

Paying the Price:

Why donors must take a new approach to the Syria crisis



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Summary

The Syria crisis is unprecedented in our times. The conflict has cost a quarter of a million lives,¹ caused immeasurable human suffering and triggered the highest levels of global displacement since the Second World War.² Millions of Syrians need humanitarian assistance just to stay alive. But they also need support to rebuild their shattered lives over the long term. The conflict in Syria has led to the largest humanitarian funding appeal of our generation.³ However, despite the scale and prominence of the crisis, the humanitarian response in Syria and the region is critically underfunded.

An urgent response is now required by donors and governments to support Syrians affected by the war inside and outside the country. The London conference ‘*Supporting Syria and the Region*’ on 4th February 2016⁴ is an opportunity for the international community to demonstrate a more ambitious and effective approach to humanitarian response, ahead of the World Humanitarian Summit in May 2016, saving lives and bringing hope to Syrians everywhere.

Concern Worldwide’s analysis of funding trends to the major coordinated humanitarian response instruments reveals worrying facts: that the response inside Syria and the region remains woefully underfunded; that donors’ commitments are not being honoured; and that donor countries have not effectively adapted their funding approaches to respond to the protracted crisis. It also reveals that the key sectors of response under discussion by governments at the London conference, education, livelihoods and protection,⁵ are the least well-funded. The results are increased levels of poverty, further displacement, increasing social tensions and the risk of a ‘lost generation’ of children. The stark reality is that Syrians’ needs are not being met and that millions live in daily fear of what their future holds.

Concern has identified three key areas which donors and governments attending the London conference urgently need to address:⁶

Key Point

Donors are failing to honour financial commitments, particularly inside Syria

Allocated funds do not match the stated strategic priorities of the coordinated Syria and regional response plans; the humanitarian sectors corresponding most closely to the conference themes are among the least funded of all

Approaches and mechanisms for response are inconsistent and incompatible with the protracted and complex nature of the Syria crisis

The Facts

More than a third of pledged funds for 2015 had not been confirmed by December that year

Education, protection and livelihoods were each funded at less than 1% to 3% inside Syria in 2015

The resilience component of the regional response plan was only 12% funded against its appeal target half way through 2015

The Response

An accountability framework must be developed and utilised to hold donors to account

Donors at the London conference must agree a coordinated approach to ensure chronically underfunded sectors and areas of response are not neglected

Donors and governments must take a long-term holistic approach to the crisis inside Syria and regionally

KEY FACTS

- Since the start of the Syria crisis, average life expectancy has fallen by 20 years.⁷
- Syrians make up a fifth of all global homelessness and people on the move.⁸
- Since 2011, 50 Syrian families have been displaced every hour of every day.⁹
- 120 countries host only around 6% of the total number of registered refugees. The remaining 94% are in Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan and Egypt.¹⁰
- Syrian people have not been meaningfully included in internationally-led processes that affect the fate of their families, communities and country.

Syrians urgently require predictable and sustained support from the international community, now and for the foreseeable future. Funding requirements must be met in full, committed on time and distributed across all sector priorities to meet the needs of the most vulnerable. A longer-term approach must be taken to funding for the crisis, not only to keep people alive, but also to help them rebuild shattered lives.

Of course, increasing and improving funding for the humanitarian response is just one element of the step change needed from the international community. If the international community does not actively pursue a **peace** settlement, secure humanitarian access, work with host governments for **policy** changes that support refugees and ensure greater **participation** of Syrians in decisions that affect them, then funding efforts will ultimately be futile.

This paper analyses key trends in funding the response to the crisis both within Syria and the wider region.¹¹ It focuses in on the three key sectors which relate to the themes of the London conference (education, protection and jobs/livelihoods)¹² and draws out a series of policy recommendations for how donors and governments attending the London conference can deliver what is needed to support Syrians at home and in host countries.

“The war changed our life from – I don’t want to say heaven – but it definitely became hell.”

Husband in Concern’s ‘Engaging Men’ programme in Lebanon

Peace: donors and governments urgently need to help secure political solutions to the conflict, an immediate cessation of attacks on civilians and humanitarian access.

