

# Added Value of Resilience Programming to the Ongoing 2017 Drought Response

February 2017

Concern Worldwide’s DFID-funded Building Resilient Communities in Somalia (BRCiS) Programme utilizes a multifaceted approach to strengthening local capacity to identify, prepare for, and respond to shocks, including: long-term adjustments in agricultural practices, resource restoration, income diversification, resource governance committees, and household habits, among many other strategies. Somali communities are resilient and, through invested programming, communities have increased resilience. Most are equipped to cope and rebuild after one shock: a flooding season, or a poor Gu (Apr-Jun) or Deyr (Oct-Nov) rainy season. However, they are less equipped to overcome two or more subsequent shocks. Two consecutive weak rainy seasons, coupled with markets and services restricted by conflict, were atop the headline drivers of the 2011 famine. In January 2017, FEWSNET reported that following a poor Gu season and failed Deyr season, food security had deteriorated significantly. The report projected that by June one out of every two people in Somalia would face food insecurity and almost a quarter of the population would be in Crises (IPC Phase 3) or Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Should the forthcoming 2017 Gu rains fail and markets struggle to cope, a famine (IPC Phase 5) would be expected (i). The report was confirmed in greater detail in February with the release of the FSNAU Post-Deyr Technical Report (ii). Because the escalating situation was expected to be beyond most communities’ resilience capacity,

the BRCiS program provided significant value to analysis, mitigation and early response efforts and continues to respond in the now emergency context.

This case study is comprised of seven sections that examine how Concern Worldwide’s BRCiS Programme utilized early warning seasonal data in June and November 2016 to identify Red Flags for the now realized drought crisis and trigger a series of early responses, months prior to conventional humanitarian actions. Cost-effective mitigating actions included fodder production, pre-emptive cash safety net distributions and emergency responses to localized non-climatic shocks. Meanwhile, the preposition of resilience programme staff enabled valuable leadership to humanitarian stakeholders through coordination fora in the forms of analysis, early action awareness and external advocacy. And finally, initial impacts of Concern Worldwide’s (Concern) resilience work will be discussed through a case-study highlighting a village’s new-found capacity to avoid displacement, and instead find themselves becoming hosts for displaced people from neighbouring villages. This trend is widely being noted throughout Concern’s BRCiS programme target villages. Currently, the BRCiS programme continues to respond to the emergency with both flexible resilience and emergency funding. This case study will be updated later in the year to further tell the story of the Concern BRCiS Programme.

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## 1.) Early Warning in the Resilience Context

Early warning information is only useful if kept in a relevant context of *who will be using the information and for what purpose*. For example, if coordinating actors or donors at a high level receive a flood warning a week before it happens, it will still take months to respond, and therefore provides little value-added to their flood response. However, if an NGO receives a flood warning one week in advance, depending on their crises modifiers and operational capacity, they can either use the information for disaster mitigation or use it to better prepare their response. At a household level, if the general public receives a few days of early warning, they can undertake decisive preparations before the flood takes place. There are many different types of early warning data: short-term forecasting, long-term forecasting, market price data monitoring, human well-being indicators and livestock indicators. Each is valuable and has

its own limitations, depending on the type of shock—a flood compared to a drought—and *depending on who will be using the information and for what purpose*. BRCiS utilized seasonal monitoring early warning data to track rainfall trends over the past year and identify vulnerable villages based on precipitation patterns. BRCiS monitored standard precipitation indexes (SPI), which show standard deviations from long-term precipitation averages, and rainfall frequency trends through weather satellite reports produced by the *Africa Flood and Drought Monitor* by Princeton University (iii). In measuring and forecasting slow-onset droughts, seasonal monitoring data is very accurate and location specific, allowing both donors and NGOs to utilize the information. However, it is less useful for sudden-onset floods or at a community level, since usually the communities themselves are already well aware of the situation.

