and grass root level management and bookkeeping	6	1	7
Water care takers & technicians	Maintenance	39	39	78

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Table 34. Summary of Interventions in Offa woreda

Kebele	Total households	Target households	No. of people who received planting material ⁵	Irrigation improvement		Cooperatives ⁶			Land reclamation Cooperatives		
				No. of beneficiaries	Area of land (ha)	SACCOS ⁵ (total members)	Honey group beneficiaries ²	Fruit & vegetable group (potential) beneficiaries ³	No of beneficiaries	No. in cooperative	Land reclaimed (ha)
Kodo	487	296	420	-	-	57 (1 Women's, 1 Youth group)	25	175	200	56	26.2
Mancha	426	359	133	-	-	20 (Women's group)	20	0	100	40	20.5
Wachiga Esho	1,323	942	447	-	-	40 (1 Women's, 1 Youth group)	25	196	400	58	47.2
Woshi Aldada	683	654	110	-	-	20 (Women's group)	0	104	350	-	235.6
Busha ¹	1,443	1,174	125	-	-	0	0	0		-	
Galida ¹	952	810	0	-	-	0	0	0	-	-	
Woshe Woche Dakaya	792	736	505	89	94	20 (one S&C group)	25	186			
Omo Bolola	809	716	170	-	-	20 (1 Youth group)	0	100	-		
Offa Heramo	1,524	1,336	201	-	-	20 (one S&C group)	0	107	-		
Zamo	1,319	1,199	165	-	-	20 ⁴ (1 Youth group)	0	109	-		
TOTAL	9,758	8,222	2276	89	94	217	95	977	1,050	154	329.5 ha

¹ Activities in two *kebeles*, Busha and Galida, were reduced to a minimum after it was found that another NGO that was improving irrigation in these *kebeles*, then started to expand its activities that overlapped with this project

² The honey cooperative has 67 members but some people who are not members bring their honey to it.

³ The Fruit and Vegetable Cooperative has 75 members (*kebeles* not known) but there are 977 beneficiaries who received fruit trees and therefore potential beneficiaries of the cooperative

⁴ The group in Zamo was the only one started by the project. The others received training but had existed before the project started

⁵ Includes any kind of planting material including seeds, suckers, seedlings, etc. Most farmers received more than one type of planting material and the number of types is given in Table 35.

⁶ Not listed is the Produce Cooperative in Gesuba which has 350 members from 13 *kebeles*, 5 of which are project *kebeles* (Kodo, Wachiga Esho, Offa Heramo, Omo Bolola and Galida (but see note 1)).

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Table 35. Number of beneficiaries receiving different numbers of planting material

<i>Kebele</i>	Number of beneficiaries					
	1 crop	2 crops	3 crops	4 crops	5 crops	TOTAL
Kodo	109	200	111	0	0	420
Mancha	133	0	0	0	0	133
Woshi Aldada	66	44	0	0	0	110
Wachiga Esho	80	120	180	50	17	447
Busha	125	0	0	0	0	125
Galida	0	0	0	0	0	0
Woshi Wocha Dakaya	63	137	189	71	45	505
Omo Bolola	29	98	43	0	0	170
Offa Heramo	158	43	0	0	0	201
Zamo	30	110	25	0	0	165
TOTAL	793	752	548	121	62	2276

Evaluation according to Development Assistance Committee criteria – Ethiopia

Relevance & quality of design

Consistency with policies and strategies

The project was consistent with the government's "Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty" (PASDEP) for 2005/06 to 2009/10. For example:

"The role of civil society is critical, and a comprehensive program of reforms is planned under PASDEP with respect to the role of membership-based CSOs. This will include the establishment of participatory mechanisms at the local level and amendment of legal and administrative regulations for CSOs." (p.177)

and the whole of paragraph 7.14.5 on District Level Decentralization (p. 184).

The Overall Objective was relevant to Ethiopia. The first part of the Specific Objective "to improve livelihoods" was very relevant to Ethiopia but the second part, "empowerment of poor farmers in decentralised decision-making" was considered less so by project staff. The 2nd Expected Result "diversified livelihoods ..." was also very relevant to Ethiopia though there was not enough attention to non-agriculturally based livelihoods. In Ethiopia there was limited scope to achieve the 3rd Expected Result ("increased involvement of non-state actors in key planning processes").