Policy: national and local policy changes in neighbouring countries that enable Syrian refugees and host communities to build a safe and dignified future are essential to resolving the humanitarian and refugee crisis.

Participation: the future of Syria belongs to Syrians; achieving any form of political or humanitarian success is contingent upon Syrians being genuinely empowered, consulted and listened to in all humanitarian and peace processes.

The Syria Crisis: Funding Overview

“There is a real sense that the situation on the ground is deteriorating and it is this sense of genuine hopelessness that is making people look more and more to Europe as a means of escape – this is true now even of those who up to this point have endured whatever this crisis has thrown at them – their hope for the future is gradually failing.”

Concern Country Director, Syria and Turkey

The unrivalled level of need for the Syria crisis is reflected in the size of funding appeals, with the UN seeking a record \$20.1bn to fund aid operations globally in 2016, of which 40% is to support Syrians (\$3.2bn to help around 13.5 million people inside Syria, and \$4.8bn for the 4.7 million refugees sheltering in neighbouring states).¹³ While there are other humanitarian funding channels, the UN-led appeals form the largest and most important mechanisms. The Syria Response Plan 2015 (SRP)¹⁴ and Humanitarian Response Plan 2016 (HRP)¹⁵ for Syria and the Refugee and Resilience Response Plan (3RP)¹⁶ for neighbouring countries are critical as they set out agreed strategic priorities and clear objectives to be achieved through donor funding, improving both coordination and forward planning.

However, Concern's analysis shows that despite the good intentions outlined in these documents, donors are failing to honour pledges and funding fulfilment for appeals is declining. In addition, the key sectors under discussion at the 'Supporting Syria and the Region' conference in London are being neglected and more strategic approaches are being compromised by delayed decision-making and a continued short-term approach to a crisis now entering its sixth year.

BROKEN PROMISES

There are worrying signs that some donors are not honouring the commitments they have made. Unpaid pledges are on the rise. Where commitments have been made, the money is frequently arriving late in the day – negatively impacting on planning and humanitarian response.

- Unfulfilled pledges as a percentage of funding to appeals increased from 0.16% in 2012 to almost 5% in 2014.¹⁷ In financial terms, this amounts to \$381 million in unhonoured pledges by donors between 2012 and 2014.
- The Kuwait II pledging conference was 90% funded overall. However, for Kuwait III the latest figures (four months after the event) show that only 35% of pledges are known to have been honoured.¹⁸
- More than a third of funds pledged to Syria during 2015 had not been confirmed by early December that year.¹⁹

REJECTED REQUESTS

The number of people in need has risen dramatically by 12.5 million between 2012-2015.²⁰ However, the international response has failed to keep pace. Overall funding provided by donors *has* increased (from \$1.2 billion in 2012 to \$5.5 billion in 2015) but not at the necessary levels. In fact, the percentage of requests being met has significantly decreased (see Chart 1).

- Overall funding fulfilment to appeals covering Syria and neighbouring countries has decreased, hitting its lowest point in 2015 when needs reached their peak.
- Fulfilment to appeals inside Syria dropped from 70% in 2012 to 53% in 2015.²¹
- Funding fulfilment for the regional response appeals decreased every year since 2012, by an average of 6%.²²

INSIDE SYRIA – SECONDARY?


Despite the devastation, the majority of Syrians remain inside the country with 6.6 million, over a third of the population, internally displaced.²³ It is in Syria that the need is most acute and where the biggest challenges to delivering aid lie: widespread insecurity, besiegement, denial of humanitarian access and bureaucratic impediments. While this limited operability creates a potential lack of channels for programmatic funds, it is still shocking that the Syria response was less than half funded in 2015, at only 43%.²⁴ Four donors - the US, UK,

Kuwait and European Commission - accounted for almost 65% of all contributions to the response inside Syria last year.²⁵

Whilst the need is greater inside Syria, the challenges of delivering assistance are reflected in the response appeals, which only target a proportion of those in need. That means overall funding requests for Syria are lower than for the regional response. Despite this, fulfilment for response requests inside Syria is consistently lower than for the regional response, by an average of 12%.²⁶

Chart 1: Fulfilment of Syria Appeals

Number of people in Syria versus Syria appeals fulfilled %



Neglected Sectors of Response

Education, livelihoods and protection (in varying forms) were identified in 2015 and 2016 as strategic priorities of the Syria and regional response plans.²⁷ These sectors, relating closely to the themes of the London conference, are critical at this juncture of the crisis. Overall underfunding means difficult decisions have to be made, but it is cause for grave concern that these strategic priorities are suffering most. Without progress in these areas, Syrians will be unsafe, cannot build a life and will be bereft of hope. Yet, our analysis shows they were among the most neglected or underfunded sectors of the response.


