ODI

Report

The next frontier for disaster risk reduction

Tackling disasters in fragile and conflict-affected contexts

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Cover photo: Indonesian soldiers patrol to prevent looting in the aftermath of the tsunami which struck South Asia on 26/12/2004. An underwater earthquake measuring 9 on the Richter scale triggered a series of tidal waves which caused devastation when they struck dry land. 12 countries were affected by the tsunami, with a combined death toll of over 150,000. Aceh, the closest landfall to the epicentre of the quake, suffered the greatest loss of life. © Dermot Tatlow/Panos Pictures.

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Acronyms

BRICS	Building Resilience in Chad and Sudan
BRCiS	Building Resilient Communities in Somalia
CIFP	Country Indicators for Foreign Policy
DFID	Department for International Development
DRR	Disaster risk reduction
FCAC	Fragile and conflict-affected contexts
GNDR	Global Network of Civil Society Organisations for Disaster Reduction
IASC	Inter-agency standing committee
IDP	Internally displaced persons
INGOs	International non-governmental organisations
LDCs	Least-developed countries
NGOs	Non-governmental organisations
ODA	Overseas development assistance
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PDNA	Post-Disaster Needs Assessments
RPBA	Recovery and Peace Building Assessments
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
UN	United Nations
UNISDR	United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction

About this report

Every day, people around the world lose their lives and livelihoods as a result of natural hazard-related disasters. Too many people are living in contexts in which states do not provide the necessary protections by failing to invest in well-known mitigation or prevention measures, and are unsupported in their efforts to prepare for recurring hazards. Often, the contexts in which the impact of disasters are most acutely felt are also affected by violence, active conflict, ineffective governance systems and state fragility.

ODI research has tried to better understand the relationship between disasters and conflict, to consolidate what is known about those affected by disasters who also happen to live in fragile or conflict-affected contexts (FCAC) and to make the case that more needs to be done to support these individuals (Harris et al., 2013).

In promoting the findings in Harris et al. (2013), ODI was met with resistance by some donors, operational agencies and United Nations (UN) entities, in particular to the idea that there could be benefits in bringing together conflict resolution, peacebuilding and disaster risk reduction (DRR). With little traction gained in policy, practice or funding streams, we decided to focus on the data (Peters and Budimir, 2016). The argument was that if those seeking to reduce disaster risk were serious about supporting those most vulnerable to disasters, then they need to get serious about adapting what works in DRR to contexts in which peace and stability is not the norm.

But still, the wider DRR community – noting this is not a homogenous entity – hesitates to actively engage in this topic. There are exceptions – National Disaster Management Agencies striving to pursue DRR in the midst of conflict and fragility, or civil society organisations working on the ground to support vulnerable communities build their resilience to extensive risk in FCAC – but they are too few and far between. Moreover, while a body of literature exists on protracted crises, particularly in Africa, this tends to be circulated and discussed by those who consider themselves to be working on either 'conflict' or 'crises', and is largely non-existent in mainstream discussions on DRR and disaster risk governance. Despite both dealing with risk management, there remains a hesitancy to explore the relationship between disasters and conflict.

This report seeks to understand *why* this hesitancy remains. It looks at the political and institutional barriers – both real and perceived – to adapting DRR policy, practice and overseas development assistance to FCAC. Stepping back from the links between DRR and approaches to securing and maintaining peace, the report adopts a narrower lens, focusing on making the case for those involved in DRR to concentrate on the places where it is needed most.

Some will see this as a step too far, as endangering the positive progress that is being made on DRR (particularly when the 'natural' in natural hazards is employed to pursue action in an apolitical manner). The intention of this report is not to disrupt those efforts but to promote better, more far-reaching DRR action for those who need it the most – which includes those who also happen to live in FCAC.

In many ways, this report does not go far enough; the relationship between DRR and conflict management, conflict prevention and peacebuilding remains unexplored. This is a task for the years to come – and one that may be well suited to the UN Secretary-General's renewed focus on crisis prevention and sustaining peace. For now, the challenge is clear: the majority of deaths from disasters occur in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, and this is where the DRR community should be concentrating its efforts.

Terminology

Terms associated with fragility, conflict, violence and security are imbued with definitional and political sensitivities. We ask readers not to allow this to distract from the focus of this report – which is to ignite a debate about ways to better support individuals and communities at risk of disasters who do not live in relatively peaceful, stable societies.

This report uses the OECD's characterisation of fragility as 'the combination of exposure to risk and insufficient coping capacity of the state, system and/or communities to manage, absorb or mitigate those risks. Fragility can lead to negative outcomes including violence, the breakdown of institutions, displacement, humanitarian crises or other emergencies. […] Risks and capacities are measured in five dimensions: economic, environmental, political, security and societal' (OECD, 2016).

As DRR is often viewed as a function of the state, the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy's (CIFP) description of 'fragility' is also useful here when thinking about government obligations to protect citizens from natural hazards. It refers to states that 'lack the functional authority to provide basic security within their borders, the institutional capacity to provide basic social needs for their populations, and/or the political legitimacy to effectively represent their citizens at home or abroad' (CIFP, 2006).

Where interviewees adopt specific terms, we do not alter these – so there are differences in the way terminology is applied through respondents' quotes:

The term "conflict" captures the attention of the "conflict" [resolution] community more than others. I would frame this in terms of fragility rather than conflict, because we don't want to "prove" a relationship between disasters and conflict, but to have a conversation about the links. (Respondent 1)

This report refers to fragile and conflict-affected contexts (FCAC), recognising that there are vast differences between and within the geographical areas of a country which differentially affect the pursuit and viability of DRR. For example, Tearfund has operationalised DRR in relatively peaceful areas of Afghanistan despite armed conflict ongoing in other areas of the country (Harris et al., 2013), while Concern has undertaken DRR in areas of Haiti affected by gang violence (see section 3.1).

Methodology

This report draws together both primary and secondary research.

A secondary literature review of peer-reviewed and grey literature identified core themes and assumptions about DRR in FCAC, which informed the design of, and were then explored through, a series of interviews with DRR experts. The review used searches for key words, phrases and combinations of terms related to disasters, hazards, fragility and conflict.[1] As part of the research, we also explored what toolkits, handbooks and guidance notes are available to advise DRR practitioners on working in conflict settings (section 2.6.3).

Primary research took the form of interviews with 18 DRR experts – senior technical and policy advisors from a range of UN entities, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and donor governments – who were selected through a chain-referral sampling method. This non-probability method built on interviewee recommendations and key informants from previous interviews conducted for Harris et al. (2013). Interviews were conducted remotely, between December 2016 and January 2017. Open-ended, semi-structured interview questions were employed, tailored to each interviewee and refined as the interview process matured. To encourage honest and open responses, interviewees were offered anonymity. The full list of interviewees is provided in Annex 1 and quotes from the interviewees are scattered throughout the report.

Full interview transcripts were produced and then analysed using data- and theory-driven coding techniques. The codes were developed from assumptions identified through the secondary literature, and were tested and refined through the primary interviews. The small number of interviews conducted may impose limitations on the generalisability and reliability of the conclusions drawn. However, the research aimed to capitalise on the benefits of obtaining rich, in-depth qualitative data on perceptions and experiences. Future research should seek to expand the scope of the perspectives gathered.[2]

Finally, the report draws specifically on Concern Worldwide's practical experiences from Haiti, Somalia and Chad (section 3). Concern Worldwide and ODI have championed the theme of DRR in FCAC for a number of years, and Concern's experiences were selected here because of their willingness to engage in a collaborative writing process and advocacy. Their operational experience enriches the evidence base, helping bring the theme to life. It should be noted, however, that the cases have not been independently verified and would benefit from being complemented by a stronger diversity of examples through future research (see the recommendations in Section 5).

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1   The key terms included, for example, 'disasters', 'natural disasters', 'hazards', 'conflict', 'violence', 'fragility', '(in)security', 'conflict sensitive', 'Do No Harm', 'conflict analysis', 'conflict prevention', 'conflict management', 'conflict resolution' and 'peacebuilding'.

2   For example, by including non-DRR experts (such as political and human rights experts, conflict experts and economists) and by enriching the diversity of stakeholders to include governments, local organisations, civil society groups, and so on.

Executive summary

Disasters caused by natural hazards hit people living in fragile and conflict-affected contexts (FCAC) hardest. Between 2004 and 2014, 58% of deaths from disasters occurred in countries that are also among the top 30 most fragile states. Fragile and conflict-affected states typically have lower capacity to cope with natural hazards, and lower-income countries are more likely to suffer higher mortality and to require international assistance. Tackling disaster risk in FCAC should therefore be a priority for national governments and the international community alike. The task is both a moral imperative and an essential step towards achieving the ambitions set out under the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Trends in the global political, funding and policy environment lend themselves to greater investment in disaster risk reduction (DRR) in FCAC. The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 sets out global targets for reducing disaster risk, and signatory governments are expected to deliver progress from the local to national scale. There is also substantial donor attention to funding fragile states, and a recognition of the need to 'leave no one behind' to achieve the SDGs. The UN Secretary-General's crisis prevention and sustaining peace agenda offers another opportunity to advance DRR in FCAC. High-profile humanitarian responses to disasters have been undertaken in FCAC, and there is increased demand for risk reduction measures in states in conflict. Yet despite commitments to support people most affected by disasters, the international community is largely silent on how to enact DRR effectively in contexts where stability and peace are not the norm. Tellingly, the Sendai Framework does not mention the words 'fragility', 'conflict' or 'violence'.

Material progress on DRR remains patchy. While some countries have reduced disaster mortality, and the DRR discourse has largely shifted from one of saving lives to broader goals of reducing disaster losses and avoiding risk creation, the wider DRR community remains reluctant to actively engage in DRR in FCAC. Very little exists, conceptually or programmatically, on how to effectively pursue DRR in FCAC; approaches and concepts are not tailored to the specific conditions affecting FCAC, and there is no community of practice to document and share learning from these contexts. Multilateral and bilateral investments in DRR have been slow to materialise for governments affected by fragility and conflict, and where money is available, it is for response, not risk reduction.

Drawing on primary and secondary data, this paper looks at the political and institutional barriers – real and perceived – to increased investment of funds, capacity and political capital to the pursuit of DRR in the countries where it is most needed. Interviews with experienced DRR policy-makers, donors and practitioners revealed a wide range of challenges, including the confines of institutional mandates; the lack of an evidence base to guide policy and programming; fear of the unknown; lack of funding for experimentation and trialling new or unproven approaches; practical concerns around accessibility and operational security; and a tendency to prioritise peace and security over DRR in FCAC. It is not clear whether DRR frameworks are the right place for discussions of fragility and conflict, or whether efforts to reduce future disaster risks are the right or the most urgent response in aid of people facing immediate threats to life. There are also political questions around combining approaches to DRR and efforts towards peace, siloed thinking and concerns that a coming together would dilute or complicate existing agendas. Expectations of what can be achieved on DRR in FCAC need to be managed, including the very real likelihood of setbacks and failures.

Despite these challenges, there are examples of approaches that are working. For example, Concern Worldwide partnered with peacebuilding and reconciliation specialists as a precursor to DRR programming in urban areas affected by gang violence in Haiti; worked 'around' conflict by adopting Conflict Sensitive Approaches to DRR in Somalia to address flooding and drought; and supported the establishment of Early Warning Systems to manage food insecurity in Chad in a context of relatively scant state presence at the local level. The study also found examples of DRR programmes in countries experiencing governance challenges, including Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lebanon, Myanmar, Pakistan and Sudan. Examples of linking relief aid with conflict prevention and DRR were cited from Honduras, East Timor and Syria. Yet documented cases of DRR in FCAC are few and far between, despite the fact that DRR and disaster resilience toolkits routinely encourage engagement in conflict management, conflict resolution and either indirect or direct involvement in peacebuilding activities. While the ambition may be there, practical application is lacking.

Making progress on DRR in FCAC requires systematic consideration of peace and conflict dynamics in DRR frameworks, policy, practice and monitoring systems. Bringing conflict and fragility into disasters discourse

provides an opportunity to develop DRR policies and programmes that better reflect the conditions in which disasters occur, and to grow an evidence base from which to design approaches to DRR specifically tailored to FCAC. In that vein, the study makes several recommendations to key stakeholders, including the UN, development and humanitarian donors, non-governmental organisations and the academic community. It is our collective responsibility to take action in four key areas:

1. Integrate DRR in FCAC into existing monitoring and convening processes. In particular, it would be extremely valuable for UNISDR, and championed by willing Member States and supported by UN agencies and non-governmental organisations, to integrate the theme at each step of the biannual Sendai Framework convening cycle. With support from the Swiss government, the pursuit of DRR in FCAC should feature as a special theme in the 2019 Global Platform for DRR.

2. Collate what we know and articulate what we do not through the generation of a robust evidence base. A solid body of technical evidence and knowledge needs to be established that documents past and current experiences of undertaking DRR in FCAC, and seeks to draw this together to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the different elements of DRR appropriate for different types of FCAC. Existing mechanisms for data collection such as the Views from the Frontline report could include this theme as a subset of its monitoring questions. The 2018 World Disasters Report could include a dedicated theme on DRR in FCAC, and collaboration between CRED, EM-DAT, UNISDR, the OECD and the Global Humanitarian Assistance initiative could provide valuable analysis on funding for DRR in relation to investments in peace and conflict prevention.

3. Establish and formalise a community of practice and accompanying group of political champions. A community of practice to share, debate and learn about the practical application of DRR in FCAC would be well suited to operational agencies already seeking to reduce vulnerability to disaster risk in FCAC. Existing inter-agency mechanisms – such as the Global Network of Civil Society Organisations for Disaster Reduction (GNDR), the BOND DRR Group (in the UK) and equivalents elsewhere (for example, the Swiss NGO DRR Platform) – would be well placed to take this forward. So too would political champions already committed to the OECD Experts Group on Risk and Resilience.

4. Utilise existing convening spaces and platforms to communicate and share this evidence. Knowledge portals such as PreventionWeb can support the gathering and organising of evidence. Other spaces for convening and discussion potentially include the Global Understanding Risk Forum, Financing for Development follow-up processes to the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and the Capacity for Disaster Reduction Initiative (CADRI) Partnership. The Executive Office of the UN Secretary-General should include the Sendai Framework and DRR in its crisis prevention and sustaining peace agenda. The World Bank, the UN and the European Commission also have distinct methodologies to inform recovery planning for disasters and conflict, and these could be brought together. Trialled in a select number of countries, this could usefully inform future investment in DRR in ways that address risk management more broadly.

1.Introduction: the current state of affairs

…based on experience, it's logical to link disasters and conflict – you can't debate it – you are working in fragile areas and in hazard prone areas. (Respondent 1)

Throughout the first two decades of the 21st century, armed conflict has caused significant human suffering (SIPRI, 2017) with far-reaching social and economic consequences (United Nations and World Bank, 2017). As violent conflict and low intensity conflict escalate (United Nations and World Bank, 2017), protracted crises continue and the global challenge of climate change acts as a 'threat multiplier' to global stability (Rüttinger et al., 2015), the notion of 'risk' – and specifically, how best to manage it – has once again come to the fore. Under the Agenda 2030 (United Nations, 2015) and complementary international frameworks on disasters, climate change, urbanisation, humanitarian action, and financing, attention has turned to how best to achieve sustainable development. Increased impetus for delivering results in fragile and conflict-affected contexts (FCAC) by influential donors such as the World Bank (United Nations and World Bank, 2017), coupled with the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General's ambition to make conflict prevention and sustaining peace lasting themes of his tenure (Guterres, 2017), mark a shift in the political, funding and policy environment – one that lends itself to addressing the neglect of disaster risk reduction (DRR) in FCAC.