The project was also broadly consistent with the EC's Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for 2008-13" which includes sections on decentralisation, Gender Equality, and empowerment. It even refers to the government's commitment in 2007 to "improve land tenure security with more flexibility and transferable rights".

The focus of this project on the poor and marginalised ensured that it was compatible with Concern's Country Strategic Plan for Ethiopia.

Relevance of project location

Concern staff in Ethiopia were vague about how Wolaita zone was selected for this project. According to staff in Addis Ababa, there has been a Concern office in Sodo, Wolaita for 30 or 40 years. It was established when Concern responded to a drought and then followed up the emergency with a recovery programme. Offa woreda was considered to be a "hot spot" but staff were not sure on what basis. Jufare (2008)¹⁶⁴ concluded that Wolaita Zone is still one of the most food deficient parts of the country.

Having been in Wolaita zone for over 30 years, Concern has built up a body of local experience and knowledge as well as lessons learned from previous projects all of which informed the writing of the Ethiopian component of this project. The interventions were all relevant to the area.

Quality of logical framework

The logical framework for the whole project is discussed in Appendix 3. Specific areas where OVI were not appropriate for Ethiopia are as follows.

- the 2nd OVI ("*priority issues of women and marginalised groups are increasingly addressed..*") for the Specific Objective was considered to be inappropriate because of the legislation in June 2011;
- the 1st OVI ("*... monitoring by Concern and partners of progress against local government development plans ...*") for the 1st Expected Result was also considered inappropriate as there is no mechanism to monitor government by NGOs (as there is in Tanzania);
- the 2nd OVI ("*15% increase in the proportion of women's representation in Community Level structures ...*") for the 1st Expected Result was outside the projects control as these are set by legislation in Ethiopia.

¹⁶⁴ **Ayele Tessema Jufare**, 2008. *Livelihood Adaptation, Risks and Vulnerability in Rural Wolaita, Ethiopia*. Ph. D. thesis. Noragric Norwegian University of Life Sciences,

- the 1st OVI for Expected Result 3, concerning increased attendance of CSOs in government planning, was not really appropriate as there is no mechanism in Ethiopia for NGOs to contribute to government planning, there are only stakeholder meetings to coordinate activities.

Relevance of activities and technical designs

Most activities and technical designs were relevant. However some activities were not appropriate and some were not implemented. There was no activity for the distribution of inputs in the logical framework though the project in Ethiopia introduced one into its reporting. The spring protection work, though important for health, did not fit easily into the project design. The following are comments on specific activities.

Training on land rights: there was no training on land rights as it was considered by project staff that this would have not been feasible in Wolaita as there was no spare land to distribute and all farmers with land had been issued with usufruct certificates.

Exchange visits: there were no international exchange visits even though in the budget revision of 2011, Ethiopia added an allocation for four government representatives to travel to Tanzania.

Awareness raising for CSOs: There was no training of the partners or any other CSOs on “*national laws and policies ... [about] opportunities for participation in key planning processes*” - mainly there are none and so this activity was inappropriate for Ethiopia.

Build capacity of kebele ... to monitor ... woreda: There was no specific activity on the part of the project but the *woreda* government claim they have a transparent system in place.

Awareness of the decentralisation process among citizens: It is government policy that *kebeles* are given more power to influence the plans being made at by the *woreda* government but there were no direct interventions by Concern or WDA (apart from government the visit to Tigre where decentralisation is more advanced) as it was considered too politically sensitive.

Selection of beneficiaries

The project selected 10 of the 23 *kebeles* in Offa *woreda* after taking advice from the *woreda* government. Beneficiaries themselves were selected by *kebele* councils. There are various versions of the criteria. One is that the beneficiaries were selected after wealth ranking (poor, medium, and rich) rather than on vulnerability. In one *kebele* I was told the beneficiaries were selected on the basis of: (1) having land but no seed, (2) being a strong farmer but with no opportunity, (3) generally poor people. I was told that if someone was suffering from AIDS their family would become one of the targeted households (though I did not come across any examples of this).