“I miss my home. I miss my friends. Studying is the only thing that helps me forget.”

12-year-old Fatima, Concern School Programme, Lebanon

INSIDE SYRIA

Inside Syria, the three least funded of the 13 sectors in the Syria Response Plan 2015 were: Agriculture, Early Recovery and Protection/ Human Rights/Rule of Law, and Education, each making up just one to three per cent of total allocated funds (see Chart 2).²⁸

Chart 2: Funding by Sector within the Syria Response Plan



The challenge of reaching people inside Syria is reflected in the UN targets for the areas. The SRP identified 12.2 million people in need of protection in 2015, but aimed to reach 5.3 million. Most stark of all, 11.2 million were in need of Early Recovery and Livelihoods support, yet the response plan aimed to reach only a tenth of these.²⁹ This pattern continues in the 2016 Humanitarian Response Plan for Syria which aims to meet 100% of those in need with non-food items, but only a proportion of people with protection and livelihoods needs (see Chart 3). This means that even if funding to these sectors were fully met, less than half of those in need would be reached. It is therefore even more crucial that funding requirements to the protection and livelihood sectors, and education, are fulfilled completely and in a timely manner.

Despite the comparatively modest caseload targets for protection, education and livelihoods support in the 2015 SRP, these three areas of response were *still* covered at a disproportionately low rate compared to other sectors and were over 70% unmet in relation to requirements (see Table A).

Chart 3: Targeted Versus Actual Needs – Syria 2016³⁰




Sector	People in need	Target caseload as % of those in need
 Protection	13.5 million	53%
 Education	5.7 million	81%
 Livelihoods	9.2 million	39%

Table A: Requirements Versus Coverage 2015³¹

Sector	Requirements (USD)	% covered
Early recovery and livelihoods	102,289,149	27%
Education	224,000,000	20%
Protection and community services	104,800,000	24%

Not only is funding for these areas insufficient, it is also unpredictable, making effective planning and response difficult. Investments in Education have grown each year,³² but have varied for Protection and Economic Recovery and Infrastructure (ERI). Despite the growing needs and overall funding increases, protection funding fell by \$4 million from 2012 to 2013 and ERI funding dropped between 2014 and 2015.³³

REGIONAL RESPONSE

In the wider regional response, Education and Protection were funded at 44% and 57% respectively in 2015,³⁴ yet they are consistently identified as a top priority of children and parents in humanitarian settings.³⁵ The result of under-resourcing and policy impediments is that more than half of Syrian refugee children were out of school in 2014-15³⁶ and the number of Syrian refugees seeking protection in third countries increased throughout last year (440,000 Syrians arrived in Europe by sea in 2015),³⁷ with often fatal consequences.³⁸

While Education and Protection were significantly underfunded they fared relatively better than other sectors in the region (see Chart 4). However, important sub-sectors have been overlooked. Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV Protection) and Personnel Training (Education), were the second least funded sub-sectors. Lack of training for education personnel could compromise quality education and the neglect of SGBV (despite the global commitments made through the UK-spearheaded Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative) risks not reaching the most vulnerable with vital support that addresses risk and multiple vulnerabilities.³⁹

Despite much of the international rhetoric on resilience, the Livelihoods and Social Cohesion sector was the least funded in the regional response in 2015. By the end of the planned intervention period, funding for planned interventions in Livelihoods and Social Cohesion for 2015 were only 18% met,⁴⁰ making this the most underfunded sector within the whole 3RP.⁴¹ Even this low level of funding was received late within the planned response period; the Livelihoods and Social Cohesion sector was just 5.7% funded by May 2015.⁴²

Addressing livelihood opportunities is critical, particularly as the crisis is now entering its sixth year. The lack of livelihood opportunities puts Syrians and their families at increased risk of exploitation and abuse in illegal/informal labour settings. They also come under pressure to put their children into dangerous forms of child labour or child marriages. Ali, aged 13, participating in Concern's education programme in Turkey told us, *"I'm no longer a child who can play during the holidays. I am now a man and I need to be working"*.