DRR is 'preventing new and reducing existing disaster risk and managing residual risk, all of which contribute to strengthening resilience and therefore to the achievement of sustainable development' (UNISDR, 2017). This includes taking measures to help reduce, mitigate, prepare for and respond to disasters. Despite improvements in disaster management in some countries, progress on DRR remains patchy (Wilkinson and Peters, 2017). Natural hazards continue to kill; 'put simply, the poorer the country, the higher the number of disaster deaths there are likely to be' (CRED et al., 2016: 5). While some countries have reduced disaster mortality, and the DRR discourse has largely shifted from one of saving lives to the broader goals of reducing disaster losses and avoiding risk creation, '[o]ver past 20 years, more than 1.35 million people were killed by natural hazards, the overwhelming majority in low and middle-income countries' (CRED et al., 2015: 5). Of the low-income countries, many are also FCAC.

Analysis in CRED et al. (2016: 12) of disaster mortality from 1996-2015 revealed that '613 million people live in 31 low-income countries. Many of these countries are either in post-conflict or conflict situations and lack the resources to account adequately for their disaster losses or to reduce their vulnerability to disasters. Thus disaster mortality in low-income countries is probably even higher than indicated in the EM-DAT database.'

FCAC are locations where there is a 'combination of exposure to risk and insufficient coping capacity of the state, system and or/communities to manage, absorb or mitigate those risks' which 'can lead to violence, the breakdown of institutions, displacement, humanitarian crises or other emergencies' (OECD, 2016). It is in these contexts that disasters are especially deadly. Fifty-eight per cent of deaths from disasters occurred in the 30 most fragile states worldwide between 2004 and 2014 (Peters and Budimir, 2016: 5),[3] a figure made all the more stark by the fact that such numbers are vastly under-reported, and often unreported (CRED et al., 2016). For example, the *Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2017* (Development Initiatives, 2017: 19) revealed that in the 2016 datasets, 'many millions of people affected by disasters elsewhere are not captured in the data, including those affected by droughts and flooding in Ethiopia, Somalia and Malawi'.

1.1.   The shortfall of ex-ante action

Fragility and conflict can limit or compromise the ability of state and non-state actors to reduce disaster risk and to respond to a disaster (Peters et al., 2013). With lower levels of development and less sustained investment in disaster management infrastructure, FCAC are less likely to have in place disaster management systems that are ready

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3   Sourced from Peters and Budimir (2016: 5); percentage figures refer to the top 30 fragile and conflict affected countries in the 2014 Fragile States Index (Fund for Peace, 2014), using CRED's EM-DAT data downloaded for selected events, and for total deaths (2004-2014). All 'natural disasters' defined by CRED: biological (epidemic, insect infestation), climatological (drought, extreme temperature, wildfire), geophysical (earthquake, mass movement dry, volcano), hydrological (flood, mass movement wet) and meteorological (storm). Figure excludes data on China.

to respond to a disaster effectively and equitably across scales (Mitchell and Smith, 2011; Feinstein International Centre, 2013). As the *Global Humanitarian Assessment Report 2017* reveals, '[w]hat tips a disaster into a crisis that requires an international humanitarian response is the severity of the crisis relative to the country's capacity to cope… South Sudan and Haiti score very low on coping capacity and consequently called for substantial international support' (Development Initiatives, 2017: 19).

In these low-income developing countries that are experiencing fragility and conflict, the lack of basic development also impacts the building blocks required for DRR (Peters et al., 2013). Such countries typically lack the basic governance arrangements, financial mechanisms, technical capacity and built infrastructure conventionally required for ex-ante DRR measures (Twigg, 2015). And unlike disaster response, which can draw on well-documented experience from the international humanitarian perspective over the past 40 years, we know very little about ways in which to approach ex-ante DRR in FCAC.

> *DRR folk just aren't in the right places. The INFORM[4] mapping of Africa, for example, reveals the disparity between vulnerability and investments. Take the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, there is a massive lack of action on the ground for DRR. This could be down to the risk tolerance of organisations, but also because we need to reconceptualise development and DRR as supporting the furthest behind first, who are being left behind first.* (Respondent 2)

Very little exists, conceptually or programmatically, on how to effectively pursue DRR in FCAC – specifically, on measures that help reduce risk and vulnerability to disasters *before* they happen. Logic tells us that simply applying approaches used in relatively peaceful contexts will fall short. DRR literature – whether academic, policy-oriented or operational – routinely encourages readers to understand their context, but then continues based on the assumption that DRR is being undertaken in relatively peaceful, stable environments. DRR approaches and concepts are not tailored to FCAC; no questions are asked of whether, when and how DRR can be effectively enacted in such settings; and there is no analysis of the institutional, political and operational barriers to, and incentives for, doing so.

Nor is there any 'community of practice' to document, share and improve from lessons across such contexts; operational agencies are 'going it alone' – learning by trial and error without the benefit of lessons learnt by others. It has taken until 2017 for the first ever special issue journal to be proposed on the topic.[5] And in the absence of coherent advocacy on this issue or a group of political champions to promote the theme in national, regional and international forums, the international policy framework that guides DRR up to 2030 – the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 (the 'Sendai Framework') – does not feature the words 'conflict', 'fragility', or 'violence'. The Sendai Framework is conflict-blind, to the detriment of those individuals who suffer from disasters and must also contend with fragility and conflict as part of their daily lives.

Moreover, multilateral and bilateral investments in DRR have been slow to materialise for governments affected by fragility and conflict. Where money is available, it is for response and is primarily channelled through the international system, not for risk reduction. For every $100 spent on response in fragile states, only $1.30 was spent on DRR between 2005 and 2010 (Peters and Budimir, 2016).

1.2. Moral imperatives, global gains

FCAC have often lagged behind on progress in international frameworks. They were the slowest to make progress against the Millennium Development Goals, for example, with 37 out of 55 FCAC (67%) meeting just two or fewer of the 15 targets (Norris et al., 2015). This historic propensity to fall behind may partly explain the growing emphasis on fragile states from many of the leading donors, with examples including recent remarks by the president of the World Bank (World Bank, 2016), the initiation of the World Humanitarian Summit process (OCHA, 2016), and the UN Secretary-General's emphasis on achieving and sustaining peace (Guterres, 2017). (This said, conflict and fragility has not emerged as a strong theme in the Paris Agreement on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 2015), though issues of human security have begun to emerge since the IPCC's 5th Assessment Report (IPCC, 2014)).

Tackling disaster risk in FCAC should be a priority for national governments and the international community. There is clearly a moral imperative – the international community has an obligation to support people at risk from disasters, to ensure they have the means to reduce disaster risk and avoid risk creation through more informed decision-making. But the imperative is not only moral; action is crucial if countries are to achieve the targets of the Sendai Framework, which include substantially reducing global disaster mortality and the

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4   The INFORM Index is avaiable at: http://www.inform-index.org.

5   The *Disasters* journal has preliminary approved a Special Issue on the theme of 'Disasters in conflict areas'. This is still subject to an extensive review and approval process.

number of people affected by disasters by 2030 (UNISDR, 2015).[6]

Piecemeal progress has been made. Though it remains highly vulnerable to disasters, Myanmar – which ranks 36th in the Fragile States Index (Fund for Peace, 2017) – has a national DRR policy framework (the Myanmar Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction), has invested in hazard risk assessments, and has an active, multi-stakeholder Working Group pursuing issues of risk reduction (MIMU, n.d.). The Philippines has also made progress in DRR in areas such as Mindanao, despite being affected by low-intensity armed conflict (Government of Philippines, 2012).

Even in relatively stable, peaceful contexts, DRR can be a low political priority, below economic growth, energy security, defence and security. In contexts experiencing fragility and conflict, DRR tends to fall even further down the list. Governance challenges in the countries that appear on indices of fragility and conflict undermine the establishment and maintenance of effective, efficient and equitable DRR legislation, strategies and delivery models with appropriate resourcing (Peters et al., 2013). For example, Guinea Bissau (ranked 16th on the Fragile States Index 2017[7]) has no national platform for DRR, no official budget allocation for DRR as of 2015, and no local DRR strategies in place, despite experiencing repeated droughts, storms, wildfire and floods (Kirbyshire, 2017).

1.3.   Why now?

To date, sound logic and evidence hasn't prompted the desired change – that is, greater investment in terms of time, money and effort in DRR in FCAC. To ensure we 'leave no one behind', we need to understand the barriers to greater engagement in FCAC, and the incentives to help overcome them. We listened to some of the world's most respected and experienced DRR policy-makers, donors and practitioners to unearth what is preventing greater investment in DRR in FCAC. They revealed a suite of challenges, including the confines of UN mandates, the nascent evidence base on DRR in FCAC, a historical separation between those dealing with disaster and conflict risk, a fear of the unknown, limited funding for trailing new approaches, and practical concerns over accessibility and operational security in FCAC. Despite these concerns,

many individuals felt that the time was ripe to advance this agenda.

Many trends in the current global political environment are conducive to greater investment in DRR in FCAC:

- Recent high-profile and costly – in terms of impacts and response – disasters in FCAC, putting pressure on a humanitarian system 'at breaking point'[8] (High Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing, 2016).
- Increasing interest in the costs and benefits of funding preparedness and early action (Cabot Venton et al., 2012 ; USAID, 2015; Peters and Pichon, 2017).
- Recognition of the need to 'leave no one behind' and to focus on FCAC in order to achieve the SDGs (United Nations, 2015).
- Increased focus on utilising overseas development assistance to support poverty reduction in fragile states (United Nations and World Bank, 2017).
- The 'coherence agenda', with its interest in the complementarity of achieving the Sendai Framework, the disaster targets of the SDGs, and the Paris Agreement on climate change (Peters et al., 2016)
- Relatedly, the UN Secretary-General's crisis prevention and sustaining peace agenda (Guterres, 2017), bringing together sustainable development, human rights and the ambition to achieve and sustain peace (with DRR constituting a contribution to the 'prevention' of disasters).
- An interest in operationalising the concept of 'resilience', including the integration of climate and disaster resilience across donor spending portfolios, with screening processes guiding investment decisions (for example, the World Bank[9] or the Asian Development Bank[10]).
- And finally, advances in technology (such as drones) and social media (including twitter) leading to increased public awareness of incidents of disasters and conflict, including in locations previously isolated from international coverage (Zeitzoff, 2017).

There has also been increased demand for risk management measures in FCAC. Since 2014, for example, there has been a 'dramatic increase in demand' for risk and post-disaster needs assessments in FCAC in Syria, Iraq, Gaza, Nigeria, Ukraine and Yemen (Fan et al., 2016: 4).

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6   The target is to achieve substantially lower average global mortality and number of affected people per 100,000 people for 2020-2030 compared to 2005-2015. For all seven global targets, see UNISDR (2015: 36).

7   Fund for Peace (2017).

8   https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/apr/11/justine-greening-global-humanitarian-breaking-point.

9   https://climatescreeningtools.worldbank.org/

10   https://www.adb.org/publications/climate-risk-management-adb-projects

Moreover, the Global Facility for Disaster Risk Reduction has invested in countries vulnerable to disasters which rank highly on the Fragile States Index (Fund for Peace, 2017), including Haiti, Yemen, Togo, Somalia and Afghanistan (Fan et al., 2016: 4). In light of these shifts, why, then, does DRR remain largely silent on issues of conflict and fragility?

1.4.   An uphill struggle?

Why is the weight of political emphasis, practical action, and investment in DRR so disconnected from the experiences of those most vulnerable to disasters? Is it because undertaking DRR requires a stable and functioning state, and accompanying institutional capacity and arrangements? Or is it because, with limited resources, conflict 'trumps' disasters in the order of risk priorities? Are there underlying assumptions that inhibit more progressive action on the compound nature of risk, and are these assumptions valid?

Many believe the odds are stacked against those in favour of this redistribution. Institutional, political and financial barriers have prevented recognition of disaster-conflict vulnerabilities in the international frameworks, restricting the incentives for donors to invest; a limited published evidence base and the lack of a community of practice have prevented shared experiences and lessons learnt about how to undertake DRR in FCAC from emerging; and without a group of political champions or coherent advocacy on the topic, the lack of visibility for the theme has persisted. Together, these factors have limited advocacy calling for greater proportions of overseas development assistance (ODA) funding to DRR in FCAC.

There are, of course, very real security challenges when working in FCAC which present barriers to operational organisations. But despite the continued prevalence of aid worker attacks and deaths in hostile locations (Stoddard et al., 2016), there does seem to be an increased willingness to think through how to engage in more 'risky' locations. The signs are that the international community is more willing to confront challenges of conflict and security, with increased commitment to investing in fragile states (United Nations and World Bank, 2017; HM Treasury and DFID, 2015),[11] and the UN Secretary-General's aim to refocus the UN system on the prevention and cessation of conflict (Guterres, 2017).

Strong views abound on the appropriateness and viability of undertaking DRR in FCAC – and, more specifically, on the appropriateness of using the term 'conflict' to categorise a type of context or barrier to the pursuit of DRR. Though much has been documented about humanitarian responses to disasters in a range of contexts, our limited experience of truly ex-ante (that is, pre-emptive rather than responsive) DRR investment in FCAC means we know little about what *could* be achieved to support communities vulnerable to disasters. Arguably, this limited evidence base precludes judgements about DRR in FCAS not being viable or appropriate, particularly while we *do* know that lives and livelihoods in FCAC continue to be lost as a result of disasters.

The terms 'fragility' and 'conflict' are contentious, especially in international negotiations and among negotiators who conventionally deal with natural hazard-related disasters and do not want to be seen to be stepping outside of their political remit (we discuss this further later). The agreement of the Sendai Framework in 2015 was a remarkable achievement and, as a global community, it was arguably more important to have achieved a global agreement on DRR than it was to include 'conflict' and thus risk a significant reduction in Member State signatories. The negotiations were political, and the document non-technical. That said, achieving the Sendai Framework global targets requires that we now get to grips with what undertaking DRR in contexts also affected by fragility and conflict means in practice.

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11 The UK government's aid strategy commits to dedicating '0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI) on international development' and, of that, allocating '50% of all DFID's spending to fragile states and regions' (HM Treasury and DFID, 2015: 3-4).

2. Revealing the elephant in the room: barriers to pursuing DRR in fragile and conflict-affected contexts

Respected and experienced DRR policy-makers, donors and practitioners were interviewed, uncovering a set of barriers to pursuing DRR in FCAC. In this section, we highlight nine issues (summarised briefly below) that emerged most prominently through the research, and unpack them to understand their validity, where the evidence gaps are, and what could be done to overcome them.

Experts are grappling with the question of **whether international DRR frameworks are the place for discussions of conflict** and, given that these frameworks are driven by Member State negotiations, there is **uncertainty around whether governments affected by fragility and conflict are willing and able to engage with DRR**. Relatedly, concerns were expressed about the **state-centric nature of conventional DRR approaches,** which are less helpful in contexts where state institutions are lacking or volatile, or where non-state actors are more active in DRR and alternative entry points may be required.

From an international aid perspective, the question of **whether the restoration of peace and security should take priority over natural hazard-related risk reduction efforts** also arises. But there is acknowledgment, too, that this is not a simple question, particularly in the context of protracted crises or slow-onset disasters. If it is agreed that it is desirable to work on DRR in FCAC, the next question becomes **whether DRR actors have the capacity to design DRR programmes adapted to such contexts,** and/or the skills to work in insecure environments.