## 2.) Red Flagging Approach

Somalia's communities have long been adapted to cope with occasional variations in seasonal rainfall – their ability to manage this variability is, for many rural areas, the very definition of their resilience. The process of Red Flagging is one of using recent shocks to predict eroded coping strategies – or lowered resilience – and thus predicting heightened risk of emergencies caused by potential subsequent shocks. Using this to inform programming first and foremost requires a general understanding of the types of covariate shocks a community may face and how many it will likely take to cause a wide-scale emergency. For this, local history is our best guide. While resilience can vary widely, most pastoralist communities can withstand one below average season without wide-scale emergency, but two in a row is often too much to handle. For chronically vulnerable IDPs or vulnerable agro-pastoral communities, one bad season can

sometimes be all it takes to result in emergency, and these areas are perpetually “red flagged.” In addition to seasonal performance, factors of clan inequality, livelihood type and diversification, water resources, various dynamics of conflict, governance and decision making, and access of markets and aid, are all important factors to consider. The villages targeted by the Concern BRCiS programme have received significant support, and for them, it generally takes at least two big shocks to equal an emergency. Red flagging for these communities is done by monitoring for the first big shock, usually a failed rain, flood or major conflict. If such a shock occurs, the community is red flagged. This status prompts scale-up in mitigation activities to future shocks, usually that of drought, and forms the basis of no-regrets early actions, including emergency responses.

### Somalia Seasonal Timeline






### 3.) Applying Seasonal Monitoring Analysis to Red Flagging

Concern's BRCiS programme was able to use seasonal monitoring data to identify several red flags before seasons were even completed and trigger initial actions at that time. These actions began in late May 2016, with analysis of the previous 2015 Deyr rains (Oct-Dec) and ongoing 2016 Gu Rains (Apr-Jun). Above average overall rainfall occurred in the 2015 Deyr rains, but in a short duration that did not last throughout the whole month of December. The 2016 Gu rains started late, resulting in a longer dry season between Deyr 2015 and Gu 2016 than is normal. Further, the 2016 Gu rains were below normal levels and came in a short burst of hard rains at the end of April and beginning of May (iv). As a result, rain-water catchments were filled, but it was an unsuccessful season for farming and for the growth of rangelands. Many farmers planted too early, which meant that their seeds were lost after rain delays. Other farmers planted crops immediately after the rains began, but still faced crop failure since there were little subsequent rains for the next month.

Additional factors considered were the El Niño /La Niña and Indian Ocean Dipole effects on rain forecasts. A very large El Niño was experienced in 2015, and with it came the increased likelihood of above average rains in the Horn of Africa, which occurred in Deyr 2015. The opposite effect often follows, with La Niña feared to take place in late 2016 associated with lower rainfalls in the Horn. Further still, the negative Indian Ocean Dipole, also associated with lower rains in the Horn, was also likely to be in affect further raising the risk of below normal 2016 Deyr rains. By early June 2016 climate monitoring data was already raising red flags, notably in: Sablaale, Kurtunwarey, and Dinsoor Districts of South West State; and Bardheere, Garbahaarey and Afmadow Districts and almost all of Middle Juba Region of Jubaland State. This specifically affected of Concern BRCiS Programme target villages in Gedo and Lower Shabelle, which – in addition to receiving poor 2016 Gu rainfall – bordered the areas with the weakest performing rainfall, and therefore were more likely to be inundated with pastoralists from Middle Juba, Southern Bay and Eastern Gedo Regions. The red flagged areas expanded by the official end of 2016 Gu season (Apr-Jun) to include most of Jubaland State and the South and South Western districts of South West State. This notably included the Concern BRCiS Programme target villages of Gedo and Lower

Standard Precipitation Index, Princeton University  
Seasonal Rainfall Compared to Average



Shabelle. While analysis using the African Flood and Drought Monitor was clear, and warnings from FSNAU on the likelihood of a deteriorating situation and a La Nina event were issued, most of the humanitarian community waited for the primary FSNAU/FEWSNET Post Gu 2016 Technical Report for definitive analysis (ii). The report was not released until the end of September 2016, prompting most organizations to wait even further to see the performance of the Deyr season (Oct-Dec) before taking action.


Waiting for satellite-based remote sensing data to be available leaves the Concern BRCiS Programme

## 4.) Leadership in Analysis, Early Action and Advocacy

Without the long-term resilience programming, Concern would not have had the understanding nor the opportunity to take a leadership role in promoting early action to what would become a nation-wide emergency. Analysis of the underperforming Gu Season first made rounds within Concern in early June 2016. This prompted contact and discussions with the UK based START Network and the early-action focused FORWARN group. Both groups have wide-networks within Somalia aid agencies and donors and helped Concern staff in understanding long-term forecasting of the Deyr rains. In August, Concern provided the greater BRCiS Consortium with various rainfall analysis and mapping which was used to inform the geographical prioritization of an allocation of DFID IRF emergency funding. By September, large tracts of Southern Somalia had run out of water and Concern presented its climate analysis to the Somalia Resilience Working Group. The group comprises of a range of NGOs and UN agencies, and was attended that month by USAID. The presentation concluded that poor 2016 Deyr rains would be a breaking point for many vulnerable communities. It therefore was recommended that agencies with flexible funding should promptly begin mitigation and that further no regrets emergency programming should be triggered immediately if the upcoming Deyr' rains were found to be either late or weak. Waiting for the full seasonal report before reacting would be too late.