SPOTLIGHT: FAILING TO BUILD FUTURE FOOD SECURITY

Within Syria, people’s access to food remains a critical issue. Horrific pictures of starvation in besieged towns like Madaya have recently reached the world’s television screens. There is a continued need for emergency food aid and this made up the largest proportion – around a third – of the Syria Response Plan in 2015. However, agriculture, upon which future food security in Syria will largely be predicated⁴³ was the least represented sector within the Syria Response Plan 2015, making up just 0.5% of the total appeal funding.⁴⁴ There is a risk that donor bias towards short-term modes of aid provision could jeopardise the need to build agricultural capacity to improve food security in the long term.

A SHORT-SIGHTED RESPONSE


In all, as the crisis approaches its fifth anniversary, the analysis above indicates a continued short-term approach. Donors have failed to fund in line with strategic priorities of response plans and are overlooking long-term and sustainable approaches. While immediate forms of humanitarian relief are vital and life-saving, they can only ever serve as a sticking-plaster. Durable approaches that complement relief items are essential, but are chronically underfunded and well overdue.

The need for a more holistic and sustainable approach has been recognised in the 3RP which has a dedicated resilience component. Indeed, the 3RP took innovative steps by attempting to integrate humanitarian and development practice, simultaneously laying the foundations for long-term resilience whilst addressing urgent needs. But donors have not risen to the challenge. In 2015, the resilience component of 3RP made up 28%⁴⁵ of the overall response plan, but was severely underfunded at approximately 28% (by the last quarter of the year).⁴⁶ It was only 12% funded half way through the year, impacting how successfully plans could be implemented. This was owing to a major discrepancy between pledged funds and committed funds for 2015 by donors at Kuwait III, who made significant pledges towards resilience activities,⁴⁷ yet in reality committed only 14% to the resilience component.⁴⁸

The importance of resilience is reflected in the 3RP’s strategic approach to 2016-17 which aims for an almost 10% proportional increase.⁴⁹ However, without a step change from donors and front-loaded investment to this component, planning suffers, predictability of support is compromised and longer-term interventions become increasingly untenable. At the individual and community level this means rising levels of dependence on a failing humanitarian response and less ability to cope with the stresses and impacts of the conflict - creating a potential ‘vicious circle’ with ever-increasing levels of need.

Chart 4: Progress on Sector Funding within Regional Response at end May 2015⁵⁰

3RP agency funding received by sector (USD)



Conclusion

Overall, Concern's analysis shows a communal failure of donor governments to adapt to the demands of this unprecedented crisis. **Funding to Syria and the region has been un-strategic, focused on short-term interventions and has overlooked critical sectors.** Despite growing need, donors have not been able to keep pace and appeals are increasingly underfunded. On top of this, some donors have not honoured commitments. The issue is not just levels of funding, but how funding is given and what has been funded.

The consequences of underfunding the humanitarian response are deadly serious. Within Syria, millions in need are not being reached with vital aid or support. In neighbouring countries, the risks of underfunding, according to the UN, are of *"leaving a generation of Syrians behind... Levels of vulnerability and poverty will continue to rise and tensions between host communities and refugees will mount, contributing to further regional destabilisation, rolling back developmental gains."*⁵¹

Globally, the average time a refugee spends in exile is 17 years.⁵² The devastation and forced displacement of its people mean that the impacts of the Syria crisis will endure for decades, even if a peace were reached tomorrow. **Funding approaches have failed to reflect the protracted nature of the crisis** and have not overcome the false dichotomies between humanitarian and development aid, favouring short-term solutions. Donors have struggled to provide more predictable, strategic and long-term responses, for which new funding pathways and partnerships are required. While the financial needs of the Syria crisis are high, they are not insurmountable if addressed through multiple funding streams, new significant donors (the response currently relies heavily on four donors) and with more flexibility and foresight than has been demonstrated so far.