Our findings reveal no consensus as to **whether DRR actors should work 'on' conflict through conflict resolution, peacebuilding and other measures, or whether DRR interventions should be designed to work 'around'** conflict – that is, acknowledging fragility and conflict as part of the wider set of contextual factors, but not actively seeking to engage in or alter those conditions. And if it were desirable to work 'on' conflict, would it be feasible to **combine approaches for DRR with those seeking to achieve and sustain peace?**

Questions emerged about **whether there is a dearth of funding for DRR in FCAC,** reflecting a broader lack of funding for DRR as a proportion of overseas development assistance. If funding were to be available, DRR approaches and tools would need to be adapted to FCAC, but **so too would expectations of what can be achieved;** setbacks, reversals of progress or downward trajectories may be more likely in FCAC. A more accurate and honest understanding of how to monitor the impact of DRR interventions will be required if we are to truly understand what works – and what doesn't – in reducing disaster risk in FCAC.

2.1. Are international DRR frameworks the place for fragility and conflict?

2.1.1. Towards a more holistic approach to risk

Various technical contributions to the suite of 2015 policy processes – from the Sustainable Development Goals to the World Humanitarian Summit – sought to encourage a more holistic approach to risk management, and so make explicit the connections between vulnerability to disasters and conflict. These contributions included reference to the intersection of disasters and conflict in the consultation report to the World Humanitarian Summit (World

Humanitarian Summit Secretariat, 2015), and various side events promoting the topic in preparatory conferences.

We refer to this not just about disasters and conflict, but about the nexus of risk. We used to push this nexus internally and externally, including with our own conflict prevention team and governance colleagues. But there was no willingness for about 2 years to discuss this. We tried to feed the issue of disasters and conflict into the SDGs High Level Panel and their narrative on risk governance, and tried to get the peacebuilding colleagues on-board – but there was absolutely no willingness to engage… sometimes we see movement, from individuals within the World Bank, or in discussions on the New Deal, but fundamentally, the conflict community has not been used to thinking about natural hazards as a consequence of conflict or vice-versa. (Respondent 1).

But Member States repeatedly decided to separate conflict from disasters – in the Sustainable Development Goals, Paris Agreement on climate change, World Humanitarian Summit commitments, and the Sendai Framework. The reasons for this stemmed from the definitions of a hazard, the confines of UN mandates, and the reality that the Sendai Framework is the outcome of a political negotiation (discussed further below).

2.1.2. Definitions and politicisation

The politicking of the terms 'fragile' and 'conflict' were laid bare during the Sendai Framework negotiations. Matured from its predecessor – the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 (UNISDR, 2005) – the Sendai Framework moved from an *output-* to an *outcome*-orientated structure, with which many expected to see a greater focus on a more nuanced understanding of the drivers of vulnerability and risk, and the operational contexts in which the framework is to be delivered.

Drawing on recent experiences of major humanitarian responses to disasters in difficult contexts, emerging evidence (e.g. Peters and Budimir, 2016), civil society advocacy by Tearfund, World Vision, Concern Worldwide and others, and the inclusion of conflict in regional inputs to the drafting process (including the African contribution),[12] a select group of Member States (including the United Kingdom and Norway) argued for the

inclusion of conflict and fragility, specifically as a driver of vulnerability to disasters. But these states were met with strong resistance, including from Jordan and Egypt.

This resistance stemmed from several practical concerns and political positions. There was debate over terminology – notably whether the term 'hazards' included conflict (UNISDR, 2009) – and discussion around whether there was enough robust evidence on the links between disasters and conflict. The term 'under foreign occupation' became entangled with certain phrases referring to 'conflict', which created much discomfort for some countries (including Israel and the United States) and which featured in early drafts of the text but was eventually removed during the negotiation process.

DRR in conflict-affected contexts has not explicitly been tackled for institutional reasons. The mandate of UNISDR under the Hyogo Framework for Action was focused on natural hazards but also explicitly not conflict. This is grounded institutionally within the UN system. Sendai has broadened the scope of hazards, but explicitly mentions not including conflict. (Respondent 6)

Guiding the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015, the UNISDR terminology report defined a 'hazard' as a 'dangerous phenomenon, substance, human activity or condition that may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic disruption, or environmental damage' (UNISDR, 2009: 17),[13] which leaves scope for the inclusion of conflict. But shortly after the Sendai Framework was agreed and signed, and after fierce debate in Geneva at the Open-Ended Working Group on Terminology and Indicators, this definition of hazard was revised[14] and a strong note of clarification added: 'This term does not include the occurrence or risk of armed conflicts and other situations of social instability or tension which are subject to international humanitarian law and national legislation' (UNISDR, 2017).

During the Sendai Framework negotiations, there were also concerns that the term 'conflict' would unnecessarily politicise the DRR agenda – counter to the strategic use of the neutral presentation of disasters as 'natural' events. As two respondents explained:

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12 African Union et al. (2014).

13 With the accompanying comment: 'Comment: The hazards of concern to disaster risk reduction as stated in footnote 3 of the Hyogo Framework are "… hazards of natural origin and related environmental and technological hazards and risks." Such hazards arise from a variety of geological, meteorological, hydrological, oceanic, biological, and technological sources, sometimes acting in combination. In technical settings, hazards are described quantitatively by the likely frequency of occurrence of different intensities for different areas, as determined from historical data or scientific analysis' (UNISDR, 2009: 17).

14 'A process, phenomenon or human activity that may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, social and economic disruption or environmental degradation' (UNISDR, 2017).

Donor countries [in favour of inclusion of DRR and conflict] tend to include the European Union and Switzerland – they are normally interested in promoting this issue and also promoted this in Sendai. But where the resistance comes from is mainly G77 countries. It becomes a political discussion as [the G77] see DRR as a sustainable development issue, whereas conflict or even humanitarian narratives are seen as interventionist and are highly politicised – and so this is seen as a politicising of DRR, which is a development issue. (Respondent 5)

Maybe people feel it's too politically sensitive. If you're meeting humanitarian needs, you can go under a neutral mandate. But if you're doing DRR you're looking at reducing vulnerabilities – and looking at causes – and the minute you look at causes you're going into a politically contested area. You're working in areas where there is very little political space. Maybe that's why people shy away. (Respondent 4)

This concern goes both ways, with many respondents explaining that 'disasters *are* political'. The concern during negotiations was that emphasising the political connection might risk some Member States not signing up to the agreement, and that the Sendai Framework could be used to legitimise interventions with geopolitical implications, associated with the idea that the Sendai Framework could be used to invoke the UN Responsibility to Protect.[15]

…my reading of this is that it's not really substantive or for technical reasons, its political. Some member States may feel like they don't want DRR and sustainable development to be 'contaminated' [by conflict] … States are worried that donors could use DRR as an entry point to do other things that are more political – as a gateway to other interventions. Member States are trying to prevent this 'politicisation' of the DRR agenda. (Respondent 5)

Conflict and fragility were 'negotiated out' of the final text of the Sendai Framework (Respondent 4), and the distinction between disaster and conflict reaffirmed.

We advocated for [conflict] in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, because we were advocating for a framework that reflects local realities – and risk to disasters are greatest in areas where conflict exists. We argued for [conflict] to be embedded into the Sendai Framework – to explicitly recognise the challenge of reducing disaster risk in fragile and conflict affected states. It was initially in the preparatory documents. It

was raised at the regional and global consultations. It did appear in the zero drafts, but got negotiated out. We tried to counter this, but for some countries it was a red line. (Respondent 4)

2.1.3. Bound by mandates?

The separation of hazards from conflict in part reflects and respects the mandates of UN entities and the division of responsibility (of UNISDR for natural hazard-related disasters, the UN Security Council for peace and security, and UNFCCC for climate change, for example). This 'fragmentation of the system' (Respondent 4) was cited as a reason for the lack of integration between the disaster and conflict agendas:

There's … narrow thematic divisions of the problem. There's a lack of ability to put issues of risk together or to get a broader shared vision for how to address them. Resilience can be a convenor to bring together siloed approaches, but this requires political leadership. Agencies are bound by their mandates e.g. UNFCCC, UNISDR, UNDP etc. all these are connected but the mandates prevent more integrated and holistic thinking. (Respondent 4)

The Sendai Framework negotiations saw constant reiteration of the need to uphold these mandates – specifically that of UNISDR's focus on natural hazard-related disasters. This, combined with the Japanese hosts' similar desire to focus on natural hazards (in part related to the pacifist Japanese constitution)[16] and the desire to secure a maximum number of signatories to the final text, eventually saw all references to conflict (and related terms of fragility and violence) removed from the final draft of the Sendai Framework.

There are many indexes showing fragile and conflict affected states are often also those which have high losses due to disaster risk. This was presented in 2011 [in the Global Assessment Report] but without presenting solutions. This has been discussed again and again, but for UNISDR for institutional reasons, for mandate reasons, they have never made an investment in this properly. (Respondent 6)

For many championing the need to take conflict seriously as an impediment to addressing disaster vulnerability, the failure to include conflict in the Sendai Framework was a significant missed opportunity, and its absence from follow-up discussions notable:

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15 Interviews conducted with UN Member States at the Sendai Conference in Japan, 2015.

16 Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution.

I work with Member States to find durable solutions to crises. When I attended the Africa Regional Platform [for DRR in 2017] I was completely taken aback to find that conflict was completely absent from the discussions. If the Framework is looking at DRR, conflict needs to be a part of the discussion it the context of Africa. (Respondent 3)

2.1.4. Conflict as a driver of vulnerability

But while definitions and mandates may preclude engagement 'in' conflict, this does not adequately address the lack of recognition of fragility and conflict as an *underlying driver of vulnerability* to disaster risk. Instead, the projection of a compartmental, binary construct of risk is at odds with evidence on the relationship between risks and vulnerabilities of crises. And though vulnerability studies lag behind the emphasis on hazards over the past 40 years,[17] the neglect of fragility and conflict in natural hazard-related disaster studies is in contrast to wider academic and political debates, which increasingly seek to better understand the interplay between risks and vulnerabilities at large (Shepherd et al., 2013; WEF, 2017).

I wonder if the mandate issue is a screen. It's an easy way to block movement towards something. I've often heard disaster-conflict being discussed. Then, all of a sudden, it is always pushed out. I've heard UN agencies pushing for inclusion of the conflict and links to disasters, but it has never really received much traction within policy processes. (Respondent 7)

It is not our intention to detail the links between natural hazard-related disasters and conflict in this report – that has been done elsewhere (see Peters et al., 2013; Fan et al., 2016). A compilation of examples in Peters et al. (2013) offers some insights into the relationship between natural hazard-related disasters and cases of conflict, fragility and violence. Despite there being a fragmented evidence base pointing towards no clear causality between disasters and conflict, '[t]he literature displays a common finding… the relationship between disasters and conflict can be mutually reinforcing—that disasters that occur in conflict-affected and fragile contexts are likely to exacerbate the impacts and fault-lines of that conflict, while the impacts of a disaster, such as food insecurity and disruption of markets, have the potential to reinforce drivers of conflict"' (in Fan et al., 2016: 12).

With its mandate to pursue effective DRR for those most vulnerable to disasters – which not only includes, but applies particularly to people in FCAC – UNISDR should be mobilising the DRR community to understand how, and in what ways, DRR can be effectively pursued in FCAC.

Moreover, the failure to explicitly recognise the challenges of FCAC has left the Sendai Framework open to criticism of being conflict-blind and fails to provide the space in which special provisions can be made for the additional challenges presented by trying to pursue DRR in certain contexts (for example, where there is not the functional authority, institutional capacity or political legitimacy to provide basic risk reduction and management).

…this is not a new issue. UNDP tried to establish a new programme back in early 2008 on this issue, and put out an early publication on DRR and conflict. But its only when Member States embrace something that it will really go forward. (Respondent 1)

UNISDR are going through a restructuring. Whether the topic of DRR and conflict gets taken forward will depend on who takes forward the policy direction of UNISDR… It depends on who will have the guts to take this through. (Respondent 6)

With the Sendai Framework in operation, the new Special Representative to the UN Secretary-General, Robert Glasser, initially signalled increased openness to engage in dialogue about the links between disasters and conflict. But there is still little consensus within and beyond UNISDR on the extent to which UNISDR should support encouragement of discussions around fragility and conflict, even when framed narrowly in terms of the role fragility and conflict play in exacerbating vulnerability to disasters. With only one reference to conflict in the updated UN Plan of Action on Disaster Risk Reduction for Resilience (United Nations, 2017) and no reference to fragility, violence and security, this topic remains very much on the margins. Under a section on strengthening the UN system and effectiveness of DRR, the single reference says, 'The ability to assess and manage risk due to the interaction between hazards, their cascading effects, and links to the risk of conflict will be required' (United Nations, 2017: 9).

This is not a new topic, this is something that's been debated for some time. There's been push back from some Member States on linking disasters and conflict. Some UN agencies are pushing this forward. There have been key debates internally [within the UN system] on whether this should be part of the UN Plan of Action for Disaster Risk Reduction. Many operational agencies work in fragile countries and understand the complexities, but even within the UN Plan of Action on Disaster Risk Reduction there's nothing on conflict. There's only a very superficial reference. I'm curious as to why. I'm not sure where the push back is coming from. (Respondent 1)

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17 Reflection from the ODI event on 14th September 2017 celebrating 40 years of the *Disasters* journal.

The links between disasters and conflict were discussed by the Capacity for Disaster Reduction Initiative (CADRI). CADRI aims to build the capacity of the UN system on DRR and deliver on the Plan of Action (at a retreat to design their 2018-2020 strategy). We wait to see whether this, and/or the UN 's new agenda bringing together sustainable development, peace and security with human rights (Guterres, 2017), prompts a renewed focus on the inter-relationship of risks and vulnerabilities, and with this a spotlight on the relationship between disasters, fragility and conflict.

The DRR community hasn't thought about systems perspectives to addressing the drivers of risks. The DRR community need to articulate their work not in a technocratic fashion but to make the case from a systems perspective, looking at cross-sectoral linkages and how they fit into the system of risk and vulnerability as a whole. (Respondent 2)

2.2. The ability and willingness of governments in fragile and conflict-affected contexts to engage on DRR

2.2.1. Government buy-in

Common throughout the discourse – in written materials, dialogue and debates[18] – is a perception of low willingness and capacity to enact DRR within FCAC, and of the inevitability that progress will not be made:

When you're dealing with conflict situations, the absorption capacity of governments is a great hindrance to DRR and this is an inherent problem. This is one of the key characteristics that often obstructs the ability of the government to participate in DRR activities. (Respondent 8)

Low government capacity, low prioritisation of DRR in national priorities, a lack of incentives to engage key sectors, high staff turnover in government departments, and poor sectoral and departmental coordination were provided as explanations for why investing in DRR in FCAC is perceived as 'too difficult' and/or not worthwhile.

But governments of countries labelled as 'fragile or conflict-affected' do recognise the importance of building their resilience to natural hazard-related disasters and are prepared to commit to this at the highest level: all UN Member States endorsed the Sendai Framework at the General Assembly in June 2015.[19] Indeed, perhaps the

absence of the terms 'conflict' and 'fragility' made it easier for them to do so (see above).

Beyond this written commitment to delivering action on DRR, many UN Member States' inputs to the Sendai Framework also signalled a willingness and desire to discuss the compound nature of fragility, conflict and disaster risk. Discussions on the links between DRR and conflict prevention were explicit in the 2014 African preparatory conferences and regional ministerial outputs, for example (see Box 1). There were also calls for these links to be echoed in the global framework (Kellett, 2014).