As the failure of the Deyr rains looked evermore certain, advocacy efforts from the Concern BRCiS staff began to move quickly. By mid-November Concern sent letters to key donors, and with the help of the BRCiS Consortium Management Unit, converted those letters into a call to action widely disseminated

staff about a week behind, but the objectivity of the data is worth the wait. By mid-November 2016 it was clear that the subsequent 2016 Deyr rains were late, prompting Concern to trigger further programmatic responses in the areas already red flagged in June as described in section 6. The late rains prompted Concern staff to begin, for the first time since 2011, to prepare for a double-digit probability of famine within the year. On January 16th 2017, FSNAU released a report first mentioning the failure of the Deyr rains and the possibility of a 2017 Famine in Somalia (vi). *At this point, Concern's BRCiS Programme staff had been using their red flagging approach to respond appropriately to this probability for seven months.*



alongside a press release by the NGO Consortium. This advocated on re-aligning existing funding and acting immediately, subsequently the European Commission sent a letter to all of its Somalia partners asking them to do the same. Concern staff also began reaching out to well-known researchers and practitioners from the 2011 Famine, some offering to help.

At the December Resilience Working Group meeting BRCiS Programme staff invited “old-hats from the 2011 famine” and led the group through a process of planning further analysis and response. This helped Concern to identify and arrange key informant meetings with people who had perspectives from outside of the aid sector, which were converted into analysis and delivered back to humanitarian agencies, donors and advocacy groups at subsequent meetings.

Throughout January and February 2017, Concern BRCiS Programme staff also worked on behalf of the Somalia NGO Consortium, providing technical inputs at various internal and external advocacy

works and events. And finally, working through the Resilience Working Group, BRCiS programme staff were central in producing and releasing recommended actions for emergency scale-up.

## 5.)Applying Early Action Value for Money Analysis to the Probability of Disaster

Concern’s BRCiS programme developed a simple formula to rationalizing when it is cost-effective to respond early and when it is not. While these details are always complicated estimates, the process of attempting this calculation leads to deeper analysis in choosing when and what to invest in when faced with the prospects of a disaster occurring (vi).

$$IF: \left( \frac{\text{Cost of Early Action}}{\text{Cost of Response}} \right) < (\text{the Probability of Disaster Occuring}) = \text{True}$$

*THEN: Early Action has higher VfM than Response*

Drought mitigation responses began after applying the above formula to red flagged Gedo Region target villages in June 2016. Concern considered that if the Deyr rains failed then disaster would certainly take place. The average cost of early action in the form of Cash Safety Nets was estimated to be \$320 USD per household (vii) and the average cost of response without early action should the rains fail was estimated to be \$920 USD per household (viii). In the below equation, the cost of Early Action divided by the cost of response equalled approximately 1/3 or 35%. To ascertain the probability, Concern reflected back on the frequency of past failed rains and also contacted the Red Cross Climate Centre (RCCC) with the simple question: what was the probability of the Deyr 2016 rains failing? Their response, upon interpretation of historical averages and seasonal forecasts, was 45 % (ix).

$$\left( \frac{\$320}{\$920} \right) < 45\% = \text{True}$$

*True = Ealy Action has a higher VfM than Response to failed 2016 Deyr Rains*

Reflecting back on this after the fact, one Concern staff member said: “It’s hard to say how accurate our cost estimates were but those are what we decided to work with at the time. Therefore, statistically, we should have responded early – but doing more than we did would have been a tough argument to make. The Gu season was a below average rainy season with particularly poor frequency, but not as bad as we saw in 2011, which for me cast some doubt on the assumption that a subsequent poor rainy season would definitely result in disaster. We know now that this doubt was misplaced, which has made our use of Value for Money and probabilities of disaster all the more important.” Working with probabilities always incurs a level of uncertainty, and this can be a challenge to organizational-level thinking and communication with donors. The process however, is hugely important to making rational decisions regarding cost-effectiveness and can help in communicating the value of mitigation and early action to decision makers. In this case, the result of this analysis was the early roll-out (and further early scale-up) of Cash Safety Nets in Gedo Region as detailed in the next section.