Of the 9,758 households in the 10 *kebeles*, 8,222 (84%) were selected as target households. This is more than one would expect (in Tanzania, 19% of households in project villages and in Burundi, 24% of households in project *collines* were targeted).

Efficiency of implementation

Quality of project management

Concern had a project manager who was an agricultural graduate supported only by office staff. He was responsible for this project plus a livelihoods project being implemented by another partner and another project being implemented by Concern without a partner. He was supported by regular visits from the Livelihoods Advisor from the Addis Ababa office.

The WDA director had an MSc. The project manager, two project officers and seven community development workers all had BSc's. However all the community development workers left because of the low salary and were replaced by unemployed people with lower qualifications (diploma holders).

Although there was a Finance Agreement with WDA, they had their own salary standards. Eventually there was a budget revision to allow WDA to offer higher salaries (but by then all the better qualified people had been replaced). This could have been foreseen.

The project was visited about twice a year by the Assistant Country Director for Programmes¹⁶⁵.

Concern staff have an effective internal complaints mechanism in their staff manual.

Quality of Monitoring and Evaluation system

Oversight of the project M&E was the responsibility of the M&E Coordinator based in Addis Ababa, supported by the Concern M&E officer in Wolaita, the project manager and the WDA M&E officer. The current M&E Coordinator did not join the project until the middle of the project.

There were three monitoring visits per year three months apart. The first used FGDs with the beneficiaries and was followed by a visit to beneficiaries' farms to see the project's impact. The second visit took the form of office level discussions and a desk review with partner's staff. The third visit in October was an annual learning review involving all stakeholders including government, partners and beneficiaries that gave an opportunity for stakeholders to reflect on their experience during the year.

The M&E Coordinators organised the baseline and endline reports though the latter was contracted out. A mid-term evaluation conducted by an external evaluator analysed the implementation of the programme up to that point and gave critical recommendations that were implemented.

When I asked for a breakdown by *kebele* of interventions and number of beneficiaries, it took WDA about 10 days to compile it (there are still a lot of unanswered queries). A basic requirement of any M&E system is knowing what has happened where. With projects with partners, making sure that this happens should be allocated to a specific Concern staff member. If a partner is involved, an updated intervention datasheet in Excel should be supplied to Concern, at least monthly including training and inputs.

The M&E officer in WDA informed me that there were 977 beneficiaries who received fruit trees and that the reason a figure of 2,500 people is given in the final narrative report is a result of double counting, some people having received more than one species. This is symptomatic of a general problem, the need to be clear about the number of beneficiaries and to avoid double counting. Double counting is a particular problem with training on different days on different topics, unless attendees' names are taken and checked each time there is a training session.

It was surprising (it had never been mentioned in reports) to discover that the project manager implemented a system of crop-cutting at the time of harvest of maize and haricot beans on 20 farmers from each of the project *kebeles*. Though it still has many sources of error, it is a far more accurate way of determining crop production than asking farmers for estimates. However the data were used to estimate food stocks (using an erroneous equation that did not take into account food stocks carried over from the previous month or sales). The harvest estimates would have been invaluable information, not for food stocks but for production increases. However the WDA field assistants who collected this information have since left along with the data, as it was never asked for by Concern.

Staff from the *woreda* Finance and Economic Development office assisted the M&E of the project by participating in the quarterly reviews and field visits though he did not write anything. He also attended the annual learning review.

Monitoring reports have been submitted more or less on time, though sometimes not easy to follow as Ethiopia introduced new activities to report against. For example under Expected Result 3 there is an activity called "*Facilitate awareness raising on the decentralisation process to CBOs*" with one sub-activity "*developing community by-laws to manage and appropriately use natural resources*" which is not relevant to either the Expected Result or the activity.

Detailed comments on the logical framework and the associated problems of the baseline and endline survey reports (ESR) are given in Appendix 3. The final and endline surveys were mainly based on the logical framework but were of questionable quality. The following are examples of specific shortcomings in the logical framework and the surveys in Ethiopia:

- some important energy crops, such as *ensete* were not included in the surveys;

¹⁶⁵ There are two in Ethiopia and manage about 10 projects between them.