Conflict was explicitly included as a driver of disaster risk in the African Regional Strategy 2014, which wasn't the case for the Hyogo Framework for Action. The Africa position was submitted for endorsement in the Sendai Framework, and the Africa group fought very hard for the inclusion of conflict in the Sendai Framework… I think this is because in Africa most conflicts have roots in natural hazards… so the link is strong. (Respondent 8)

2.2.2. Government capacity

Of course, willingness is one issue, active engagement in practice is another, as is capacity to deliver on commitments made at the international and national level through the Sendai Framework and national disaster management plans and policies. Moreover, in many developing countries local authorities simply do not have the means to implement national DRR policies at scale. Nor is there always the political will and/or institutional means to ensure accountability, compliance and enforcement of the existing DRR laws and regulations. This has led to growing concerns that urbanisation and development processes are creating new risks – a challenge not limited to FCAC, and concerns over the capacity to deliver even basic risk reduction measures. For example, one respondent with experience in Somalia said:

…a challenge we face is that we often work directly with governments and when working with governments we have to ask about their ability to absorb DRR activities – Somalia has great needs in terms of drought and climate change but the biggest challenge is the sustainability to implement DRR, and whether we have trusted interlocutors to work with. This all plays a part in our decision-making. (Respondent 8)

But while it is clear that institutional arrangements for DRR lack maturity in many FCAC, respondents felt that

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18 Personal communications at Global Platforms on DRR, regional DRR conferences and Ministerial meetings since 2014.

19 http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/69/283

there is an underestimation of the capacity – both real and latent – and willingness to engage with governments on DRR. Much progress has been made over the decade of the Hyogo Framework, including in contexts where significant challenges in governance have been experienced, albeit at a much slower pace (Wilkinson and Peters, 2017).

In the last 5-7 years, a number of African counties have shifted DRR from emergency management to the Departments of Planning or to the Prime Minister's Office, to be seen as a priority, and as a development activity that needs more than just response after a disaster hits. (Respondent 8)

What neither the primary or secondary evidence revealed is a nuanced understanding of the conditions in which components of DRR could progress. We know little about how varying conditions of fragility and conflict present opportunities for, or barriers to, establishing, maintaining or maturing DRR. It is clear that different ways of working may be required, and it is this knowledge and experience that has not yet been collated. For example, how can DRR be pursued when the national government is not a viable entry point? And how can National Disaster Management Agencies be supported to progress action on DRR when political power changes, preventing or stalling the approval of updated disaster management laws – as was the case for Nepal and Fiji over the lifetime of the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 (Peters, 2017)?

Within fragile or weak government environments – approaching DRR will need to be done in a different way. More thinking will need to be done to work with countries where we have these types of situations, especially where the main player for DRR action is not the national government. Because of the need for the UN to work with government, DRR becomes more complex. Regional [UN] offices are hesitant to engage too deeply with DRR in these situations, as it would circumvent our main [government] counterparts. (Respondent 6).

2.3. The state-centric nature of conventional approaches to DRR

2.3.1. DRR's focus on the state

The state continues to be viewed as the primary arbiter for delivering DRR measures, and conventional DRR approaches are predominantly state-centric, as noted by interviewees:

The entire DRR system is geared towards working with state structures. Organisations do work with non-state actors on tangible deliverables rather than working on building long term resilience structures. Donors and INGOs often don't recognise how to work with non-state actors. (Respondent 10)

As a result, there is still an overwhelming focus on using national government structures – including national disaster management policy and national platforms – in protecting citizens from natural hazards. This focus comes partly from a history of DRR that is rooted in civil protection and centralised command-and-control structures (Peters et al., 2017), with civilian assistance and protection a primary sovereign responsibility. With good reason, a significant proportion of the DRR literature presents an ideal end-game for an effective DRR system predicated on the nation-state architecture, with decentralised modalities for operationalisation. This is reinforced through the international policy architecture, with the Sendai Framework operating through the representation of UN Member States.[20]

There is a growing concern that narrowly defined state-driven DRR policies and practices are simply not relevant and/or appropriate for the complex, informal and uncertain local risk realities in which the vast majority of poor people on the planet live and work. Alternative entry points are required.

2.3.2. Finding alternative entry points

States, their composition, and the supporting institutional and governance arrangements are routinely in a state of flux. But while mainstream DRR practice has become accustomed to planned changes in political leadership, there is little evidence or experience of how to pursue and maintain progress on DRR where the relevant institutional arrangements are largely absent or contested, as can be the case in FCAC: '…there are concerns about working with the governments in conflict-affected contexts. Where there is too much fragility, it's hard to build DRR programmes' (Respondent 11). Where an effective and functioning government are not in place, and/or where such structures do not exist, we need to be searching for alternatives.

Some respondents pointed to concerns that in FCAC the 'social contract' between state and citizens (as duty bearers and rights holders, respectively) may be limited or undermined. In FCAC the social contract can be attacked, weakened or, at worst, deliberately abused or exploited to increase vulnerabilities, maintain political patronage and advance elites agendas. In such contexts, the call for developing a range of methodologies and approaches appropriate for different contexts may be viable.

Yet respondents struggled to articulate what alternative models for enabling effective DRR could look like when state-level governance structures are not in place. It was claimed that ex-ante actions to reduce disaster risk were not feasible, as functioning and effective state-level governance structures were a necessary prerequisite for DRR (ergo 'not the time or place for DRR just yet').

…there needs to be a change of mindset within the development community if they are to effectively target the most vulnerable. And to work at different levels more effectively… the emphasis on working through country systems has been narrowly interpreted. (Respondent 2)

This view was countered by some who felt that DRR may be viable and appropriate in some FCAC, including those where DRR practitioners don't conventionally focus their attention (documented examples include Afghanistan,[21] South Sudan,[22] Mali,[23] and Somalia[24]). Such cases primarily use sub-national, community-level entry points.

Even if DRR isn't related to state infrastructure, you can always find ways to support DRR through community infrastructure. We can observe the way people are living and organising themselves despite long-term instability and find ways to support them to cope with disasters, while they 're already coping with instability and conflict. (Respondent 11)

Organisations do work with non-state actors on tangible deliverables rather than working on building long-term resilience structures. (Respondent 10)

There is a wealth of activity and experience in supporting community-based DRR in FCAC, primarily through NGO-led initiatives. And with state-building theories increasingly recognising that states are not uniform and that it is possible to identify actors to work with even within relatively weak apparatus, there could be opportunities to develop models that better suit 'unconventional' institutional arrangements and governance structures in FCAC.

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20 Attempts to bring non-state voices to the negotiating table, alongside the formal UN Major Groups, include advocacy calls for there to be formal representation of civil-society actors as a Major Group.

21 http://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/afghanistan-disaster-risk-management-and-resilience-program

22 http://www.braced.org/about/about-the-projects/project/?id=4dfc5e51-173e-4fe6-a97a-7edc5bb515d1

23 http://www.braced.org/about/about-the-projects/project/?id=a0aeab18-96a9-4cb7-84b0-3c6ddd5f4493

24 http://www.somrep.org/

We are missing something by working in fragile states with our old tools and looking for institutional frameworks – we should be looking at what exists and how we can work around or with this. (Respondent 11)

2.4. Prioritisation of peace and security over the pursuit of DRR in fragile and conflict-affected contexts

2.4.1. Institutional stability as a starting point

It is often repeated – and was echoed by respondents – that when a state is particularly fragile, DRR will not be a top priority for donors or implementing agencies (Mitchell and Smith, 2011: 43).

The assumptions and anecdotal evidence suggest that stability is needed to pursue conventional approaches to DRR, particularly those which adopt state-centric entry points. This leads to a tacit prioritisation of peace and security over DRR in FCAC.

Maybe people feel it is too insecure, that conflict has to be resolved first. (Respondent 4)

Aida Mengistua, Deputy Head of Office for OCHA for East and Southern Africa, reflecting on work in Somalia and South Sudan, felt that 'you need stable institutions in place to work sustainably on DRR. That's not the case in South Sudan, for example'. Similarly, when setting priorities for development, it has been noted that establishing 'basic political legitimacy and order is an essential first step' (Grindle, 2004: 537).

But there is little robust evidence to support – or refute – the need for institutional stability as a foundation for DRR; we know very little about different DRR approaches that might be appropriate for application in contexts in different states of fragility and conflict.

I always hear the same thing: "we can't talk about DRR or risk reduction when in a conflict state, as conflict is a priority". This is where we need evidence – I'm not sure about this assumption. What do people do about addressing chronic risk under a state of conflict or fragility? (Respondent 10)

By extension, there is a dearth of practical experience on how best to sustain DRR support in situations of dramatically changing leadership. A report published by ODI demonstrates how in Nepal and Fiji, political instability and government regime change – including to military rule – significantly curtailed progress on DRR legislative reform (Peters, 2017). Furthermore, in Fiji, the National Disaster Management Office shifted the focus of its risk reduction measures towards those of civil-military relations in times of response during the Fijian period of military rule (Peters, 2017). And yet the DRR community is virtually silent on how to support a shift in ex-ante DRR approaches to reflect changing political realities such as this.

This is a nascent area of work – there is an acute lack of evidence or conceptual grounding to articulate the types of DRR that are viable and appropriate for states of fragility and conflict. Calls to invest more in conflict prevention and risk management from the United Nations and World Bank (United Nations and World Bank, 2017) could offer ideas on how to pursue investment in FCAC, which could be adapted to DRR, but the operational question of how best to sequence and prioritise the management of different types of risk remains a deeply debated one, especially when there is an immediate threat to life.

2.4.2. Prioritising an immediate threat to life

Discourse suggests that DRR is not appropriate and should not be pursued in an area of active conflict. Reflecting on an initiative to create a development plan in addition to a humanitarian plan in South Sudan, Aida Mengistua, Deputy Head of Office for OCHA for East and Southern Africa, felt that the initiative would have been the avenue through which institutions could have provided space for engaging on issues of risk reduction, but 'given the fragility that's just not feasible. And as far as the funding environment is concerned, lifesaving is the priority in South Sudan and Somalia'.

Many donors say DRR programming isn't a priority, not while you can save lives every day in places like Syria, for example. Donors understand their job of [funding] immediate response – in crisis situations. The impact of DRR is long term. We, as practitioners, want to move away from immediate response, and be able to say that we've prevented the loss of life. This [way of thinking] hasn't translated into the donor community yet. (Respondent 9)

Broadly speaking, in relatively stable contexts that experience an escalation of active conflict, the focus will shift to mobilising a robust diplomatic and/or humanitarian response, especially where there is actual, or potential for, immediate loss of life. Examples from the Philippines in 2013 illustrated that when fighting armed militias and facing food insecurity, governments and recipients lose interest in DRR (Walch, 2013: 12, 15). Taken in its simplest form, this is logical; in an active conflict area, stabilisation, protection of civilian life and the restoration of peace, security and order take precedence. With DRR historically rooted in humanitarian practice, the need to prioritise critical, life-saving responses is well understood as part of the humanitarian imperative – particularly over longer-term risk reduction activities.

But such oversimplification undermines the complexity, state of flux and nuance with which contexts – and indeed,

individuals – experience different risks and vulnerabilities, often simultaneously:

Of course, we wouldn't go into a conflict affected area and say "let's prepare for an earthquake that might happen in the next 50 years", but if we have a more nuanced understanding of resource degradation, long-term drought etc, then of course [DRR] becomes a bigger priority. (Respondent 9)

2.4.3. DRR as a convener for peace

Though limited, there is some evidence that points to DRR as a convening and supporting mechanism for strengthening dialogue across conflicting fractions. There is also an emerging body of evidence on 'disaster diplomacy' (Kelman, 2011), which draws on a small selection of cases often cited as evidence of the opportunities for establishing peace in post-disaster situations (such as the debated case of Ache following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami).

…after conflict, there is a window of opportunity. DRR is not perceived as being political [by many States], so it can be used as a convening sector. This happened after an earthquake in Tajikistan, where the window of opportunity was used to promote dialogue across divided communities. (Respondent 9)

[Bringing together DRR and conflict] is not just something that you have to do: we can use DRR and adaptation as a vehicle and conduit for conflict resolution and conflict prevention. That's the value of it. If left, [disasters] exacerbate the conditions that can get contexts into conflict. (Respondent 10)

For many, the tacit hierarchy of priorities is becoming outdated. The compartmentalisation of risks is being increasingly challenged by a move to focus on the multidimensional nature of vulnerability and long-term protracted crises:

There's a perception that these things are separate issues. That crises are separate from development. That disasters are separate from development. Rather than really understanding that these things are manifestation of failings in our development processes. (Respondent 4)

The outcomes of the World Humanitarian Summit (World Humanitarian Summit Secretariat, 2015), including the 'Grand Bargain', are testament to a move to focus on the cyclical nature of risk, protracted crises and, in response, revisiting the relationship between development and humanitarian action. More recently, the UN Secretary-General's refocusing of the UN system towards sustainable development and peace (Guterres, 2017) is also being

seen as an opportunity to better pursue questions of compound risk and vulnerability. Ongoing research at the Social Science Research Council is exploring how DRR and the Sendai Framework could serve as a basis for conflict prevention (Stein and Walch, 2017). This will be an important line of enquiry over the next three to five years.

Disasters can trigger a conflict, but the best approach is if we can – through DRR – avoid disasters instigating a conflict. (Respondent 5)

2.5. The capacity of DRR actors to work in fragile and conflict-affected contexts

2.5.1. The potential for knowledge sharing

It has been argued that donors and implementing agencies may be hesitant to invest in FCAC because of the belief that in active conflict or violent settings, DRR experts will be ill-equipped to respond to the unique challenges presented. The basis for this is that practitioners and experts working in risk reduction often have very different formal training even within the DRR community, let alone in comparison to conflict management specialists (Interagency Resilience Learning Group, 2014: 3). Conflict and disaster communities come from 'different worlds' (with roots in socio-political and natural sciences, respectively) with different terminology, approaches and experiences, and concerns abound that DRR practitioners do not always receive adequate training to engage with conflict (Murphy, 2015; Grafe et al., 2011: 17, 27).

It cannot be taken for granted that individuals will be able to adapt their programmatic approaches to situations of conflict 'just by common sense' (Grafe et al., 2011). This sentiment highlights the operational divide that exists between DRR and conflict management and peacebuilding (Feinstein International Centre, 2013: 16; Walch, 2010: 3; Grafe et al., 2011: 41), but also suggests possibilities for formal training and knowledge sharing to bridge this gap.

We [the DRR community] need to learn more from those people who are working on issues of peace, state building and conflict resolution. Those organisations that work on these sensitive issues have developed tools and approaches to work in these difficult areas, which we need to learn from. The system is fragmented and we have to actively reach out. (Respondent 4)

The respondents' understanding and perceptions of the suitability and capacity of DRR actors working in FCAC was multifaceted. Respondents cited examples of effective response to disasters in active conflict contexts – including Afghanistan, Somalia and Sudan – which demonstrate a certain degree of experience and knowledge within the DRR community. What's less clear is whether longer-term,

ex-ante DRR approaches can or should be adapted for operation in FCAC; and if they should, where the intention would lie along a continuum from 'doing no harm' through to active engagement in conflict dynamics (see section 2.6). Where an agency situates itself along that continuum will significantly affect the types of knowledge and skills required to work effectively and safely in FCAC.

2.5.2.   Operational safety and feasibility

Donors and practitioners face a difficult choice between balancing staff safety and project feasibility with assisting the most vulnerable to disasters. Interviewees pointed to a willingness to gain access in remote and challenging areas for emergency response by humanitarian actors and to the feasibility of doing this, but less so for long-term DRR interventions (in cases that these are funded independently from a response operation). Where DRR activities have been implemented, FCAC present challenges in accessing vulnerable communities and households, and in ensuring staff safety (Walch, 2013:13; Mitchell and Smith, 2011: 43). Political sensitivities, communal tensions and armed conflict itself can render certain areas off-limits to practitioners. International NGOs working on DRR in the Philippines in 2013, for example, noted that security concerns in the Taytayan region presented a significant obstacle to their work and heavily influenced where they could operate (Walch, 2013 :13).