Rather, **evidence suggests that donors have focused on symptoms and not causes.** Whilst vital, forms of immediate relief have not been sufficiently complemented by funding towards sustainable interventions, namely in the areas of early recovery, resilience, livelihoods, protection and education. These sectors are not only strategic priorities of response plans but are also often highlighted by communities as priorities. There has also been a short-sighted approach to food security and not enough

attention to conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution approaches at all levels.

Responses inside Syria are the least funded. Concern acknowledges the significant obstacles to programming inside Syria and that donors may have legitimate concerns that, should they release the funding for protection, education and livelihoods sectors, there will be limited channels through which to implement these programmes. These issues should be openly addressed at the London conference, with space for discussions about ways in which these barriers can be overcome for the sake of the Syrian people. However, donors and governments share responsibility for inadequate diplomatic efforts to ensure humanitarian access. Demands from the international community for adherence to International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law from all parties to conflict must be unwavering. The profound sensitivities and security risks on the ground are also further reason that the support and provision of aid must, in line with Humanitarian Principles, be based on need alone and not on which parties to conflict are controlling any given area.

In sum, **donors have so far failed to change gear for a conflict entering its sixth year.** The international community must address the causes of the Syria crisis – ultimately this means securing an inclusive peace. While the continuation of the war is a major challenge, the international community cannot just 'wait and see' before committing to fund more sustainable interventions. This risks further deterioration and stunted progress in the country, as well as further suffering and loss of life. Planning for Syria and the region should take all these factors into account, strategically aligning immediate relief with early recovery and long-term objectives.

The 'Supporting Syria and the Region' conference in London in February 2016 provides a **critical opportunity for donors and governments to introduce a new level of ambition – and action** – into meeting the needs of Syrians inside and outside the country, providing support and hope for the millions that need it. It also provides the international community, ahead of the World Humanitarian Summit in May, with the opportunity to set the bar high through renewed leadership and progress in responding to the world's most serious protracted crisis.

Policy Recommendations

The Supporting Syria and the Region conference in London must result in commitments towards:

- 1. A shared, comprehensive diplomatic strategy for a political resolution to the conflict.** Alongside the ongoing negotiations around a peace process, an immediate de-escalation of violence and practical measures to ensure unimpeded humanitarian access inside Syria must be prioritised. Participants at the London conference should issue the strongest possible joint communique demanding compliance with International Humanitarian Law and International Humanitarian Rights and an immediate cessation of attacks on homes, schools and medical facilities. Processes and efforts for achieving peace should include a comprehensive recovery plan for Syria and the region.
- 2. Commitments by donors and governments to a long-term, holistic approach to the crisis** by: prioritising resilience-building inside Syria and regionally; committing to multi-year financing until at least 2020; integrating humanitarian and development mechanisms; and supporting local capacities to respond. Pledges at the London conference must match the core principles agreed at the Resilience Development Forum on Syria and set out within the Berlin Communiqué 2014,⁵³ including closing the gap between humanitarian support ending and development assistance beginning. New partnership solutions across humanitarian and development funding mechanisms would bolster a lagging response.
- 3. An accountability framework to hold donors and governments to account for financial commitments,** with a target for disbursing pledged funds within an eight-week timeframe. At a minimum, this must include an official record of each commitment, who is accountable for achieving it, who is responsible for following up, and an accessible, published record of all commitments.
- 4. An agreed, coordinated approach to ensure chronically underfunded sectors and areas of response are not neglected.** Donors and the UN have a responsibility to ensure funds are allocated and distributed based on levels of need and across requested sector priorities. This must be effectively coordinated and areas of response that tackle the needs of the most vulnerable must not be overlooked. Donors and host governments must make specific commitments to, and support the implementation of, projects addressing protection, quality education and livelihoods within Syria and the wider refugee response (as well as integrated programming that brings these approaches together). This should take the form of a 'compact' which ensures donors and international bodies base their funding not on their own strategic priorities, but firmly in line with levels of need.
- 5. Support to and creation of policies that respond to the needs and rights of all Syrian refugees.** Neighbouring host nations must be supported to provide reliable and simplified solutions to refugees, enabling access to education, safe livelihoods and protection - including obtaining and maintaining legal status. Technical and financial support to neighbouring countries from the international community must support this. Globally, governments – including those in Europe, the Middle East and Africa - must provide safe access and conditions for refugees fleeing the crisis to third countries, committing fully to hosting their 'fair share' of refugees⁵⁴ and taking seriously their obligation to non-refoulement.
- 6. The active involvement of Syrians, including the most vulnerable, in international processes around the crisis** as the primary partners in seeking solutions to the humanitarian disaster and ongoing conflict. Governments should set out a roadmap and devise international guidance for ensuring inclusion in relevant international events and set standards and a benchmark for meaningful inclusion.