- following guidelines from Dublin, the endline survey did not attempt to discover what the priority issues of women and marginalised groups were, but instead reported on “critical issues the community expects the kebele council to address” and the “critical issues the kebele and woreda councils were thought to have [actually] addressed in the last six months”;
- the 1st OVI (“regular joint monitoring by Concern and partners of progress against local government development plans in all 3 programme countries” for Expected Result 1 was not reported on in the final report, largely because, unlike Tanzania, there is no mechanism in Ethiopia for monitoring of government budgets by an NGO;
- similarly the 2nd OVI (“15% increase in the proportion of women’s representation in community level structures, in Burundi and Ethiopia” was not reported on because the ratio of men to women in kebele and woreda councils are defined in law and because of the 2011 law prohibiting NGOs to work on women’s rights;
- some of the data in the Endline Survey Report are presented in an illogical way and are not easy to follow;
- the unreliability of the figures is illustrated by the fact that in Table 16 of the Endline Survey Report, beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries had had training in traditional methods which clearly did not happen;
- the ESR discusses only the setting up of honey cooperative and the fruit and vegetable cooperative and not increased income accruing to members.

Financial efficiency

External audits by Deloitte took place once a year though there were no field visits for verification. In addition there were internal audits from Concern once a year. The internal auditor audited the accounts of the partner together with the Partners Focal Person (liaison officer). Stores were subject to systems put in place by the internal auditor. The cooperatives were not audited by Concern, only by the woreda government auditor in the Cooperative and Marketing Department.

The 2011 law that required NGOs to limit the administration part of their project budget to 30% has caused some inconvenience, as the government classifies expenses (such as drivers) normally considered as implementation costs, as administration. The problem has been overcome by judicious re-categorization of expenses.

The final narrative report for Ethiopia states that the “*programme, in collaboration with the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) of the government has managed to overachieve the target by facilitating the rehabilitation ...*”. This implied that the government had contributed to the costs of land reclamation. However, enquiries during the evaluation established that this misunderstanding was caused by the use of the term “*Productive Safety Net Programme*” by the project to apply to modalities and not to financial resources used by the programme.

The duplication of work in two kebeles is discussed on page 34. As a result of the duplication, work in the two kebeles was minimised to training on DRR and other topics. However, given that the budget was for 10 kebeles rather than 8 and that only one year of the project had elapsed, transferring activities to an alternative two kebeles should have been considered.

Co-financing was handled in Dublin and was not a problem.

There were minor budget modifications including an allocation for flights to Tanzania for four government representatives to travel to Tanzania for exchange visits around decentralisation (which was never used).

The final¹⁶⁶ project cost in Ethiopia was €1,006,158, 26% of the total cost for the three countries. Cost per target beneficiary reached was around €366. The alpha value, the percentage of the budget directly spent on beneficiaries consists of 38% on inputs and infrastructure, and 16% on training, a total of 54%. There were no budget lines overspent. With the exception of a few delays mentioned above, the rate of spending was acceptable.

¹⁶⁶ unaudited - provisional at the time of writing


Cost-effectiveness and use of funds

The major project cost was for inputs and infrastructure (37.6%). Of this the largest component was for land reclamation (330 ha), small-scale irrigation (94 ha) and, presumably the four springs that were protected. The cost for this component was €175,160 (46% of the inputs and infrastructure costs) which seems rather high. Ignoring the spring costs, it works out at around €413 per ha of improved land. The next most expensive item was the Woyo bridge construction.

Training was the other major expenditure. This was fairly evenly spread between decentralisation and planning (21.4% of the training budget), farmer training (22.2%), livelihood diversification (45.8%) and disaster risk reduction (10.7%).

For those items that were attributable, the cost associated with Expected Result 1 (strengthened government) was €51,267 and those associated with Expected Result 2 (improved livelihoods) was €538,567.

Figure 9. Breakdown of expenditure in Ethiopia



The main concern is the crop warehouse. Its capacity is between 800 and 1000 tonnes¹⁶⁷ but the maximum amount in store at any one time has been 100 tonnes. Before construction of warehouses, there should be a short market research to determine the potential number of customers, distance they are prepared to travel and amount of produce they are likely to sell. It is not good practice to build the largest warehouse possible with the available budget which is what I was told by the manager. However it is acknowledged that the cooperative is only in its second year and use may increase with time. For large investments like warehouses, some attempt should also be made to calculate and report the internal rate of return (there is a function in Excel to do this) or the payback period.