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BRCiS Programme staff interview recently widowed mother of eight in Gedo Region

## 6.) Early Actions Taken

As the poor Gu' 2016 season reached its final month of June, villages in Gedo and Lower Shabelle were red flagged. All but two Gedo locations are primarily pastoralist and most have sparse water resources. Lower Shabelle villages are all riverine, and despite other vulnerabilities, access to the river makes them more resilient to drought in the short-term. The red flagged villages in Gedo began immediate mitigation activities, and all target villages were monitored

for further shocks (including non-climatic, e.g. conflict) and given immediate response when these occurred. As the 2016 Deyr rains began to fail, the project was prepared and by November responded through further expanding cash distributions, fodder production and village-specific emergency responses to local conflict. Concern's BRCiS programme provided early action, leading to wider-scale inputs from DFID IRF and ECHO emergency funding.

### 6.1) Cash Transfers

In June 2016, BRCiS programme staff worked through BRCiS Programme Community Disaster Management Committees to target poorest households in Gedo villages. This included 10% of households in most villages, and 20% in the worst-off villages. In total, 803 households were selected to receive 30 USD per month between June and November, with potential continuation should the situation not improve. In November 2016, after Deyr rains started late, Concern triggered an early scale-up of the social safety nets, increasing the amount from \$30 to \$50 USD per month and doubling the number of households in the case-

load to 1,606. By early December, 20 to 40 percent of target village populations in Gedo were receiving cash support. In January 2017, after rains proved to indeed be very below normal throughout the Deyr season, the 1,606 households had their monthly distributions increased to \$60 USD per month. However, at this time the severity of the situation had escalated to an extent where DFID IRF emergency funding was better positioned to cover costs. As a result, the response continued under IRF funding instead of BRCiS from February 2017, in total providing relief for 11,242 people.

### 6.2) Fodder Production

Prolonging the productivity of household milk animals during drought is essential to supporting the nutritional status of the entire family, particularly children. With this in mind, BRCiS piloted an emergency scale-up of fodder production for red flagged villages in November 2016.

Farmer Field Schools (FFS) have long been one of Concern's most successful activities for riverine communities and was selected for implementation by the (only) two riverine BRCiS communities in Gedo. In addition to training normal FFS, Concern identified the deficit of fodder in the market and adapted the established FFS model to be Fodder Field Schools (Fodder-FS) in late 2015. The communities were familiar with commercial fodder farmed in Kenya and Ethiopia, but had not yet learned to produce it themselves. Concern piloted the new model with 2 Fodder-FS groups of 25 members each. The Fodder-FS groups cultivated Sudan and Columbus fodder due to their short two month cropping season. The 2015 Deyr rainy season ended early, and therefore the fodder harvest was met with a high demand and a



*Concern Field Coordinator and Local Elder Inspecting Gedo Fodder Production in February 2017*

high local market price, supplying area milk-animals in the dry seasons of 2016. With the 2016 Deyr rains late, fodder in early 2017 was already being planned by BRCiS Fodder-FS members, but poorest households were unlikely to be able to afford it. In response, Concern leveraged the existing capacity of 4 Fodder-FS farmers and 15 conventional Farmer Field School farmers by contracting fodder production of 50 acres and subsequent distribution in red-flagged villages.



*Local farmer that replicated fodder production after seeing it done by BRCiS Fodder Field School Farmers*

The scale-up pilot undertook a series of community negotiations as the vast-majority of already-trained Fodder-FS members had already begun scale-ups of their own. After detailed community negotiations, signing MoUs, seed purchases, and land preparation, fodder production began in the additional riverine areas during the first week of January 2017. The fodder is to be distributed to vulnerable households with lactating animals in quantities sufficient for 3 lactating goats to be productive through April. One to two harvests will take place depending on the availability of river water as the dry season progresses. The first harvest began in late February and will go to worst-off pastoralist villages and IDPs not from the productive riverine villages, the second harvest will be provided to poor households and IDPs in the riverine communities where the fodder is produced. In all instances, the contracted Fodder-FS and FFS farmers will build relations between communities by working directly beside BRCiS Programme staff to distribute the fodder to their fellow Somalis. The 50-acre scale up will support extreme

poor who would not otherwise be able to afford fodder and prolong their essential household nutrition until the Gu 2017 rainy season can revitalize local rangeland.