Considerations of access, protection and staff safety in areas of active armed conflict are amplified by the continued trend of concerning statistics showing attacks on aid convoys and the increasingly dangerous nature of aid delivery. In the last decade, over 220 aid workers have been killed, injured or kidnapped each year in humanitarian contexts – this figure rose as high as 475 in 2013 and has remained high, with 288 aid worker victims in 2016 (Stoddard et al., 2017). Research indicates that the more violence there is in a conflict zone, the fewer aid projects in operation, even though the need for them may be many times greater (Stoddard et al., 2016).

Many tools are available to help inform decisions about whether working in certain areas is feasible and safe, and how best to engage with actors on the ground (Mitchell and Smith, 2011: 43; Frankenberger et al., 2012). Practitioners can change the way they access their target group, for example by forging strong partnerships with national and local organisations which could also help to build trust between the local community and DRR teams (Twigg, 2015: 290-291; Haddad, 2009). The use of flexible programming approaches has been identified as one way to help practitioners alter the scale at which they are working if circumstances make certain modes of operation difficult or unsafe (Twigg, 2015: 290-291). Thorough conflict analysis and innovative ways of engaging with non-state armed groups may be needed to undertake DRR intervention in FCAC (Walch, 2014), depending on the level of ambition of a project to engage on, or around, conflict.

2.6.   Should DRR practitioners should work *on*, or *around*, conflict?

2.6.1.   The 'continuum of intent'

The extent to which agencies are willing to proactively engage with conflict as part of their DRR work varies considerably. This has been characterised as a 'continuum of intent' (Harris et al., 2013; 28): 'At one end of the continuum DRR is seen as a vehicle for enacting conflict prevention objectives; at the other end, agencies work 'around' conflict dynamics, but often adopt "Do No Harm" principles' – a concept which explicitly recognises that aid is a resource which can intersect with power dynamics in conditions of conflict, thus deep contextual analysis is required to inform and monitor progress to ensure an intervention avoids negative (unintended) impacts on a context (Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, 2004; Anderson, 1999; Swiss Peace, 2012). The continuum has been updated to include recognition that some agencies are not actively adapting their DRR approaches to FCAC, and this may unintentionally exacerbate drivers of conflict.

The primary interviews reveal a diversity of strong opinions about the scope of intent for DRR. Some respondents felt that issues of peace and conflict should be separate from the technical design of a DRR intervention, considered discretly as part of the operating environment. Others believed fragility and conflict should be actively addressed though inclusion in the intended outcomes of DRR projects, with, for example, a conflict analysis forming an essential prerequisite of any DRR intervention.

> …there's a continuum and where you place yourself on the continuum depends on the context. If it's raining barrel bombs: there's no place for a conversation about DRR. But if you're thinking about instability there needs to be a discussion on DRR and adaptation because it's a time bomb… we need to look at where conflict is concentrated within a country, and not to look at an entire state but to look at pockets of fragility and where the conversation could be had and where there could be [DRR] work done. Afghanistan is one example where DRR was happening…. talking about DRR in a case like Syria will not get a lot of traction. It's somewhere in the middle of the continuum when there becomes an opportunity.

Regardless of respondents' views of where on the continuum of intent DRR activities should fall, almost all felt there was a professional responsibility to be more explicit about the conflict dynamics within an area of operation. Explanations varied from conveying to donors how difficult some operating contexts are, to better

protecting staff, to learning more about the possibilities of DRR in supporting and sustaining peace, to achieving a greater awareness of the possible intended and unintended impacts of DRR programmes on the wider context.

2.6.2. Making DRR conflict-sensitive

Application of tried-and-tested approaches such as Do No Harm (Anderson, 1999) and conflict-sensitive approaches (Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, 2004) to the delivery of aid could offer a means to ensure that DRR interventions avoid unintended negative impacts on drivers of conflict, and offer the potential to improve the delivery and sustainability of the intended DRR outcomes. Examples from conflict-affected areas in Ache, Darfur and East Africa reveal that there is a danger of doing more harm than good if technocentric approaches to climate and disaster challenges are adopted that neglect the political realities of the context in which interventions are delivered (Levine et al., 2014). This suggests working at the middle of the continuum is a bare minimum (Figure 1), i.e. to Do No Harm.

> …*where we've made progress is on where natural hazards contribute to fragility, but less on how development interventions including DRR can be a positive force for conflict prevention – or if structured wrongly, accentuate or make existing conflict drivers even worse.* (Respondent 1)

2.6.3. The demand for practical guidance

To understand the guidance being given to DRR practitioners about operating in FCAC, we analysed the extent to which 24 mainstream DRR and disaster resilience toolkits recognised conflict as an important consideration for DRR work. The analysis reveals a mixed picture:[25] 8 of the toolkits did not significantly engage with or discuss conflict, 12 encouraged engagement in conflict management activities, 10 encouraged engagement in conflict resolution, 9 toolkits encouraged either indirect or direct involvement of DRR practitioners in peacebuilding activities.

Far fewer toolkits advocated more middle-ground approaches when it came to engaging with conflict. There is clearly polarisation in the DRR field between those that don't significantly adjust their ways of working to account for the role of fragility and conflict in DRR, and those that feel it is so important they actively recommend practitioners to engage with it to the fullest extent. Only 7 of the toolkits encouraged the incorporation of conflict sensitivity, and even fewer (5) explicitly advocated the Do No Harm principles.

Tellingly, only 9 of the toolkits that did explicitly engage with the role of conflict in DRR provided practical advice on how to implement the activities they recommended, again raising the question of the skills and capacity of DRR professionals to work in these contexts (section 2.5). When it did come, this advice was in the form of guiding questions, checklists, suggested resources, frameworks and workshop formats.

> …*as a team we've tried to get to grips with what is means [the disaster and conflict link] at the country level. We haven't translated what we know is a complex issue into guidance to country colleagues i.e. to say this*

Figure 1. Continuum of intent: disaster risk reduction and conflict prevention

Source: adapted from Harris et al. (2013).

No (intentional) engagement		Indirect engagement	Pro-active engagement
No adaptations to DRR programme are made	**Integrate Do No Harm principles**	**Apply conflict-sensitive approaches**	**Apply conflict prevention, management, resolution or peacebuilding strategies**
Risk of unintentionally exacerbating the drivers of conflict	Working 'around' conflict, seeking to do no harm but not actively addressing conflict dynamics	Understand the context, and the interaction of an intervention and the context, and seek to maximise positive impacts on the conflict	Actively seeking to use measures to promote peace and prevent conflict

25 Analysis conducted with the support of Rebecca Holmes, an independent researcher.

is the way we're going to address this issue.
(Respondent 1)

Many organisations – if they follow the advice of these toolkits – are trying to incorporate conflict management and resolution measures into the design of their DRR programmes (Feinstein International Centre, 2013: 18). But operational engagement of DRR in FCAC will require improved practical guidance on how to mainstream conflict sensitivity and management techniques into current ways of working.

The two spheres [DRR and conflict prevention] are resistant to talking to each other. We need to come up with conceptual frameworks, then move on to develop new tools and approaches for putting ideas into practice. These are not mutually exclusive issues. I've seen the demand. In practice, everyone is talking about it and asking for concrete guidance. Local CSOs are all struggling with these issues all the time.
(Respondent 10)

2.7. The politics and practice of combining approaches to DRR and peace

We need to disentangle fact from fiction, and to document case studies to understand the relationships between disasters and conflict. (Respondent 5)

2.7.1. 'Siloed thinking' and 'siloed approaches'

The separation of policy-makers, practitioners and technical experts working on disaster and on conflict has prevented a comprehensive dialogue about what combining approaches and ambition could look like, including the relative benefits and limitations. Disaster management and conflict management are distinct in approach, terminology, experience and attitudes. However, their separation in practice prevents 'experimentation' which could see approaches designed for working in FCAC to create and sustain peace being applied to DRR practice, and equally the integration of DRR into conflict resolution and peacebuilding approaches.

This lack of coalescence may in part be due to the perception that DRR actors cannot or should not be working in conflict-affected contexts. As one respondent noted: 'There's siloed thinking and siloed approaches. […] There's a misunderstanding by the conflict community on what DRR is – they think that we, the disasters community, sit around waiting for a disaster, then go in and respond. The links to conflict and fragility are not well understood, but should be' (Respondent 1). A better understanding of DRR approaches to vulnerability, risk and politics might reveal more commonality across the two communities of practice than is currently appreciated.

2.7.2. Diluting, or convoluting, existing agendas?

Another potential barrier is the feeling among donors and practitioners that DRR interventions could be compromised if they include aspects of conflict management (Feinstein International Centre, 2013: 16). For example, where it is believed that the neutrality of DRR actors may be a key part of their identity, involvement in the resolution of a conflict could jeopardise their mandate, may undermine local trust, and could result in staff being put in danger. There is also concern that integrating conflict analysis and management training would result in too much additional complexity (Grafe et al., 2011: 27; Interagency Resilience Learning Group, 2014: 1) when practitioners are already being 'squeezed between many other demands' (Grafe et al., 2011: 39).

…how much opportunity there is at a political level, to link DRR with conflict resolution and peacebuilding, or conflict sensitivity and Do No Harm, is too early to tell. Most of the time the agenda is overshadowed by current political crisis e.g. Syria. (Respondent 6)

Evidence from meetings between donors and implementers on this topic suggests that attempts to persuade some European donors to incorporate 'conflict' into DRR was met with resistance due to the rigidity of institutional structures (Interagency Resilience Learning Group, 2014: 3). As a result, little funding is invested in understanding what the relative benefits and limitations are in bringing together approaches. Some respondents even pointed to fears that the combining of themes would lead to budgets being combined and, as a result, reduced:

Funding for fragility and security issues, and peacebuilding, are separate from DRR. From a donor perspective, it is difficult to mix these portfolios. … I can imagine some countries pushing back as it may imply having less available budget from those donors if these issues start to merge and funding is brought together. That's partly why there's been a reluctance to put the issues [of DRR and conflict resolution] together. (Respondent 7)

2.7.3. Practical challenges

The overall lack of investment in developing a body of literature and practice is at odds with the continued perception of those working on the ground that there may be opportunities for achieving vulnerability reduction through combined programmatic approaches to reducing disasters and conflict. Interestingly, emerging evidence on the potential security impacts of climate change – including climate-related disasters – has led to a growing interest in the relative benefits of bringing together climate change adaptation and mitigation with approaches to peace and conflict (Tänzler et al., 2013, Rüttinger et al., 2015).

References to DRR in *A new climate for peace* (Rüttinger et al., 2015), for example, posit DRR as a form of upstream conflict prevention, helping to avert the potential negative implications for security of climate extremes and disasters.

But even if coalescence of DRR and conflict approaches were desired by operational agencies, implementation is an ambitious aim, beset with practical challenges beyond just funding. For practitioners wanting to blend DRR with conflict management, prevention, resolution and peacebuilding (the far-right of the continuum), for example, 'the guidance isn't there' (Respondent 4):

> *There's a separation between agencies on protection, peacebuilding and state-building. That tends to be done by different groups of actors to those on natural disaster reduction.* (Respondent 4)

There is also a lack of practical examples on which to draw, which was stressed by researchers from Kings College London as one limiting factor when examining approaches for integrating conflict sensitivity and resilience in Pakistan (Murphy, 2015). Donors, too, have cited the lack of detailed examples of what successful integration of these two fields would look like in practice as a reason for this reluctance (Interagency Resilience Learning Group, 2014: 3).

But the assertion and contention associated with combining DRR and conflict approaches is not only pragmatic; our findings reveal that perspectives on whether coalescence compromises DRR ambitions are influenced by individuals' experiences of different contexts, and the mandate and ambition of the agencies they work for. Different perspectives also originate from the more fundamental and conceptual differences among those working to reduce disaster risk – which are yet to come to the fore – related to the extent to which progress on DRR is also about addressing vulnerability as a driver of disaster risk (Wisner et al., 2003). Though addressing the root cause of risk and vulnerability is front and centre of the Hyogo and Sendai Frameworks, in some contexts discussion around vulnerability as a driver of disaster risk are still largely absent.

Without a defined community of practice on DRR in FCAC, progress and maturity of understanding of the relative feasibility and value-added of linking conflict and DRR objectives and approaches have been inhibited. Greater clarity is needed to understand what aspects of achieving and sustaining peace can be operationalised in relation to different aspects of DRR, and in which contexts. For example, what challenges and opportunities do FCAC present in disaster risk prevention, mitigation and preparedness? And what is the 'appropriateness of disaster risk management strategies for particular contexts given the complexity and uncertainty that conflict and fragility pose' (European Commission et al., 2011)?

2.8. Is there a lack of funding for DRR in fragile and conflict-affected contexts?

OECD analysis of aid per capita reveals that fragile states receive more than the average developing country (OECD, 2011), which is justified by their greater levels of need. Trends show that ODA is concentrated, with half of ODA to fragile states focused on eight countries (OECD, 2011). Between 2011 and 2014, fragile states received 64% of total ODA (OECD, 2016), although since the 2000s other sources of finance for fragile states, such as remittances and foreign direct investment, have been growing faster than ODA (OECD, 2016). From a DRR perspective, many believe that this money is not being channelled appropriately to risk reduction:

> *…most of the money for DRR goes to middle income and countries where we have low hanging fruit. Little money goes to fragile states for DRR. It's a donor driven issue – they don't look at DRR and conflict, they just focus on the issue of conflict. This is partly why development agencies haven't taken forward DRR in these contexts.* (Respondent 1)

Analysis of DRR through ODA reveals a mismatch between those contexts most vulnerable to disasters and those receiving investment for ex-ante DRR (Peters and Budimir, 2016). For example, Myanmar, Somalia, Afghanistan and Uganda all appeared among the 30 countries with the highest reported disaster deaths between 2005 and 2010, and all appeared in the list of top 30 recipients of humanitarian aid over the same period. But none of these four appears among the top 30 recipients of DRR assistance.

2.8.1. The lack of DRR funding

For many, a barrier to action is not DRR in FCAC *per se*, but the lack of funding for DRR by national governments the world over, and of funding by donors relative to the proportion spent on humanitarian and development aid. The perception (and the reality) remains that DRR still 'falls through the funding cracks' (Kellett and Caravani, 2013). With the exception of donors such as Japan, DRR has typically been a low priority, with as little as 40 cents invested in ex-ante risk reduction for every $100 spent on development aid over 20 years (Kellett and Caravani, 2013: vi).[26]

> *In political arenas and negotiations, particularly in New York, there is a tendency for G77 countries to keep conflict out of the DRR conversations. But that doesn't explain why there isn't enough investment in DRR in FCAS. Because bilateral donors don't need topics to be included in intergovernmental agreements before making investments.* (Respondent 5)

Restrictions on funding mechanisms for FCAC, in some contexts, may play a role in stemming the flow of (DRR) funding, as resource allocation is based partially on need and partially on performance – 'fragile states generally have higher needs, they also have weaker policies and institutions, which constrains their ability to absorb aid and use aid strategically to deliver transformative results' (OECD, 2011: 10).