References

1. Estimated death toll is 250,000. Information contained in UN press release available at <http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12008.doc.htm>. Accessed 2 January 2016.
2. UNHCR global trends analysis on refugees, available at <http://www.unhcr.org/53a155bc6.html>. Accessed 8 January 2016. High displacement figures not exclusively owing to Syria but the conflict cited by UNHCR as key driver.
3. The Syria crisis was the top recipient of humanitarian aid in 2015. Information available at FTS homepage <https://fts.unocha.org/>. Accessed 27 December 2015. For 2016, the Syria country appeal is requesting \$3.2 billion so far and \$4.8 billion for the 3RP.
4. The conference is hosted by the UK, Norway, Germany, Kuwait, and the UN. It is a welcome attempt to fill the funding gaps and secure longer-term financing solutions. As the hosting nations stated; *“The international community has a responsibility to help the 13.5 million vulnerable and displaced people inside Syria, and the 4.2 million Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries and we must step up our efforts.”*
5. The London conference will focus in particular on livelihoods and jobs, education and protection (under the banner of ‘inside Syria’ or a ‘safer’ Syria).
6. All statistics are featured within the main text of the report where corresponding endnotes detail data sources and methods.
7. Humanitarian Response Plan (Dec 2015) - Syrian Arab Republic 2016-17. Available at https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/system/files/documents/files/2016_hrp_syrian_arab_republic.pdf. See p.7.
8. Dominic MacSorley, CEO Concern Worldwide, blog piece available at <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/textis/vtx/refdaily?pass=52fc6fbd5&id=55c443705>. Accessed 22 December 2015.
9. Humanitarian Response Plan (Dec 2015) - Syrian Arab Republic 2016-17. Available at https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/system/files/documents/files/2016_hrp_syrian_arab_republic.pdf. See p.7.
10. This figure is based on numbers of registered refugees in the neighbouring countries = 4,390,439, plus the 303,000 in another 120 countries = 4,693,469. Total number of registered refugees in the region is accurate as at December 2015, whilst those in the rest of the world is accurate as at June 2015, hence the approximation of the figure. See primary data in the 3RP available at <http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/3RP-Regional-Overview-2016-2017.pdf>
11. Any new data presented within this report is compiled using the Financial Tracking Service (FTS). In the case of Syria this data is based on donor commitments and contributions towards the given response plan for that year, as well as contributions outside these frameworks to UN agencies, NGOs or the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement) in Syria and neighbouring countries, as reported to FTS and UNHCR. For more information on what FTS generally includes and discounts, please see the FTS FAQ available at: <http://ftsbeta.unocha.org/content/faqs-all-funding>.
12. The London conference has three main themes; inside Syria (focused mainly on protection), education and jobs/livelihoods. Concern has looked at the humanitarian sectors which correlate most closely to these themes across both Syria and regional responses, as well as the prioritised sectors of the response plans which include strongest emphasis on these same thematic areas.
13. UN Global Humanitarian Overview. Available at <http://www.unocha.org/stateofaid>. Accessed 18 January 2016.
14. The SRP 2015 is available in full at: https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/2015_SRP_Syria_EN_AdvanceCopy_171214.pdf.
15. The HRP is available in full at: <http://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/2016-syrian-arab-republic-humanitarian-response-plan-january-december>.
16. The 3RP 2015-16 regional overview is available in full at: <http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/3RP-Report-Overview.pdf>. The 3RP 2016-17 strategic overview is available in full at: <http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/3RP-Regional-Overview-2016-2017.pdf>
17. Data is from the Financial Tracking Service Syria appeals pages (e.g. 2012 is available at <https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=special-syriancrisis&year=2012>) which state the outstanding pledges for any given year. Outstanding pledges as a % of total funds is as follows: 2012: 0.16%, 2013: 2.7%, 2014: 4.8%. FTS states that; the funding included within this data is donor commitments and contributions towards the given response plan for that year (e.g. Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan (SHARP) 2012 and the Syria Regional Refugee Response Plan (RRP) 2012), as well as contributions outside these frameworks to UN agencies, NGOs or the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement) in Syria and neighbouring countries, as reported to FTS and UNHCR.
18. The latest updates to funding pledges from Kuwait III are from July 2015 and are accurate as of 22 January 2016. The figure of 35% includes the status of all pledges except for those that are fully committed (i.e. these are all pending commitments and one partial commitment). This, as well as late reporting, can still affect ability to effectively coordinate services and ensure no duplications etc. Raw data is available at: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1Rb75shy62QpZpCXqg_UvmsXCXF7Q_MqnyJK20Yhgk8/edit#gid=1519102764.
19. This data is created is using the FTS custom search tool and includes the 3RP 2015 and SRP 2015. There were 2500 total pledges in 2015 according to this data, of which only a third ‘contribution status’ was ‘paid contribution’. The remaining were listed as ‘commitments’ or ‘pledges’ only by December 22nd 2015.
20. Humanitarian Response Plan (Dec 2015) - Syrian Arab Republic 2016-17, p.8. Available at https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/system/files/documents/files/2016_hrp_syrian_arab_republic.pdf.
21. Percentages from Chart 1 are generated from FTS figures which set out the total amount of requested funds and the amount that was received against this figure each year. The data is separated for inside Syria and regional response. Raw data, e.g. for 2015, is available at: <https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=special-syriancrisis&year=2015>.
22. 2012-2013 = 4% decrease, 2013-2014 = 11 decrease, 2014-2015 = 3% decrease.