In addition to the 50-acre fodder scale-up, the BRCiS programmes' ongoing work establishing fodder production has resulted in 128 additional acres being cultivated privately by 180 BRCiS Fodder-FS and FFFs Farmers, and 24 non-beneficiary farmers have now copied the production growing another 89 acres. As a result of the BRCiS programme intervention, a total of 267 acres are under production, providing a gross income of over 350,000 USD to village residents during the current 2017 dry season, including 184 BRCiS' trained farmers. The nutritional impact of this will be felt by approximately 22,500 drought-affected people, 6,000 of which are extreme poor and will receive this support free of cost. In total, all of the fodder-related activities described here cost Concern's DFID funded BRCiS programme a modest 60,000 USD.

## 6.3) Early Responses to Localized Non-Climatic Shocks

### *Dhamasa: Drought + Conflict*

After June 2016, several red flagged villages experienced shocks in addition to drought. Near the border town of the BRCiS target village of Dhamasa, attacks by Al Shabab in Kenya prompted Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) to bombard the town in late June and early July. This caused most of its 1,200 households to displace, leaving behind their homes and the only clean water source in the area. The BRCiS programme responded with daily water trucking to IDP settlements beginning on July 5th and a couple of weeks later with NFI shelter kits. This complimented the ongoing cash safety nets previously described. As IDPs did not return home and water trucking continued to be needed, the water trucking activity was transitioned over to DFID IRF emergency funding in September 2016. The IRF also allowed the expansion of Dhamasa Cash Safety Net caseload from 150 to 300 households and the increase in amount from 30 USD to 100 USD per month. After nearly five months of displacement, negotiations between Dhamasa community elders and Kenyan officials produced border security rules and assurance that bombardment would cease. With this, IDPs from Dhamasa felt assured of safety and returned to their village. Cash safety nets continue at a rate of 60 USD per month. In total, the BRCiS programme provided relief to 5,600 Dhamasa residents, two-thirds of the village population.

### *Afgoye: Drought + Conflict*

Despite being weakened by poor harvests during drought, BRCiS target villages in riverine Afgoye are more water-secure than most of Somalia, resulting in them still being a destination for IDPs. In late October 2016, militia of the Biyomal clan, predominantly from nearby Merka district, openly opposed Al Shabab. In retaliation, Al Shabab forcibly displaced riverine villages mixed with large numbers of Biyomal and other clans. A BRCiS Programme rapid assessment estimated that 9,160 households were displaced. Most of the displaced Biyomal moved away from the river to areas controlled by Biyomal militia and AMISOM. This area however has far less presence of aid agencies compared to nearby Afgoye District. For this reason the non-Biyomal clan households displaced to Afgoye District to receive support, creating an influx into the red flagged BRCiS target villages. These villages were already stressed due to a poor Gu Season Harvest and late Deyr rainy season, leaving them with little capacity to support IDPs. Concern BRCiS staff deployed prepositioned NFI shelter kits in response in November. Further, results from a new Concern Clinic in Afgoye showed a worrying number of new AWD cases in the district. Again, Concern BRCiS staff responded by sourcing hygiene and sanitation kits from the closest WASH Cluster Supply Hub and pre-emptively distributed them to the new IDPs. In total, Concern provided support to over 15,000 people in red flagged Afgoye villages.



## 7.) Early Impacts as of February 2017

The month of February was filled with emergency round-table meetings in Somalia, Nairobi and in donor capitals. Few of which went without the question: *“But what of the resilience programmes? What impact are they making?”* The answer is not empirically clear, some of the reasons being that crises is still unfolding, adequate control-group villages are not readily available to survey and resilience programmes in Somalia are as diverse as the villages they are there to support. Concern BRCiS Programme staff have reflected heavily on this question, and the piece of evidence cited most often from field staff is displacement.

Concern originally targeted BRCiS Programme villages because they represented the most vulnerable in their respective areas. For some, the vulnerability was village-wide while for the more water-secure villages, sub-groups of the populations represented the most vulnerable. In all rural BRCiS target-villages however, a drought similar to the one Somalia is going through would have displaced vast numbers of their population. However, Concern BRCiS Programme villages are not only holding on, but are now receiving and hosting IDPs from neighbouring areas.