2.8.2. Funding through development and development assistance

From the humanitarian perspective, funding for DRR is largely allocated as a proportion of humanitarian response; for every $100 spent on response between 2005 and 2010, just $1.30 was allocated to risk reduction (Peters and Budimir, 2016: 12). This is a general limitation of securing funding for DRR, with the sequencing of DRR often referred to as being 'too little, too late'. Moreover, the lack of earmarked funding for DRR often reduces the overall amounts spent on 'genuine' DRR work (Van Aalst et al. 2013), with a greater focus on disaster response than on prevention (Bond, 2015; Van Aalst, 2013: 5). For every $100 spent on response to disasters between 2005 and 2010, only a fraction was spent on ex-ante DRR – $0.08 in Somalia, $1.26 in Myanmar and $0.05 in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Peters and Budimir, 2016: 12-13).

The international humanitarian system frequently supports response to disaster situations where government capacity has been exceeded, or where adequate government response is not forthcoming. By their very nature, therefore, FCAC are often recipients of response funds. But conversely, it can also be the case that 'in some conflict affected contexts, governments don't ask for support to respond to disasters. This translates as no funding for DRR – as DRR is tied to humanitarian response' (Respondent 9).

Linking DRR to humanitarian funding can present 'red lines' for donors where sanctions are in place – '…though many recognise DRR as a development issue, this presents challenges when it comes to "fragile countries". For example, when sanctions are in place on development (as for Sudan), funding has to be purely humanitarian. (Respondent 8)

Funding risk reduction from humanitarian allocations also often means interventions are too short-term, thereby compromising their impact (Interagency Resilience Learning Group, 2014: 5; Bond, 2015). Research by the FAO High-Level Expert Forum has suggested that long-term funding (in the range of 6-10 years) may be a more appropriate timescale to address the root causes of vulnerability (Frankenberger et al., 2012); this is pertinent to DRR, which is partly a political endeavour. The principles of impartiality and neutrality (which the ICRC argues are at the basis of its access in conflict zones) present challenges for pursuing DRR under a humanitarian guise in FCAC. Indeed, addressing aspects of underlying vulnerability, such as the marginalisation of certain groups in conflict, might be seen by government as political and partial, putting operations and staff at risk and limiting the feasibility of delivering impactful results.

To deal with current and future disaster risk, DRR wisdom states that DRR should be mainstreamed across sectors and funded through multi-year investments. In FCAC, where humanitarian responses predominate, the option of linking DRR investments to longer-term development funding is limited. This is particularly problematic for FCAC such as Mali and Sudan, where disasters such as drought or flooding occur annually.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that piecemeal DRR activities are being implemented in FCAC under the guise of other sectoral labels, both intentionally and unintentionally. Actions which contribute to reducing disaster risk in FCAC may be labelled as natural resource management, for example, as is the case in Darfur (Harris, 2010), or food insecurity as in Niger and wider Sahel.[27] This may be a strategic response to the availability of funding, because of the need to use a more politically palatable entry point, for alignment with national priorities, or because a lack of Development Assistance Committee (DAC) code on DRR presents a barrier to and disincentive for tagging ODA as such.[28]

Conversations on the humanitarian–development nexus, instigated by the World Humanitarian Summit and pursued through the IASC Task Team and corresponding UN Development Group on the nexus, may provide space to reconsider how finance for DRR – possibly derived from development funds – can be channelled to FCAC, providing a means to pursue risk reduction over multi-year timeframes. Other options include the potential of climate change funding, discussed in the next section.

2.8.3. The potential of climate change funding

The links between climate change and disasters, and between DRR actions and climate change adaptation

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26 Tracking spending on DRR is notoriously challenging, in part because there has not been a Development Assistance Committee (DAC) marker, and many DRR actions can be labelled under other sectors/tags.

27 SAREL (no date) Sahel Resilience Learning Platform. (http://sarelresilience.net/sarel/).

28 The OECD in collaboration with UNISDR have devised a DRR marker which been presented in an initial form to the DAC without major objection. If the marker is agreed, it is expected to be operational within 2 years i.e. data may be ready by 2019.

actions (with overlaps in some hazard early warning systems, risk transfer, preparedness and response, and so on) provide opportunities for risk reduction activities to be funded through climate change adaptation funds. Due to their high degree of climate vulnerability and, in many cases, their least-developed country (LDC) status, many fragile and conflict-affected states are, in theory, target countries for climate financing.

In practice, however, access to and use of climate financing by the most vulnerable countries is proving to be a challenge, and countries with 'weak' governance – including many FCAC – are receiving low levels of funding (Rahman and Ahmad, 2015). Climate finance, like that for DRR, has tended to flow to middle-income countries and functioning democracies with good institutional performance (Halimanjaya, 2016; Betzold and Weiler, 2017; OECD, 2015).

The levels of climate change adaptation funding that are flowing to FCAC differ across the various multilateral funds. Preliminary analysis indicates that 19% of funding approved to date under the Adaptation Fund has been allocated to fragile states,[29] and that 22 of the LDCs to have received funding through the Least Developed Countries Fund are fragile states (CFU, 2017). Some of this funding is aimed at increasing the capacity of these countries to absorb and manage finance, before funds are received for adaptation actions (Tenzing et al., 2016).

The bias toward countries with good governance is due to stringent ODA allocation policy, which serves as a financial safeguard against corruption and financial mismanagement. Complex mechanisms that are challenging for countries with weak institutions to navigate also dissuade access (Halimanjaya, 2016). For example, direct access modalities requiring national implementing agencies to become 'accredited', combined with confusion regarding the requirement for climate financing to be 'new and additional' to development aid, have caused access problems (Tenzing et al., 2016; Masullo et al., 2015).

There is also reason to believe that bilateral climate investments are providing funds for DRR activities in FCAC when governments have simultaneously made commitments to the International Climate Fund and made FCAC a focus of aid strategies. For example, as a proportion of the UK's commitments to the International Climate Fund, the Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters (BRACED) delivers approximately £92 million in climate change adaptation and DRR projects in 13 countries,[30] many of which rank highly on the 2017 Failed States Index (including Sudan,

Chad, Ethiopia and Niger). Whether or not examples such as this are intentional is unknown.

There are of course a whole catalogue of funding instruments that work outside the traditional institutional funding models – remittances, private investment, zakat,[31] etc. – which require further exploration to better understand the extent to which risk financing is available and is invested formally and informally in DRR measures in FCAC.

2.9. Managing expectations of what can be achieved in DRR in fragile and conflict-affected contexts

2.9.1. The likelihood of setbacks

When designing DRR programmes, it is often assumed that consistently positive progress will be made and that the success of an intervention will naturally lead to, and reinforce, the success of others. This is continually reiterated in discourse and in programme design, log frames, and results reporting.

Experience shows this is not always the case, and the volatility of FCAC could make reversals in DRR progress more likely. Tearfund faced numerous setbacks while implementing DRR initiatives in Kandahar, Afghanistan in 2012, for example. As conflict in the country continued, DRR became less of a priority for the government, which increasingly mistrusted civil society organisations. As civil–state working relations eroded, Tearfund's access to disaster-affected areas was often restricted (Harris et al., 2013: 30). Of course, this challenge is not unique to the pursuit of effective DRR:

> …creating sustainable results in difficult environments where there is a lack of governance, stable government etc. – these challenges aren't only for the DRR community but for all interventions. (Respondent 9)

Setbacks, reversals of progress, or downward trajectories are common experiences in FCAC for all development ambitions, and this applies equally to DRR. This begs the question: what level of impact is it realistic to achieve from DRR in FCAC? At the moment, we simply don't know enough about how to undertake DRR in FCAC to answer this question.

> …when I was working on DRR in the Arab States, there was a period where extremely effective interlocutors

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29 Based on the list of the 30 most fragile states in the last five years, according to the Fragile States Index.

30 http://www.braced.org/contentAsset/raw-data/49e25440-a477-4754-be8a-0e37c3c3704b/attachmentFile

31 Zakat is a pillar of Islam in which a form of religious tax sees wealth distributed to those less fortunate.

were supporting strong DRR progress in Syria, with positive response despite significant drought at the time. They were very well set up, but when the war broke out it was the last thing on our mind to continue DRR. So even when we do succeed in DRR in fragile countries, an outbreak of conflict just sets us back. (Respondent 8)

2.9.2. Redefining expectations

In discussing the challenges of implementing DRR in FCAC, respondents often referred to unrealistic expectations on the part of donors, as well as a need to redefine practitioners' own expectations – both in terms of the impact of a DRR programme and, relatedly, how we measure and define successful outcomes. Some argue that DRR funding should be more risk-tolerant, given the unpredictable circumstances under which programmes are often implemented (Van Aalst et al., 2013: 16).

Anecdotal evidence suggests that the real challenges of achieving progress on DRR in FCAC are hidden from view due to the pressure to report positive progress to donors and protect organisational reputations, and because there is at present no supportive culture of learning from failure. This challenge is arguably found across the board in development[32] and is perceived to have been exacerbated over the past few years, with the increased focus of the UK and other donors on a results agenda and on value for money (Valters and Whitty, 2017).

There is no evidence of the effectiveness of money put to DRR in fragile states – we can invest significantly in some community programmes, but the conflict situation can wipe out this investment in a few minutes. This means we have to accept the risk of investing, but also accept that if we don't reduce the risk a humanitarian situation from escalating then we will have to deal with the consequences. (Respondent 10)

Uncertainty and regression of perceived or actual progress is not confined to the most volatile or conflict-affected contexts, but also affects those regarded as relatively stable and peaceful. A growing interest in adaptive programming within development practice is testament to the desire to find ways to adapt programmes in response to changes in the operating context (Valters et al., 2016). Adaptive programming recognises that: '…development actors may not be able to fully grasp the circumstances on the ground until engaged; that these circumstances often change in rapid, complex and unpredictable ways; and finally that the complexity of development processes means actors rarely know at the outset how to achieve a given development outcome – even

if there is agreement on the outcome of interest.' (Valters et al., 2016: 5)

The characteristics of adaptive programming – such as a focus on learning how an intervention and its context interact, or a focus on accountability for learning (Valters et al., 2016: 21) – could provide useful foundations for the pursuit of DRR in FCAC. These characteristics lend themselves to the design and delivery of interventions in such a way that internalises a 'learning by doing' approach, which is arguably essential to trialling DRR in FCAS.

Changes to the way we measure the impact of DRR in FCAC would also require changes in how DRR is monitored and evaluated, such as situating progress relative to the changing context, or developing conflict-sensitive indicators to measure accurately the impact of an intervention in the wider context of conflict and fragility (Grafe et al,. 2011: 37). The lack of integration of Do No Harm or conflict-sensitive approaches would be a necessary starting point – a topic on which DRR toolkits are largely silent at present (see Section 2.6.3).

This needs to be framed not as disasters as such, but as the 'ratchet effect' of the vulnerabilities that exposure to disasters create, when layered on top of fragile conditions if left unattended the consequences are clear. (Respondent 10)

Practitioners of DRR have remarked that volatility experienced in FCAC limited the scope of their work and restricted their programming to short-term interventions, because longer-term approaches weren't considered viable (Interagency Resilience Learning Group, 2014: 5). DRR practitioners may need to alter their activities and end goals to maximise the impact they can have in FCAC when operations may be punctuated by a changing conflict context. This could involve planning for more short-term, high-impact activities that can be integrated into longer-term projects later, under more stable circumstances (Mitchell and Smith, 2011: 46).

If we invest in fragile states we have to accept the timeframes which often restrict spending to 6 months or shorter. We have to be prepared to work with more appropriate [longer] time frames and be flexible to adapt to changing situations. (Respondent 11)

The reality is that the pursuit of DRR in FCAC may require donors to accept a higher level of investment risk, particularly in the early stages of this endeavour and until we know more about what can and cannot be achieved in different contexts. We turn next to the experiences of Concern Worldwide, who have pursued DRR in a number of FCAC.

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32 For an exploration of whether, in the UK context, the results agenda has gone too far, see: http://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/dfid-is-20-years-old-has-its-results-agenda-gone-too-far/

3. Experiences of delivering DRR in fragile and conflict-affected contexts

When talking to DRR experts about ex-ante DRR in FCAC, the response is nearly always the same – 'Yes, it's needed; I'm sure there are examples out there; but no, I don't know of any'. This translates into very low levels of awareness of what DRR practice in FCAC could look like, and the potential impact for people who are vulnerable to disasters who also live in locations experiencing fragility and conflict.

> *I haven't really seen any examples of good practice of DRR in conflict-affected contexts. I don't know if that's because they don't exist, or because they're not documented.* (Respondent 3)

> *We often get [conflict affected] countries saying they have good examples of DRR practice, but they're actually based on response to disasters, not the reduction of risk.* (Respondent 8)

> *Now I come to think of it, I'm not aware of any examples of best practice of DRR in fragile or conflict affected contexts.* (Respondent 5)

Is this lack of awareness of examples of DRR being tailored to FCAC pervasive, or does it reveal a disconnect between those in the international aid system and experiences on the ground? It is highly likely that a much broader set of interview respondents[33] would have produced a different set of perspectives, challenges and assumptions. As an extension to this work, it would be valuable to understand the perceptions and experiences of local and national governments, National Disaster Management Authorities operating in FCAC, community groups and affected communities.

Of those we did interview, many respondents had some knowledge of DRR programmes in countries where governance challenges prevail, including Afghanistan, Kenya, Myanmar, Pakistan and Sudan. Examples were cited of DRR being embedded into the Prime Minister's Office in Lebanon; of DRR action down to the local level in Ethiopia in areas frequently affected by conflict; of the integration of risk reduction in peacebuilding programmes in Karamoja, Uganda; and of disaster risk management projects in northern Sri Lanka in the context of communal violence and conflict.

Examples of linking relief aid with conflict prevention and DRR were cited from Honduras, East Timor and Syria, and respondents spoke of innovative means to pursue DRR in Afghanistan at the community level through eco-DRR (albeit in relatively peaceful provinces), and of DRR linked to natural resource management to reduce conflict in the context of drought and flooding in Darfur, Sudan. Experiences were also shared of 'workarounds' – past experiences where individuals were brought from South Sudan to Nairobi and to Addis Ababa to build their DRR capacity, thereby circumventing challenges related to security.

> *…the problem with the international community generally is that universal models and solutions being applied don't work in fragile situations – they can do more damage than good. The processes through which we frame and develop home-grown tools and mechanisms, that's where the work is really needed – rather than a universal understanding of how to deal with fragile institutions… deeper and contextual evidence that comes from specific case studies is what's needed.* (Respondent 10)

One operational agency seeking to address the gap in DRR in FCAC is Concern Worldwide. Concern have undertaken DRR in FCAC in a range of countries, including Somalia, Chad and Haiti (2nd and 8th and 11th, respectively, on the Fragile States Index 2017) (Fund for Peace, 2017). Drawing on Concern's experiences through three in-country case studies, this chapter reveals both opportunities for, and barriers to, the pursuit of DRR in FCAC.

Concern Worldwide produced the examples in this section. As detailed in the methodology, they are not independently verified, and are intentionally descriptive. The cases illustrate grounded examples of DRR in FCAC,

and link to a number of themes explored in section 2. A full and thorough documentation of experiences of DRR in FCAC – encompassing a diversity of experiences from local community groups, to sub-national government, through to multi-agency interventions and private investment – is urgently required, as is documentation of the various examples mentioned by interviewees (noted above). This is articulated in our recommendations (section 5).

3.1. Partnering with peace and reconciliation specialists: joint programming in Haiti

In 2009, Concern's Haiti team began work on an urban DRR programme to address vulnerability in Martissant, a heavily populated district south west of Port-au-Prince. Many of Martissant's residents live in informal settlements built along the ravines, and the area is prone to regular flooding and at high risk of landslides during the rainy season. Gang violence and endemic criminality are prevalent in the region, and are a significant obstacle to Concern's engagement with communities on DRR.