Timeliness

The start-up workshop for stakeholders was not held until May 2010, the baseline survey took place in June and the project finally started implementation in July 2010. WDA took from February to May to recruit the project staff and establish an office in Offa. The project in Ethiopia was therefore late starting.

As described above, all the WDA community development workers left in their first year. This also contributed to delays in project implementation.

¹⁶⁷ two estimates given by different members of staff

Support to the cooperatives was started far too late in the project cycle. Though formed in 2011, the honey cooperative did not start collecting honey until June 2013, after the end of the project. The fruit and vegetable cooperative was not registered until after the end of the project (June, 2013). Because of the late start, other opportunities such as juice extraction, jam making and drying, have been missed, even though these value added activities are undertaken in neighbouring *woredas*.

The procurement process worked fairly well. There was a no-cost extension requested by Ethiopia.

Quality of inputs and outputs

Because of the late start on providing support to the Fruit and Vegetable Cooperative, technical support has been totally absent. They have had no training on storage or transport of fruit and vegetables. Similarly, there has been no training on food quality standards for the honey cooperative. The *woreda* government promised to rectify this situation. The other cooperatives established were of a reasonable standard and benefited from being members of the national cooperatives movement.

The report produced by two value-chain consultants employed in 2012 was considered by the project manager to be too general to be of much use.

It was planned to provide 490 farmers in 70 groups with drip irrigation equipment. Only one system was installed because of a lack of necessary skills. The one system installed is not working. When planning technical innovations such as drip irrigation, it is essential to ensure that there are sufficient skilled staff available to implement and maintain the new system.

Training materials used by the *woreda* government were usually prepared at zonal level and seemed adequate. More use of handouts should be made though this would increase training costs.

There has been no specific training provided for WDA. Capacity building of national NGOs was an inherent part of this project so this was unfortunate. Comments on capacity building of partner CSOs are made in the main report.

The main infrastructure outputs were the warehouse and the Woyo bridge. As far as I could tell (I am not a building specialist), the warehouse was constructed to a good standard. We could not visit the Woyo bridge because of a broken neighbouring bridge so I cannot pass comment. The land reclamation work was perhaps one of the highlights of the project and was done to a very high standard.

As in other projects, there was no attempt to measure the success of training by setting simple tests (commented on in the main report).

Methodology

Concern worked in partnership with the Wolaita Development Association, a local NGO. There has been no specific training provided for WDA. Capacity building of national NGOs was an inherent part of this project so this was unfortunate. Comments on capacity building of partner CSOs are made in the main report.

Access

Four *kebeles* were inaccessible this year between May and October and in previous years for at least 3 months. Internet access in the Concern office was acceptable.

Effectiveness

Achievement of results and objectives

The extent of achievement of the Expected Results and Objectives are summarised below:

Annex 3: Ethiopia

Expected Result 1: “strengthened local government structures to manage, regulate and coordinate local development”.	The project facilitated training in budgeting and planning at <i>woreda</i> level and <i>woreda</i> government capacity has improved as a result. There was no training on decentralisation of planning at <i>kebele</i> level though this activity could have been included.
Expected Result 2: “diversified livelihoods for farmers through working with local institutions and the private sector”.	Livelihoods were mostly improved through agricultural training and planting material distribution. Links with the private sector have been minimal other than with individual businessmen coming to buy produce and the link to the Damota Cooperative Union in Sodo. Saving and Credit Cooperative have helped to <u>diversify livelihoods</u> but only for the 217 members. The spring protection activity did not fit easily into this Result.
Expected Result 3: “increased involvement of non-state actors in key planning processes”.	NSAs do not really participate in government planning but they attend stakeholder meetings, mainly for coordination as well as to answer to government on their progress with projects. The Expected Result was achieved only to a very limited extent.
Specific Objective : “to improve livelihoods and empowerment of poor farmers in decentralised decision-making processes”.	Livelihoods have been improved for some of the targeted beneficiaries but the degree to which farmers have been empowered in decentralised decision-making was rather limited.
Overall objective: “to contribute to the achievement of MDG1 and food security in Tanzania, Ethiopia and Burundi”.	The project in Ethiopia contributed to MDG 1 (eliminate extreme poverty and hunger).