### From IDPs to Hosts of IDPs: Shaalay Village, Afgoye District

In Afgoye District, Shaalay village is considered the worst off among the BRCiS Programme villages in the district. Located close to the grey border of Al Shabab controlled territory, it is in constant threat of being caught in the middle of the conflict, and not able to regularly access the urban opportunities and aid of the government controlled Afgoye Town. Despite this, a village elder gave an optimistic message when asked how this crises is different than 2011: *“We are hosting the displaced because of our capacity.”*

The BRCiS Programme has done various resilience-building interventions in partnership with the village, notably: farmer field schools, Community Health Worker house-to-house hygiene and Infant and Young Child Feeding promotion, Self-help and Savings Groups (SHGs), strengthening and training of community committees, canal rehabilitation, construction of sluice gates and culverts, as well as the construction of a new shallow well with water kiosks, elevated water tank and solar pumping system. These wide-ranging investments add up and the Shaalay community is stable as per the end of February while former better-off villages are affected by outward displacement. Since the failure of the 2017 Deyr rains approximately 2,100 IDPs have arrived in Shaalay, 80% of which are from neighboring villages. Relations between villages mean that Shaalay is now sharing much of its harvest with the IDPs they host.

An elder member of the BRCiS Programme community based disaster management committee said: *“In Shaalay, we have all sorts of basic human services – clean and permanent water source, more than 100 farmers with improved farming techniques,*



*hygiene promoters and trained women’s self-help groups who are all engaged in business activities... We are slightly better than other villages in terms of livelihood and water because we have gained improved farming techniques which enabled us get good harvests, we received storage facilities from the programme and used a proper grain storage system to save our crops. In addition to these, the women’s self-help groups are doing their small businesses, and clean water is piped to houses in the village.”*

In Afgoye District, as of February 25th, BRCiS Programme Target Villages had seen little displacement, but were already hosting over seven thousand newly arrived IDPs representing a 39% increase in their combined village population. The elder from Shaalay village intentionally used the words *“slightly better off than the other villages”* – they still have a long way to go and will not be able to support their neighbours much longer. But it does mark a major change to their situation, and this has been widely noted by BRCiS programme staff and the people living in the resilience programme villages.

## ■ External Citations

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- (i) Joint FEWS NET-FSNAU Somalia Alert - January 16, 2017: <http://www.fsnau.org/publications>
- (ii) FSNAU-FEWSNET Post Deyr 2016 Technical Series Report (Forthcoming): <http://www.fsnau.org/publications>
- (iii) <http://stream.princeton.edu/AWCM/WEBPAGE/interface.php?locale=en>
- (iv) Sources used for meteorological analysis include: Princeton University's African Flood and Drought Monitor, Somalia Water and Land Information Management (SWALIM), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), FSNAU and FEWSNET.
- (v) FSNAU-FEWSNET Post Gu 2016 Technical Series Report No VII. 69, October 19, 2016: <http://www.fsnau.org/publications>
- (vi) While detailed definitions for Value for Money may be preferable for more technical discussions, for the purposes in this paper Concern simply defines Value for Money as "cost-effectiveness".
- (vii) Estimates for Early Action consists of (costs of mitigation before potential disaster) + (cost of further support should disaster occur x percent chance of occurrence). This included 30 USD/Month for Jun-Nov (or \$180) and, should the rains be severely weak, an average of 51.66 USD per month Dec-may (or \$310). The calculation therefore was  $\$180 + (\$310 \times .45) = \$319.50$ .
- (viii) Estimates for response included \$60 USD/month for Jan-Jul, \$350 USD livelihood asset package in July, and \$30 USD/month Aug-Dec)
- (ix) Concern would like to thank the Red Cross Climate Centre and Colombia University's International Research Institute for Climate and Society for their continuous technical guidance and their brave interpretations of seasonal trends and forecasts that continue to amaze us. It is important to note that RCCC did not provide forecasting, but instead provided analysis and interpretations of existing forecasts and past seasonal monitoring. We are very grateful to have been given the opportunity to apply this to our work in Somalia.

*This report was written by Dustin Caniglia, Concern Worldwide and Sarah Baran, Baran Consulting. This report is not a legally binding document. It is a collaborative informational and assessment document and does not necessarily reflect the views of any of the contributing partners or funding agencies in all of its contents. Any errors are the sole responsibility of the authors.*

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