The presence of gangs restricted the access of NGOs in these areas and had forced the suspension of government services. Concern therefore set out to address conflict to gain access to vulnerable people, and as a key component of its DRR programme.

Concern uses community-based risk analyses to define the scope of its DRR programming, choosing activities based on whether they respond to risks identified by the community, and on whether Concern could effectively engage.

This approach means that no area of risk is considered inherently unsuitable for DRR, as long as it is at a scale that a DRR programme can realistically tackle. In the words of one Concern staff member: 'You can apply the wider logic of DRR to human-derived as well as natural hazards, you just have to be clear where your effectiveness ends'.

Organisationally, there was no theoretical objection to the idea of Concern Haiti tackling the risk of conflict within its DRR programme; but there was a question around how effectively the organisation could manage it. The team was aware that it lacked the necessary experience and skills in conflict resolution to interact with gang members. Concern therefore began its DRR work in Martissant by partnering with a specialist peace and reconciliation organisation, Glencree,[34] on a three-year programme to achieve a lasting reduction in violence.

Through dialogue and capacity strengthening, the programme supported local people – including former gang members – to tackle the drivers of conflict in their region. By building trust and establishing community peace committees, the programme also laid the foundations for subsequent work to address additional hazards within the community.

Once the peacebuilding programme had concluded, Concern followed up with more traditional DRR activities such as building drainage canals, soil conservation and reforestation to address the risk of flood. They also provided training and support to the Grand Ravine's Civil Protection Committee on disaster preparedness and mitigation.

The benefits of the joint DRR programme became apparent when Hurricane Matthew struck Haiti in October 2016. Community committees, supported by the programme, played a key role in ensuring the timely evacuation of people. Moreover, storm damage was significantly less than in surrounding areas, once again due to a combination of DRR structural measures and preparedness implemented through capacity-building of civil protection committees. After Haiti announced a red alert in advance of the oncoming hurricane, for example, the Concern-trained Local Civil Protection Committee of Martissant (CPLC) cleaned the main canals of the large amounts of waste that prevent an effective waste management and drainage system. The operation allowed water to fill the canals to their maximum levels, but not overflow. These benefits originated in large part from the original peacebuilding work undertaken by Glencree. The more traditional DRR activities were only possible due to a reduction in violence in the community and the access Concern could leverage; so, too, the work with the civil protection committees, which proved indispensable to preparedness and evacuation measures when Hurricane Matthew struck. Capacity-strengthening of community structures such as these would previously have been viewed by the gangs as a threat.

The programme was not without its challenges – while the inclusion of gang members in the programme was considered an important component of the peace-building process, it also led to perceptions of impunity among some people in the Martissant and the feeling that gang members were being absolved of past crimes.

Furthermore, although the peacebuilding component of the programme paved the way for wider programmatic benefits, this connection was not necessarily understood within the community. An independent evaluation found that future interventions of this sort should spend more time communicating how peacebuilding could be a catalyst for additional development gains, otherwise the wider benefits of working on conflict could easily be missed.

33 See the section on methodology at the beginning of this report.

3.2. A conflict-sensitive approach to drought and flood mitigation: working 'around' conflict in Somalia

Since 2013, Concern has been working in consortium with four other agencies[35] to build the resilience of people across 22 districts of southern and central Somalia. The Department for International Development (DFID) funded Building Resilient Communities in Somalia (BRCiS) aims to help communities withstand the impact of disasters without undermining their ability to move out of poverty. DRR is a central component of the programme.

Communities in the programme area are vulnerable to a range of hazards including drought and floods, and the programme includes activities designed to address these, such as farmer field schools, water point improvement, savings groups, hygiene promotion, pre-emptive cash transfers, and the commercialisation and distribution of fodder.

But in several regions, outbreaks of conflict also represent a threat, both to programming and to the communities with which Concern works. In keeping with Concern's approach to DRR, which considers human-derived hazards as well as natural hazard-related disasters, the programme aims to address these as well. Given the scale and complexity of the conflict in Somalia, BRCiS works indirectly on the conflict, taking a conflict-sensitive approach (Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, 2004). This means helping people to build resilience to the impacts of localised outbreaks of fighting, ensuring that other strands of programming focused on hazards such as drought and flooding can continue despite the volatility of the environment, and ensuring that Concern's activities do not inadvertently contribute to the dynamics of conflict.

This requires staff to have a strong and detailed knowledge of conflict dynamics in the regions where the programmes operate. BRCiS began in 2013, Concern's programmes in Somalia are rooted in several decades' experience of development and humanitarian delivery, and the BRCiS field team are all Somalis who understand the potential conflict dynamics in their regions well.

Based on local staff understanding of the conflict dynamics in the region and previous experience of water points being appropriated by military groups, Concern's team working in the Gedo region of Somalia, for example, recognised that the establishment of boreholes – identified by the programme as key to helping withstand drought – could attract African Union-backed forces to an area and therefore affect the changing frontline of the conflict between these forces and armed groups. This also risked creating a perception that Concern was party to the conflict. This made it more necessary to fully consult communities on this issue, who in turn consulted both the

government and the armed groups in the region to ensure that boreholes could be installed in places where they would not be perceived as influencing the conflict. Only when BRCiS had received full assurances from the local community did they go ahead and construct the water source.

The BRCiS programme also benefits from a strong network of relationships built up over many years, and in certain areas the programme works through local partners who have better access to regions controlled by armed groups. When the programme responded to the risk of flooding in riverine areas of Somalia in August 2015, Concern was able to work with partner organisations and existing community structures to raise awareness of the flood risk and distribute sandbags in areas that would otherwise have been inaccessible.

While not working directly on conflict resolution, the BRCiS programme does address the impact of localised outbreaks of conflict on the communities in which it works. It ensures these interventions to address localised outbreaks of conflict are well integrated with its broader DRR objectives.

When clashes between Al-Shabaab and Kenyan defence forces in June 2016 caused displacement of almost all 1,200 households in a programme village, BRCiS was well placed to respond. The village had already been identified for pre-emptive cash transfers based on its vulnerability due to weak rains; following the displacement, Concern increased these transfers and responded with daily water trucking to internally displaced persons (IDP) settlements and, later, shelter kits to meet people's emerging needs. This meant the community did not have to move a great distance. After five months of displacement, they could negotiate safe return to their village.

This demonstrates a further benefit of bringing conflict-related hazards under the parameters of DRR actions within resilience programming. Concern's response to displacement could dovetail effectively with pre-existing drought mitigation efforts, and ensure that the additional shock of conflict did not leave the community vulnerable to further escalation of the impact of the drought. By addressing the multifaceted needs of communities in regions where human-derived and natural hazard-related disasters often go together, Concern has helped communities manage the often overwhelming impacts of overlapping climate- and conflict-derived shocks.

Among the lessons learnt by the BRCiS team has been the importance of decentralising decision-making to local staff based in the project areas. It remains important to invest in communication mechanisms, so that the central programme office can stay abreast of key developments. But in such an unpredictable and rapidly changing environment not directly accessible by non-Somali staff,

34 Glencree (n.d.) Glencree: Transforming violent conflict building peace. (http://glencree.ie/). The programme ran between 2009-2012.

best-practices in communication only go so far. For the programme to respond effectively to complex and rapidly changing issues, trust must be put in locally based staff to take key decisions in the first instance. The programme also requires the flexibility to change focus rapidly between different kinds of interventions, since the dynamics of conflict can quickly alter how disasters affects people.

Another key area of learning for the team has been the importance of preparing for a significant influx of people to programme areas from conflict-affected regions at times of drought. In early 2017, the combined population of a group of communities where BRCiS operates has increased by 39%. Many of these people are from regions controlled by armed groups and when disasters occur, the unavailability of support – including aid - in conflict-affected regions becomes a key factor in displacement, driving people to areas where development and DRR programmes are operating and infrastructure such as functioning water sources is to be found.

3.3. Establishing and operationalising early warning systems: managing food insecurity in Chad

Chad has struggled with low-intensity conflict, interspersed with periods of full-scale civil war, since independence.[36] It is a large and complex country – a patchwork of over 150 different ethnic groups, extending across many different regions and climatic zones.[37]

Chad faces numerous problems, which are compounded by poor governance. These include extreme poverty, poor infrastructure, adverse climatic conditions (environmental degradation, erratic rainfall, droughts and flooding) and scarce human resources due to poor educational, training and research and development infrastructure. The poorly developed infrastructure of roads, markets and basic services means that the state has a minimal presence on the ground – in terms of both geographical reach and administrative capacity.[38]

An effective early warning system (EWS) is crucial to building communities' preparedness for slow-onset food crises. However, lack of capacity and resources at the local government level have presented challenges in the setting up and coordination of such a system in Chad. An example from Concern shows that the challenges faced in fragile states with unstable political and security situations can hinder the setting up of effective DRR early warning systems. However, engaging with existing institutions and building capacity at different levels is an effective way to bridge the gaps.

Over many years, externally funded projects had established a number of early warning systems, each

collapsing when funding ended. Eventually, in 2013, a national government-led EWS was resuscitated by the Ministry of Agriculture, and supported by the Food and Agriculture Organisation and the European Union. The design of this national EWS for food insecurity – the *Système d'Information sur la Sécurité Alimentaire et l'Alerte Précoce* (SISAAP) – was based on a structure reaching from local to national government, with early warning committees in place at local, district and regional government levels. However, weak governance structures hindered the flow of information through the system and communities were not well linked with the local early warning committees, and hence were not able to share and receive data effectively.

Concern Worldwide and partners, including Tufts University and the World Agroforestry Centre, are working to support Chad's EWS through the Building Resilience in Chad and Sudan (BRICS) project (BRACED, 2017).[39] In Sila in eastern Chad, the project has collaborated with the local government to establish 21 community action committees, each of which is comprised of representatives from between three and four villages. These community committees have been trained to collect key data for early warning, including harvest levels, rainfall, malnutrition rates and market price information. They have also been trained and supported to connect effectively with the wider local early warning committees and thus better link in to the overall system. This means that communities can now share the information they collect with the national EWS in addition to receiving information at the national level on predicted rainfall and weather patterns, which enables them to make better-informed decisions around planting, harvesting and consumption.

Alongside this, Concern is collaborating to support the operation of existing early warning systems at the regional level, including working with other stakeholders to improve coordination and to share information more efficiently with actors both up to the national level and down to the district and local levels.

The challenges faced by the Concern-led BRICS programme and the government of Chad in this work include a lack of key expertise at the local government level and a limited budget for decentralised government structures responsible for collecting food security related data, monitoring potential shocks and stresses, and supporting households' resilience to these shocks. Capacity-building of government staff is therefore taking place as part of the BRACED programme to ensure that regional and district government institutions have both the financial and technical support required to ensure the sustainability of interventions in the long term.

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35 Cooperazione e Sviluppo (CESVI), Concern Worldwide (CWW), the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and Save the Children International (SCI).

4. Conclusion: opportunities for action

Advancing progress on DRR in FCAC requires systematic consideration of conditions of conflict in DRR frameworks, policy, practice and monitoring systems. To neglect conflict is to neglect a major driver of vulnerability to disaster risk and of affected UN Member States' desire to discuss the interrelationship between different risks. Bringing conflict and fragility into disasters discourse provides an opportunity to mature DRR to better reflect the conditions in which disasters occur, and to develop an evidence base from which to design approaches to DRR specifically tailored to FCAC. In time, a coming together of disasters and conflict could provide the scope to explore the potential for linking ambitions for peace to actions to reduce disaster risk.

While the terms 'conflict' and 'fragility' may be contentious for some audiences, the reality is that populations vulnerable to disasters are living in FCAC, and the DRR community – under its broadest definition – has a moral obligation to support those populations. This will be by no means an easy task; after all, DRR is a political endeavour and one that becomes more complicated in societies experiencing fragility and conflict.

> *I always hear 'the great thing about DRR is that it's unpolitical' but it should be really political – it should not be seen as a technocratic topic. There's a tendency not to make [DRR] too complicated, but if we do this we won't get anywhere. The social construction of risks is nothing new, we've been talking about it for 40 years, but working with governments is not something that they want to highlight.* (Respondent 6)

Working in FCAC will be challenging. Anecdotal evidence suggests basic stability is required to pursue conventional approaches to DRR, particularly those that adopt state-centric entry points. While many DRR actors are not currently equipped to work on ex-ante risk reduction in volatile environments, cooperation between DRR practitioners and specialist agencies – including those in conflict prevention and peacebuilding – will be essential to working sensitively and effectively on DRR in FCAC.

The question of 'intent' – that is, whether DRR interventions are designed to work 'on' or 'around' conflict – is still hotly debated, but the majority of respondents pointed to a bare minimum for DRR in FCAC. Where DRR interventions operate in FCAC, conflict analysis should be an essential prerequisite, and Do No Harm and/or conflict-sensitive approaches should be considered and adopted to avoid unintentionally exacerbating drivers of conflict. Current DRR toolkits do not provide detailed advice on how to do this, which should be addressed.

DRR practitioners have much to offer on risk management that is currently not being utilised. Anecdotal evidence and grey literature illustrates that there are examples of DRR interventions in FCAC, operating under a narrowly defined natural hazard lens. There are also examples of DRR interventions that have broader objectives, including those articulated as contributing to achieving and sustaining peace. Independent, robust analysis of the impact of those interventions – from a peace, conflict and disaster perspective – is needed to inform programme design, policy orientation and funding decisions.

There is a need to plug the gap in our understanding of what types of DRR actions will be appropriate for different states of fragility and conflict, including when conditions are in flux. More research on the ground is needed to understand how different conditions affect the viability of DRR interventions. This will need to be a collaborative endeavour between those working on peace and conflict.

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36 Emy Alberto, Chad Governance under conflict situation.

37 Sahel Working Group, Pathways to Resilience, 2011

38 Sahel Working Group, Pathways to Resilience, 2011

39 BRICS is one of 15 consortia funded by the Department for International Development under the Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters programme (BRACED, 2017).

To accelerate progress on DRR in FCAC, funding will be required. Detailed analysis of financing flows to FCAC for DRR would be a helpful contribution to the debate, including and beyond aid. Initial analyses of aid flows suggest that DRR in FCAC is not proportionate to need, exacerbated by the lack of funding for DRR in relation to ODA, and the continued linking of DRR to disaster response meaning it comes 'too little, too late'. While significant volumes of ODA are spent in fragile states, half of the total assistance to fragile states goes to just eight countries (OECD, 2011). Broadening the recipient base and ensuring long-term investments in DRR are available will be a positive step forward, and will help to counter growing concerns about 'crowding-in' to a concentrated set of recipient countries.

Many respondents interviewed felt there are a number of opportunities on the horizon for increasing funding and attention to DRR in FCAC. First, there are potential links to the UN Secretary-General's conflict prevention and sustaining peace agenda. This may create opportunities for raising awareness and for generating political and operational momentum behind the theme of DRR in FCAC, if DRR as a tool for conflict prevention can be substantiated (Stein and Walch, 2017). Second, several donors (including the UK and the World Bank) are moving towards a greater focus on FCAC as a proportion of spend, which may result in increased funding for managing disasters in complex contexts. Third, this topic is well placed to fit into the growing debate supporting the humanitarian–development–peacebuilding nexus being pursued through the UN's new ways of working and various IASC and UN Development Group Task Teams. Fourth, new opportunities for investment through alternative forms of risk financing, and other sources such as remittances and foreign direct investment, offer potential for financing risk reduction. Linking DRR to climate change adaptation actions also opens up possibilities for accessing climate change adaptation finance (though this should not be exaggerated, and is not a substitute for systematic and sustained national investment in DRR).