Assumptions and risks

Assumptions about the government commitment to decentralisation was over-optimistic for Ethiopia. There is also an assumption that “*Local authorities will not block civil society's participation in local governance issues*” which in view of the 2011 legislation prohibiting most NGOs from becoming involved in governance issues was also over-optimistic.

Coordination with other development actors

Government staff from the *woreda* were paid DSAs ((WDA rates) even if they helped with training within Gesuba, the *woreda* administrative centre (though normally government officers are paid only when “out of station”. There are large discrepancies between agencies, some paying only for lunch while others pay 3 days DSA for each day worked. This issue needs to be resolved not only in Ethiopia but the other countries as well as is discussed in the main report.

Coordination with other NGOs was meant to be through the annual GO-NGO forums at *woreda*, zonal and state levels. The forums held at *woreda* and zonal levels are the nearest thing in Ethiopia to involvement of CSOs in government planning. They are meant to avoid duplication. However in the case of this project, the *woreda* forum obviously did not function properly since one NGO, that was originally going to implement only irrigation in which this project was working, then started to expand

its activities so that it began to overlap with this project's activities. As a result, Concern stopped working in the two *kebeles* apart from providing training.

Visibility

Visibility was not done according to EC requirements. For example brochures and signs often has only an EC logo with no explanation that it was the European Community and no reference to the EC as the (major) source of funding. There was no web site (apart from the central one controlled in Dublin) and there were no press or media releases.

Impact

My estimate for the *woreda* population for 2012 is 118,093 (21,842 households) based on the population of 103,870 in the 2007 census¹⁶⁸ and a growth rate of 2.6%. There were 8,222 households targeted out of the 9,758 households in the 10 project *woredas*.

According to WDA, 2,276 farmers received planting materials and training. There were another 217 members of SACCOs, some of whom may not have received planting materials and 15 people were trained in pottery. For the cooperative groups and bee-keeping the monitoring system cannot disaggregate who were targeted families and who were not, who had had planting material and who had not. About 1,500 people benefited from the spring protection. The Woyo bridge benefited all the households in Ofa Heramo (a project *kebele*) plus another 3,690 households of the nearby *kebeles* that were not part of the project. The bridge also benefited people living in Ome Bolola, Okoto Sore and Zamo that were also part of the project and surrounding *woredas*.

The Produce Warehouse Cooperative has 350 members but some of these are from non-project *kebeles* and of the remainder, there is no knowledge of whether or not they were target families. Customer records have not been analysed.

My estimate is that 3,000 target families actually benefited from the project (excluding the beneficiaries of the bridge and the spring protection).

For those that did receive planting materials, food security and crop production (and so income) were improved. Similarly the honey cooperative members and customers have increased family incomes from honey sales (though not dramatically).

Impact on decentralised decision making and the degree to which the issues of vulnerable groups are considered in planning has been small. Because there was thought to be no scope for doing so, there was no intervention on land certification other than for the Forest Conservation Cooperatives.

Government capacity both at *woreda* and at *kebele* levels has been enhanced by the project though it is noted that virtually all the training was undertaken by other government officials from a higher level (usually zone).

The Disaster Risk Reduction training and setting up the *kebele* committees will go some way to alleviating the impacts of future disasters though capacity is still weak and there is a danger of collecting data such as commodity prices with no attempt to analyse them as an early warning of food shortages.

After Concern undertook a capacity assessment of their partner, the WDA, training was provided on planning and M&E over a 3 day period by the Concern M&E Coordinator.

The project therefore contributed to the capacity building of:

- the *woreda* government;
- 8 *kebele* councils;
- 8 *kebele* DRR committees;
- the three produce cooperatives (honey, fruit, crops);
- 10 SACCOs.

The impact in the four *kebeles* that were inaccessible for 3 or 4 months of the year would have been substantially less than the others.