23. UNOCHA statistics available at <http://www.unocha.org/syria>. Accessed 28 December 2015. In comparison, 4.3 million Syrians are estimated to have fled the country.
24. This percentage is against total funds requested. Data available at <https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=special-syriancrisis&year=2015>. Accessed 3 January 2016.
25. See 'Funding by Source' graph on FTS Syria overview page available at <https://ftsbeta.unocha.org/countries/206/summary/2015>. Accessed 17 January 2016.
26. 2012 = 15% less, 2013 = 5% less, 2014 = 12% less, 2015 = 16% less, the average across four years is therefore 12%.
27. <http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/3RP-Report-Overview.pdf>, page 9.
28. <http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/3RP-Progress-Report.pdf>, page 5.
29. Syria Response Plan 2015 (2014). Available at https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/2015_SRP_Syria_EN_AdvanceCopy_171214.pdf. See p.14 for Protection and p.24 for ERI.
30. Targeted caseloads and sector needs can be found in the 2016-17 HRP available at https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/system/files/documents/files/2016_hrp_syrian_arab_republic.pdf. See chart on p.6.
31. Table A is compiled of data directly from FTS - Syria Response Plan 2015 Table D: Requirements, funding and outstanding pledges per Cluster Report as of 28-December-2015 (Appeal launched on 15-December-2014) <http://fts.unocha.org> (Table ref: R32sum). Table is available at [https://fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/ocha_R32sum_A1069__28_December_2015_\(02_33\).pdf](https://fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/ocha_R32sum_A1069__28_December_2015_(02_33).pdf). Accessed 28 December 2015.
32. Data was created using the custom search tool on FTS and disaggregating paid contributions to appeals by sector (Education, Protection and ERI). Along with overall funding investments, Education went up from \$1.4 million in 2012 to \$40.1 million in 2015.
33. Ibid data source. ERI dropped from 9.2 million in 2014 to 7.5 million in 2015.
34. 3RP Regional Overview 2016-17. Available at <http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/3RP-Regional-Overview-2016-2017.pdf>. Figures are on P. 11.
35. See joint NGO evidence paper prepared as input to the World Humanitarian Summit. Putting Children at the Heart of the World Humanitarian Summit (2015). Available at http://resourcecentre.savethechildren.se/sites/default/files/documents/putting-children-at-the-heart_full_text_final.pdf.
36. Right to a Future (Nov 2015). Joint Agency Briefing Paper. Available at <https://www.savethechildren.net/sites/default/files/Report%20final-%20Syria.pdf>. Figure on p.8.
37. 3RP Regional Overview 2016-17. Available at <http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/3RP-Regional-Overview-2016-2017.pdf>. Figures are on P. 11.
38. Exact figures of deaths are uncounted/unknown, but evidence of these deaths and more information can be found via the British Red Cross: <http://www.redcross.org.uk/What-we-do/Emergency-response/Current-emergency-appeals/Europe-Refugee-Crisis-Appeal>.
39. Data is based on figures half way through 2015, captured within the 3RP Regional Progress Report (June 2015). Available at <http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/3RP-Progress-Report.pdf>. See p.10 for Protection breakdown and p.18 for Education breakdown.
40. 3RP Regional Overview 2016-17 18% was the lowest level/unknown, but more information can be found via the British Red Cross: by sector (Education, Protection). Available at <http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/3RP-Regional-Overview-2016-2017.pdf>. Figures P. 11.