Over the lifetime of the SDGs (United Nations, 2015) and the Sendai Framework (UNISDR, 2015), effective disaster management is feasible, and effective DRR is within reach. Yet, champions of DRR – and in particular, the wealth of international technical capacity and assistance channelled through the bilateral and multilateral system – must focus on where progress is lagging behind. This means addressing the pressing need to reduce disaster risk in FCAC, with greater urgency in contexts where climate change is exacerbating vulnerability to natural hazards (IPCC, 2014).

4.1.   What's working?

In contrast to the UNISDR terminology (UNISDR, 2017), some organisations, such as Concern, are adopting broader definitions of 'hazards' that include conflict and violence. Definitions aside, there is evidence that DRR can be pursued to the benefit of communities at risk of disasters even where gang violence, localised outbreaks of fighting or weak state presence are the norm. As the examples from Haiti, Somalia and Chad discussed in the section 3 demonstrate, partnerships with specialist agencies, effective sequencing of peacebuilding and DRR activities, trusting respected local partners, and working across scales become important in delivering effective results.

4.2.   A word of caution

I imagine there's a lot more happening on the ground than we realise – and this is not necessarily translating into raised awareness at the higher levels.
(Respondent 1)

Overwhelmingly, respondents considered the examples they knew of – from Afghanistan, East Timor, Myanmar, Sudan and Syria, to name a few – to be relatively isolated, short-term NGO-led projects, with questions raised about their impact and sustainability. It is beyond the scope of this report to delve into the operational details of these examples – what happened, where, when and how – but it is clear that few respondents could point to documented evidence of those experiences. This makes recording and communicating experiences such as those of Concern even more important. Not doing so risks missing opportunities for learning what works and what doesn't from which to design programmes, inform policy on the viability of undertaking DRR in FCAC, and better understand the possible benefits and limitations. It also means that we need to tread carefully, to be mindful of what the limits of DRR in FCAC may be.

The DRR community will need to go forth with caution. DRR investments will not always have a positive cumulative impact on reducing risk, and in FCAC there is increased potential for setbacks or progress reversals. A more accurate and honest understanding of how to monitor the impact of DRR in FCAC requires changes to business-as-usual monitoring and evaluation approaches. To this end, better documentation of practice is required from which the DRR community can learn and adjust programming. Enlisting specialists in monitoring and evaluating progress in FCAC, such as the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP),[40] in collaborating with traditional DRR monitoring specialists could provide a really interesting endeavour. This might include, for example, linking with the efforts to design and monitor

progress against the Sendai Framework through the Sendai Monitor.

As an underexplored area of work, a reorientation of DRR towards FCAC could be of potential benefit not only to the DRR agenda. Scant but emerging evidence on the relationship between DRR and situations of in/stability, the state–society contract, of peacebuilding and conflict-sensitivity approaches, of disaster diplomacy, and conflict resolution (Kelman, 2011; Fan, 2013; Fan et al., 2016) suggests that those seeking to manage disasters and those focusing squarely on conflict could have much to gain by working more closely together.

We have to take collective responsibility for the pursuit of DRR in FCAC if we are to achieve the global targets of the Sendai Framework and, as the Agenda 2030 mantra voices, to ensure 'no one is left behind'. To move the agenda forward, a robust evidence base needs to be generated, documenting what we know, what works and what doesn't, and a community of practice and accompanying group of political champions should be established to promote the theme in policy, practice and funding decisions.

5. Recommendations: take collective responsibility

Taking the agenda of DRR in FCAC forward is a collective responsibility, and one that will not be without challenges. The language of 'fragility' and 'conflict' can present significant barriers to engagement when interacting with some UN Member States. Though not a small point, in the recommendations below, it is assumed that politically astute and sensitive framings of this issue will be employed and tailored to the audience and context at hand.

…for me it's a no brainer, to look at it [DRR in FCAS] from the drivers of risk angle. Not starting from doing DRR in conflict areas, but what are the key drivers of disaster risk and within those, if you expand the governance angle, then that's where a lot of this sits… this is technically sound and socially and politically viable way of going about this. (Respondent 6)

We have to move this agenda forward if we are to effectively and equitably support communities at risk of disasters. Taking the agenda forward is also critical to achieving the Sendai Framework's global targets and national progress on DRR. Action is needed to:

1. Integrate DRR in FCAC into existing monitoring and convening processes under the direction of UNISDR and Member States.
2. Collate what we know and articulate what we don't through the generation of a robust evidence base.
3. Establish and formalise a community of practice to share, debate and learn about the practical application of DRR in FCAC, and promote that learning in policy spaces through a group of political champions.
4. Utilise existing convening spaces and platforms through which to fast track progress on DRR in FCAC.

These recommendations are discussed in turn next.

5.1. Integrate the issue into monitoring progress on global targets

The focus for UNISDR is to support the attainment of the Sendai Framework global targets. But how will we achieve Target E to establish national strategies by 2020, when there is no obvious entry point or structure in fragile and conflict affected contexts? And how do we achieve progress on other targets when E isn't in place? (Respondent 6)

To effectively pursue DRR in FCAC, it would be of great value to integrate the theme at each step of the biannual Sendai Framework convening cycle, championed by willing Member States and supported by UN agencies and non-governmental organisations.

- **The 2018 Regional Platforms on DRR**, to be convened in Asia, Africa, Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, and the Americas, are important spaces for discussion and exchange of information, particularly for civil society organisations implementing DRR and operational UN agencies. Examples of progress, constraints and commitments to advance DRR in FCAC should be recorded in the regional platform outcome documents.
- Accompanying the regional platforms, a suite of **2018 Regional Ministerial Conferences on DRR** will take place. Where there is government appetite to engage on this issue, space should be provided by UNISDR to include FCAC as a special theme in formal agenda. Member States can signal their interest (and/or concerns) in promoting this topic in their official statements and declarations (where relevant) (see section 2.2).
- Managed by UNISDR, the **2018 Global Assessment Report** should specifically include the theme of DRR in FCAC. The report provides the latest evidence on DRR and represents an important opportunity for robust, technical evidence to be presented to the wider DRR community. Given the lack of robust evidence on this issue, UNISDR should support research institutes

to secure funding to document this theme in an independent manner.

- The regional platforms and ministerial conferences culminate in the 2019 **Global Platform for DRR hosted by Switzerland.** With support from the Swiss government, the pursuit of DRR in FCAC should feature as a special theme, with space designated to share and contrast the findings from the regional platform and ministerial processes, in light of the technical evidence presented in the Global Assessment Report. The Global Platform would be a useful space in which to explore the challenges raised in sections 2.6, 2.7 and 2.9.
- Technical groups supporting reporting against **the Sendai Monitor** (the reporting mechanism for the Sendai Framework) should provide specialised support to Member States ranking highly on the Fragile States Index (Fund for Peace, 2017), and to areas affected by fragility and conflict. Support could include tracking progress with limited data and/or where access is restricted; support to governments could entail adapting indicators to allow progress to be captured, and/or supporting an improved understanding of the impact of fragility and conflict on DRR progress.
- To support the ambition listed above, collaboration with specialists in monitoring and evaluating progress in FCAC, such as the **Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action** (ALNAP), could prove to be an interesting endeavour.
- There is a formal relationship between reporting on the Sendai Framework and the disaster targets of the SDGs. Building on these established links, technical appraisals of the impact of disasters on the **attainment of disaster and non-disaster SDGs** could provide a useful evidence base for understanding the pace of progress on risk reduction in FCAC. Data collection processes related to reporting against adaptation markers under the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, and WHS commitments including (where relevant) those under the Grand Bargain, should also be utilised to provide evidence on DRR in FCAC from which to determine a future direction for the theme.
- Finally, building on the dialogue generated through side events on this theme at the World Humanitarian Summit, the **World Humanitarian Summit's Annual Stocktakes** should be used as an opportunity to feature the theme of DRR in FCAC with both the disaster and conflict communities. This would be a useful space in which to explore the themes of development–humanitarian nexus, discussed in sections 2.4-2.6.

5.2. Collate what we know and articulating what we don't

I'm always asked for the evidence. We need more evidence but you can't get evidence without funding. (Respondent 11)

A robust, technical body of evidence and knowledge needs to be generated that documents past and current experiences of undertaking DRR in FCAC, and seeks to draw this together to generate a more comprehensive understanding of the nuances of different elements of DRR, for different types of FCAC. Only when we have this evidence base will it be possible to understand what types of DRR actions can be pursued in what types of contexts, under what constraints, and to what benefit. This would help address many of the questions raised in sections 2.5-2.7.

- New knowledge needs to be generated through the documentation of existing operational practice on DRR in FCAC, catalogued in accordance to different hazards and geographies, and articulating the intention of DRR ambitions in those contexts (Figure 1). In collaboration with operational organisations, we recommend that independent think tanks – including ODI – and **academic institutes specialising in disasters and those specialising on conflict** seek to build this body of evidence.
- Specifically, more is known about the natural science of hazards than the social science of vulnerability to disasters – this requires redress, with a specific focus on issues of equity and equality in DRR in FCAC. Relatedly, based on existing practice, an organising logic such as a **conceptual framework** should be developed that situates different aspects of DRR in relation to their intention to work in, on, or around fragility and conflict (as depicted in the continuum in section 2.6).
- Where existing mechanisms for data collection exist – such as the *Views from the Frontline* report, the participatory monitoring programme convened by the **Global Network of Civil Society Organisations for Disaster Reduction** (GNDR) – this theme should be included through a subset of monitoring questions in future rounds of data collection.
- In 2018, the *Disasters* journal will be the first of a number of journals that publish on the themes of natural hazard-related disasters, peace and conflict to dedicate a Special Issue to DRR in FCAC. We recommend that **other journals, including the *International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction,*** dedicate space to the theme of 'disasters and conflict' to help generate a peer-reviewed and robust evidence base on the topic.
- In light of the global Agenda 2030 ambition to 'leave no one behind', the **2018 World Disasters Report** could

include a dedicated theme on DRR in FCAC. Once a more substantial body of evidence has been published, the **International Federation of the Red Cross,** as convenors of the report, should consider the theme as the basis for a full report in the near future.

- Detailed analysis of financing flows to FCAC for DRR is required. In addition to official ODA, it is also important to assess remittances and foreign direct investment, in conjunction with domestic investment in risk reduction measures. Taking a historical perspective, understanding trends in investment before and after a disaster would provide insight into the contribution of finance to managing disaster risk in FCAC. Conversely, understanding the extent to which funding for peace (through peacebuilding, conflict resolution and conflict management) includes investment in DRR measures, and the impact of conflict dynamics on DRR spending patterns would be helpful. Such analysis would require collaboration between, for example, **CRED, EM-DAT, UNISDR and the OECD and the Global Humanitarian Assistance** initiative.

- Funding is required to make these recommendations a reality, and we call on donors – Switzerland, the Nordic countries and the UK, alongside those committed to the **OECD Experts Group on Risk and Resilience** – to fund the exploratory work described here.

5.3.   Establish and formalise a community of practice and accompanying group of political champions

An informal community of practice should be established comprised of those agencies and individuals who are champions of the ambition to pursue DRR in FCAC. This would be well suited to operational agencies already seeking to reduce vulnerability to disaster risk in FCAC.

- Existing interagency mechanisms – such as **Global Network of Civil Society Organisations for Disaster Reduction (GNDR), BOND DRR Group (in the UK) and equivalents elsewhere (for example, the Swiss NGO DRR Platform)**[41] – would be well placed to take this forward. Once established, the community of practice should be formalised and supported by donors to ensure sustainability. Linked to the UNISDR convened regional process, a biannual conference in each region could be hosted on disasters and conflict in order to share

experiences and discuss and debate the evidence base to inform policy, practice and funding.
- Convened by an independent body, a **group of political champions** could be established comprised of a select number of government representatives, UN agencies (e.g. UNISDR, UNDP, UNEP), donors (GFDRR), and civil society representatives (e.g. GNDR, among others). The purpose of this group would be to champion the theme in regional and international forums. Important roles would include chaperoning the theme to ensure that it is productive and not disruptive to the DRR agenda, tapping into new and emerging debates on fragility and peacebuilding, and supporting discussions between stakeholders orientated around an emerging technical evidence base.

5.4.   Use existing convening spaces and platforms to fast track the agenda

Existing mechanisms should be used to communicate and share this evidence.

- Knowledge portals such as **PreventionWeb,**[42] which tag and categorise relevant existing material and provide an online site for information exchange and networking, can support the gathering and organising of different evidence. An online space could be populated by a 'call to evidence' wherein PreventionWeb would specifically ask organisations to upload evidence and documented experiences of DRR in FCAC.
- As an important convening space for some of the main contributors to DRR through ODA, the OECD should include a discussion on the findings from this report in the **8th Experts Group Meeting on Risk & Resilience** to be held in Paris.
- Other important spaces for convening and discussion include the **5th Global Understanding Risk Forum, to be held in Mexico City in May 2018**, and **Financing for Development** follow-up processes to the Addis Ababa Action Agenda through the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) forums. Building on the agreed conclusions and recommendations from the Financing for Development forum held in May 2017 in New York[43] – including 'reaffirming the importance of addressing challenges in special situations including countries in conflict and post conflict situations' – follow-up action should see natural hazard-related

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41 http://www.drrplatform.org/

42 http://www.preventionweb.net/english/

43 http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/2017-ECOSOC-forum-on-Financing-for-development-follow-up.pdf

disasters brought into the conversation on UN action in FCAC.

- The **Executive Office of the UN Secretary-General** should include the Sendai Framework and DRR as a theme in future directions of its crisis prevention and sustaining peace agenda, including, for example, future scoping exercises seeking to better understand the UN's prevention capacities. Commissioning a piece of research to explore the potential role and limitations of DRR in peacebuilding and conflict prevention would help to ground discussion of the nexus of disasters and conflict, with evidence on practical experience and opportunities for further development under the Secretary-General's new agenda.

- **The Capacity for Disaster Reduction Initiative (CADRI) Partnership**[44] – an initiative to build DRR capacity within the UN system – should include DRR in FCAC in the upcoming CADRI Programme 2018-2022, as an explicit subset of the initiative, and track progress by including it as a discrete theme within the 2018 CADRI Annual Retreat and subsequent retreats.

- Finally, the **World Bank, UN and European Commission** have two distinct methodologies to inform recovery planning; the Post Disaster Needs Assessments (PDNA), focused on disasters caused by natural hazards; and the Recovery and Peace Building Assessments (RPBA), designed for FCAC. The RPBA process is designed to incorporate conflict analysis and a deeper analysis of the political and operational constraints under which state and non-state actors are operating. An exercise to bring together the PDNA and PRBA processes and results, trialled in a select number of countries, offers opportunities to share data, approaches and plans for future investment in DRR in ways that address risk management more broadly.

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44 http://www.cadri.net/

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Annex 1

In alphabetical order (this order bears no relation to the numbering of respondents referenced in the report).

Name	Organisation
Aida Mengistu	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Amjad Abbashar	United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction
Andrew Clayton	UK Department for International Development
Bina Desai	United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction
Elina Palm	United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction
Hugh MacLeman	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Jan Kellett	United Nations Development Programme
Jo Scheuer	United Nations Development Programme
Marcus Oxley	Global Network of Civil Society Organisations for Disaster Reduction
Martin Ras	United Nations Development Programme
Marisol Estrella	United Nations Environment Programme
Mo Hamza	Lund University
Nicole Stolz	Caritas
Oenone Chadburn	Tearfund
Oscar Gomez	Japan International Cooperation Agency
Terry Cannon	Institute of Development Studies
Tim Waites	UK Department for International Development
Youcef Ait Chellouche	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent

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