¹⁶⁸ http://www.csa.gov.et/newcsaweb/images/documents/surveys/Population%20and%20Housing%20census/ETH-pop-2007/survey0/data/Doc/Reports/STATISTICAL_SNNPR/Statistical_SNNPR_PartI.pdf

Sustainability

Cooperatives

The registration of the cooperatives with the government will contribute to ensuring sustainability. The Produce Warehouse and Honey Cooperatives, though still quite immature stand every chance of being permanent and sustainable. They both had healthy cash injections from the project. Hopefully there will be sufficient social auditing to avoid misappropriation. They have had training in business management though worryingly the honey cooperative members did not know the cost of equipment or where to get it from. Even so, there is support at hand from the *woreda* government. The Savings and Credit Cooperatives are also well established and have had good training. The weakest cooperative was the Fruit and Vegetable Cooperative. Its future success and sustainability will depend to a large extent on the commitment of the *woreda* government.

Crop production

The increased crop production brought about by improved varieties and crop husbandry practices should be sustainable in the short term (3 to 5 years). Eventually they will need new planting material. It remains to be seen if farmers search out new appropriate varieties for themselves or wait for a new project. It was a pity the ginger production has had to be aborted because of the virus outbreak earlier this year, as this could have contributed to increased incomes substantially.

Government training

The main danger is that trained *woreda* staff will be transferred. It is best to be philosophical about this and assume their acquired skills will be applied in other needy parts of the country. *Kebele* level extension agents who have had training are local and so should remain in service as long as the government is prepared to pay them.

Environmental sustainability

There are no environmental sustainability issues other than the need to properly maintain soil conservation structures such as terraces and check dams, especially in the Forest Conservation Cooperatives.

Role of private sector

The involvement of the private sector has been rather disappointing in that there have been no links made with large companies other than the Damota Cooperative Union. It must be assumed that individual businessmen will continue to come to Offa from outside the area as long as they can offer produce at competitive prices.

Exit strategy

There was no specific exit strategy and perhaps too much of an assumption that sooner or later there will be another livelihoods project in the area in order to continue some of the activities.

Cross-cutting issues

At the start of the working day on land reclamation work, WDA led 20 minute discussions on topics covering gender, HIV, family planning. The latter was a particular focus because of the high population and so small farm size in the area. The project staff felt restricted by the government legislation in June 2011 that forbids NGOs working on women's rights, human rights, land rights, governance, or advocacy unless specifically registered for that purpose (though I was told that talking about gender equity was permissible). The following are comments on the impact of the project on specific cross-cutting areas.

Environment

In Ethiopia, the reclamation of the 329 ha of badly eroded common land and bringing it into productive use under the management of Forest Conservation Committees has made a positive contribution to environmental protection.

Empowerment of the beneficiaries

Kebele councils may feel more able to negotiate with the *woreda* government as a result of the project but not to a great extent. Beneficiaries have not been empowered politically very much as a result of the project though they have been empowered as a result of improvement in living standards.

Gender equity

Again, the project had minimal impact though there were some talks led by WDA at the land reclamation sites. We learned that women increasingly take control of their income such as when buying goats or poultry. Some water committees have women members. However, in 90% of families, it is still the man who makes decisions about family planning matters. Women's literacy rate is very low in the area and this is something the project might have considered as contributing practically towards empowerment. I was told that because of the June 2011 legislation, the project could not address issues such as gender based violence (GBV). However, the Women's Affairs Office did training sessions in *kebeles* on women's rights. The office believed the incidence of GBV was reducing and women were coming forward more. Some women's political organisations (such as the Women's League and the Women's Federation) were involved in the *kebeles* in social and income generating activities as well as political issues.

Human rights

Because of the legislation of June 2011, there was little impact.

Democracy & governance

Because of the legislation of June 2011, there was little impact.

Disaster Risk Reduction

The project had a substantial impact on Disaster Risk Reduction as it was an inherent part of the project.

Equality

Some training on HIV was carried out by WDA but it is not clear what effect it had on discrimination of those having the disease.

Conflict management

The main issue is GBV which the project staff felt it could not address.

Complaints response mechanism

This is in the process of being introduced in Ethiopia but it was not functioning during the project. A booklet explaining the Programme Participant Protection Policy and standards has been translated into Amharic for sharing with beneficiaries. HAP standards are now also in place but were not functioning during the project.