41. Ibid. 18% was the lowest level of fulfilment among all the sectors covered within the 3RP.
42. See Chart 6. Data is from 3RP Regional Progress Report (June 2015). Available at <http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/3RP-Progress-Report.pdf>. P. 36.
43. FAO Country Brief on Syria. Available at <http://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=SYR>. 'Food security situation severely impacted by prolonged conflict, especially for vulnerable groups'; 'Assistance to agricultural sector, including crops and livestock, is essential to protect livelihoods and prevent further deterioration of the sector'.
44. See Chart 2.
45. 3RP Regional Overview 2015. Available at <http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/3RP-Report-Overview.pdf>, p.9.
46. Data is from 3RP Regional Progress Report (June 2015). Available at <http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/3RP-Progress-Report.pdf>.
47. Ibid. Commitments amounted to 44 per cent of the 3RP's resilience component.
48. Ibid. p.5.
49. 3RP Regional Overview 2016-17. Available at <http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/3RP-Regional-Overview-2016-2017.pdf>. Figures are on P. 11.
50. 3RP Regional Progress Report (June 2015). Available at <http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/3RP-Progress-Report.pdf>. P.7. All data was reported by Agencies as of 2015. Excludes funds not yet allocated to a Sector. Sector configurations may vary at the country level.
51. 3RP Regional Progress Report (June 2015). Available at <http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/3RP-Progress-Report.pdf>. P.7.
52. See UNHCR homepage overview <http://www.unrefugees.org/what-we-do/>.
53. This was held in November 2015. The core principles referred to are that donors 'allocate funding in a way that creates synergies between humanitarian and development investments and approaches' and building, not replacing, local capacities to respond'. More information available at <http://www.resilience-forum.org/>
54. Oxfam. Syria Fair Shares Analysis (2015). See Oxfam's Fair Shares analysis which compliments Concern's paper available at <http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/syria-crisis-fair-share-analysis-2015-347197>.

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“The human and financial cost of this conflict has taken us to the brink. Withstanding an inclusive peace, there will be yet another pledging conference next year and the year after that and so on, each time requesting more funds than the last. Every additional day that we are failing Syrian people is making the response to the crisis more expensive - but most of all costing the lives and futures of millions whose homeland is at stake.”

Concern Country Director, Lebanon



Concern Worldwide (UK) is an international humanitarian organisation dedicated to tackling poverty and suffering in 27 of the world's poorest countries. We work in partnership with the very poorest people in these countries, directly enabling them to improve their lives, as well as using our knowledge and experience to influence decisions made at a local, national and international level that can significantly reduce extreme poverty. Concern has been working in Syria since 2013, and also has programmes supporting Syrian refugees and host communities in both Lebanon and Turkey.

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Front cover image: A young Syrian refugee stands between the tents at an informal settlement in the north of Lebanon.
Dalia Khamissy/Lebanon/2015